A Europe of struggles: Blockupy as a political moment Open Access

The European Central Bank has been the main target of a protest campaign that developed through mass protests in Frankfurt, converging under the label of Blockupy. In this article, Blockupy is analysed as a political moment in (at least) two meanings of the term. First, it reflects a specific time and space in the evolution of the Great Recession (and of the Great Regression). Second, it emerges from the attempt to trigger a turning point, bringing radical protests and frames ‘at the heart’ of neoliberal Europe. Based upon information from documents and in-depth interviews, the article is structured around the three main concepts of resource mobilisation, protest performances and action framing with particular attention to continuities and innovation vis-à-vis the European Social Forum (ESF). Building upon literature on Europeanization of social movements, it suggests a path of solidarization.

Blockupy developed in 2002 through the coordination of various German networks that converged in the organisation of an event, at the core of which was the blockade of access to the European Central Bank (ECB) in Frankfurt am Main. Among the founders, formed by human rights activists, social democrats and eco-activists, Attac was in most direct continuity with the European Social Forum (ESF) which is the network of civil society organisations promoted by the Global Justice Movement that had represented a main instance of the Europeanisation of protests. Some left-wing groups from more recent protest campaigns also joined: the Interventionistische Linke (‘Interventionist Left’, in which three post-anarchist groups converged after the anti-G8 counter-summit in Heiligendamm in 2007) and Ums Ganze (formed by libertarian-communists involved in a Beyond Europe network). In addition, Blockupy mobilised local platforms, with occasional participation of the youth fronts of left-wing party activists, the M18 Alliance and Europe Commune, some unionists (in particular, from the public sector), the Unemployment Forum Germany, peace cooperatives, and student activists. Some resources were provided by the left-wing party Die Linke, founded in 2007 by the merger of the Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), which had developed from the official socialist party in the German Democratic Republic, with a split on the Left from the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), and since then is present in the federal parliament as well as in regional parliaments and governments.

Already at the beginning of the Great Regression, in March 2009, 50,000 had marched in Frankfurt under the slogan ‘Wir zahlen nicht für eure Krise’ (‘We will not pay for your crisis’), targeting the headquarters of the European Central Bank. Later on, the Indignados-Occupy movements in Southern Europe inspired further protests. After a day of global action against austerity on 15 October 2011, ‘Occupy Frankfurt’ (including a protest camp in front of the headquarter of the ECB) lasted until the Summer of 2012. Within a year, on 31 March 2012, a protest with 6,000 participants ended in fights with the police. Stigmatising the ‘authoritarian Crisis-Regime of the European Central Bank and the German Federal Government’ (Blockupy, 2015a), protestors expressed solidarity with the citizens of the countries where the crisis was most acute. In May 2012, planned protests for the first edition of Blockupy (including 70 debates) were prohibited, with 5,000 police officers deployed and fences built around the Bankenviertel to halt the 3,000 protestors who attempted a blockade on 18 May; 1,430 were arrested and 600 were given an ‘Aufenthaltsverbote’, that is, a prohibition to stay. As many as 30,000 marched on the next day, protesting against austerity as well as repression. A second Blockupy was organised in May 2013. Prohibited by the police but then allowed by the judiciary, the protests, which were required to remain at least 5 kilometres away from the set target, were heavily repressed. The police encircled and blocked 1,000 protestors. A decentralised action week then took place in 2014, and a third centralised Blockupy was organised in 2015.

While research on the anti-austerity protests that spread since 2011 points at a domestication of protests (with national governments as the main target of claims-making), Blockupy was an open attempt to Europeanise protest, by contesting a main institution of the European Union, the European Central Bank. Additionally, an attempt was made to revitalise the network of social movement organisations that had developed around the European Social Forum (ESF) at the beginning of the new millennium, bridging them with groups active in protest campaigns in the second half of the 2000s. Openly referring to a main slogan of that time, Blockupy also promoted ‘another Europe’, a social and democratic one. While Blockupy was successful in thematising a critical view of Europeanisation, and catalysing a network of social movement organisations that succeeded in promoting well-articulated and visible protest campaigns, the attempt at transnationalisation however mainly failed in terms of construction of transnational organisational networks, while succeeding in spreading a cross-national solidarity framing.

