The article explores how feminist and LGBTQI organisations frame the European Union (EU), the claims they address to the EU institutions, and the actions they put in place at the continental level. Challenging previous beliefs of a linear increase in the Europeanisation of progressive social movements, this study reveals a more complex picture. Heavily affected by the economic and political crises, Italian women and LGBTQI activists share the radical criticism of EU austerity policies put forward by labour and youth movements. Nonetheless, they reject any option for breaking down the EU, as they conceive of it as a source of multilevel opportunities and a field for struggles from below, in which mechanisms of cross-national horizontal diffusion have facilitated the return of mass protest. While chances to realise the ‘other Europe’ project are perceived as low, activists hope that the EU is a potential ally against domestic conservatism.

The outburst of the economic and democratic crises in 2008 encountered intense social resistance in the whole of Europe, with particular intensity in southern countries and Ireland (della Porta et al., 2016). Defined as ‘anti-austerity’ (della Porta, 2015; Flesher Fominaya & Cox, 2013; Tarrow, 2011), protests were in opposition to growing social inequality and democratic exclusion, which both protesters and critical scholars associated with the triumph of the neoliberal doctrine (Crouch, 2011; della Porta, 2017; Gallino, 2011; Streeck, 2014, 2016). Within this framework, activists’ discourse stigmatised the European Union (EU) as one of the powerful supranational actors imposing ‘blood and tears’ policies on indebted national states (della Porta, 2016a). Reflecting a climate of widespread mistrust towards representative institutions at all levels (local, national, and continental), anti-austerity movements exacerbated the criticisms that previous leftist social movements, particularly the Global Justice Movement (GJM) of the 2000s, had addressed to the European construction, and expressed less faith in the possibility of reforming it (Kaldor, Selchow, & Murray-Leach, 2015).

While, in Spain and Greece, mobilisations unified under an Indignados/Occupy identity, in Italy, anti-austerity protests remained segmented in different fields of action (Andretta, 2016; Zamponi, 2012). In this fragmented scenario, a new wave of feminist and LGBTQI movements emerged in parallel to (further) retrenchment of the welfare state and consolidation of conservative politics, becoming an important component of anti-austerity struggles and acquiring massive numbers and visibility (Chironi, 2019).1

On the one hand, harsh neoliberal and austerity policies recently implemented hit especially disadvantaged social categories (Crouch, 2011; della Porta, 2016a, 2016b; Gallino, 2011; Streeck, 2014, 2016), among which are women, gay, transgender, and intersexual people. Both the contraction of public services and the reform of the labour market had a negative backlash on female workers and those considered socially undesirable, who experienced a substantial worsening in their material conditions (Allon, 2014; Federici, 2012; Fraser, 2013; Mies, 2014).

On the other hand, during the economic crisis, Italian society moved towards the right, increasingly supporting right-wing parties (Chiaramonte & Emanuele, 2014; Conti, 2013). In power from 2008 to 2011, the right-wing coalition – composed of Forza Italia, the Northern League, and National Alliance – promoted traditionalist visions of sexuality, gender roles, and the family. The Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi embodied a subaltern conception of women as sexual objects, which was expressed in his sexist jokes about female politicians2 and inappropriate behaviour, such as relationships with minors and sexual favours, often in exchange for money, expensive presents, and even political positions. After a technical cabinet with bipartisan support from the main centre-left and centre-right parties (2011–2013), the centre-left Democratic Party (Partito Democratico/PD) acted as the pivot for a series of grand coalition governments (2013–2018), taking ambivalent stances on both bioethical issues and the extension of civil rights (Conti, 2013, p. 60; Ozzano & Giorgi, 2016) until a law on civil unions (criticised as too tame) was finally approved in 2016.

In this context, both women and citizens with different sexual orientations and identities protested intensively. After a phase of compartmentalised struggles and failed attempts at constructing a unitary mobilisation, in 2016 different groups converged into Non Una Di Meno (Not One Less/NUDM), the Italian section of the international movement against male violence. Like other movements of the crisis (della Porta et al., 2016; Graeber, 2012), Italian gender-based movements have developed mainly at the national level, targeting domestic problems. Nonetheless, they are embedded in a structure of multilevel opportunities (della Porta & Caiani, 2009), in which the EU might represent not only a source of contested social policies, but also an institutional arena for some movement demands to be addressed or defended. Similarly, women’s movements mobilising in other countries hit by the crisis – particularly in Spain and Argentina (and, to a lesser degree, also in Greece and Poland) – might have acted as inspiration for new ideas and forms of actions to spread in Italy.

Considering these assumptions, this article analyses the visions of the EU that are widespread within Italian feminist and LGBTQI movements, aiming at providing an answer to some key questions. How did the financial, economic, and democratic crisis affect gender activists’ discourses and frames around the European project and institutions? Did scepticism increase compared to the past? If yes, what are the factors that influenced this transformation? Do the political and social changes at the domestic level play a role in shaping perceptions and hopes regarding the EU? What are the effects of multilevel opportunities and transnational diffusion of protest? Do contemporary movements for gender rights believe in the possibility of reforming the EU?

In order to answer these questions, this article explores the ways in which Italian feminist and LGBTQI collectives frame the EU, the claims they address to European institutions, and the actions they put in place at the continental level.

In the next section, I review extant literature on alternative visions of the EU put forward by social movements, underlining that gender-based movements’ perceptions were overlooked. Drawing on previous literature, I present the central concept and arguments. In the methodological section, I describe my data and the scope of the case study. Subsequently, I provide a contextual background and trace the evolution of the feminist and LGBTQI movements in Italy. I will focus on the configuration of political opportunities marked by the lack of institutional allies at the domestic level, but with transnational opportunities opening up at the EU level and processes of protest diffusion occurring at the transnational level. Then, I illustrate the general visions of the EU ensuing from a perceived democratic deficit and the claims deriving from a widespread dissatisfaction with public policies regarding social and civil rights. Finally, I deal with the actions adopted to transform the EU through activism ‘from below,’ considering the level and type of cross-national coordination and the (low) expectations of success. In the conclusion, I summarise the main findings.

The article contributes to the literature on the effects of the financial, economic, and democratic crises on citizens’ support for European institutions and the project of European integration. At the societal level, data indicate a dramatic drop in citizens’ trust in the EU in the last decade. Mistrust has increased in all European countries, reaching its apex in the central years of the crisis: in the period between 2011 and 2014, an average of 55% of citizens polled in the member states stated that they did not trust the EU. In the countries worst hit by the economic crisis – the GIIPS3 – this figure was even higher (62% on average) (Eurobarometer, various issues). At the political level, party studies have underlined the rise of Euro-sceptical forces in many European countries (Pirro, Taggart, & van Kessel, 2018; van Kessel, 2015).

