Ernst Troeltsch: Philosophical theologian and political observer^† Open Access

Troeltsch's ‘Religionsphilosophie’ was his contribution to the ‘Festschrift’ for Kuno Fischer. This two-volume work entitled Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts was first published in 1904 and contained contributions from a number of Neo-Kantians. It was primarily Kuno Fischer's books on Kant that began the ‘Back to Kant’ movement that became Neo-Kantianism. Kuno Fischer had published them in the 1860s and in the succeeding decades he gained a reputation as one of the leading authorities on the history of philosophy. While many of the contributors had been students of Kuno Fischer, Troeltsch was not. However, he had been Kuno Fischer's colleague at Heidelberg for more than a decade and was a natural choice to write an article on the philosophy of religion.

Given Kant's importance at the time it is not surprising that Troeltsch begins by invoking him. Rather than mentioning Kant's epistemology, he mentions Kant's influence in the areas of psychology and history; this is not totally surprising given that Troeltsch wrote on these two specific topics, and the articles are included in this volume. But it is the philosophy of religion that is Troeltsch's focus and that means ‘God, soul and world’ (‘Gott, Seele und Welt’) (6: pp. 543–545). Troeltsch claims that there are five different groups of thinking in the philosophy of religion but they overlap so much that the distinction seems artificial. He does differentiate between those who, like Hume, reduced religion to almost a psychological illness, and those who, like Schleiermacher and Hegel, believed that it is one of the most important parts of human life (6: pp. 554, 564, 595, 607). As much as Troeltsch admired both of his German predecessors it seems that he had a preference for Schleiermacher because he shares with him the belief in the importance of the religious spirit in the community (6: p. 570). Furthermore, Troeltsch believes that religion is not just a spiritual feeling but ought to be scientifically studied and that means objectively examining different religions with clear concepts (6: pp. 578, 583, 591, 611).

‘Das historische in Kants Religionsphilosophie’ is more like a book than an essay. It was published in Kant-Studien (edited by Hans Vaihinger) as part of the 1904 volume devoted to the centenary commemoration of Kant's death. It also appeared as a separate special edition that same year. It is 134 pages long, and in correspondence with Vaihinger, Troeltsch apologised repeatedly for its length, explaining that as he had difficulty writing shorter works he was evidently not suited for publishing in journals (6: pp. 865–866).

‘Das historische in Kants Religionsphilosophie’ has four sections. The first is a brilliant and comprehensive overview of recently published writings on Kant. It showed that Troeltsch not only was well versed in Kant but also was cognizant of much of the literature on him. The second and third sections are devoted to Kant's point of departure for his discussion on the relationship between religion and history, while the lengthy fourth section is devoted to Kant's own doctrine. Troeltsch believed that Kant recognised the fundamental tension between his universal ethics and the particularities of history and so his approach was a compromise that was fundamentally psychological (6: pp. 910, 913, 921–923). Troeltsch continued a line of criticism about Kant's universalism; that it led to an empty and effective-less theory (6: p. 40). He credited Kant for providing Schleiermacher with the ‘moral ideal’ upon the basis of which he could take theology in a new direction, from abstract thought to personal feeling (6: pp. 972–973–475). Yet, Troeltsch also credited Kant with the first attempt at a genuine philosophy of religion as well as a philosophy of history. Finally, Troeltsch maintained that Kant showed that the history of religion is also the foundation and the completion for the philosophy of history (6: pp. 1026, 1028–1030, 1061). Troeltsch concluded with a crucial warning about the function of history: it does not carry the same scientific ‘weight’ as natural science; regardless whether it is the history of humans or the history of the divine. Science demonstrates, but history illustrates (‘Das historische dient nur zur Illustration, nicht zur Demonstration’).