In this article, relying upon some of the main categories in social movement studies, I first address the development of Blockupy as a ‘political moment’, looking at it as an adaptation to a perception of closed political opportunities at the European level and the related weakening of organisational resources, in comparison with the previous campaigns around the ESF. Faced with these hostile conditions, Blockupy was conceived as a transformative event that had to catalyse new energies. In the following part of this article, I sketch the theoretical model that will lead the analysis. In part 3, I then introduce the main methodological choices. Following this, I summarise the results of my research on Blockupy around resource mobilisation, protest performances, and action framing, as the three core concepts in social movement studies. I pay particular attention to continuities and innovation vis-à-vis previous waves of protest on global issues, such as the ESF. Part 4 presents Blockupy as a political moment – a strategic adaptation in terms of organisational structure and action repertoire, while part 5 links this to diagnostic, prognostic and motivational framing. I conclude with some reflections on challenges and opportunities for social movement Europeanisation in times of crisis.

When addressing Europeanisation processes, social movement studies have distinguished paths of domestication, as the targeting of national governments to address European-wide problems and policies; externalisation, as the targeting of EU institutions to address national problems and policies; and transnationalisation, as the construction of European networks targeting EU institutions (della Porta & Caiani, 2009; della Porta & Tarrow, 2005; see also Imig & Tarrow, 2001; Tarrow, 1995). A main assumption has been that two main mechanisms favour the increasing importance of transnationalisation.

Firstly, in line with the political process approach, a mechanism of appropriation of opportunities has been singled out. Not only were the increasing competencies of the EU expected to focus claim-making at that level, but previous mobilisations were also expected to open up new institutional channels, strategically playing on the different opportunities that different EU institutions might open. In particular, some party groups in the European Parliament, but also some General Directorates in the European Commission, and some member states within the European Council, have variously played the role of allies to progressive social movements (della Porta & Parks, 2018; Parks, 2015). As for the second mechanism, organisational brokerage grew during protest campaigns that shifted the scale from domestic to EU targets, connecting national social movement organisations across borders, as well as with transnational organisations active on various issues. From labour conditions to the environment, from gender rights to public education, protest campaigns grew more and more multilevel, converging in the sustained and broad networks of social movement organisations that promoted the ESF. Grounded in the World Social Forum, which since the beginning of the millennium had provided a space for the encounter of thousands of social movement organisations and tens of thousands of activists, the ESF debated the limits of the European institutional process and promoted alternatives to neoliberal globalisation. Meeting for the first time in Florence in 2002, the ESF fostered EU-wide networks of activists and alternative European identities (della Porta, 2009a, 2009b).

While in the second half of the decade the Social Forum process had lost momentum, since 2011 protests multiplied all over Europe, targeting the austerity policies that had been adopted by European governments, under pressure from EU institutions during the financial crisis (della Porta et al., 2017). Contestation especially targeted cuts in public expenditure at the national level that resulted in the privatisation of public services and the deregulation of financial and labour markets. Beginning with Iceland in 2008, and then in Egypt and Tunisia, Spain, and Greece, citizens took to the streets against what they perceived as a corruption of democracy, as a source of social and political inequality. From so-called ‘Indignados’ and ‘Occupy movements’, contention diffused globally in the following years, also involving countries such as Brazil and Turkey, which had been considered on the winning side of neoliberal development (della Porta, 2015, 2017).

If the ESF at the beginning of the millennium has been analysed as an example of transnationalisation, with upward scale shifting through the construction of European social movement organisations, more critical visions of Europe interacted with a move towards domestication, and with a downward territorial scale shift, during the financial crisis that began in 2008. The global financial crisis hit with different timing and intensity, leading EU member states to refocus their attention at the national level, as EU policies addressed the crisis as deriving from a lack of competitiveness of some national economies. While the cross-national spreading of ideas certainly happened during anti-austerity protests (della Porta & Mattoni, 2014), their rhythms and forms were strongly embedded in specific domestic timings and characteristics of the global financial crisis (della Porta, 2015, 2017).

A general shift from the transnational counter-summits and social forums to the camps of anti-austerity mobilisations in the EU has been linked to a declining interest by domestic mass movements, as well as EU social movement organisations (those that engage in more targeted, EU-level campaigns on specific European policies and legislation) in addressing EU institutions (Pianta & Gerbaudo, 2015). The turn away from the EU has been read as a strategic choice in light of closing opportunities at the European level (della Porta & Parks, 2018), as well as difficulties in organising and mobilising transnationally. Nevertheless, recent research (such as that considered in this special issue) shows that Europe remained a relevant reference for the activists of progressive social movements, notwithstanding their increasing criticism of EU policies and politics. Even if the occasions for organising EU-wide activities diminished, frames of transnational solidarity were resilient.