While quantitative data highlight a legitimacy crisis for the EU, updated qualitative research on movement perceptions is as yet underdeveloped. In the past, movement research stressed that activists in the GJM embraced a specific type of critical Europeanism, which mixed criticism of both the EU architecture and its policies with proposals to reform the European arrangements (della Porta, 2009; della Porta & Caiani, 2009). When analysing more recent anti-austerity movements, some scholars noted a radicalisation of the criticisms addressed to the EU, now deemed responsible for the imposition of unpopular neoliberal policies that would favour banks and corporations (della Porta et al., 2016). Moreover, they showed that after the advent of the financial crisis, progressive social movements have operated mostly at the national and local levels, engaging very little with the EU (della Porta et al., 2016; Flesher Fominaya, 2017; Kaldor et al., 2015).

As della Porta (2020) notes in the Introduction to this Special Issue, research on the topic has not yet systematically addressed the question of whether contemporary social movements still support plans for ‘another Europe,’ or rather have incorporated Eurosceptic visions. We also know little of the specific claims they address to the European institutions and the tactics they adopt to pressure them (if any). Precisely when the EU legitimacy crisis calls for alternative supranational models, movement studies seem to have renounced to investigate proposals for a different European Union coming ‘from below’.

What is more, movement literature tended to consider the anti-austerity movements as a unitary actor, and overlooked the differences between types of social movements. Feminist movements have typically been involved in a range of other movements, including peace, the GJM, environmental, gay and lesbian, and reproductive rights (Meyer & Whittier, 1994; Staggenborg & Taylor, 2005). Previous research has highlighted that they have contributed with their visions and tactics to such movements, also shaping their contents, repertoires, and outcomes (Meyer & Whittier, 1994; Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004). More recently, scholars have not investigated the role of gender-based actors within anti-austerity movements, and even important movement dimensions are yet to be studied.

Contemporary Italian gender studies have dealt with social and legal discrimination (Garbagnoli & Prearo, 2017; Peroni, 2014; Zambelli, Mainardi, & Hajek, 2018), evolutions in LGBTQI discourse (Prearo, 2015), and feminist theory (Casalini, 2017, 2018), while there is only scant empirical analysis on movement dynamics. Recent exceptions are the work of Pavan and Mainardi (2018) on online social and semantic networks in the NUDM; and that of Chironi (2019) on the role of generations in the same movement. As feminist and LGBTQI activists’ stance towards the EU and their level of Europeanisation remains unexplored, this article aims at filling this gap in current literature by focusing on the Italian case.

Specifically, I focus on three movement dimensions: frames, claims, and forms of action. Frames are the dominant worldviews that guide and coordinate the behaviour of social movements. According to Ferree (2009, p. 87):

Framing means connecting beliefs about social actors and beliefs about social relations into more or less coherent packages that define what kinds of actions are necessary, possible and effective for particular actors. The point of frames is that they draw connections, identify relationships and create perceptions of social order out of the variety of possible mental representations of reality swirling around social actors. By actively linking people, concepts, practices and resources, frames allow for a co-ordination of activity for oneself that also is open to interpretation by others […]. The relationship or connection, not the individual element, is the key unit for framing work. Framing creates the known world: It actively gives concepts meaning by embedding them in networks of other more or less widely shared and practically relevant meanings, which are what I call frameworks.

The concept of frame was coined by Erving Goffman in his seminal work Frame Analysis (1974). Framing theories are rooted in the symbolic interactionist and constructionist principle that meanings are not naturally attached to the objects, events, or experiences. Instead, cultural interpretive processes mediate the attribution of meanings. Frames thus refer to a symbolic construction of external reality by performing three main functions (Snow & Benford, 1988). First, frames focus attention by determining what, in relation to the object of orientation, is relevant (that is, what is ‘in-frame’) and what is irrelevant (that is, what is ‘out-of-frame’) in our sensorial field. Second, they help to articulate narratives by tying together different aspects, so one set of meanings is conveyed to the detriment of others. Third, frames transform how objects of attention are seen or conceived and their relationships between one another or to the actors.

There are two different approaches to framing within social movement scholarship. On the one hand, a body of literature emphasising cognitive processes looks at the ways individuals frame events into familiar categories, in order to make sense of social dynamics (Gamson, 1988). Looking instead at the meso level, some contributions have shed light on the symbolic construction of reality by collective actors (Snow & Benford, 1988). Normally, these processes of meaning attribution consist of three different stages. First, certain occurrences, which might previously have been attributed to individual responsibility or to natural factors and phenomena, are recognised as and converted into problems; second, potential strategies to address them are identified and developed; and third, motivations to act upon this knowledge are put forward. In the words of Snow and Benford (1988), these three steps correspond to the ‘diagnostic,’ ‘prognostic,’ and ‘motivational’ dimensions of framing.

Taking up this second line of inquiry, I reconstruct the visions of the EU which are widespread in contemporary gender-based movements, by considering the problems that activists identify as descending from the EU; the possible solutions they propose; and the rationales for action and engagement with the EU in the current context. The analysis will therefore also intercept the political claims (Tilly, 1978, 2008) that feminist and LGBTQI movements address at the EU level, and their action repertoires (Tilly, 1986).

I assume the economic crisis to have acted as a ‘critical juncture’ (Roberts, 2014), which new institutional theories understand as a watershed event that radically transforms the structure of social conflict and, consequently, future political developments. In its neoliberal version, a critical juncture consists of crisis-induced policy reforms (austerity, job market deregulation, liberalisation, and privatisation of services) that spark ‘reactive sequences’ both at the social and the electoral levels (Roberts, 2014). In southern European countries, including Italy, society pushed back against heightened exposure to market-based insecurities and inequalities first with mass mobilisations, and subsequently with the electoral punishment of mainstream political parties (della Porta et al., 2016; Roberts, 2017).

Within the austerity-ridden context, I expect political changes at the domestic level to have resulted in a closing down of the opportunities available for gender-based movements, stimulating an increase in social protest, but also nourishing a negative perception of representative democracy, including at the EU level of governance. Conservative politics at home, as well as the market-oriented policies pursued by the EU, are likely to have radicalised the criticisms that movements for gender rights addressed to both national governments and the EU, also modifying their repertoires, with an increase of direct action and a dismissal of forms of institutional pressure from ‘within.’ At the same time, increasing dissatisfaction with the political system and its policies might not imply an immediate abandoning of the European level as a field of struggle, nor a definitive abandonment of the ‘alter-European’ project. From this point of view, I also expect the EU to open up transnational opportunities for mobilisation able to counterbalance trends towards Euroscepticism, especially in a country such as Italy, where cultural and political conservatism is particularly pressing, and mistrust in national institutions is highly widespread.

