Exploring the changing forms of caste-violence: A study of Bhumihars in Bihar, India

In this paper, we reflect on the caste-violence perpetrated on lower castes by Bhumihars, one of the dominant castes in Bihar, India, as it indicates their complex relationship with important socio-economic and political issues such as land relations, identity assertion and socio-economic differentiation, among others. We also pay attention to ideological and moral constructs embedded in the narratives about Bhumihars, which provides legitimacy to their violence. Several narratives and personal interviews have been incorporated in our analysis along with a broader mapping of Bhumihars’ historical engagement with violence as a form of caste assertion and its changing character in the contemporary era marked by ‘backward-caste’ mobilisation and the rise of Hindu right-wing politics in Bihar. Our critical study traces these historical trajectories and points to a decisive shift from Bhumihars’ engagement with direct violence towards a more subtle and symbolic form of violence, often masquerading as their articulation and expression of caste identity.

The historical legacy and influence of the caste system on the socio-cultural and political sphere continues to shape every aspect of collective life in India, providing a perspective for understanding various manifestations of violence as a social phenomenon. Moreover, the cultural, as well as structural, aspects of the caste system lend specific meanings and sensibilities to understanding how violence is staged to demonstrate assertion by the dominant caste. Given the ever-changing character of the caste system and its implications, violence associated with caste also undergoes significant transformations. Therefore, specific contexts act as reference points to make sense of the relationship between violence and the caste system at any given point in time.

In this paper, we analyse various aspects of caste violence by taking the example of the Bhumihar caste in Bihar, a state in central India. Bhumihars have traditionally remained one of the most politically powerful castes and have a long history of socio-political dominance and related conflicts (Kumar et al., 2008; Jha & Pushpendra, 2014). The presence of Bhumihars, who constituted just 2.9% of the state population according to the 1931 census, increased significantly after Bihar’s partition.¹ The term ‘Bhumihar’ is derived from the Sanskrit word bhumi (land), indicating a symbiotic relationship of the caste with the ownership of land and its allied activities. Bhumihars, who are also called Babhans and were ranked below the Brahmins in terms of ritual status, consider themselves a Brahmin community associated with land and agriculture.²

As one of the dominant castes in Bihar, the recent history of Bhumihars is closely entangled with caste violence. One can argue that the dominance Bhumihars enjoy in the local caste hierarchy has often been the product of their traditional association with physical violence. As M. N. Srinivas (1997) pointed out, when a numerically dominant caste with relatively superior ritual status wields considerable economic and political power, it can be considered a dominant caste. As a dominant caste, Bhumihars have extensively resorted to violence as a tool of assertion over other castes, leading to some of the most vicious cycles of violence in the history of independent India. To understand the position of the Bhumihars, the wider socio-historical scenario in Bihar is also examined here. How the Bhumihars take to violence is explained in the context of land relations, mythologies and cultural constructions that are used to lend legitimacy to such violence. We find here, however, that a number of important historical and socio-political changes have significantly influenced articulation of their identity, leading to increased dependence on symbolic violence rather than the physical violence that has been perpetrated by them in the past. Prominent among them are the political mobilisation of the Other Backward Classes or OBCs (castes and religious communities which are socially and educationally disadvantaged are classified as Other Backward Classes by the government of India³), and the identification of Bhumihars with Hindutva right-wing politics during the 1990s.

We begin our analysis with a brief overview of the literature on caste and violence in India and then explore the specific context of the political economy in Bihar with a view to understand the relationship between caste, class and violence that exists in the state. The next section examines the case of Bhumihars and their engagement with physical violence since the early 1980s as manifested through several caste armies and their bloody encounters with the lower castes and Naxalite groups. The section that follows elaborates on the rise of ‘backward-caste’ politics in Bihar and the subsequent decline of overt violence perpetrated by Bhumihars. The last section looks at contemporary times, when Bhumihars have identified with the Hindutva politics, and at the implications of this identification for the use of symbolic violence in their identity assertion rather than resorting to overt violence.

The study demands developing a long-term perspective on the changing engagement of Bhumihars with violence, and thus, emphasises a research method that combines historical analysis with ethnographic fieldwork. The historical materials regarding the formation of caste associations and incidents of violent encounters of caste militia were collected from archives and local libraries. The ethnographic method was used primarily to understand the current caste dynamics, particularly with reference to Bhumihars in Bihar and to specifically explore questions related to inter-caste relations, caste identity and pride, construction of the past and so on. Primary data for our study were collected from three villages (Chiraura, Gopalpur, Chehaul) under Naubatpur block in Patna district and from Mokama town, between September 2015 and March 2017. All three villages mentioned in this study are dominated by Bhumihar with more than half of the village population being Bhumihars. Along with these villages, fieldwork was also conducted in Patna, the capital city of Bihar, where the office-bearers of caste associations and political leaders, academics and journalists reside. The data collection involved close interaction in the form of both structured as well as unstructured interviews, and group discussions with important stakeholders of caste mobilisation in Bihar. Since the focus of the study was to understand the transformation of Bhumihars’ engagement with violence over the decades from the 1980s to the 2010s, a wide spectrum of important people who could comment on these transformations were also identified. This included prominent leaders and activists in the caste association as well as ordinary members from Bhumihar, and ‘backward’ castes such as the Yadavs, Koeri and Pasis. Along with this, village headmen and priests from Parasuram temple of Mokama town, Bhumihar landowners, cultivators, share-croppers and so on were interviewed during the fieldwork. These interviews included both formal interviews as well as informal conversations in casual settings in the village. Being a native speaker, one of the authors of this paper was able to participate in the informal interactions, mostly held in Magahi and Hindi. Many of these interviews were digitally recorded and later transliterated into English. Our data collection encompassed a crucial phase in the socio-political landscape of Bihar as the state was experiencing general elections in 2014, followed by the election to the state legislature in 2015.

