This paper investigates whether the Chinese RMB has become more influential (than the U.S. dollar) in determining the exchange rates of East Asian currencies in recent years. We use a regression method with time-varying coefficients to trace changes in coefficients over time. The empirical results show that the RMB's effects on East Asian currencies were near zero before 2008, but since then have significantly increased and taken over the role of the U.S. dollar in some countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines). In Singapore and Thailand, the RMB is still a non-factor. South Korea shows an interesting pattern, in that the role of the RMB swings over time, with an increase in the past couple of years. We conjecture that the trade share with China has a positive influence on the role of the RMB. In conclusion, given the small absolute value of the regression coefficient on RMB, although the RMB has attained a more significant status in the currency market, it is too early to talk about the creation of an RMB bloc in East Asia.

This paper estimates the degree of risk sharing for each of 10 East Asian countries with countries in the region and with OECD countries by using cross-country consumption correlations and formal regression analysis. Risk sharing is found to be far from complete and quite low for most of the countries. Taiwan and Singapore have the highest risk sharing. Indonesia and Malaysia have the lowest (and significantly negative) risk sharing. The degree of risk sharing does not increase in most countries over 1970–2000. For the less-developed countries, potential gains from risk sharing would be larger with OECD countries than with East Asian countries.

As trade integration deepens in East Asia, closer links among the business cycles of East Asian countries can be expected. Theoretically, however, increased trade could lead to either closer or looser business cycles across trading partners. This paper seeks to understand how the business cycles of 12 Asian economies have been influenced by increased trade among them. It finds that the increasing trade itself is not necessarily associated with an increased synchronization of their business cycles. Intra-industry trade, rather than inter-industry trade or the volume of trade itself, is the major channel through which their business cycles become synchronized. This result has important implications for the prospects for a unified currency in the region.

As was the case in the Mexican crisis of 1994–95, the G-7 and international financial institutions appear to have lost their zeal to garner the support they need for reform. The ongoing debate on the future direction of international financial reform suggests that most of the problems are likely to remain unchanged. This pessimistic outlook arouses a deep concern in developing countries that they will remain vulnerable to future financial crises, even if they faithfully carry out the kinds of reform recommended by the IMF and the World Bank. Given this reality, developing countries may have to develop a national or regional defense mechanism of their own by instituting a system of capital controls, adopting an exchange rate system that lies somewhere between the two-corner solutions, or strengthening regional financial cooperation.