The article is based on a case study research design. Considering the lack of secondary literature on the specific topic dealt with, this method responds to an exploratory aim, and has no pretension for generalisation. At the empirical level, I rely on qualitative materials coming from ten semi-structured interviews conducted in 2018 with activists in gender struggles in Florence and Bologna.4 The fieldwork was part of an on-going research project on youth political mobilisation for a just and sustainable European society in selected EU countries.5 A snowballing technique was used to recruit the interviewees, balancing the sample by organisational membership in both feminist and LGBTQI grassroots local organisations, and age cohort, with respondents’ age spanning from 27 to 70 years old. Excerpts from the interviews, as well as movement documents, are used throughout the text to support the main arguments.

Traditionally an important data source in social movement studies, qualitative interviews are employed to explore activists’ perspective and to collect extensive and frank information (Blee & Taylor, 2002). They are therefore ‘especially useful in studies where goals are exploration, discovery, and interpretation of complex event and processes’ (Blee & Taylor, 93), as is the case here. While I am aware that the set of interviews presented here is rather limited, they are representative of the movement milieus in cities that have experienced high levels of mobilisation and are fully integrated in the broader NUDM movement. Though preliminary, the analysis allows verifying the validity of the expectations presented above, providing insights for the study of similar cases, such as the Spanish feminist movements in times of crisis (see Chironi & Portos, 2020).

Previous literature has divided the history of Italian feminism into three waves (Del Giorgio, 2010).6 The first, from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the 1960s, was characterised by strong relationships with large left-wing parties and trade unions, a focus on labour issues, and the presence (since 1944) of a large national association of women, the Unione Donne Italiane (Italian Women’s Union/UDI), linked to the Communist Party.

The second wave developed in the 1970s, when several feminist groups flourished in major cities. They claimed full independence from parties, unions and institutions, put in practice new forms of action, such as the autocoscienza (practice of self-consciousness), and embraced new theories, particularly the pensiero della differenza (theory of difference), dealing with issues such as women’s self-determination, subjectivity, sexuality, and roles. Embedded in a moment of great social effervescence, the second wave of feminism expressed itself in local circles, but also in the streets and in the squares, questioning existing power arrangements and obtaining important achievements, such as the Law 194 on abortion, approved in 1978.

A third wave started in the 1980s when visible and unitary mobilisation disappeared, and a specific type of ‘diffused feminism’ emerged (Calabrò & Grasso, 1985): a large number of heterogeneous groups began to specialise, professionalise, and to some extent institutionalise. Since then, female cooperatives and professional agencies have coexisted with centres of documentation and journals that were no longer voices of the movements, but spaces for intellectual debates within small circles of activists. ‘Reformist’ perspectives, such as the culture of equal opportunity and women’s empowerment, began to be discussed and to influence legislative production.

This sort of normalisation of feminism was interrupted in the 2000s, coinciding with the rise in power of the right-wing coalition Casa delle Libertà (House of Freedoms) led by the media tycoon and businessman Silvio Berlusconi, and the parallel birth of the GJM (Del Giorgio, 2010). Even though younger feminist activists engaged in the new movement, introducing feminist demands and concerns, the long-established feminist groups had a minor role in its growth (Del Giorgio, 2010). While new ties were created during the decade, it is only since the financial crisis has exploded that we witness a general reorganisation of feminist movements in Italy.

I therefore argue that the conditions for a fourth wave to occur are to be found in the critical neoliberal juncture investing the continental level that, on the one hand, acted as a trigger for protest and, on the other, pushed activists to grasp multilevel opportunities (della Porta & Tarrow, 2005), and set in motion processes of cross-national protest diffusion. As della Porta and Mattoni (2014) have illustrated, anti-austerity mobilisations in northern Africa, northern Europe and the United States shared similar visions and practices as ideas and forms of action travelled cross-nationally. Similarly, the development of NUDM was influenced by mobilisations occurring in EU member countries experiencing similar economic, social, and political transformations, particularly Greece and Spain. A fundamental input for the adoption of a common framework came from Argentina, where the Ni Una Menos movement launched a clear message that could be easily adapted to contexts with high levels of feminicide and male violence against women.

The feminist question came back to the forefront in 2011, when Berlusconi was head of government for the third time and the effects of the economic crisis were largely felt. A judicial inquiry into the sexual misconduct of political elites triggered a wave of public indignation urging some well-known women (such as film directors, actresses, professors, politicians, and unionists) to call for action against ‘a model of relationship between women and men, displayed by one of the higher office-bearers in the State, which deeply affects the life-styles and the national culture, legitimating behaviours that violate the dignity of women and institutions’ (Se Non Ora Quando, 2011). The appeal marked the birth of Se Non Ora Quando (If Not Now, When?/SNOQ), an eventful protest campaign including flash mobs and marches taking place in all major cities on 13 February,7 8 March, and 11 December 2011.

Occurring after the fall of the Berlusconi cabinet and the formation of a so-called technical government led by the economist Mario Monti, with the support of the mainstream centre-left and centre-right parties, the latter day of action aimed to clarify that Berlusconi and his associates were not the only problem, as issues of women’s bodies and their dignity remained open in Italy (Cavallari & Robiony, 2017). While SNOQ’s claims remained rather vague and its fortunes inextricably linked to that of its founders (Int.IT.G1; Int.IT.G6; Int.IT.G7), the connections between previously separated groups built in this phase were important for organising future mobilisations (Int.IT.G5; Int.IT.G6; Int.IT.G7).

In 2012, grassroots feminist collectives allied with trade unionists and members of the radical left-wing parties to form the network Donne nella Crisi (Women in the Crisis). They focused on the effects of austerity policies over women, underlining how they ‘pay the higher price because exploited twice, in both the job market (lower wages, more job insecurity and precarity, fewer labour protections, and so on) and at the social level ([due to] the dismissal of the public systems of social protection)’ (Pirotta, 2015). In 2014, the network promoted fundraising to finance the self-managed social clinics in Greece,8 and spread information about the retrenchment of the public health service in Italy.

In the same year, Italian activists demonstrated in solidarity with Spanish women fighting against their government’s proposal to restrict access to abortion. As in the previous case, the Io Decido (I decide) campaign became the occasion to denounce the conservative wind blowing in Italy (Int.IT.G3; Int.IT.G5).