Hannah Arendt (1969, p. 43) points out that ‘violence is nothing more than the most flagrant manifestation of power.’⁴ In light of Arendt’s observation, how violence continues as a social phenomenon in India needs closer investigation, given the extremely skewed power relations in the economic, political as well as physical manifestations that define the inter-relationships between different caste groups in the country.

Earlier studies of the Indian caste system through the Indological lens privileged only its ritual and religious aspects, but the emergence of anthropological traditions brought forth a sharp focus on the question of power in its various manifestations in the Indian caste system (Béteille, 1965; Gupta, 2000; Marriott & Beals, 1986; Srinivas, 1962). However, in the post-independence period, the interaction of caste with modern politics gave new dimensions to the institution of caste, especially in the context of political power. The centrality of power in caste studies has been the principal focus of several scholars of rural sociology and the socio-cultural anthropology in India (Béteille, 1965; Jodhka, 2010; Natrajan, 2012; Sharma, 1997; Srinivas, 1962).

Bhumihars, despite their three per cent population, succeeded in dominating the economic as well as political landscape of Bihar since the late colonial period. Vinita Damodaran (1992), recounting the story of the elite appropriation of popular protests during the decade of 1936–1946 in Bihar, states that Congress succeeded in attaining political power after 1937, drawing its strength largely from the powerful social and economic elites that had dominated the policies of the new government, before and after independence, and prevented any major transfer of resources to the rural under-class of sharecroppers and landless labourers (Damodaran, 1992). As long as the Congress dominated politics in Bihar, Bhumihar elites who actively engaged in the politics and constituted significantly to the party structure of Congress could continue to maintain their dominance. Among these Bhumihar elites, there were those who by virtue of their ownership over large expanses of land and economic dominance could develop a strong political clout which enabled them to control the socio-political and economic relations within rural Bihar. Simultaneously, another group of Bhumihars made use of the opportunities presented by modern English education and government jobs, and subsequently joined the freedom struggle which enabled them to influence Bihar politics. Thus as in the case of other dominant castes in India, since the late colonial period, Bhumihars maintained a tight grip over the political as well as economic resources of the state, thereby consolidating their dominance even in post-independence period until the rise of the ‘backward-caste’ movement.

Therefore, even after the independence of India the operation of power in its various manifestations in rural India, in terms of the physical and numerical superiority that leads to political power as well as economic superiority based on land ownership, in addition to other factors, has had a decisive role in shaping inter-caste relations. Mencher (1974) finds that caste has been used as an effective system by the upper and land-owning groups to exploit the labour force from lower and landless caste groups. The upper castes have suppressed the emergence of class consciousness among lower-caste people because the former feared the threat to their entrenched status that might emerge from collective action on the part of the lower castes (Mencher, 1974, p. 478). Therefore, among other issues, the relationship between the labourers and landlords has been a crux of agrarian tensions across India (Chakrabarty, 2004; Gupta, 2000; Shah, 1978).

During a long conversation with Lalan Kishore Singh (age 76), a Bhumihar from Chiraura village whose grandfather was a landlord and lost a substantial part of his holdings owing to the land reforms, recalls that ‘We used to have lathaites (muscle men)⁵ form Yadav caste⁶ for instilling fear and maintaining control and discipline among labourers from lower castes working in our fields.’ Lalan Kishore Singh further stated that ‘This arrangement was very much stable until the government brought in land reforms in 1950s and we lost our ancestral land as well as our comfortable life.’ His remarks reflected the frustration of a large section of Bhumihar landlords, who were forced to be contended with the changed circumstances brought in by electoral democracy. For landed Bhumihars, the land reforms of independent India posed a major challenge to their economic superiority and ruptured their traditional relationship with lower castes. Subsequently, to maintain their superiority, violent assertion became even more vital for Bhumihars.

A decade after the independence of India, Bihar was also witnessing changes in the political sphere. In a phenomenon of contestation arising from lower-caste mobilisation, political leaders of disadvantaged lower castes and Other backward Classes (OBCs) began to demand more power (Frankel & Roa, 1989). Thus, from 1968 to 1971, leaders such as Satish Prasad Sinha, B.P. Mandal, Bhola Paswan Shastri and Daroga Rai from OBCs and Scheduled Castes (SCs) emerged as Chief Ministers of Bihar, heralding a new era in its political history of Bihar. Dinesh Prasad Singh (age 58), the first Bhumihar to get a PhD degree in the Gopalpur village and currently working as a journalist in Patna, recalled, ‘As a young boy I observed visible change among the lower castes of village, they no longer revered Bhumihar landlords.’ He further stressed that the change was an apparent product of changing land dynamics and new political awareness among the lower castes. A dominant caste such as Bhumihar was now not only challenged on the economic turf fuelled by the land redistribution policies of the government but was also deeply affected by the newly found political empowerment of lower castes due to their mobilisation. Thus, it is from this juncture that the paper begins examining the engagement of Bhumihars with violence marked by direct physical violence through caste armies and the cultural and symbolic violence embedded in the caste system.