In 1904, Troeltsch travelled to St Louis to present a lecture at the International Congress of Arts and Sciences. His lecture was entitled ‘Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft’ and was published the following year.² In his prefatory remarks, he noted that his lecture builds upon both ‘Religionsphilosophie’ and ‘Das Historische’ (6: p. 215). But here, even more so than in the other two works, Troeltsch emphasises ‘psychology’, in two different senses. In one, he is building upon the Kantian, and more so, in the Neo-Kantian sense. For Kant, the human mind was both the source and the boundary for knowledge; his ‘transcendental psychology’ sought to prove that the mind imposed the necessity and universality, which makes mathematics and natural science possible. The Neo-Kantians continued Kant's emphasis on the subjective origins of knowledge and approved of his delineation of objective limitations; however, they also were convinced that Kant had not recognised that there were two types of science—natural sciences and ‘human sciences’. The first were predicated upon abstractions and produced general laws, while the second, the so-called ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ dealt with individuals and produced general rules. It was Wilhelm Windelband who first distinguished the nomothetic sciences of nature from the ideographic sciences about humans, but it was his student Heinrich Rickert who more fully set out the parameters for each and showed how history could be made into a science. It was primarily Rickert's work that influenced Troeltsch's psychological and historical readings of Kant.

Troeltsch is employing ‘psychology’ in a sense that is based upon William James in his Varieties of Religious Experiences. Troeltsch clarified to his St Louis audience that his discussion of James was not because of his American listeners, but was a happy coincidence stemming from his own work related to James’ book (6: pp. 215–216). He claimed that he had learned much from James about the importance of the individual and observation, but he insisted that James was too empirical (6: p. 228). He learned more from Kant, because Kant combined empiricism with rationalism, but here, too, Troeltsch believed that corrections were necessary (6: pp. 232–234). He noted that Schleiermacher had improved upon Kant with the latter's emphasis on subjective feeling, but even Schleiermacher did not go far enough (6: p. 241). Troeltsch believed that more attention needed to be given to the mystical elements in religious feeling because without them no true religion was possible (6: pp. 249–250). Thus, while the study of religion was primarily objective and rational, the actual practice of religion was subjective and irrational. Scholars tend to lose sight that the irrationality of mysticism gives religion its ‘freshness and liveliness’ (6: p. 254).

At first glance, ‘Die Trennung von Staat und Kirche, der staatliche Religionsunterricht und die theologischen Fakuläten’ and ‘Schleiermacher und die Kirche’ have little in common. The first was Troeltsch's lengthy Pro-Rector speech and was published in 1907 while the second was one of six short articles which were collected in Schleiermacher der Philosoph des Glaubes, a book which appeared in 1910. Whilst the two works share many similarities, the main ones revolve around the current religious crises. Troeltsch insisted that Schleiermacher was ‘the greatest religious genius of Protestantism since Luther’ but does not explicitly say why he believed this (6: pp. 688–689). However, Troeltsch makes it clear by his discussions of the two major religious crises facing the modern world: the problem of religious thinking and the issue of the religious community. He emphasised that it was Schleiermacher who first began to address both issues. Regarding the first problem, Schleiermacher replaced the sterile dogma of Catholicism and the artificial universalism of Protestantism with his contention that religion was the feeling of dependence on God. Schleiermacher had objected to Kant's moral absolutism as he would later object to Hegel's emphasis on reason. Drawing on his study of Kant's writings and his own religious background, Schleiermacher found a way that substituted feeling for reason and retained Luther's emphasis on the personal instead of the universal. It was the second issue that Troeltsch believed was more pressing and again he thought that Schleiermacher helped show the path to a solution. In ‘Die Trennung’, Troeltsch took up a problem that had a long history and that was the relationship between church and state. For Catholics that was not much of a problem; earlier the Church and the State were basically one and the same (6: p. 366). However, this identification began to change in the nineteenth century, and especially in Germany. While there were some Catholics who had little trouble adjusting to Germany's unification under Bismarck, there were many who believed themselves to be primarily Catholics. The struggle intensified with the ‘Kulturkampf’, which squarely placed the question of allegiance: Do you owe allegiance to the State and, by extension, to Bismarck, or do you owe allegiance to the Roman Catholic Church and especially to the infallible Pope? For Protestants, despite Luther's rejection of the Church hierarchy and his insistence on the ‘freedom of belief’, it was still an issue because it revolved around the question: was theology a science and should it be taught according to strict scholarly standards or was it a religion and should it be regarded as a special type of moral instruction? (6: pp. 343–345, 356, 359–362). ‘Die Trennung’ was primarily an examination of the historical relationship between church and state and while Troeltsch looked to different countries for different approaches to the issue he did not offer much of a solution. However, more of one can be found in ‘Schleiermacher und die Kirche’.