National coordination and a real social movement dynamic were however lacking until the NUDM arrived in Italy in 2016. After the brutal murder of a 22-year-old student in Rome, a national assembly was called to oppose the dominant narrative that described this type of crime as due to an excess of love on the side of the male partner. Different subjects converged there, including historical feminists, collectives of recent formation, groups based in squatted social centres, anti-violence centres, and LGBT and queer collectives. In sum, NUDM became the point of connection between feminist and LGBTQI movements, which had traditionally remained separate (Int.IT.G1; Int.IT.G2; Int.IT.G3; Int.IT.G4; Int.IT.G7), as well as different generations of activists and different political streams (Chironi, 2019).

The first goal of NUDM was the collective elaboration of a feminist plan against male and gender-based violence that would push the state to adjust the inadequate Italian legislation to the lines foreseen by more advanced supranational agreements. Acting as a paradigmatic example of supranational opportunity, the Istanbul Convention on preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence – signed in 2012 by the member states of the Council of Europe (CoE) – had defined a broad concept of gender violence, which includes forms of symbolic, psychological, and material violence, and provided for a series of actions and policies to contrast it.9 Adopted by the Italian Parliament in 2013, it had not been implemented: in calling for its fulfilment, activists advanced concrete proposals to overcome discrimination and gender violence in the workplace, language, education, and health system (NUDM, 2017).

Initially, the movement spread at the local level through city assemblies. Later, over 250,000 people with different political and generational backgrounds demonstrated in Rome on 25 November 2016 in the occasion of the Global Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, marking a turning point in the construction of the movement. After the march, activists met at the Sapienza University and divided into ‘thematic tables’ in which the contents of the mobilisation were further discussed, and unitary documents were produced. More than 1,000 women attended the concluding assembly. Massive participation attracted intense media coverage and encouraged the organisers to continue their mobilisation. A series of initiatives followed in the subsequent two years, both at the national (particularly large assemblies and marches for the Women’s Day and the Global Day of Action Against Gender Violence) and local levels (with permanent assemblies taking place in major cities at least once per month).

Like other ‘movements of the crisis,’ feminist and LGBTQI movements are very critical of representative democracy because of a perceived impossibility to influence public decisions ‘from below.’ In the words of an activist in the feminist collective Libere Tutte (All Free), ‘real democracy’ should entail ‘the ability to participate, to intervene in public choices, to be all equal and count equally. Participation is granted by our Constitution, but in reality it is not there’ (Int.IT.G5). Widespread is the feeling that institutions – be they local, national or European – promote a façade of participation, and then tend to ignore citizens’ demands (Int.IT.G1; Int.IT.G5; Int.IT.6; Int.IT.9).

At the EU level, the financial crisis unveiled the weaknesses of a supranational construction driven by economic and monetary assumptions. Among the most sceptical interviewees, a militant in the Assemblea di Genere del CPA (Gender Assembly of the Popular Self-Managed Centre of South Florence) and NUDM activist expressed her deep disappointment with an EU, which

… is mainly focused on economic issues and, from many points of view, it’s responsible for a worsening of our life conditions: think of repressive apparatuses, and austerity policies. Sure, sometimes the European Parliament condemns Italy for some violations and that’s fine, but now we also have to face the increase in the social disparity between northern and southern countries, particularly Greece, Spain, and Italy. (Int.IT.G1)

In continuity with the GJM, feminist and LGBTQI activists are also worried about a democratic deficit that, in their opinion, characterises the European institutional architecture. Especially, those who had been involved in the Social Forums at the beginning of the 2000s pointed to the minor role assigned to the European Parliament, compared with the powerful non-elected executive and financial bodies (Int.IT.G3; Int.IT.G5; Int.IT.G6; Int.IT.G7).

Understood as a market-driven construction, the EU is accused of having built an exclusionary ‘fortress’, where ‘there is the free exchange of goods, but not the free circulation of people, as the rejection of the immigrants demonstrates’ (Int.IT.G5). Following the diffusion of the intersectional perspective (Int.IT.G1; Int.IT.G2; Int.IT.G3; Int.IT.G4; Int.IT.G7; Int.IT.G9), contemporary movements for gender rights are indeed particularly sensitive towards the problem of growing racism in the member states and beyond (Int.IT.G4). Originally born in the United States to criticise white feminism for its indifference towards racism, intersectional feminism refuses to assign priority to sexism as compared with other forms of oppression, rather analysing the intertwining of class, race, sexual orientation, age, disability, and gender in producing discrimination. Linked to intersectional feminism, queer theory rejects binary gender identities (Int.IT.G4; Int.IT.G7; Int.IT.G9).

Well-rooted in NUDM, intersectionality and queer theory brought about a renewed interest in fighting racism, fascism and capitalism, which is not disjointed by a radical critique of the EU immigration policy (Int.IT.G2). According to a member of the Smaschieramenti Laboratory in Bologna:10

We need to be involved in all social struggles [and] find broad alliances between the oppressed, including racialised and disabled bodies, to move towards an anti-capitalist and anti-patriarchy transformation […]. In the past, they shot at us [LGBT people], now they shoot at them [the immigrants]. What side are you on? With the white people who govern in Europe or with the black people who are being shot? (Int.IT.G4)

Moreover, ‘the LGBTQI youth feels part of the generation that calls for a basic universal income for peoples of Europe’ (Int.IT.G4).

An even stronger lack of democracy is however denounced at the domestic level, involving municipal, regional, and national institutions. Municipalities are accused of having disregarded the work of participatory bodies, such as the Committee for Secularity (Int.IT.G6) and the Commission for Equal Opportunities (Int.IT.G5), respectively aimed at promoting the principle of secularism and gender equality through dedicated policies. Regional institutions, in charge of the health service, are targeted for the incomplete implementation of the Law No. 194 on abortion, while only partially accepting the suggestions made by the participants of the Tavolo sulla 194, an informal committee involving politicians, doctors and healthcare professionals, and representatives of feminist groupings (Int.IT.G5).

National institutions are equally considered impermeable to claims from below. The interviewees lament Parliament’s disregard for law proposals brought forward by civil society groups. Examples are the citizens’ initiative ‘Equal democracy for elective assemblies,’ aimed at achieving a gender-balanced representation in the national Parliament and the regional and municipal councils (Int.IT.G5), and ‘a law proposal aimed at respecting the integrity of intersex bodies’ (Int.IT.G9), both filed in Parliament and never scheduled for discussion. A member of the Intersexioni network, which deals with the rights of intersex people, expressed a deep perception of having been left alone by public institutions, as ‘obviously these are issues that do not interest our politicians’ (Int.IT.G9).

