Minority communities frequently draw upon voluntary donations to support their unique needs and giving prominent recognition to donors is a widely used strategy, although anonymous donors are not uncommon. Studies in the West suggest that consequentialists (those concerned with the overall benefit from the outcomes, including to themselves) value the recognition gained by engaging in pro-social behavior. Deontologists, or those holding to values that stress right conduct, would engage in pro-social behavior even without recognition. The latter values parallel principles espoused in Eastern thought. What would be the optimal strategy to maximize donations from both groups? Using the methods of experimental economics, we examined the effect of observability on pro-sociality, and the interaction of moral judgment and observability on the cooperative behavior of participants in a Public Good game. The finding shows that participants who felt they were being observed made significantly higher contributions to the public pool as compared to those who felt anonymous, regardless of the values they professed. This validates the strategy of promising recognition to donors used by Asian immigrant communities because it motivates those who value recognition to donate, and prods those who give without recognition to donate more than they otherwise would.