Galtung, when elaborating violence, identifies its three statuses: (i) direct violence is an event; (ii) structural violence is a process with ups and downs and (iii) cultural violence is an invariant, a ‘permanence’ (Galtung, 1990). He further contends that direct, structural and cultural forms of violence are the overarching categories or ‘super-types’, which create a (vicious) violence triangle. When violence stands on the ‘direct’ and ‘structural’ feet in the triangle, the image invoked is cultural violence as the legitimiser of both (Galtung, 1990, p. 294). Therefore, Galtung’s classification of violence offers remarkable insights into the socio-historic context of caste violence in Bihar where all the three manifestations of violence are ingrained in the institutionalised system of caste inequality and oppression. However, his arguments about ‘cultural violence’ as the most enduring form of violence is of particular significance in order to elaborate the decline of physical violence perpetrated by Bhumihars. It is in this context that the paper demonstrates the continuation of cultural practices by Bhumihars that inflict symbolic violence over the lower caste in a communally charged political environment in contemporary Bihar, where forces of Hindutva and BJP enjoy significant dominance. The paper also draws upon Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptualisation of symbolic violence as a form of violence that is ‘exerted through the purely symbolic channels of communication and cognition … recognition or even feeling’ (Bourdieu & Thompson, 2001, p. 23). For Bourdieu systems of symbolism and meanings are imposed on groups or classes of people ‘in such a way that they are experienced as legitimate’ (Jenkins, 2001, p. 104). Thus the gradual acceptance and internalisation of ideas and structures of oppression as legitimate by subordinate groups results in masking the underlying power relations and hence, perpetuating the oppressive social structure.

Caste violence in Bihar, as in other parts of the country, is a product emerging from negotiations between various markers of class position, ritual status, political mobilisation and assertive identity politics. Structural interventions such as land reforms and Backward Caste movements have significantly disturbed the traditional class structure of rural India.⁷ Consequently, influence and authority wielded by the traditional upper caste elite of the village have shifted much more decisively into the hands of new popular leaders, who belong to various castes, including ones from traditional lower sections (Brass, 2008; Guha, 2015; Jaffrelot & Kumar, 2012). The emergence and transformation of organised caste violence in Bihar needs to be contextualised within this larger scenario.

In terms of social demography, in spite of the presence of pockets of Muslim influence, Bihar has been the ‘home of extreme Hindu orthodoxy’, which has survived on the strength of the caste system (O’Malley, 1907, p. 3). As elsewhere, Bihari Hindu society is differentiated into three hierarchical layers: upper or forward castes, backward castes and the scheduled castes. The first category includes only four castes: Brahmins (5%), Bhumihars (3%), Rajputs (4.4%) and Kayasthas (1.2%).⁸ To the second category belong a large number of castes: Yadavas (12%), Koiries (5%), Kurmies (4%), Baniya (1%), and so on.⁹ The third category is mostly comprised of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes: Chamar (4%), Dusadh (4.2%), Dom (0.5%), Pasi (0.5%), Mushar (1%) and so on. Caste communities have operated as a closed network among themselves when it came to occupation, marriage and societal associations.

Reflecting the pan-Indian scenario, the upper castes were the traditional land-owning castes and the lower castes the marginal farmers. The previously ‘untouchable’ castes invariably formed the landless agricultural labourer group (Hutton, 1946; O’Malley, 1907; Risley, 1889). In the context of land relations and political economy, the colonial administration in Bihar was only interested in the collection of revenue. Any change that occurred was the unintended consequence of colonial rule in Bihar rather than any direct attempt to bring about changes in land relations (Chakravarti, 2001; Robb, 1988). However, the dominance of four upper castes – Brahmin, Bhumihar, Rajput and Kayastha – remained unchanged throughout the nineteenth century and during the most part of the twentieth century, as the landlords largely retained their proprietary rights over land.

After India’s independence in 1947, Bihar was the first state to pass the Bihar Abolition of Zamindari Bill in 1948, which was later amended and enacted as the Bihar Abolition of Zamindari Act, 1950.¹⁰ The next step in the land reforms was the imposition of ceilings on individual ownership of land, State acquisition of the surplus land over and above the prescribed ceiling from the individuals concerned and its distribution among the landless. However, these measures proved to be ineffective, as large landowners managed to save substantial portions of land and thereby successfully scuttled the attempts to change the feudal nature of agrarian Bihar. The Ceiling Act was passed in 1962 and actual implementation of this act could begin only after the widespread ‘land grab’ movement in which lower-caste people forcibly took possession of suspected surplus land under the Ceiling Act (Das, 1982; Prasad, 1975; Sharma, 2005). The definition of family and the procurement for the settlement of surplus land in the Ceiling Act was amended in 1973 (Jha, 2009, p. 21).¹¹ The abolition of statutory landlordism (the Zamindari system) and the enactment of the Ceiling Act did weaken the feudal structure but were unable to completely abolish it. In this scenario, the Naxalbari Movement (1967–1969), which started from Bengal, quite swiftly spread to parts of Bihar and rapidly developed into a long-drawn-out organised struggle against exploitative landlords (Banerjee, 2006; Bhatia, 2005; Kunnath, 2006). These legal interventions and political movements created a heightened awareness among the rural poor about their rights (Jannuzi, 1974, p. 131). The poor, made up of lower castes and Dalits, harboured anger and deep-seated frustration regarding their socio-economic vulnerability.