The lack of channelling agents

Frustration with Italian politics is increased by a lack of institutional allies, which contributes to further narrowing the political opportunities available for gender-based movements at the domestic level. All interviewees are very critical of the centre-left PD and of the largest trade union, the CGIL.11 Seen as a catch-all party, the PD is blamed for having compromised with the neoliberal agenda and post-democratic governance (Int.IT.G1; Int.IT.G3; Int.IT.G5; Int.IT.G7; Int.IT.G10). The words of an activist in both the Libreria delle Donne (Women’s Library) and the NUDM movement testify to the loss of institutional points of reference for social movements, which she also connected to the personalisation of politics:

In this moment, there aren’t valid interlocutors in public institutions […]. Politicians, including those of the left, represent themselves; they neither have strong ideas nor are they guided by a strong political party able to produce a coherent action. I had a meeting with [the President of the Tuscany Region] Rossi: I believe that he is focused on self-promotion and he only cares about initiatives and events that enhance his personal image. They all behave in the same way, even mayors and city councillors […]. Therefore, there is an evident democratic problem: if those who should represent you only represent themselves, obviously there is complete disconnection. (Int.IT.G3)

A sceptical attitude towards confederal trade unions12 is also common, as they are considered incapable of performing their tasks successfully, and are accused of trying to control social movements:

Trade unions in Italy tend to appropriate the movements and to establish their hegemony on them. Currently, they are facing a deep crisis: they have nothing serious to say about labour and therefore they try to say something on other issues. For instance, to embrace opposition to male violence allows them to have a role in street politics […]. In Italy, both trade unions and political parties, which do not have an autonomous strength, try to ride the social movements. (Int.IT.G3)

As a part of the problem, the parties of the radical left, though sympathetic with gender issues and tactics, are extremely divided and weak compared to any other European country (Int.IT.G5; Int.IT.G9; Int.IT.G10). Present in Parliament and local councils in exiguous numbers, they are considered substantially unable to channel movements’ demands. As a feminist explained, ‘since the 2000s, the Left did not have enough MPs to bring our aims forward. This is the basic reason why the Parliament rejected all our policy proposals, including those for improving health services dedicated to women’. (Int.IT.G5)

The crisis of the Italian Left negatively reverberates also at the EU level. In the European election of 2014, both small radical left-wing parties and key movement activists converged in the electoral list L’Altra Europa con Tsipras (The Other Europe with Tsipras), which collected only four per cent of the vote and three MEPs. Five years later, in 2019, the radical left, united in the electoral cartel La Sinistra (The Left) did not pass the electoral threshold and remained outside the European Parliament. Where leftist parties have a credible presence, ‘there is a fruitful dialogue; [in the other cases] there are single MPs and MEPs, members of mainstream parties, who try to do something, but are constantly held back by the moderate party faction’ (Int.IT.G9).

For older activists, the present situation is characterised by a diminished possibility for social movements to influence policy outcomes. In their interpretation, the 1970s were the moment of greatest achievement for the feminists in Italy due to the interaction, though conflictual, between the institutional Left and social movements. As an activist in the oldest feminist organisation in Florence, the Giardino dei Ciliegi (Cherry Orchard), recalled:

In politics, the maximum of efficacy can be obtained when there is a relationship, that can often be conflictual, between a strong independent movement and a strong leftist presence in institutions […]. In the 1970s more than twenty laws for an actual implementation of the Constitution were produced, and I include in this group also divorce and abortion. It was a fantastic moment, in which there was a movement in the street that didn’t trust the PCI [Partito Comunista Italiano/Italian Communist Party], and a PCI in the institutions that didn’t trust the movements, but the existence of both made it possible to approve important laws, because the Parliament felt a pressure. (Int.IT.G7)

Nowadays, activists are aware of operating in a far more difficult context:

With the weakening of social movements, the loss of strength of the political Left in public institutions and the reciprocal separation of these two worlds, we are near to a paralysis […]. The crisis of the Left has made [Italian] social movements more fragile, because our privileged interlocutor is now lacking. (Int.IT.G7)

The EU is among the institutions that feminist activists call into question for gender inequality and rising levels of violence against women. The increase of poverty, as well as cuts in welfare and social services are seen as effects of neoliberal policies imposed on indebted member states by a Troika composed of the International Monetary Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank (Int.IT.G1; Int.IT.G3; Int.IT.G5). According to NUDM activists, growing impoverishment and social disintegration are major causes of male violence:

The EU has its share of responsibility for the increasing levels of violence against women. First, violence is directly proportional to economic problems. Second, violence not only entails physical aggression: cuts on welfare, services, and funding devoted to supporting women, all have a backlash on our lives. Third, Europe has a political responsibility, because it didn’t impose on its member states to incorporate some basic principles, such as full access to abortion. Within the Union, very different abortion laws coexist; some are more advanced than others, introducing big differences between women who live in different countries. Europe only intervenes through periodical, non-binding recalls. (Int.IT.G3)

Most interviewees are extremely sceptical about the possibility to reverse the economic and social policies of the EU, as they see it as a major component of a neoliberal system in which the exploitation of female labour and the privatisation of social services are functional to capitalist profit-making (Int.IT.G5). From this point of view:

There are no improvements. In the 1970s, we conquered important rights and promoted a cultural change, but this was not enough. Discrimination is still ongoing: just think of male violence against women […]. Or think of schools: recent research showed that school books reproduce the dominant idea of the man as strong, courageous, and enterprising [… while] girls should be cute, helpful, and kind. Or let’s consider care work: the fact that women undertake care work is functional for the system because the welfare state is (and remains) underdeveloped. (Int.IT.G5)

However, activists identify Italian politics as the main problem. National and local political elites are blamed not only for reproducing the same economic and social policies supported by the EU, but also for disregarding civil rights. The interviewees consider the coalition between the Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle/M5S) and the right-wing Lega (League), in power from June 2018 to September 2019, as the apex of a series of national governments hostile to feminist and LGBTQI claims. As a participant in the Gruppo Giovani LGBTI* (LGBTI* Youth Group) clarified, this was especially due to ‘the presence of a Minister for the Family, Lorenzo Fontana, coming from the Lega ranks, and known for his homophobic and traditionalist views’ (Int.IT.G2).

More generally, interviewees stress the great influence of the Catholic Church over politics and the tendency of mainstream parties to second (and nourish) the conservatism typical of Italian society (Int.IT.G3; Int.IT.G9; Int.IT.G10). As proof for their criticism, they mention frequent connections between politicians, including those in the centre-left, and conservative civil society organisations. For example, a gay activist in the association Ireos13 remembered when:

In 2014, we had to organise a demonstration in front of the Municipality of Florence to contest the parallel meeting between the local centre-left administration, the (PD member) Undersecretary for Public Education, and the Italian section of La Manif pour Tous, an organisation that stands against the enhancement of civil rights. (Int.IT.G10)

Recent governments are also accused of withdrawing public funding from projects aimed at opposing racial and homophobic discrimination. For instance, ‘in the last years, we witnessed the disempowerment of the National Agency Against Racial Discrimination, which had dealt also with discriminations against gays and lesbians’ (Int.IT.G10).