Troeltsch begins ‘Schleiermacher und die Kirche’ by noting that the problem about church doctrine and the problem about the religious communities are not really identical but are closely connected (6: p. 687). By pointing to a solution for the second, Troeltsch apparently believed that he was also offering a solution for the first. And, he believed that he was following Schleiermacher, both in recognising the two interrelated problems and in offering a solution (6: p. 689). Like Schleiermacher, Troeltsch recognised that there was a tension within Protestantism between the emphasis on the personal beliefs of the individual and the human need for community (6: p. 691). Schleiermacher was convinced that the Roman Catholic view of the Church as the supernatural institution was far removed from the spirit of the original church and, in his own writings, he often refrained from using the word ‘Kirche’ because of its historical connections to the Church hierarchy and dogma. Instead, the ‘church’ was simply the ‘religious community’ (6: pp. 698–699). As such, the ‘religious feeling’ (‘religiöse Gefühl’) better reflected the ‘communal spirit’ (‘Gemeingeist’) (6: pp. 696–697). Schleiermacher recognised that was probably too utopian but he believed it lay in the right direction. In Troeltsch's reading, Schleiermacher combined spiritualistic desire for freedom with the human need for community and order.

The tension between order in the community and an individual's freedom is found in ‘Politische Ethik und Christentum’. This 1904 publication was an expansion of a lecture that Troeltsch presented the previous May at the annual meeting of the ‘Evangelisch-sozialen Kongress’. In it, Troeltsch recognises that the Hegelian-Fichtean idealistic conception of the state was totally unsuited for the world and that it had been replaced by the modern and more realistic notion of the state as the instrument of power (6: pp. 137–138, 141, 143). However, Troeltsch was uncomfortable with this conception because it ignored ethics. He believed that democracy was connected to ethics and especially to the notion of human rights. Troeltsch specified that these included not just the principles of freedom and equality but also of personality and individuality (6: pp. 147, 162). The first two are commonly found in claims for human rights, whereas the second two are not. Troeltsch included them because of his Protestant basis for politics, much in the same way that he attempted to link the notion of personality to salvation (6: pp. 164, 172). But he seemed to recognise that he was not able to offer a comprehensive account of political ethics. Troeltsch makes this clear with several remarks: that he bases much of his work on that of the legal scholars Max Weber and Georg Jellinek; and that in order not to go beyond his competency, his topic is not so much political, as it is ethical (6: pp. 136–137, 172, 179). In fact, Troeltsch's concern remained primarily ethical until the war and only then did he turn to politics. But, when he did become interested in political thinking, he did so fully, as evidenced by the writings in Spektator-Briefe and Berliner-Briefe.

Spektator-Briefe contains 56 ‘letters’ that Troeltsch published between February 1919 and November 1922 in the journal Kunstwart und Kulturwart. The letters are divided into two series; the first are entitled ‘Spektator-Briefe’ and were published anonymously. In the closing paragraph to his ‘letter’ from August 1920, Troeltsch explained that he had originally chosen to write under the pen name ‘Spektator’ in order to speak as much as possible in an independent voice. The omission of the author's identity helped deflect any questions of party affiliation and whether he was a member of the government. Troeltsch wished to avoid causing difficulties for his party and the regime (14: pp. 325–326). He now believed that he no longer needed to remain anonymous so, beginning in October 1920, the letters were known as the ‘Berliner-Briefe’ and were signed by Ernst Troeltsch.

