Life and cognition are inherently circular dynamical processes, and people have difficulty understanding circular causation. I give case studies illustrating some resulting confusions, and propose that the problems may lie in failing to properly distinguish between similar concepts used to describe both local and global features of a system. I analyze how explanations in terms of circular causation work and how they rely on principles of normal settlement . Even though they typically will not explain the origins of phenomena (that is the province of linear causal explanation), circular explanations have predictive power for any persisting (i.e., stable or metastable) phenomena.

In both social systems and ecosystems there is a need to resolve potential conflicts between the interests of individuals and the collective interest of the community. The collective interests need to survive the turbulent dynamics of social and ecological interactions. To see how different systems with different sets of interactions have different degrees of robustness, we need to look at their different contingent histories. We analyze abstract artificial life models of such systems, and note that some prominent examples rely on explicitly ahistorical frameworks; we point out where analyses that ignore a contingent historical context can be fatally flawed. The mathematical foundations of Gaia theory are presented in a form whose very basic and general assumptions point to wide applicability across complex dynamical systems. This highlights surprising connections between robustness and accumulated contingent happenstance, regardless of whether Darwinian evolution is or is not implicated. Real-life studies highlight the role of history, and artificial life studies should do likewise.

When niching or speciation is required to perform a task that has several different component parts, standard genetic algorithms (GAs) struggle. They tend to evaluate and select all individuals on the same part of the task, which leads to genetic convergence within the population. The goal of evolutionary niching methods is to enforce diversity in the population so that this genetic convergence is avoided. One drawback with some of these niching methods is that they require a priori knowledge or assumptions about the specific fitness landscape in order to work; another is that many such methods are not set up to work on cooperative tasks where fitness is only relevant at the group level. Here we address these problems by presenting the group GA , described earlier by the authors, which is a group-based evolutionary algorithm that can lead to emergent niching. After demonstrating the group GA on an immune system matching task, we extend the previous work and present two modified versions where the number of niches does not need to be specified ahead of time. In the random-group-size GA, the number of niches is varied randomly during evolution, and in the evolved-group-size GA the number of niches is optimized by evolution. This provides a framework in which we can evolve groups of individuals to collectively perform tasks with minimal a priori knowledge of how many subtasks there are or how they should be shared out.

We survey developments in artificial neural networks, in behavior-based robotics, and in evolutionary algorithms that set the stage for evolutionary robotics (ER) in the 1990s. We examine the motivations for using ER as a scientific tool for studying minimal models of cognition, with the advantage of being capable of generating integrated sensorimotor systems with minimal (or controllable) prejudices. These systems must act as a whole in close coupling with their environments, which is an essential aspect of real cognition that is often either bypassed or modeled poorly in other disciplines. We demonstrate with three example studies: homeostasis under visual inversion, the origins of learning, and the ontogenetic acquisition of entrainment.