Stablecoins and central bank digital currencies are on the horizon in Asia, and in some cases have already arrived. This paper provides new analysis and a critique of the use case for both forms of digital currency. It provides time-varying estimates of devaluation risk for the leading stablecoin, Tether, using data from the futures market. It describes the formidable obstacles to widespread use of central bank digital currencies in cross-border transactions, the context in which their utility is arguably greatest. The bottom line is that significant uncertainties continue to dog the region's digital currency initiatives.

According to conventional wisdom, capital flows are fickle. Focusing on emerging markets, we ask whether this conventional wisdom still holds in our contemporary world. Our results show that, despite recent structural and regulatory changes, much of it survives. Foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows are more stable than non-FDI inflows. Within non-FDI inflows, portfolio debt and bank-intermediated flows remain the most volatile. Whereas FDI inflows are driven mainly by pull factors, portfolio debt and equity are driven mainly by push factors; bank-intermediated flows are driven a combination of push and pull factors. Capital outflows from emerging markets behave differently, however. FDI outflows from emerging markets have grown and become significantly more volatile. There is similarly an increase in the volatility of bank-intermediated capital outflows from emerging markets. Our findings underscore that outflows from emerging markets, both FDI and bank-related flows, have come to play a growing role and warrant greater attention from analysts and policymakers.

Productivity growth is slowing around the world. In 2015, the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) hovered around zero for the fourth straight year, down from 1 percent in 1996–2006 and 0.5 percent in 2007–12. In this paper we identify previous episodes of sharp and sustained decelerations in TFP growth using data for a large sample of countries and years. TFP slumps are ubiquitous: We find as many as 77 such episodes, depending on definition, in low-, middle- and high-income countries. Low levels of educational attainment and unusually high investment rates are among the significant country-specific correlates of TFP slumps, and energy-price shocks are among the significant global factors.

Previous studies have focused on when the renminbi will play a significant role as an international currency, but less attention has been paid to where. We fill this gap by contrasting two answers to the question. One is that the renminbi will assume the role of a global currency similar to the U.S. dollar. Supporters point to China's widely diversified trade and financial flows and to its institutional initiatives, not just in Asia but around the world. The other is that the renminbi will play a regional role in Asia equivalent to that of the euro in Greater Europe. Proponents of this view argue that China has a natural advantage in leveraging regional supply chains and deepening its links with other Asian countries as well as in developing regional institutions. Asia, they argue on these grounds, will become the natural habitat for the renminbi.

Using international data starting in 1957, we construct a sample of cases where fast-growing economies slow down. The evidence suggests that rapidly growing economies slow down significantly, in the sense that the growth rate downshifts by at least 2 percentage points, when their per capita incomes reach around US$ 17,000 in year-2005 constant international prices, a level that China should achieve by or soon after 2015. Among our more provocative findings is that growth slowdowns are more likely in countries that maintain undervalued real exchange rates.

This paper makes the case that Asian countries should start preparing now for a disorderly correction of global imbalances. It points to six measures they should take: allowing their currencies to appreciate against the dollar as a way of limiting their dependence on the U.S. market; accelerating regional trade initiatives to support their export sectors; using fiscal policy to sustain domestic demand; developing their financial markets; allowing intraregional exchange rates to move to accommodate differences in the impact of the shock and the scope for offsetting action; and enhancing regional cooperation to address free-rider and firstmover problems that might otherwise discourage these adjustments.

This paper reviews the controversy over China's exchange rate regime. Placing the issue in the context of the literature on exit strategies, it argues that the best time for China to exit from its peg is now while capital is flowing in and there is a tendency for the rate to appreciate. In contrast, waiting to exit until sentiment has turned around would be problematic. In addition, moving now to a managed float would help the Chinese authorities to gain better control of domestic credit conditions. The principal objections to this recommendation (viz., the banking system is weak, many state enterprises are loss making, and the capital account is not sufficiently open) are unconvincing. Finally, the impact on other countries is likely to be more complex and varied than suggested by other analyses.

An important instance of regional cooperation in Asia is the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) for swap lines and credits agreed to by the ASEAN+3 countries in May 2000. This agreement reflects the desire to buttress financial stability following the searing crisis of 1997–98 and the recognition that governments can better achieve this collectively than individually. The question is to what end the resources of the CMI will be directed. This paper argues that using the swap lines and credits of the CMI to support a system of common basket pegs for East Asian currencies would not enhance financial stability; to the contrary, it would be a costly mistake. It would be better to devote these resources to a collective effort to develop securities markets in the region, thereby addressing the fundamental problem, of which exchange-rate instability is one symptom.