Technological progress may be less beneficial for older workers than younger workers. In this paper, we empirically examine the relationship between technological change and the wage share of old workers. More specifically, we look at five different types of technological advancement using data from 30 European and Asian countries at the forefront of global population aging. Our findings indicate that recent technological developments centered on information and communication technology, software, and robots do not adversely affect old workers. One possible explanation is that old workers may be more open to and capable of learning new technologies than widely presumed.

Although entrepreneurship plays a key role in economic development, its precise effect remains largely unknown. This is because it is challenging to objectively measure entrepreneurship and identify its determinants. In this paper, we analyze the effect of a particular feature of the institutional landscape, namely, corruption, on entrepreneurship. It is expected that corruption discourages entrepreneurship because it undermines fair competition. We use two proxies for entrepreneurship that are widely used in the literature: (1) nascent entrepreneurship collected from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor, and (2) entry rate defined as the number of new firms divided by the total number of previous year's registered businesses, collected from World Bank Group Entrepreneurship Survey. We find that better control of corruption promotes entrepreneurship. Our evidence is stronger when we use entry rate as a proxy of entrepreneurship. Our findings are preserved when we add other determinants of entrepreneurship drawn from the literature. When we use legal origins as instruments for corruption, our results remain essentially the same. The size of population, a proxy for market size, is positively associated with entrepreneurship while corporate taxes are negatively associated.

In this paper, we investigate six channels through which population aging affects output growth per capita of 35 OECD countries where the old dependency ratio is already quite high. The six channels we consider are changes in: (i) physical capital; (ii) human capital; (iii) average working hours; (iv) labor participation rate; (v) age composition of 15–64 (the share of population aged between 15 and 64 years; and (vi) total factor productivity (TFP). We first confirm findings from previous studies that aging in OECD countries has negative effects on GDP growth per capita. We then find that the most important channel through which the negative effects of aging on economic growth operate is lowered TFP growth. Across our empirical specifications, lowered TFP growth associated with aging explains more than fully the lowered growth rate of GDP per capita. We also find evidence of demographic deficit (decreases in working age population share), but this negative effect of aging is more than nullified by compensating increases in the average working hours and the labor force participation rate. We conclude that because TFP growth rate can be permanently lowered, aging's negative effects on GDP growth per capita are expected to be permanent.

Since the currency crisis in 1998, Korea has experienced continuous current account surpluses. Recently, the current account surplus increased more rapidly—amounting to 7.7 percent of GDP in 2015. In this paper, we investigate the underlying reasons for the widening of Korea's current account surpluses. We find that the upward trend in Korea's current account surpluses is largely explained by its demographical changes. Other economic variables are only helpful when explaining short run fluctuations in current account balances. Moreover, we show that Korea's current account surplus is expected to disappear by 2042 as it becomes one of the most aged economies in the world. Demographic changes are so powerful that they explain, quite successfully, the current account balance trends of other economies with highly aged populations such as Japan, Germany, Italy, Finland, and Greece. When we add the real exchange rate as an additional explanatory variable, it is statistically significant with the right sign, but the magnitude explained by it is quite limited. For example, to reduce the current account surplus by 1 percentage point, a 12 percent depreciation is needed. If Korea's current exchange rate is undervalued 4 to 12 percent less than the level consistent with fundamentals, it is impossible to reduce Korea's current account surplus to a reasonable level by adjusting the exchange rate alone. Another way to reduce current account surplus is to expand fiscal policies. We find, however, that the impact of fiscal adjustments in reducing current account surplus is even more limited. According to our estimates, reducing the current account surplus by 1 percentage point requires an increase in budget deficits (as a ratio to GDP) of 5 to 6 percentage points. If we allow endogenous movements of exchange rate and fiscal policy, the impact of exchange rate adjustment increases by 1.6 times but that of fiscal policy decreases that it is no longer statistically significant.

Productivity growth is slowing around the world. In 2015, the growth of total factor productivity (TFP) hovered around zero for the fourth straight year, down from 1 percent in 1996–2006 and 0.5 percent in 2007–12. In this paper we identify previous episodes of sharp and sustained decelerations in TFP growth using data for a large sample of countries and years. TFP slumps are ubiquitous: We find as many as 77 such episodes, depending on definition, in low-, middle- and high-income countries. Low levels of educational attainment and unusually high investment rates are among the significant country-specific correlates of TFP slumps, and energy-price shocks are among the significant global factors.

Using international data starting in 1957, we construct a sample of cases where fast-growing economies slow down. The evidence suggests that rapidly growing economies slow down significantly, in the sense that the growth rate downshifts by at least 2 percentage points, when their per capita incomes reach around US$ 17,000 in year-2005 constant international prices, a level that China should achieve by or soon after 2015. Among our more provocative findings is that growth slowdowns are more likely in countries that maintain undervalued real exchange rates.

Developing Asia has traditionally relied on exports to the United States and other industrialized countries for demand and growth. As a result, the collapse of exports to the United States and other industrialized countries during the 2008–09 global financial crisis has sharply curtailed GDP growth across the region. The emergence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a globally influential economic force is fueling hopes that it can supplement the United States as an additional source of demand and growth. The central objective of this paper is to investigate whether exports to the PRC has a significant and positive effect on the GDP of eight developing Asian countries. Although the study's results indicate that exports to the PRC contributed to developing Asian countries' recovery from the global crisis, it is far too early to make well-informed judgments about the PRC's ability to support Asia's growth in the medium and long term.

Countries in East Asia (EA) have made a great deal of progress in integrating their economies since the early 1990s. There has been a sustained increase in intra-regional trade in EA. On finance, however, regional financial integration has been lagging behind trade integration and EA has reached out to global financial markets to effect deeper global integration. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of intra-regional and extra-regional financial integration on changes in the pattern of EA's business cycle since 1990 to see whether there is any ground for “decoupling” of EA from the United States and the EU. On trade relations, the empirical results show that deepening trade integration contributes to more synchronized output movements among EA countries. There is also evidence that financial integration enhances more synchronization of output, but because its impact is not strong, the extra-regional integration does not necessarily dispute the prediction that EA's output movement has become more idiosyncratic than before, and therefore less closely tied with that of the United States.

As trade integration deepens in East Asia, closer links among the business cycles of East Asian countries can be expected. Theoretically, however, increased trade could lead to either closer or looser business cycles across trading partners. This paper seeks to understand how the business cycles of 12 Asian economies have been influenced by increased trade among them. It finds that the increasing trade itself is not necessarily associated with an increased synchronization of their business cycles. Intra-industry trade, rather than inter-industry trade or the volume of trade itself, is the major channel through which their business cycles become synchronized. This result has important implications for the prospects for a unified currency in the region.