Writing in the June 1921 ‘letter’ Troeltsch observed that ‘These letters were never optimistic’ but he pointed to the early part of 1919 when he was slightly optimistic because of the Versailles Peace Treaty and the defeat of the Spartakus Movement (14: p. 412). However, the early ‘letters’ reflect a sense of anxiety: the Bolshevik threat from the East, problematic integration of the returning soldiers, financial instability and lack of food. Instead of a ‘new Bismarck’ to lead during these revolutionary times, there were only charlatans and swindlers. There was no hope either from the Left or from the Right (14: pp. 60, 63–64, 66, 69, 76). Troeltsch continued in the same vein, writing of the ‘dark clouds’, the ‘threatening clouds’ and the ‘darkness’. He wrote that ‘Pfingsten’ (‘Whit Sunday’) was the most troubling one in a 100 years, if not in the history of Germany (14: pp. 86, 88–89, 107). The danger came not only from external enemies—from the Bolsheviks in the East and the ruthless capitalists in the West, but also from within—the radicals on the Left who dreamed of a future utopia and the reactionaries from the Right who wanted a restoration of the monarchy from the past.

During the summer of 1919, Troeltsch wrote ‘letters’ about the peace treaty and its implications for Germany. Cautious optimism was replaced by almost complete resignation; the cause was the punitive nature of the treaty. Troeltsch blamed much of this on the ‘hatred of the Germans’ (‘Deutschenhass’), but he also attributed it to the economic greed of the Allies and their belief in their moral superiority. Nothing else could explain why they insisted on placing total blame for the war on Germany. As much as Troeltsch was angered and hurt by this, he still believed that what was worse was Germany's own lack of political leadership, which was powerless and wavering, and either could not, or would not, defend the country. One thing was clear to Troeltsch, that this was the end of Germany's ‘world power politics’ (‘Weltmachtpolitik’) (14: pp. 117, 121–122, 131). His reservations concerning Germany's future continued throughout the autumn of 1919. He was fearful about the collapse of the government and the immediate revolutionary aftermath. He noted that in mid-November his wife did not want him to go out without a revolver for protection (14: p. 206). Not only was Troeltsch concerned that Germany had lost its monarchy, he was also concerned that Germans had lost the traits that had made them so productive in the past—their sense of discipline, their talent for innovation and their love of freedom (14: pp. 156, 160, 176, 197). What was apparently replacing these traits was cynicism and despair that was marketed under the misleading slogan ‘The new spirit’ (‘Der neue Geist’) (14: pp. 165, 169). Troeltsch continued to warn of the dangers from the Right. The conservatives sought to persuade the population that the socialists and communists were the enemies, but Troeltsch recognised that the Right was even more committed to gaining power and was willing to use trickery (14: pp. 229, 266, 275, 290).

