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Peter Ulric Tse
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Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0011
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0012
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0013
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0014
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0015
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0016
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0017
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0018
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0019
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0020
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0021
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262019101.001.0001
EISBN: 9780262313155
A neuroscientific perspective on the mind–body problem that focuses on how the brain actually accomplishes mental causation. The issues of mental causation, consciousness, and free will have vexed philosophers since Plato. In this book, Peter Tse examines these unresolved issues from a neuroscientific perspective. In contrast with philosophers who use logic rather than data to argue whether mental causation or consciousness can exist given unproven first assumptions, Tse proposes that we instead listen to what neurons have to say. Tse draws on exciting recent neuroscientific data concerning how informational causation is realized in physical causation at the level of NMDA receptors, synapses, dendrites, neurons, and neuronal circuits. He argues that a particular kind of strong free will and “downward” mental causation are realized in rapid synaptic plasticity. Such informational causation cannot change the physical basis of information realized in the present, but it can change the physical basis of information that may be realized in the immediate future. This gets around the standard argument against free will centered on the impossibility of self-causation. Tse explores the ways that mental causation and qualia might be realized in this kind of neuronal and associated information-processing architecture, and considers the psychological and philosophical implications of having such an architecture realized in our brains.
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0001
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0002
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0003
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0004
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0005
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0006
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0007
EISBN: 9780262313155
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 22 February 2013
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9498.003.0008
EISBN: 9780262313155