The analysis of the challenges Blockupy met as it tried to move on a path toward transnationalisation indicates an adaptation to the perception of closing opportunities and shrinking organisational resources. Rather than stopping any attempt at organising and acting transnationally, the perceived threats pushed towards a different strategy than the one followed by the ESF. The latter had in fact presented itself as a long-lasting process of building broad and plural networks through the construction of an alternative public sphere in which thousands of social movement organisations and tens of thousands of activists had to construct a critical knowledge. Based upon principles of consensus, the ESF privileged the discursive quality of participation, in a process oriented to build alternative visions of Europe.

In comparison with the ESF, given the different contextual conditions, for Blockupy the building of a process of coordination of European social movements proved impossible. As the perception of a closing down of opportunities interacted with increasing difficulties in mobilising resources for protest at the European level (della Porta & Parks, 2018), Blockupy tried to keep European mobilisation alive, adapting to declining opportunities and resources by triggering a political moment. Targeting the ECB in Frankfurt through disruptive forms of protest, Blockupy developed as a political moment in (at least) two meanings of the term. Firstly, Blockupy reflects a specific time and space in the evolution of the Great Recession (and of the Great Regression). Secondly, Blockupy attempted to trigger a turning point, bringing radical protests and frames ‘at the heart of neoliberal Europe’. Building upon the example of the ESF, but also of the anti-austerity acampadas in Spain and Greece, Blockupy aimed at acting as a catalyser of protests in Germany and other EU countries. Active during the financial crisis, Blockupy carried out loosely-coordinated, disruptive moments of protest, aimed at generating solidarity among the various domestic struggles against austerity, including those at the core of European (financial) capitalism (Mullis, 2015; see also Bruckmiller & Scholl, 2016).

Faced with very fluid organisational networks at the EU level, and sporadic occasions for Europe-wide protest, the framing of Europe became more and more critical. While transnationalisation of protest remained the aim, the path of Europeanisation developed rather through solidarisation among domestic movements based on limited cross-national ties and occasional shared participation in transnational protest events. While strongly critical of the EU institutions, the progressive movements that grew from the ashes of the social forum process maintained a cosmopolitan vision, with an inclusive definition of the European demonstrations. Rather than pointing to a return to the national level, it appealed to solidarity among similar struggles, perceived as converging on a common platform, and still locating Europe as a main terrain for progressive struggles.

While acknowledging difficulties in mobilising transnationally, with closing opportunities and shrinking resources, campaigns such as Blockupy can be seen as an attempt at catalysing a European convergence through disruptive action. In fact, we can link the very conception of Blockupy to adaptation to a momentous time, characterised by a perception of crisis and sudden change that accelerates time and increases uncertainty (della Porta, 2018). As I note elsewhere:

As ruptures in routine emerge, protests aim at producing a momentous effect, challenging the established order. In social movement studies, some protest events have been considered as particularly capable of triggering abrupt transformation. In what follows, I argue that Blockupy aimed at creating solidarity in action among various national movements by ‘creating a moment’. Differently than in the ESF, attention focused on the organisation of disruptive events that could catalize attention by different domestic movements.

The empirical research presented in this article focused on a critical case study. While other parts of the broader comparative project presented in this special issue addressed the Europeanisation of progressive movements at the national level, Blockupy has been selected as the main attempt to keep alive the experience of the ESF, building upon organisational networks, collective frames and action strategies that had developed during that process. Only partially successful in this attempt, the case of Blockupy is crucial for an analysis of the challenges produced by changing contextual conditions, as well as on strategic adaptation to them through the development of a path of solidarisation.

The case study is mainly based upon an analysis of the organisational documents, retrieved from the organisations’ websites. These documents were studied through a conceptual scheme constructed around some of the main dimensions usually adopted for frame analysis: diagnostic frames (referring to the causes of problems), prognostic frames (referring to potential solutions), and motivational frames (referring to the reasons to act) (Caiani, della Porta, & Wagemann, 2012). I first read the documents thematically, based on some of the main concepts that I had derived from discourse analysis of documents of the ESF in the 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2006 editions (della Porta, 2009a). Based on this first reading, I integrated the conceptual scheme and then proceeded to a second reading, based on the more complex conceptual framework.