The ‘Berliner-Briefe’ end abruptly with the ‘letter’ from November 1922. Troeltsch offered no reason for the discontinuation and speculation has continued as to why he stopped. His health had not been good for a number of years; he suffered from a heart problem during 1918 but his health was no worse in 1922. He continued to be overworked; along with his ministerial duties he had his scholarly obligations and his academic writings. Granted, Troeltsch was preparing for his months-long trip to Great Britain during which he was scheduled to give a number of lectures, but that does not appear to be the reason why he suddenly ceased to write the ‘Berliner-Briefe’. Instead, it is suggested that he was deeply affected by the June 1922 assassination of Walther Rathenau (14: pp. 33–34). The June ‘letter’ was a combination of hope and resignation: hope because of the possible progress in the matter of war reparations and resignation because Germany's defeat caused so much pain and suffering for its population (14: pp. 536–537, 547). The tone of the July ‘letter’ was far more anxious; Troeltsch wrote of the possibility of progress but that appeared increasingly unlikely with the consequences of further inflation and more economic instability. Worse, as Troeltsch was going through the page proofs, word came that Rathenau had been murdered (14: pp. 552–553, 557). Troeltsch entitled his August ‘letter’ ‘Gefährlichste Zeiten’ and he wrote of the increasing desperation of the population. He warned that politics was increasingly becoming a question of life and food and bemoaned the loss of Rathenau. Not only was Rathenau a close friend and a party colleague, he was a person of the greatest integrity and had possessed an incredible sense for economics. Troeltsch believed that Rathenau was probably the only person who could have led Germany through the increasingly desperate future (14: p. 563). The October and November ‘letters’ revealed that Troeltsch was even more disillusioned; after Ratheneau's murder, fear and hopelessness increased and the Reich Mark continued its downward spiral. Everyone feared the coming winter; without Rathenau there was no one capable of dealing with the increasing problem of the relationship between politics and economy. Instead of enjoying his late summer vacation, Troeltsch was full of anxiety for Germany and its future (14: pp. 570, 588).

Troeltsch's ‘Spektator-Briefe’ and ‘Berliner-Briefe’ offer a magnificent commentary on Germany's problems. He not only provided a detailed analysis of the problems facing Germany, but also offered what he believed was a way to overcome them. Troeltsch insisted that the Left's belief in ideology and romanticism rendered them unfit to govern. However, he also insisted that the Right's attempt to return to the failed principles of the past also made them unable to govern. What was needed were leaders who had a sober sense of reality and were willing and able to implement reasonable solutions. These solutions needed to fit within Germany's current economic and political framework and had to solve the country's political and social problems (14: pp. 330, 358, 405–407, 419). Moreover, he was always concerned with Germany's economic collapse, which he believed was caused by the impossible demands for reparations and the continuing fall of the German Reich Mark (14: pp. 403, 463, 484–486, 512). If the question of German guilt was answered more reasonably then the issue of reparations could also be made more acceptable. Germany would be able to pay a reasonable amount and avoid the impending monetary collapse.

Ernst Troeltsch died in February 1923, three years after Max Weber. Troeltsch is often regarded as Weber's source for information on theological issues and is frequently considered the co-founder of sociology of religion, but with respect to cultural and political issues, Troeltsch is considered to be a minor figure compared to the towering personality of Weber. The long-time editor of the Historische Zeitschrift, Friedrich Meinecke, was a friend and colleague of both Weber and Troeltsch. In his introduction to Troeltsch's posthumously published Spekator-Briefe, Meinecke expressed the hope that the volume would demonstrate Troeltsch's political importance as much as the posthumously published Gesammelte Politische Schriften showed Weber's political acumen (14: p. 589). It is not clear whether Meinecke's hope was realised; however, it is now more likely with the publication of these two volumes in the new Troeltsch Kritische Gesamtausgabe. The Spektator-Briefe volume documents Troeltsch's keen analysis of political events and issues after the end of the war and its revolutionary aftermath, and the Schriften zur Religionswissenschaft und Ethik reveal Troeltsch's powerful examinations of critical issues in theology, philosophy, and culture. Most of the theological and philosophical issues that Troeltsch dealt with were contemporary ones, and all of his political commentary was on immediate crises. However, Schriften zur Religionswissenschaft und Ethik reveal Troeltsch to be far more knowledgeable about philosophy than is usually acknowledged, and Spektator-Briefe shows him to have a better grasp of political problems than is often allowed. Taken together, these two books show that Troeltsch was successful in treating theoretical issues as well as in confronting practical problems. They help demonstrate that Ernst Troeltsch was one of the most original and insightful thinkers of the early twentieth century.