Naxalism emerged as an act of resistance against the upper castes and landlords in parts of the state. Between 1967 and 1977, localised Naxalite mobilisation began to take root in several parts of Bihar. The ethnographic evidence collected by Bhatia (2005) and Kunnath (2006) suggests that the social base of the Naxalbari movement in central Bihar was among the landless, small and marginal peasants of lower and intermediate castes, though there were some supporters among the higher castes and classes, who occupied also occupied a few of the leadership positions (Kumar, 2005; Banerjee, 2006). Rather than any ideological affiliation to Naxalism, individuals from lower castes firmly believed that the Naxalites are there to stand with them in their fight for justice; many lower-caste people eventually became Naxalite sympathisers. A group of farm workers and daily wage labourers of Koeri and Pasi castes- lower castes- led by Tilakchand Yadav (a contract farmer) stated that,

The emergence of the Naxalite movement produced an equally violent backlash from the upper castes, who formed armed caste armies. Thus, the political history of Bihar since the 1970s is intertwined with violence which resulted in gruesome killing of men, women and children between these violent groups (Bhatia, 2005; Kumar, 2005; Kunnath, 2006). Private informal caste armies, colloquially known as ‘sena’, were formed by the upper and landed castes. Thus, Bhoomi Sena and Lorik Sena represented the Kurmi and Yadav castes (founded in 1980) whereas Kuer Sena, Brahmarshi Sena, Sunlight Sena and Sawarn Liberation Front (founded during 1980–1985) carried the Rajput and Bhumihar caste interests. These were but some of the most organised and powerful caste armies in Bihar (Kumar, 2005, p. 147). Senas not only mobilised both the rich and the poor for a united front against the violent mobilisation of lower castes by the Naxals but also presented caste as a carrier of distinctive innate qualities and moral essence rooted in the notion of purity and impurity. This was evident during a conversation with Sanjay Kumar Singh, whose father played a pivotal role in establishing a much-feared Bhumihar caste militia but who was later killed by a rival gang from within Bhumihars. Sitting in his house at Ara, a small town near Patna, Singh describes how the series of violent reprisals on low castes and Dalits was necessary to remind them of their lowly status and to create segregation between pure and impure castes within the society. He further stressed the fact that: The caste armies systematically reinforced the notion of caste structure in terms of merit, purity and prestige and used violence to perpetrate economic and political dominance in the region. Inferred from the responses mentioned above, Bhumihars do not just perceive the Brhamsrshi Sena or Swarna Liberation Front as a caste-based militant organisation but their view is influenced by their class-based reaction to the declining fortunes of the Bhumihars. Many members of the caste militias were small landowners, farming labourers, young people with no government jobs and Hindu fanatics, who were convinced that unleashing violence over the lower castes was imperative to maintain the superior caste status and ensure economic and political dominance. The systematic physical violence unleashed over the lower castes was aimed at ensuring physical dominance as well as inscribing ritual superiority.

Several scholars have recorded the long trail of violence perpetrated by the Bhumihars in Bihar. Between 1984 and 2001, there were as many as ninety recorded incidents of brutal violence by Bhumihar caste militias, resulting in the deaths of 860 people (Louis, 2002). According to press reports and police sources, Brahmarshi Sena was involved in some of the infamous acts of violence in Bihar such as the Parasbihga and Pipra massacres.¹² Ranvir Sena carried out twenty-seven massacres between 1995 and 2000 that left a total of 263 dead, mainly in the district of Bhojpur and Jehananbad (Jaoul, 2009, p. 31). In the Bathani Tola (Bhojpur, Bihar) massacre in 1996, Ranvir Sena killed twenty-one Dalits, including women and children, in response to Dalit labourers’ demand for a wage increase (Narula & Human Rights Watch, 1999). Similar attacks on Dalits and labourers were unleashed by the Ranvir Sena in Laxmanpur Bathe (a village in Arwal district in Bihar about 90 km from Patna). In a massacre on 1 December 1997, fifty-eight Dalits, including twenty-seven women and sixteen children, were killed by members of the Ranvir Sena, who believed that the Dalits were sympathisers of the Naxalites responsible for the killing of thirty-seven upper caste men in Bara in Gaya district in 1992. Clearly, the incidents of mass murder precipitated the acts of direct violence but it is the singling out of women and children that accentuated the degree of violence. Ashwani Kumar, in his doctoral dissertation, Peasant unrest, Community warriors and state power in India: the case of private caste senas (armies) in Bihar, records the statement of a Ranvir Sena ex-commander:

While responding to questions on the relationship between Bhumihars and caste militias, Dr. L. N. Sharma (Professor of Political Science, Patna University), a well-known academic from the Bhumihar community and a keen observer of the caste dynamics in Bihar, stated that the creation of caste armies addressed two concerns of Bhumihars: first, they were able to stamp their superiority in the caste hierarchy and protect their landed property; second, using caste connections, the sena maintained close relations with many Bhumihar politicians and became a major influence during the elections. He also noted that: For Bhumihars, a caste sena was an entity that protected their socio-political privileges and was also built on myths and legends, espousing the identity and pride of Bhumihars as a warrior caste. There are numerous such narratives of different castes putting forward their special claim through gaurav gathas (tales of pride) and jati puranas (origin tales of jatis or castes) (Cort, 2004; Gupta, 2004; Michelutti, 2008). Bhumihars also draw heavily from the Hindu treatises, especially from the figure of Parsurama. This mythological figure of Parasurama assumes significance as he is widely revered by Bhumihars as a warrior Brahmin who defeated Kshathriyas – the warrior class – and hence, a symbolic figure who combines the highest ritual purity with valiance for Bhumihars. This myth is used to establish a Bhumihar's status as a Brahman who can choose to be ayachak (one who does not receive alms) or a landowner as well as a warrior. Such narratives, while inculcating a deep sense of pride, also distinguish them from the other ‘lowly’ castes. Caste violence was situated within these narratives that work as a moral compass for legitimising the use of brutal force. During fieldwork (September 2016), at a Parshuram temple located at Mokama (90 km east of Patna, Bihar), one of the priests, Sanjay Shukla (aged forty-two), stated: The religio-cultural legitimacy of caste hierarchy derived from these myths enabled the Bhumihars to engage not only in direct forms of violence but also in symbolic forms of violence espoused by the religious and cultural ideologies which unabashedly reinforce caste hegemony and discrimination. We also observed that, even though many low-income Bhumihars did not know much about the origin of the Ranvir Sena, they had a very strong positive sentiment associated with this group. They were prompt to respond that the Sena has been instrumental in their community’s struggle against injustice and oppression. In a group of young Bhumihars at Chiraura village near Patna, Bhushan Kumar (age 31), a grocery shop owner and Kaushal Singh (age 36), a cab driver, were assertive in stating: For this group of younger people, mostly comprising of unemployed youngsters in the village, the violence unleashed by caste armies such as Ranvir Sena was justifiable as the lower castes were the main support base of the Naxals, who were in the forefront of armed struggle against the Bhumihars. Hence the analysis of the relationship between the Bhumihars and the Ranvir Sena brings forth the complex relationship between caste and class as well. The caste violence perpetrated in the form of conflict between Sena and Naxals also overlays the antagonism between classes (though class antagonism may seem abstract, while caste violence and conflict is visible).

