Structural monetary policy (SMP)—differentiated policy action targeting specific economic activity— has become more frequently applied by major central banks lately, although the practice of developmental central banking has been in existence for quite some time. The effectiveness of such structural monetary policy, however, has not been adequately evaluated. In this paper, we attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of SMP introduced by the People's Bank of China and also to offer a broad framework for thinking about SMP. We first document the brief history and main components of China's SMP and estimate the narrow- and broad-measures of SMP accounting for 17.9 percent and 27.9 percent of base money, respectively, at the end of 2022. We then discuss two key factors determining success of SMP: bank credit flows to the targeted area and risk implications for banks. By applying the difference-in-difference and panel data analysis approaches using a monthly data set of city commercial bank loans, we evaluate the impacts of targeted required reserve ratio (RRR) cuts in 2019 and 2020 on small- and medium-sized enterprise lending. No statistically significant impact is found, whether in the short run or in the long run, and whether for medium-sized enterprises or for micro and small businesses). We conclude that, as no statistically significant impact of targeted RRRs are found, SMP's effectiveness, if exists at all, might be temporary; when facing impaired monetary policy transmission, it is important to conduct careful analysis of its effectiveness and sustainability.

This paper studies the impact of digital transformation on the ex post risk differentiation of large and small banks, measured by nonperforming loan (NPL) ratios. It uses the Digital Transformation Index of Commercial Banks compiled by the Institute of Digital Finance of Peking University, which contains data on three dimensions—cognition, organization and products—for 97 banks from 2011 to 2018. The three main findings are: (1) the digital transformation of cognition and organization only affects the NPL ratio through the digital transformation of products; (2) the digital transformation of products only increases the NPL ratio of small banks, but not large banks; and (3) the reason for the above results is that, in fulfillment of the mandatory requirement of lending to the micro-, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), digital transformation makes it easier for large banks to discount commercial bills held by MSMEs, thereby pushing small banks to extend corporate loans to MSMEs, which have higher risks.

This paper offers a comprehensive review and careful assessment of China's mobile payment business. With broad access, low costs, and reliable transactions, mobile payments are creating a revolution of financial inclusion, changing people's daily lives and commercial business models. This study also confirms that mobile payment improves risk sharing among individuals and increases entrepreneurial opportunities. These mobile payment successes can be traced to three key factors: supply shortages of alternative payment services, a friendly regulatory environment, and recent technological developments. A number of outstanding issues remain, however, including data ownership, data inequality, and regulatory shortcomings.

From a data set of Chinese firms in the 2005–07 period, we find that government investment boosted the performance of zombie firms and crowded out the growth of private firms; we also found that the higher the concentration of state banks (and of state-owned enterprises), the more conducive is the environment for nurturing zombie firms. With the exit of zombie firms, (a) the industrial output growth rate would be higher by 2.12 percentage points, (b) the capital accumulation rate would be higher by 1.4 percentage points, (c) the employment growth rate would be higher by 0.84 percentage points, and (d) the rate total factor productivity growth would be higher by 1.06 percentage points. Our results support a radical change in the way that government investment has been carried out, and support comprehensive reform of the state sector, but they do not necessarily argue against government investment in large infrastructure projects and strategically-critical areas.

Boosting consumption has been a policy strategy for rebalancing the Chinese economy. The official statistics, however, show persistently declining consumption as a share of GDP during the past decade. In this paper, we provide a more complete picture of Chinese consumption by piecing together data from official and unofficial sources. Our estimations suggest that the consumption share rebounded from 2008, after a period of decline. This may provide the first piece of evidence that the rebalancing of the Chinese economy is already under way as a result of changes in factor markets, especially rapid increase in labor income, that have resulted in increases in household income as a share of GDP and improvement in income distribution across households.

China's large current account surpluses not only destabilize its own macroeconomic conditions, but are also a focal point for global rebalancing discussions. Existing explanations by the literature fail either to account for the recent surge or to offer actionablepolicy responses. In this study, we propose an alternative hypothesis: asymmetric market liberalization and associated cost distortions. These distortions are producer subsidy equivalents, which contributed to both extraordinary growth performance and the growing structural imbalances. Our rough estimates of such factor cost distortions offer some explanations for recent movements of the current account. We argue that China needs to adopt a comprehensive reform package to rebalance its economy.

This paper describes the economic implications of the SARS outbreak that hit many Asian economies in spring 2003. Without a workable diagnostic test and a treatment for the illness, surveillance and quarantine were the key weapons against SARS last year. In general, risks are greater in countries with poor public health care, poor sanitation systems, high mobility, or high population density. During the height of the SARS outbreak, we estimated that the total costs of the epidemic would be about 1.5 percent of GDP for China. Better-than-expected containment of the virus reduced the impact to only about 0.5 percent of GDP. The experiences of the SARS outbreak point to the strong need to improve both the public health system and the governance structure in Asia.

We assess the quantitative effects of the 1997–98 banking crisis in Asia at both the macroeconomic and bank levels, comparing our findings to broader studies of banking crises. Asia's crisis was both more severe and more costly than others but showed little evidence of prolonged bank runs. We assess the nature of reforms using measures designed to address externalities or market structure, information asymmetries, and legal infrastructure. We compare these measures to results from Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2000) with respect to the effects of banking structure and regulation on financial development, finding that reforms to date have underemphasized private monitoring and have concentrated too many assets in state-owned institutions. Despite extensive efforts at broadening legal infrastructure, progress has been poor, especially in Indonesia and Thailand.