Skip Nav Destination
Close Modal
Update search
NARROW
Format
Subjects
Date
Availability
1-20 of 43
Thomas Metzinger
Close
Follow your search
Access your saved searches in your account
Would you like to receive an alert when new items match your search?
Sort by
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 03 January 2003
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/1551.003.0001
EISBN: 9780262279727
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 03 January 2003
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/1551.003.0002
EISBN: 9780262279727
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 03 January 2003
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/1551.003.0003
EISBN: 9780262279727
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 03 January 2003
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/1551.003.0004
EISBN: 9780262279727
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 03 January 2003
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/1551.003.0005
EISBN: 9780262279727
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 03 January 2003
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/1551.003.0006
EISBN: 9780262279727
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 03 January 2003
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/1551.003.0007
EISBN: 9780262279727
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 03 January 2003
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/1551.003.0008
EISBN: 9780262279727
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 03 January 2003
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/1551.003.0009
EISBN: 9780262279727
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 03 January 2003
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/1551.003.0010
EISBN: 9780262279727
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 03 January 2003
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/1551.003.0011
EISBN: 9780262279727
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 03 January 2003
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/1551.003.0012
EISBN: 9780262279727
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 03 January 2003
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/1551.001.0001
EISBN: 9780262279727
According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One , Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 28 August 2000
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/4928.003.0011
EISBN: 9780262279734
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 28 August 2000
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/4928.003.0012
EISBN: 9780262279734
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 28 August 2000
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/4928.003.0013
EISBN: 9780262279734
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 28 August 2000
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/4928.003.0014
EISBN: 9780262279734
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 28 August 2000
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/4928.003.0015
EISBN: 9780262279734
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 28 August 2000
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/4928.003.0016
EISBN: 9780262279734
Publisher: The MIT Press
Published: 28 August 2000
DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/4928.003.0017
EISBN: 9780262279734