The document analysis has been integrated by in-depth interviews with two core organisers, representing two main ideological but also generational components within the Blockupy campaign. The interviewees were asked questions about the framing of opponents and of the self, as well as their diagnosis and prognosis (with particular attention to visions of Europe), the organisational networking between different groups and generations of activists (with particular attention to cross-national contacts), and the evolution of the organisational repertoires (with particular attention to the targeting of EU institutions).

The data thus retrieved were triangulated with the analysis of press archives and existing sociological research on Blockupy itself. In addition, in order to assess the evolution in time of processes of social movement transnationalization, I referred to the data collected on the ESF during the project on Democracy in Europe and the Mobilization of the Society (della Porta, 2007; della Porta, 2009a, 2009b; della Porta, Andretta, Mosca, & Reiter, 2006).

Social movement studies have traditionally pointed to the importance of networked organisational structures. The ESF was defined as a ‘network of networks’ (or even a ‘movement of movements’) connecting various local, national and transnational struggles. In its campaign, the ESF could mobilise resources for transnational mobilisations coming also from more structured organisations, including unions, NGOs, and even left-wing parties (della Porta, 2009a, 2009b). Lacking sufficient resources for the development of a process of transnational mobilisation, Blockupy attempted instead to promote an upward scale shift in mobilisation through disruptive direct action oriented to fuel transnational solidarity.

Blockupy emerged in some respect in continuity with the ESF, having been announced in 2012 in Florence at the transnational forum, called at the tenth anniversary of the first ESF:

The political and social bases of Blockupy were, however, narrower than the ones mobilised by the ESF, as well as by the Indignados in other countries, as Blockupy was able to involve only the more left-wing oriented component within a process that was, since the beginning, perceived as skewed towards those already politically active. In particular, according to an interviewee, ‘it was always clear, after the government made the deal with the automobile industry for shorter hours in the week, that it would never be like an indignados movement’ (INTBL1).

The organisational efforts focused on the blockades, which involved ‘preparatory meetings to train “skills for action”, administrative struggles for an official Blockupy protest camp in Frankfurt, and funds, which needed to be raised’ (Palm, 2014; see also Skaerlund Risager, 2018). In order to accomplish these organisational tasks, Blockupy maintained a loose coordination structure made of KoKreis (Koordinierungskreis, ‘Coordinatory Circles’), which were in large part autonomous from each other. According to an activist:

In comparison with the well-structured organisational process of the ESF (della Porta, 2009b), the organisational structure of Blockupy remained very informal, based upon a large use of social media for internal and external communication (Neumayer, Rossi, & Karlsson, 2016). Accused by some activists of being too hierarchical, Blockupy’s organiational structure was pragmatically oriented to the management of protest, based on the assumption that ‘to have a movement, someone has to organize it’ (INTBL1). As an activist remembered: Initially conceived as a national campaign against financial capitalism and austerity policies, Blockupy was involved in the mentioned days of actions against the ECB in Frankfurt, alongside social movement organisations from other European countries. However, transnational contacts remained informal and sporadic. As an activist remembered, the project to build a European network developed especially since 2012 in order to express transnational solidarity: So, at the international level, a very loose cross-national coordination grew out of voluntary commitment and chance encounters, with perceived difficulties in upward scale shifting in comparison with the previous wave of protest. The contextual differences were acknowledged by the activists, As organisational resources to invest at the transnational level remained scarce (with very little material help even from the Left Parliamentary group in the European Parliament), transnational meetings were only occasionally called in Brussels, with some funds from foundations like the Rosa Luxembourg Stiftung (linked to the party Die Linke). Faced with poor internal resources, attempts at transnational coordination remained much more limited than in the ESF, building upon occasional ties for the organisation of specific events.

Social movement studies have traditionally considered protests as a resource for the ‘powerless’, raising the attention of necessary allies through disruptive forms of collective action (della Porta & Diani, 2020). The ESF had organised complex protest events involving a multiplicity of performances, aiming at the construction of free spaces for debates, but also carried out massive marches in the streets. Moving from one European city to the next, the ESF mobilised activists from all over Europe and beyond, addressing EU institutions (della Porta, 2009a, 2009b). While Blockupy explicitly targeted one of the most important EU institutions, the ECB, it mainly mobilised German activists in more disruptive forms, which resonated with a moment of perceived weakness, restricting the range of potential participants.