Eventually, due to internal strife and mounting pressure by human rights organisations, especially after the infamous Laxamanpur Bathe massacre in December 1997, the government was forced to take strong action on the sena, making it highly vulnerable. Thus, Ranvir Sena gradually lost its organisational zeal and turned into a platform to settle personal feuds between the influential leaders of Bhumihars. After 2002–03, Ranvir Sena became less involved in direct violence and the several factions within the sena moved towards a direct engagement in electoral politics.

The political clout and physical dominance enjoyed by Bhumihars till the late nineties began to face significant challenges due to the transformations brought in by the electoral mobilisation of the backward caste politics in Bihar. The political group that dominated in the state between 1990 and 2005, led by Lalu Prasad Yadav and later his wife Rabri Devi, maintained power through a strong electoral alliance of Yadavs, the Muslims and the numerically important scheduled castes in Bihar (Hauser, 1997; Jafferlot, 2003; Witsoe, 2012). While Bihar experienced political stability and witnessed structural changes due to political representation of different caste groups, Lalu Prasad Yadav’s regime fomented political conflict, dismantled state institutions and dispensed patronage to Yadavs at the expense of Bhumihars (Phillips, 2017; Witsoe, 2012). The idea of social empowerment and political autonomy for lower castes, which brought Lalu Prasad Yadav to power, gradually evolved into political remuneration and patronage transactions, which Hauser identified as ‘Yadavisation’ (Hauser, 1997, p. 2602). From 1990 to 2005, Bihar was governed through the politics of extreme patronage and personalisation for electoral mobilisation to topple the upper-caste control of the state apparatus (Phillips, 2017, p. 5). The political patronage accorded to Yadavs, in particular, enabled them to challenge upper-caste superiority in every aspect of socio-political and economic domains, resulting in considerable consternation for the Bhumihars. Thus, in a direct confrontation between Yadavs and other dominant castes, Bhumihars became increasingly insecure and anxious about their waning dominance in the socio-political sphere of Bihar.

Concurrently, the heightened caste consciousness during the 1990s, owing to Lalu Prasad Yadav’s style of ‘backward-caste’ politics and the invigoration of caste militia in the form of Ranvir Sena, lapsed into intemperate violence. During this period, Ranvir Sena actively indulged in massive violence, justifying its massacres as retaliation to the Naxalite movement supported by low castes in Bihar. Lalu Prasad Yadav’s regime viewed the Naxalite movement and sena operations as a political opportunity for its consolidation of power. While his government dealt with the Naxalite violence with an iron hand, his approach to the caste sena was characterised by inaction so that his government could demonise the sena and garner political support from the lower castes and the peasantry, who were pitted against the upper castes (Bhatia, 2005; Jha & Pushpendra, 2014; Witsoe, 2012). Lalu Prasad government’s strategy was deliberate state incapacity when it came to law and governance, employment and resource allocation, while state capacity swung into action for the selective benefit and protection of the core constituents of his electoral base (Jha & Pushpendra, 2014, p. 17). However, his government came under intense criticism from human rights organisations and media for the unabated cycle of violence and especially after the Laxamanpur Bathe massacre in December 1997, the State Government was forced to constitute a single-member judicial commission headed by Justice Amir Das to inquire into these incidents (Kumar, 2005, p. 218). Concomitantly, the BJP-led central Government of India imposed president’s rule in Bihar on February 12, 1999 and took over the government of Bihar in the aftermath of Narayanpur massacre by Ranvir Sena.¹³ By many observers such a political ploy by BJP was seen as an effort to get rid of the influence of Laloo Yadav in the state politics and government without recourse to elections (Kumar, 2005; Mathew & Moore, 2011; Witsoe, 2007).