Lack of courage and opportunistic politics are said to have prevented the reform of Italian legislation, which is criticised by all interviewees. For the feminist activists, ‘Italy appears in the last places of all European rankings for gender policies, both in cultural and economic terms’ (Int.IT.G5). Echoing this pessimistic vision, a lesbian activist listed some of the current legislative shortcomings: ‘Our legislation doesn’t include individual rights for transsexual people […]; labour protections for victims of violence are lacking […]; funding for anti-violence centres are exiguous; single people cannot adopt a child, and so on’ (Int.IT.G1). To complement this list, other interviewees lamented the absence of a law against homophobia (Int.IT.G2) and the total denial of intersexual and transgender people’s rights (Int.IT.G9). A member of the Intersexioni network also criticises Italian governments for their inactivity towards genital mutilation, both of intersexual minors and women belonging to some minority communities, while her ‘judgment about the intervention of the European Union on these issue is more positive’ (Int.IT.G9).

In this context, the approval in 2016 of the Law 76 introducing the same-sex ‘civil unions’ – known as the Cirinnà Law, from the name of the MP who proposed it14 – is seen as a tactical move of the government led by the PD leader Matteo Renzi, in office from February 2014 to December 2016. According to most interviewees, civil unions were aimed to balance unpopular economic measures. A militant in the social centre CPA underlined that:

[Between 2013 and 2018] the coalition governments led by the PD have followed the drift of their predecessors: the exploited has remained exploited and the exploiter has remained exploiter […]. They were leftist only in appearance and used this story of the civil unions to clean their image. The Cirinnà Law doesn’t change our social conditions! Do you want my judgment about all the other laws that were approved in the last years on pensions, labour, and school? They all increased our problems. (Int.IT.G1)

In a similar vein, a NUDM activist underlined that civil and social rights should complement each other, and criticised recent governments not only for their austerity policies, but also for their conservatism on gender issues:

I am happy about the Cirinnà Law, but I believe it was used as a ‘honey trap:’ They needed it to justify their identity as ‘progressive,’ while on everything else … Let’s look at the cuts they made: cuts to public health system, to consultori [clinics for women], to social services, to contraception. The consequences hit especially women and disabled people […]. The Ministry of Health is extremely important, and if you want it to function properly you do not nominate at its head a right-wing person, neoliberal and I might say Catholic (though she is not) for her moralist view of the individual […].15 My judgment about the Renzi government is completely negative. (Int.IT.G3)

While acknowledging that the law on civil unions ‘has changed the mindsets’ (Int.IT.G3) and ‘it’s culturally useful’ (Int.IT.G9), activists deem it largely insufficient, particularly because it does not provide same-sex couples with parenting rights, such as the rights to joint adoption and/or to adopt a stepchild (Int.IT.G9).

Though criticisms of the EU assets and austerity policies are harsh and widespread, none of the interviewees propose to abandon the Union. Some past examples of the EU’s intervention in Italian affairs are given to support hopes that it can act again as a shield for the protection of basic civil rights in the country, and potentially in the continent. A feminist activist in the All Free group recalled the role of the EU in admonishing Italy for the shortcomings in the full application of Law 194 on abortion:

Europe has admonished Italy for the incorrect application of the 194 Law due to the sharp increase in doctors refusing to perform abortion on personal grounds of conscientious objection. This gap causes problems for Italian citizens, but our country doesn’t seem to care about European warnings. (Int.IT.G5)

As women in other member states face similar difficulties, the interviewees suggest that the EU undertakes the task of:

… imposing a minimum standard of civil rights’ protection to all member countries. In Poland abortion is granted only in cases of rape! The Union should give common directions on civil unions, same-sex marriage and fundamental principles. It is certainly responsible for the current financial situation of the states, but it could at least enforce the respect for basic civil rights. (Int.IT.G3)

Hopes for the EU to act as an ally in the implementation of civil rights also arise from the recent experience of the civil unions, described as ‘an achievement which would have been impossible without membership in the EU’ (Int.IT.G2). According to a young activist, ‘Italy remains the rear-guard in Europe, and if there weren’t the European level sometime to say: ‘Careful because we will sanction you, because as for what regards civil rights you are light years behind,’ here nothing would ever change or move’ (Int.IT.G2). When expressing the same point of view, a leading figure of Azione Gay e Lesbica (Gay and Lesbian Action), the oldest LGBT association in Florence, exclaimed:

Thank God we are in the European Union! Italy is basically a right-wing country, with a regressive mentality. Therefore, [membership in the EU] is the only reason why we still have certain rights and protections, otherwise we would have forgotten about them! Civil unions, for example, were approved only because we had to fit European standards, otherwise we would never have had them! (Int.IT.G8)

Confirming this interpretation, another activist added that:

Civil unions were possible only because Italy is included in the European process for the implementation of civil rights […]. Despite this, our Parliament passed a law that doesn’t even consider our unions as proper families. (Int.IT.G10)

In a national context where the right-wing is growing and the centre-left parties are perceived as increasingly distant from social movements’ demands, both the EU and the CoE appear as sources of political opportunities. Their institutions, particularly the Courts, are indeed seen as an additional level of governance to which to appeal.16 Reconstructing the long path that finally led to the law on civil unions, an interviewee remembered that, long before the Cirinnà Law, gay and lesbian couples in Italy used to call upon the European Court of Justice, asking for the official recognition of civil unions celebrated by rebel mayors. ‘In consequence of our actions’ – she observed – ‘the Italian State was forced to justify the reasons why, unlike other member states, it was ignoring European directives. Europe safeguards our civil rights’ (Int.IT.G8). Other activists underlined the positive role of the European Court of Human Rights in protecting the rights of intersexual and transsexual people (Int.IT.G9; Int.IT.G10).

While domestic institutions are accused of not encouraging or supporting grassroots activities (Int.IT.G7), the EU has financed social projects related to gender issues. For instance, a member of the LGBT association Ireos informed me that ‘thanks to European funds we could realise programs against discrimination in high schools and trainings for teachers’ (Int.IT.G10). Similarly, an Intersexioni activist underlined that ‘there are European funds for many of our activities, opportunities for international exchanges, and trainings on our issues. Therefore, Europe remains a valid interlocutor for us’ (Int.IT.G9).