In its repertoire of action, Blockupy took over some of the performances of action of the EU counter-summits of the previous decade, but developed them within a more radical conception of civil disobedience. The choice of the form of action was based on a reflection on the movement’s limits, but also some potential strengths in building upon German movements’ experiences with direct action in previous conflicts. As an activist recalled:

The situation of crisis was mentioned in the interviews as one of the causes of a shift from mass protests to civil disobedience, by way of non-violent resistance.

In particular, the days of action in Frankfurt involved the organisation of an anti-capitalist camp, a blockade of the ECB, and the ‘Blockupation’ of the main commercial street, the Zeil. During the day of mobilisation, the protest camp dually functioned as a space for identity construction, and an organiational space, with meetings to coordinate action, workshops to exchange knowledge, and daily general assemblies. In this, it ‘reflected the wide political spectrum of Blockupy, which remained fragmented in its appearance, yet unified by the overall organization of the camp’ (Palm, 2014). In fact:

The prefiguration of different social relations included ‘solidarity, democratic decision taking, rejection of discrimination [as] underlying social values protestors tried to realize within the spaces produced, especially in the Camp Anticapitalista’ (Palm, 2014).

As its very name indicates, the core of the campaign was in the organisation of action of civil disobedience. So, the very term Blockupy

The Blockupy days implied three elements: debates, mass demonstrations, and civil disobedience, in a precise temporal evolution in which the blockade took the most relevant role. Presented as ‘konkret [etwas] anders zu machen’ (‘to concretely do something different’), the blockade was considered an effective way of pressuring institutions (Mullis, 2015). The organisation of the blockade was in fact articulated in order to achieve the symbolic aim of bypassing the police lines. The activists formed ‘reference groups’, or bandits, made of ‘fingers’, each of which belonged to an ‘arm’, that was the starting point of one of the paths through which the ECB was to be reached. So, ‘Each finger had its own destination close to the ECB, and a uniquely colored leading flag in order to give orientation in case the situation would get hectic’. Fingers could then subdivide in small groups – as ‘the police chain might turn porous, and activists could trickle into the restricted area little by little’ (Palm, 2014).

After a first wave of protest that focused on the blocking of the ECB, a second wave followed in order to outline the connections between austerity and more specific problems, in particular precarity and migration. Left to the self-organisation of various networks of activists, these actions had to broaden the Blockupy network (INTBL1). Civil disobedience was practised to oppose the deportation of migrants or the exploitation of workers in the production and selling of commercial products. Actions around the main shopping street in Frankfurt involved mainly symbolic provocations which were to disturb ‘global value chains at their most local, and therefore vulnerable point during the protests, namely at the point where products were supposed to be purchased’ (Blockupy, 2013). In the 2013 edition of the Blockupy protests:

While the ESF privileged the construction of arenas for the development of alternative knowledge, Blockupy aimed at disruptive actions as moments of expression of radical opposition. The use of blockades as a repertoire of action builds upon German-specific experiences, having been employed already in the 1980s against the Castor transport of nuclear waste, and then transformed during a new wave of protests early in the 2000s. While the traditional anti-Castor protest blockades were carried out at the individual level, in a later development the activists publicly announced their plans for civil disobedience: ‘we say what we do and we do what we say’, in order to stress that ‘we are breaking rules, we are on the move, and we are going where it is necessary to be’ (INTBL2). In particular, since 2009, as a younger generation had joined anti-nuclear protests, the blockade script went beyond the typical occupation by removing stones from the track. As an activist explained: Blockades were then also adapted to the urban setting, for instance during anti-fascist protests or the G8 counter-summits in Heiligendamm in 2007, as activists started to protect themselves with the asserted goal ‘not to fight with the police, but to be there, with many people, with decisions based on consensus’ (INTBL2). The anti-G8 protests in Heiligendamm were in fact a transformative event in which also several future activists of Blockupy had participated (INTBL1).