It is also important to highlight here that, repulsed by the chain of massacres committed by the senas, many Bhumihars kept a distance from their politics and ideology. In a pamphlet published on March 23, 1997 in Jehanabad, 39 prominent Bhumihar signatories – mostly urban professionals such as teachers, professors, journalists and so on – categorically stated their opposition to the politics and practice of the Ranvir Sena saying that these senas do not represent all Bhumihars (PUDR, 1997, p. 28). This period is also characterised by the gradual but substantial shift in the dependence of Bhumihars from land to non-agricultural occupations based in cities, as evident from their large-scale migration to the urban areas. For this new class of urban professionals, who saw themselves as more modern and educated, violent struggles over the land in rural areas were not something that their caste must be associated with. Additionally, the emergence of favourable political platforms in the forms of BJP and its allies compelled Bhumihars to abide by the ideological foundations of Hindutva that wanted to project a unified face of Hinduism beyond caste differences. Finally, with the changed socio-political landscape in Bihar, the Bhumihars too realised that to achieve greater political power they would need to shed their militant caste image. All these factors played significant roles in diminishing the spectre of direct violence perpetrated by the Bhumihar caste militia. However, this is not to say that the perpetration of direct violence by Bhumihar completely ceased to exist, but its intensity and frequency certainly diminished and the symbolic violence which was always existent in the past became the prominent forms of violence in post Ranvir sena period and Lalu Prasad Yadav’s regime.

During the course of these transformations, the rise of Hindutva politics and the ardent acceptance by Bhumihar of this religious mobilisation deserve special attention. As Mohammad Sajjad (2013) summarises the developments of the early 1990s, the arrest of the Hindu nationalist L.K. Advani and the stopping of his Rath Yatra, firm handling of communal riots, combined with his strong opposition to upper-caste hegemony with his characteristic native wit and rustic wisdom, made Lalu Prasad Yadav tremendously popular among the Muslims (and lower-caste Hindus). His electoral equation, Muslim-Yadav, became the famous mantra for his subsequent electoral successes (Sajjad, 2013, p. 272). Bhumihars in Bihar saw such an electoral equation not only as a threat to their supremacy in the socio-political sphere but also as a threat to nationalist interests. Hence, they uninhibitedly supported any Hindutva rhetoric and engaged in symbolic forms of violence against low-caste Muslims and Dalits (as we reiterate below). It is in this regard that Bhumihars became aware of the fact that they no longer can continue to perpetrate the kind of direct physical violence to which they used to resort. For them, associating themselves with the broader narrative of Hindu nationalism appeared to be most convenient, since they could draw on the fact that they had always used the brahmanical narratives of Hindu religious texts to further their claims of superiority and identity.

Bhumihars once formed a significant vote bank and held leadership positions in the Congress party in the state. But the community gradually shifted its alliance towards the BJP during the early 1990s, which has had tremendous implications for their identity articulation and modes of mobilisation (Jha & Pushpendra, 2014; Kumar, Sanjeer Alam, & Joshi, 2008). With a self-identity as Brahmins, Bhumihars could naturally submit to the vanguard role of defending the cause of Hinduism and began to ride with the Hindutva wave from 2000. Undoubtedly, a majority of the Bhumihars became hard-core supporters of the BJP and RSS. Data provided by CSDS and Lokniti, analysing the voting patterns of Bhumihars during various elections in Bihar from 2000 to 2014, show that their voting for the BJP has shown a significant increase from 43 to 69%.¹⁴ The president of Akhil Bhartiya Bhumihar Brahmin Mahasangh (the Bhumihar caste association, which has offices in Delhi and Bihar), Manish Kumar Sekhar, identified the BJP as the most viable option for Bhumihars, saying:

The Hindutva rhetoric about the appeasement of Muslims and the threat to Hindus resonated deeply with the Bhumihars in Bihar, who also become increasingly uneasy about employment and educational priorities presented to lower and backward castes following the Mandal Commission recommendations.¹⁵ Lower castes and the Muslims appear as a single undifferentiated threat for Bhumihars in terms of accessing institutional privileges, since they believe that under the Mandal Commission recommendations, educational as well as employment opportunities available for Bhumihars will be reduced substantially. Hence, Bhumihars could easily identify with the upper-caste consolidation spearheaded by the BJP in the post-Mandal scenario in North India, as it provides a sense of pride in being ‘Hindus’ and also sparks resentment against the lower castes, Muslims and Dalits who are seen as adversaries of the party in the electoral politics. Thus, Bhumihars in Bihar not only find the stance of BJP sympathetic to the cause of agitating upper castes but have also started to view the BJP as a better option than the Congress party in electoral politics. The BJP’s Hindutva project of mobilising Hindus, and the party’s demand to include economic criteria as the basis for positive discrimination, have attracted Bhumihars into their electoral fold.

At the same time, it should also be kept in mind that the larger alliance with Hindu nationalist politics and the expected rapprochement with other castes bring dilemmas and predicaments for Bhumihars, as they are now forced to deal with their assertive identity articulations more carefully. The current coalition of the BJP and Janata Dal (United), spearheaded by Nitish Kumar, is composed largely of backward castes, which necessitates castes such as Bhumihars to be more accommodative and reconciliatory towards the lower castes in the political arena. Elucidating this tension, Wilson argues that while Narendra Modi has been forced to invoke his own ‘backward caste’ origins in an attempt to broaden his appeal in Bihar, his party’s base is still solidly upper caste and its campaign reeks of hostility to lower castes, Muslims and poor people (Wilson, 2014). She also mentions that BJP leaders, such as Giriraj Singh and R. K. Singh, Bhumihar and Rajput respectively, do not shy away from expressing their contempt for lower castes and Muslims in Bihar.

In terms of contemporary identity politics, empowerment and recognition of social groups are achieved by asserting the very same markers that distinguish and differentiate them from others to establish self-identity, which is based on difference rather than equality (Hasan, 2010, p. 5). Bhumihars too, while inducing a distinct identity, assert a self-formulated image, which they express as a matter of pride. Bhumihar caste associations play a vital role in keeping alive the collective caste identity and are vehement in their assertion of Bhumihar superiority. In this context, the construction of symbolic violence by the caste and its associations is inflicted through everyday narrations.