As the EU offers opportunities for enhancing gender-based movements’ claims and strengthening their actions, at least in the field of civil rights, these activists stand against the perspective of exiting the Union and reject any type of nationalist discourse. Even though they are disillusioned about the possibility to radically reform the EU, the ‘other Europe’ project still resonates with the feminist and LGBTQI movements, as any other option would entail a step back in the achievement of some basic goals. As a feminist activist concluded, ‘despite its thousands of faults, to get rid of Europe and return to the national state would be even worse. Taking into account the Italian political situation, a similar move would let all the right-wing and conservative symptoms explode’ (Int.IT.G3). Nationalist messages are stigmatised as ‘ … political propaganda. The current anti-European sentiments are partially rooted in the attempt to make Italian people identify an external enemy, while forgetting the responsibilities of local elites’ (Int.IT.G2). Nationalism is considered a right-wing solution to the current crisis and associated to patriarchy and even fascism (Int.It.G4). While not denying that ‘in economic terms, being members of the EU is certainly causing problems […], nationalism only leads to fighting with your neighbour. I still stand for a world without barriers’ (Int.IT.G2).

In light of this, reforming the EU is the only path these activists conceive in order to strengthen democracy at the European level (and in the member states): ‘I would say that the EU is not providing positive responses to the people’s needs and it should change its politics […]. However, I adopt a reformist stance, because to leave it is meaningless […]. I don’t believe that our problems are rooted in the single currency, or in the Union per se’ (Int.IT.G5). Taking up this proposal, an activist in the LGBT movement affirmed: ‘I’m absolutely against breaking the European Union, because it remains one of the few perspectives that we have’ (Int.IT.G8).

As in the case of other ‘movements of the crisis’ (della Porta, 2015), mistrust in representative institutions and governments, as well as the lack of powerful allies, are reflected in a highly conflictual attitude and a return of direct action. While motivation for mediation and tactics of pressuring institutions ‘from within’ is very low, the activists urge for ‘keeping social conflict to a high level, as we still have a long way to go’ (Int.IT.G2).

At the domestic level, this means efforts towards the reconstruction of autonomous, claim-making social movements and constant intervention in the social and cultural fields. At the European level, the politics of autonomy implies building internationalist networks and solidarity campaigns, which favour processes of horizontal diffusion of ideas and action repertoires. While the GJM had combined protest with lobbying institutions from within (Balme & Chabanet, 2008; Ruzza, 2004), for contemporary feminist and LGBTQI movements the way to transform the EU in times of crisis is contentious action from below. Compared to their predecessors, they reflect far less on the European architecture and how to change it, as they think of the EU as a ‘field of struggle’ rather than a set of institutions. As a feminist explained, it is seen as an internationalist space for building horizontal networks with affinity groups and sharing experiences:

At the European level, our work focuses on constructing relationships. We do not talk as much of the EU, but we look at the several struggles that develop on its territory. For instance, […] we have built an alliance with the Women against Fundamentalism, a group based in London that unites women from different ethnic and religious backgrounds […]. They fight against the presence in Great Britain of five courts that apply the Sharia, which coexist with English courts, and have some validity. We have tried to shed light on this cutting-edge struggle bringing it to the attention of the leftist movements here in Italy. (Int.IT.G6)

The high level of international coordination required for organising large supranational meetings, such as the European Social Forums of the 2000s, is no longer possible, but processes of cross-national interaction are common at the grassroots. Inclined to move abroad, young activists are accustomed to interact with groups based in other countries, sometimes exploiting EU-funded programmes: ‘Some of us are just coming back from Berlin, where we attended a training course in a German [LGBTQI] association with which we collaborate within the Erasmus Plus framework. We have organised exchanges like these for three years’ (Int.IT.G2).

Solidarity campaigns with women or other disadvantaged social groups mobilising in other European countries are also frequent. A feminist of the All Free collective underlined that ‘though based in Florence, we supported and participated in global initiatives. When Polish women rebelled against the attempt to ban abortion, we demonstrated in solidarity with them. In 2013, we joined a large solidarity campaign with Greece, where poorer women could not access medical assistance and were forced to give birth at home’ (Int.IT.G5).

Cross-national contacts, both direct and mediated, and solidarity links have helped developing sentiments of identification that facilitated the spontaneous adhesion to global protest events involving different countries on the very same day or period. Significant for gender-based movements are the International Women’s Strike, a global protest coordinated across more than fifty countries and coinciding with International Women’s Day on the 8 March; the Global Day of Action against Gender Violence on the 25 November; and the Pride Month in June. All these events are characterised by creativity and inclusive tactics, but are organised independently of political parties, trade unions, and public institutions (Int.IT.G4).17 Symbols of political parties and trade unions are not allowed in these demonstrations as the distance between gender-based social movements and institutional politics is becoming increasingly visible (Int.IT.G3; Int.IT.G7).

While activists ‘have matured a massive dose of mistrust and low expectation that actions directly linked to institutions can produce results’ (Int.IT.G7), their efforts are directed to strengthen their presence in society and gain wide popular support before embarking on any sort of political mediation (Int.IT.G7). Political disenchantment combined with the urgent need of reacting to a ‘regressive’ scenario is said to have produced a re-birth of mass action:

Compared to the 2000s, today we witness a regression in all fields: relational, social, political, and legal. Ten years ago, we would have never thought that neo-fascist parties would participate in elections, and the fascist threat would return in Europe. However, there’s also the will to build large movements, such as I haven’t seen since the great wave of Social Forums. Today, the women’s movement is growing and it involves a lot of people. NUDM has put together different generations of feminists and different type of groups. (Int.IT.G5)

The return of mass action is linked to a set of everyday actions, such as lessons in high schools and universities, services for psychological support against discrimination, social dinners, claims in the workplace, book presentations, movie screenings, and so on. As an activist summarised, ‘the movement acts at two levels: one is large, very visible and massive; in the same moment we demonstrate in Florence, Argentina, and Paris. Then, there is the daily action, less visible and very tiring’ (Int.IT.G5).

This article has analysed the visions of the EU that are widespread in Italian feminist and LGBTQI movements in times of crisis, contributing to filling a gap in movement literature. It emerged that the joint effect of the economic and democratic crises configured a typical neoliberal critical juncture (Roberts, 2014, 2017) that transformed movements’ perceptions of politics, involving the European Union. At the domestic level, movements for gender rights have experienced a closing down of political opportunities, due to very low levels of government responsiveness and the absence of institutional allies.

On the one hand, the deterioration of both material and symbolic conditions triggered a new wave of mobilisation on gender issues. Opposition to neoliberal policies increased as gender-based movements crossed paths with other movement sectors further radicalising criticism towards the EU, deemed responsible for ‘blood and tears’ recipes imposed on indebted member states. As a result, feminist and LGBTQI movements renounced the use of forms of institutional pressure ‘from within’ EU institutions and reverted to direct action.