Visibility increased as direct (even if non-violent) action brought about frequent conflicts with the police; according to an interviewee, ‘the police stays on the way, and we try to go through the police line creatively, and we use protection, which is highly criminalised of course’ (INTBL2). The interactions with the police seem however to become a core concern, with the main message being embedded in the choreography of the action itself. As an activist explained:

The radicalism of the action was considered as a way to catalyse attention in a situation of low mobilisation: ‘We knew we were never going over the 30,000’ (INTBL1). While able to attract attention, the event itself was however of limited use to build cross-national ties.

The choices in terms of repertoires of organisation and action are linked with some framing of problems and solutions. As mentioned, frames are the dominant world views which guide the behaviour of social movement groups, defining first and foremost the ‘us’ and ‘them’. Looking at the process of attribution of meaning, which lies behind the conflict, Snow and Benford (1988) distinguish diagnostic, prognostic and motivational dimensions of framing, referring respectively to the recognition of certain occurrences as social problems; the singling out of possible strategies which would resolve these; and the creation of motivations for acting on this knowledge. On all these dimensions, the framing of the protests by Blockupy is a development and adaptation of the discourse of the ESF to the economic, social and political circumstances of the multiple crises in Europe. In comparison with the framing processes within the ESF, the diagnosis is more critical of the politics, policies and polity of the European Union, in terms of its extremely neoliberal socio-economic policies. The EU is also defined as politically illiberal, and the prognosis is more radical in its proposals, assessing ‘turbulent times’ as times of deep changes. In this context, motivations are provided to act as a spark, a triggering moment, that can prompt a convergence of domestic struggles.

In the diagnostic framing, we find a clear perception of a closing down of political opportunities at the EU level. As in the ESF, neoliberal capitalism is defined as a main target, as ‘the EU is a space of power that we are facing, and we have to face it at that level’ (INTBL2). In comparison to the ESF, there is however a more critical view of financial capitalism as well as of illiberal politics.

For Blockupy, financial capitalism is symbolised first and foremost by the ECB. Alongside it, EU institutions are stigmatised as ‘the EU’s neoliberal elites with their ongoing austerity politics and the growth of nationalism and right-wing populism across Europe’ (Blockupy, 2017a). They are accused of supporting a ‘disciplinary neoliberalism’, which attributes responsibility for the crisis to ‘irresponsible’ governments and ‘lazy citizens’. The activists thus target ‘the authoritarian crisis management of the Troika (and its major source of inspiration, the German federal government)’ (Blockupy, 2015a).

EU institutions are stigmatised for promoting the retrenchment of social and labour rights through the imposition of neoliberalism on national governments. So:

Expressing solidarity with the Nuit Debout movement in France (della Porta & Felicetti, 2018), Blockupy states that: Disciplinary neoliberalism is also singled out in the closing of external borders. Stigmatising the global role of the EU, the activists contest ‘the imperial Europe of the ruling order’, as ‘this Europe is destroying the world’ (Blockupy, 2016a). Europe is especially criticised for the position taken towards refugees, within an emergent vision of a colonial Europe. In particular: Contesting the very existence of borders in Europe, Blockupy called for a blockade of the German Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, stating: The spreading of racism in Europe is linked to austerity and the ensuing decay of the EU, as: With the political shift to the Right –that ‘uses the broken promises of happiness and freedom in neoliberalism to defend the privileges of a white Germany with a toxic cocktail of overt racism, social-chauvinist criticism of the system and reactionary anti-feminism’— the EU is also perceived as in deep crisis, with Brexit being the most visible sign that ‘the neoliberal Europe has started to decay openly’ (2016g).

The context of crisis brings about fragmentation and potential tensions among different countries given the specifically domestic characteristics it has, as well as the increased competition between national economies it brings about. Therefore:

The diagnosis so connects various criticisms in:

In sum, austerity is considered as at the basis of repression. The very perceived closure of political opportunities brings about a conception of action as a catalyser of struggle, as there was in fact ‘little hope in changing the institution, which has to do with the fact that the EU has shown its authoritarian and neoliberal face’ (INTBL2).

As for prognostic framing, as in the ESF, a struggle for ‘social rights, democracy and a radically different Europe’ is called for. Faced with ‘the emergence of false, nationalist alternatives to the ‘no alternative’ regime of the neoliberal European elites’, in order to make ‘visible the ‘invisible threads’ that are connecting apparently particular austerity regimes, right-wing mobilizations, impoverishment and centers of power’, the need is stressed to fight back in the respective contexts, given the ‘ specific shapes of power as well as alliances of protest’ (Blockupy, 2016f).

