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Catherine Z. Elgin
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Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0011
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0012
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0013
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0014
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0015
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0016
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0017
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0018
EISBN: 9780262341370
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.001.0001
EISBN: 9780262341370
The development of an epistemology that explains how science and art embody and convey understanding. Philosophy valorizes truth, holding that there can never be epistemically good reasons to accept a known falsehood, or to accept modes of justification that are not truth conducive. How can this stance account for the epistemic standing of science, which unabashedly relies on models, idealizations, and thought experiments that are known not to be true? In True Enough , Catherine Elgin argues that we should not assume that the inaccuracy of models and idealizations constitutes an inadequacy. To the contrary, their divergence from truth or representational accuracy fosters their epistemic functioning. When effective, models and idealizations are, Elgin contends, felicitous falsehoods that exemplify features of the phenomena they bear on. Because works of art deploy the same sorts of felicitous falsehoods, she argues, they also advance understanding. Elgin develops a holistic epistemology that focuses on the understanding of broad ranges of phenomena rather than knowledge of individual facts. Epistemic acceptability, she maintains, is a matter not of truth-conduciveness, but of what would be reflectively endorsed by the members of an idealized epistemic community—a quasi-Kantian realm of epistemic ends.
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0001
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0002
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0003
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0004
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0005
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0006
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0007
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0008
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0009
EISBN: 9780262341370
Book: True Enough
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 29 September 2017
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/11118.003.0010
EISBN: 9780262341370