Some of these everyday narrations which produce symbolic violence are transmitted through various images, language, norms and cultural constructs. Several interviews conducted with Bhumihar leaders revealed their preoccupation with a sense of exclusive superiority and contempt for lower castes. Rakesh Kumar of Sir Ganesh Dutt Parishad, which functions as a non-government organisation in fields of legal consultancy and social awareness dominated by Bhumihars in Patna, mentioned that:

Similarly, respondents at Taret-Pali Mutt, which is one of the most influential Bhumihar religious institutions near Patna, had this to say: Symbolic violence perpetrated by Bhumihar caste associations is preserved through the ideas of endogamy, exclusiveness, commensality and ritualistic orthodoxy. For Bhumihar caste associations, disapproval of inter-caste marriages, celebration of caste virtues and proclamation of superiority in matters of merit, morality and valour are considered paramount. The communities or people who fall short of these norms are considered inferior and subjected to systematic symbolic violence that manifests as discrimination and humiliation. Therefore, the routinisation of the practices of identity assertion, moral superiority and maintenance of Hindu social order through a day-to-day production and consumption of systems of symbolism and symbolic capital (such as prestige, honour, care) by Bhumihars and their caste association has been an essential source of power and superiority for them. During field visits in the villages mentioned above, the persistence of several discriminatory practices was visible. For instance, the Bhumihar youth would address the lower caste elders in the singular (sometimes abusively as well), without suffixing any of the honorifics they use while addressing their own caste people. Similarly it was evident that the everyday life of Bhumihar centres around exclusive interactions within their own group; intimate informal relationship with other castes are almost non-existent. Friendship circles of school-going children and youth were limited to within the caste, as developing friendship with lower castes were strictly discouraged. Such caste exclusivity and prejudice was also observed in the context of Bhumihar caste associations based on professional affiliations. The large-scale migration of Bhumihars from rural areas to the urban centres during the last couple of decades has resulted in the rise of the Bhumihar middle class in urban areas such as Patna where a number of Bhumihar professional associations for advocates, doctors and so on have been established. However, these associations function more to protect the caste interest of Bhumihar professionals with hardly any official collaboration with their colleagues from other communities. Interestingly, contrary to what Sheth (1999) argues as the ‘classisation’ where the members of the new middle class distance themselves from their own caste and increasingly associate and identify with the same class of other castes, Bhumihar professional associations in Patna, along with showing an increased assertion of caste identity, also contribute to caste exclusivity and prejudice (p. 2504). This sense of exclusivity and segregation is evident in the government schools as well, where the Bhumihar children sit separately during lunchtime, when food is served to all children under the state-sponsored mid-day meal programme. Ranju kumari, a lower-caste lady in her early forties working as a maid in Bhumihar households, says that practices of untouchability are omnipresent in her life. These lived experiences of lower castes and the institutionalised practices of exclusion perpetuated by Bhumihars illustrate the pervasiveness of cultural violence as elaborated by Galtung. He characterises such form of violence as those aspects of culture – the symbolic spheres of our existence – that are capable of rendering direct as well as structural violence legitimate and acceptable (Galtung, 1990, p. 291). Hence, as Galtung rightly observes, though direct violence is an event and structural violence a process, cultural violence is an invariant, a ‘permanence’ remaining essentially the same for long periods, given the slow transformation of basic culture (Galtung, 1990, p. 294). Earlier, the overt forms of violence undoubtedly fortified the identities of Bhumihar, whereas in contemporary social settings, symbolic violence emerges to the fore in the Bhumihars’ articulation of the self in the relative absence of direct violence. This Bhumihar-self is conceived in terms of the identity of a warrior-Brahman who, even in contemporary Bihar, expects to command authority, practise caste-based principles of purity and pollution and maintain dominance within the larger socio-political sphere. It is in this regard that this paper argues that the violence perpetrated by Bhumihars sets aside physical violence, but continues to espouse cultural and symbolic violence, masquerading as marking superior caste identity which continues to define the distinct identity of the Bhumihar caste. These markers, an integral part of Bhumihar caste superiority, have legitimised direct violence perpetrated by them over the centuries, and continue to be important signifiers of their dominance and exclusivity in the ritual and religious spheres even in the absence of direct violence. Thus, in contemporary Bihar, while the Bhumihars are compelled to tone down their assertive caste politics and join hands with other caste groups in the wider coalition of Hindutva politics, their boundaries and exclusivity of caste are vehemently protected. Subsequently, the political alliance forged by Bhumihars in cooperation with other castes is merely a pragmatic move for the sake of attaining political power. Bhumihars do not encourage much social interaction or cooperation in the ritualistic or religious aspects of caste.

In contemporary Bihar, the spectacular rise of Hindu right-wing political mobilisation has succeeded in, considerably, transforming the appearance of inter-caste dynamics within Hinduism. Hindutva, the political project of mobilising Hindus, is presented as a unified ideological system where every caste, irrespective of their ritual status is supposed to bind together through a singular, overarching religious identity in an egalitarian manner. This presentation of Hindutva ideology, noted by scholars since the late nineteen nineties, has been largely successful in co-opting lower castes into its fold, while maintaining the ideological hegemony of upper castes (Bandyopadhyay, 2008; Narayan, 2009; Pai & Sajjan, 2019; Shah, 2002; Shani, 2007; Teltumbde, 2018). At this point, Bourdieu’s exposition of symbolic violence helps us understand this situation as he elaborates,