The crisis itself is also perceived as potentially opening opportunities. With reference to Antonio Gramsci, turbulent times are singled out as a situation of ‘instability and unpredictability’:

Nevertheless, the perception is also that it is possible to open up opportunities: After the hopes and disillusionment around the Greek referendum of 2015,¹ the need to construct a Europe of solidarity is particularly stressed during the so-called summer of migration, which is seen as ‘bringing drama to Europe’, but also promoting waves of solidarity all over Europe:

National struggles against precarity and borders are perceived as addressing similar conditions, which are presented as an outcome of EU institutional pressures. This attribution of similarity grounds solidarity in a common frame. Struggles are linked in the narrative of the neoliberal attack:

Specific national struggles became symbols of common resistance to common problems, such as precarity. So, in expressing solidarity to the Nuit Debout movement, Blockupy states ‘your struggle is our struggle – a struggle against a Europe of austerity and borders, a struggle for a very different Europe’ (Blockupy, 2016c). So, Blockupy declared, it wanted to strengthen ‘the convergence of struggles that is currently taking place in France against the Labor Bill and its system and austerity policies which are creating a society of injustice, precarity and inequalities’ (Blockupy 2016e). Thus, a main slogan reads, ‘They want capitalism without democracy, but we want democracy without capitalism!’ (Blockupy, 2014b). More explicitly than in the ESF, the relevant transnational space is considered as going ‘beyond Europe’. As the organisation stated: Within an internationalist conception, Europe is considered as too narrow a point of reference: ‘to say only Europe contradicts our internationalist vision’ (INTBL2). There is then a perceived urgent need to construct another Europe: ‘When if not now! Everywhere in Europe we know very well that there must be something else: a Europe from below, a Europe without borders, a Europe of social rights, of struggles, of guarantees’ (Blockupy 2016e).

Rejected is instead ‘the idea that national sovereignty can be a solution in the direction of freedom against exploitation’ This is because Blockupy ‘[does not] want to save Schengen by securing external borders, we want freedom of movement for all’ (Blockupy, 2016a). Claiming ‘a Europe of social movements’, Blockupy states it supports ‘neither this EU nor a return to the national’, but rather aims at creating ‘space for a Europe of struggles, that is currently fragmented, but in which it can become visible again and in which the experiences gained during the last years of struggles can converge’ (Blockupy, 2016a). In particular, while the construction of a European identity is at odds with the recognition of the exploitation that Europe externalises outside, as well as the territorialisation of the crisis, a transnational perspective is considered as ‘a new way to breathe together’ in the ‘becoming crisis’ of financial capitalism and its multiple crises.

While still focusing on ‘building a Europe from below’, Europe is, however, a difficult issue to address given the Euroscepticism on the political right and the perceived risk of any criticism being assimilated with right-wing ones. As an activist observed:

On the other hand, there is the perception that it ‘would be too divisive if we took too much of a position on Europe’, as it is ‘difficult to talk about differences’ (INTBL1). As an activist explained: In sum, while the EU and its management of the financial crisis is strongly stigmatised, Blockupy still aim at building another Europe, transforming the crisis into an opportunity for struggling against inequalities.

As for the motivational frame, the definition of the identity was to a certain extent similar to the one developed by the ESF, which had defined itself as a point of culmination of various national and transnational campaigns targeting the EU (della Porta, 2009a). Along the same lines, Blockupy presents itself on its webpage as:

As for the ESF, the aim is ‘to create a common European movement, united in diversity, which can break the rule of austerity and will start to build democracy and solidarity from below’ (Blockupy n.d.). The assumption is then that ‘together, we – migrants and students, precarious, industry workers and citizens – can link our struggles and impose another agenda to this austerity regime. To stop the destruction of social and political rights, we will fight back!’ (Blockupy, 2016d).

At the very origins of Blockupy is the hope of triggering a moment of struggle, even under unfavourable conditions. Initially, against growing frustration with the organisation of traditional marches, the Occupy movements provided some inspiration, pushing towards adapting its main organisational format to the German situation. The experiences in other countries catalysed attention in a country characterised by very different experiences of the crisis. So, as an activist noted:

Against this backdrop, later on Blockupy started to aim at providing a catalyst for a transnationaliation of struggles through disruptive forms of protests that could call attention to the EU’s responsibility in the crisis. Especially after the repression of the first campaigns, Blockupy presented itself as ‘a transnational, Europe-wide point of reference for the fact that, even in the center of the crisis regime, resistance and solidarity are still possible’ (Blockupy, 2015a).