On the other hand, the closed political opportunities at home pushed activists to consider multilevel opportunities opening up at the European level. The European legislation; the Istanbul Convention signed by the member states of the CoE; the recalls that both the EU and the CoE addressed to Italy; the possibility to appeal to both the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights; and the funding for social projects are all interpreted as windows of opportunity that stand in contrast to a growing conservatism at the national level. What is more, the EU is conceptualised not as a mere set of institutions, but rather as a field of struggles from below that provides for an internationalist space in which to share ideas and experiences, and develop solidarity links.

Faced with culturally rooted and politically nourished social conservatism in Italy, every hypothesis to exit the EU is dismissed as potentially dangerous and purely nationalistic. As in the case of the labour movement (Zamponi, 2020), mistrust in the national state is so widespread in movements for gender rights that any option of dissolving the European Union appears as a step backwards on the path towards emancipation. Hopes that the EU will act as a shield for protecting basic civil rights in the country, and eventually as an ally for further implementing them at the continental level, mostly arise from high disaffection with Italian politics, rather than satisfaction with the EU project and policies.

While we cannot confirm previous scholars’ expectations for a linear increase in the Europeanisation of progressive social movements (della Porta & Caiani, 2009), it emerges that the political situation in Italy, as well as in other member states such as Greece, Poland and Spain, has led feminist and LGBTQI activists to perceive the EU as the external authority that, though defective, can stem social and political conservatism at the domestic level. Visions of ‘another Europe’, more inclusive and democratic, still resonate within the movement, though the plans to realise them have been temporarily set aside, and short-term goals only regard the enhancement of civil rights in the continent.

1

The acronym LGBTQI stands for ‘lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersexual.’ ‘Transgender is an umbrella term used to describe a wide range of identities whose appearance and characteristics are perceived as gender atypical – including transsexual people, cross-dressers […], and people who identify as third gender. Transwomen identify as women but were classified as males when they were born, transmen identify as men but were classified female when they were born, while other trans people don’t identify with the gender-binary at all […]. Intersex people are born with physical or biological sex characteristics, such as sexual anatomy, reproductive organs, hormonal patterns and/or chromosomal patterns, which do not fit the typical definitions of male or female. These characteristics may be apparent at birth or emerge later in life, often at puberty’ (United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner [UNHRO], 2013).

2

To give some examples, in 2009, Berlusconi insulted the PD MP Rosy Bindi in a TV talk-show for her physical appearance, and in 2011 it was discovered that in the past he had made offensive sexual allusions regarding the German Chancellor Angela Merkel.

3

Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.

4

The full list of interviewees is reported in the  appendix.

5

Hosted at the Scuola Normale Superiore, the ‘Critical Young Europeans’ (CRY_OUT) project is funded by the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research (MIUR) as well as the Scuola Normale Superiore (Principal Investigator: Donatella della Porta; see http://cosmos.sns.it/projects/critical-young-europeans-cry_out/).

6

It is worth noting that some scholars in the field of gender studies have criticised the concept of ‘feminist waves’ as it can produce a sense of feminist history as a straightforward process (Nicholson, 2016, p. 44). Hemmings (2011) has asserted that progress narratives are damaging because they tend to flatten difference within each ‘wave.’ For Hemmings, the story of feminism should not be the story of one school of thought displacing another; rather we should draw links between the common feminist features of these approaches and treat feminism ‘as a series of on-going contests and relationships’ (2005, p. 131).

7

More than one million people took to the streets in Rome and tens of thousands in the other 230 Italian cities (and even abroad).

8

The social clinics were part of a broad set of self-organised solidarity structures set up by Greek anti-austerity activists after 2012 to provide food and other goods to the population in need (Vogiatzoglou, 2016).

9

The CoE is an international organisation whose aim is to uphold human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Europe (see https://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/values). Founded in 1949, the organisation has 47 member states, and is formally distinct from the 27-nation EU. Most EU citizens, as well as the activists interviewed for this article, tend to assimilate the CoE to the EU construction, partly because they share the same flag and anthem. Moreover, no country has ever joined the EU without first belonging to the CoE. Unlike the EU, the CoE cannot make binding laws, but it does have the power to enforce select international agreements reached by European states on various topics. For these reasons, I include the action of CoE in the complex of multilevel opportunities opening up for feminist and LGBTQI movements.

10

The name of this group is a play on words that cannot be translated into English. It expresses the idea of a laboratory to unmask the social impositions that stand behind gender identities and roles.

11

Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (Italian General Confederation of Labour).

12

These (CGIL, CISL, and UIL) are the largest and oldest trade unions in Italy, which aim to represent all types of workers and try to cover all economic sectors. They are distinct from both the autonomous and rank-and-file trade unions, which are much smaller and conflictual.

13

An ancient Greek word, Ireos means both ‘lily’, which is the symbol of Florence, and ‘rainbow,’ which is the symbol of the LGBTQI movement.

14

Monica Cirinnà is a politician of the Democratic Party; she was elected Senator in 2013 and again in 2018.

15

This refers to the centre-right politician Beatrice Lorenzin, who was Minister of Health from 2013 to 2018.

16

The interviewees mention both the European Court of Justice (ECJ), which is the supreme court of the EU in matters of EU law, and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), which is an international court established in 1959 by the European Convention on Human Rights, which was ratified by all the 47 Council of Europe member states. Having been adopted within the context of the Council of Europe, the ECHR, technically, is not a EU body (see footnote 10).

17

LGBTQI Prides represent a partial exception as they ask for the official support of local administrations in order to obtain a greater political legitimacy (Int.IT.G10).

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

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List of interviewees:

Int.IT.G1: A. (age 43), Assemblea di Genere del CPA, feminist and LGBTQI movement, Florence, 03/13/2018

Int.IT.G2: G. (age 27), Gruppo Giovani LGBTI*, LGBT movement, Florence, 06/07/2018

Int.IT.G3: L. (age 44), Libreria delle Donne, feminist movement, Florence, 02/15/2018

Int.IT.G4: D. (age 30), Laboratorio Smaschieramenti, transfeminist and LGBTQI movement, Bologna, 04/11/2018

Int.IT.G5: L. (age 70), Libere Tutte, feminist movement, Florence, 02/13/2018

Int.IT.G6: D. (age 44), Libere Tutte, feminist movement, Florence, 02/08/2018

Int.IT.G7: A. (age 70), Giardino dei Ciliegi, feminist movement, Florence, 02/28/2018

Int.IT.G8: V. (age 50), Azione Gay e Lesbica, LGBTQI movement, Florence, 04/18/2018

Int.IT.G9: A. (age 33), Collettivo Intersexioni, LGBTQI movement, Florence, 04/05/2018

Int.IT.G10: M. (age 38), Ireos, LGBTQI movement, Florence, 02/12/2018

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