At the same time, individuals do not question their own role in the production and reproduction of domination and subordination (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; Bourdieu & Thompson, 2001). In the course of fieldwork it was observed that the endorsement by BJP in celebrating Parshuram Jayanti (anniversary) and Hanuman Jayanti has not only been useful in consolidating support of upper castes like Bhumihar in Bihar, but also is being used to incorporate other lower caste within the folds of Hindutva. More recently in 2018, when Ramnavmi processions were organised by BJP leaders in several districts of Bihar, participated in by almost every caste, they turned violent and unruly in many places.¹⁶ During these processions, crowds with weapons (swords and lathis) shouted Jai Shree Ram (Hail, Lord Rama) as they raised their weapons in the air. Such symbolism expressed by the crowd in these processions was not only meant to assert their dominance but also to strike fear among those it targeted. A news report offering an eye-witness account of these events mentioned that, ‘The people who were displaying weapons said they were doing this to glorify the Hindu religion. One of them said they had come to show their strength just as Muslims do during Muharram.’¹⁷ Similarly, parashu – the axe used by the mythological character of Parashuram as his prime weapon- finds increased prominence in the public discourse of Bhumihars, and by extension among the wider Hindutva masses. A magazine named Parshu which had a large pictorial display of this weapon was circulated during various events organised by Bhumihar caste associations starting form 2017 at Patna.¹⁸ In these discourses, the symbolism of this weapon is used to highlight the qualities of Virta Aur Paurush (valour and chivalry) the same way the Trishul (trident) is used by Hindutva outfits to display their willingness to fight and destroy their enemies the way the mighty Hindu god Shiva does in the Hindu mythology.

These incidents and processes shed light on two important facts here: one, the BJP has been strategically mobilising people from different caste backgrounds but their immediate support and leadership comes from the upper caste since the legitimisation of Hindu religious ideologies has been carried out by the dominant castes. Secondly, others (castes) who are attracted towards Hindutva in large numbers willingly accept such a legitimisation. Therefore, symbolic violence and domination comes to be exercised over individuals through everyday social habits, and is generated through the ‘subtle inculcation of power relations upon the bodies and dispositions of individuals’ and can occur through the specifically intended manifestations of domination as well as mundane processes and practices of everyday life (Bourdieu & Thompson, 2001).

Hence, this paper argues that while upper-caste Hindus view Hindutva as mandatory for the formation of Hindu rashtra (nation), the forces of Hindutva also appear to be complementing the patronage provided by the Hindu social order to upper castes. The growing appeal of Hindutva did not just lie in Hindu-Muslim antagonism alone; in fact it is also an expression of deepening tensions among Hindus, nurtured by an instability and inequality in the relations between castes (Shani, 2007). As it appears, on one hand Hindu right-wing politics constrain the upper castes from continuing with the old forms of physical violence over the lower castes, and on the other, it justifies and to a great extant naturalises physical violence against Muslims and Christians. The ideological foundation of the Hindu right wing provides the space for the dominant castes to justify physical violence against these religious groups and use symbolic violence against the lower castes so as to maintain the ideological foundation of the caste system. This projection of a unified Hindutva, crafted through the careful use of mythical figures, symbolism and value systems of upper castes effectively masks the exploitative and discriminatory character of the caste system. In this process, Bhumihars, along with other upper castes, find their ritual position and ideology gaining wider acceptance among castes in Bihar. In this sense, the use of physical as well as cultural and symbolic violence continues to be an integral part of the identity articulation of this dominant caste: while the former is aimed at the ‘religious other’, the latter targets the ‘caste other’ within Hinduism.

Violence in its diverse manifestations is an endemic feature of the caste system. We analysed the specific case of Bhumihars to understand how violence is enacted as a part of identity assertion, which at one point in time led to the formation of caste armies that unleashed horrific violence on the lower castes. Concomitantly, mythologies and other cultural resources provided perfect legitimations to caste assertion through the ruthless use of violence. However, the changing political landscape and the consolidation and empowerment of backward castes ultimately challenged the hegemony of Bhumihars when the lower castes began to offer a stubborn resistance to their violent aggression.

The rise of Hindutva politics, to which Bhumihars have currently subscribed, encourages them to tread carefully in asserting their caste identity and moderate their stance to fit into political alliances based on a unifying religious identity. While religious mobilisation is a potential platform for large-scale violence against the ‘religious other’, in a way it leads to forging alliances with other castes, who were traditionally seen as the adversaries.

In the contemporary context, the pressures of the democratic process and the inevitable political empowerment of numerically preponderant backward castes have compelled the Bhumihars to identify alternative forms of identity assertion characterised by symbolic violence rather than resorting to physical violence and domination. Along with the increased representation of OBCs and other lower castes, the rise of BJP and Hindutva politics necessitated a shift in the nature of caste violence from overt and direct to symbolic forms of violence. The traditional mode of dominance, espoused through upper-caste identity and feudal agrarian structure, began to crumble in the wake of democratic mobilisation and a host of other socio-economic transformations. Thus, for the Bhumihar, who have been significant protagonists in the long history of violence and oppression against lower castes, now the challenge is to establish themselves not as perpetuators of physical violence but as the guardians of Hinduism, which enables them to protect their caste identity and Hindutva principles. The symbolic violence embedded in caste society and religious institutions has become the new modus operandi for Bhumihars to assert their identity and superiority. It is a welcome development that, given the bloody history of Bihar, overt violence associated with caste dominance is on its way out and more democratic and peaceful contestations mark caste mobilisation in contemporary Bihar. However, the growing influence of the Hindu right wing encourages Bhumihars to increasingly resort to symbolic violence towards the lower castes, while leaving open the option of overt violence to the ‘enemies’ of Hindu right-wing ideology.

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.