As ‘another Europe has not just to be mentioned but practiced’ (Blockupy, 2015b), social movements have to make and unmake Europe: ‘While an increase of networking has taken place in the past years, we still have not found the practices to translate separate struggles into a transnational movement’ (Blockupy, 2014a). Since a ‘Europe of struggles’ needs struggles in order to grow, Blockupy presented itself as ‘the label for solidarity and resistance against austerity and authoritarian crisis management’ and ‘a transnational, Europe-wide point of reference for the fact that, even in the center of the crisis regime, resistance and solidarity are still possible’. The organisation of counter-summits is perceived as a way to build transnational ties and other visions of Europe. So, Blockupy calls for transnational resistance, stating that ‘Europe is our minimum space of political action and initiative’ (Blockupy, 2015b).

The aim of Blockupy is thus defined as catalysing a ‘Europe of struggles’, going from rebel cities to the protest campaign for women’s self-determination in Poland, or the fight against the neoliberal labour reforms such as the Loi Travail, through the (anti-racist) rights4all campaigns, and to defend the Commons. These are all considered as testifying to a ‘possibility that the development of intense conflictual social dynamics pushes forward radical social and political transformation towards freedom, equality and democracy’ (Blockupy, 2016h).

Against a return to the ‘narrow dimension of National States and to their old reactionary values’, Blockupy suggests:

The call is then to: The explicit aim is to connect the various national struggles within a conception of transnational solidarity as ‘an outcry against the sellout and permanent uncertainty, against the submission, disciplining and castigation, against the exploitation all over Europe and beyond … against both the neoliberal competition as well as the right agitation of fear’ (Blockupy 2016e). These struggles should develop ‘the cracks of the multiple crises within the EU’ (Blockupy 2016e). Given examples of these ‘crises’ are: Blockupy is thus perceived as embedded in All in all, Blockupy is considered as ‘a positive moment for European change’, giving the ‘opportunity to become a European voice, in the making’, ‘an opportunity we used, but opportunities are not always there’ (INTBL1).

In conclusion, contrary to the ESF that was presented as a well-structured transnational political process, Blockupy aims at triggering a political moment. In this sense, the organisation of disruptive protest events were to catalyse a transnational organiational process in the construction of a Europe of solidarity, against the neoliberal EU that could build upon anti-austerity struggles at the domestic level. In fact, Blockupy itself did not follow a transnational path, by building EU-wide organisational structures, but neither remained constrained within a path of domestication, aiming at putting pressure on national government. Rather, it presented itself as an expression of transnational solidarity.

From the point of view of the mobilisation of resources, the protest campaigns were based on a very loose network of what is defined as a ‘mosaic of struggles’ and pragmatically oriented to the organisation of annual events in Frankfurt. Even if inclusive, the campaign involved just a part of the movement pillars that had converged in the ESF – mobilising only a few supporters outside of the radical Left. Differently than in the ESF, based on well-structured and long-lasting networks, in Blockupy the transnational organisational level mainly consisted of informal ties, activated for specific occasions.

In terms of action, the Blockupy campaign was a synthesis of past forms of actions (such as the debates and march of the Social Forum, but also the camps and the blockades of the counter-summits) with the protest camps of anti-austerity protests. While choosing symbolic EU targets, such as the ECB, the protest remained mainly national in its composition, and the main event oriented to the practice of civil disobedience as a signal of the possibility of resistance. The use of direct action allowed for visibility, but also alienated potential sympathisers outside of the mobilised social movement area. Also, differently from the ESF, while allowing for various performances to be used by groups with different preferences, the organisation of the days of action in Frankfurt did not trigger massive and sustained interactions among groups with different experiences of mobilisation at the national level.

The frame analysis indicates that the perception of closed opportunities was linked to the organiation of disruptive actions oriented to trigger a broader convergence of protest campaigns in various European countries. In the diagnostic frame, in fact, Europe is seen as a space of power which, additionally, is in deep crisis, with the emergence of authoritarian and racist trends. It is not only neoliberal in terms of the claimed relations between the state and the market, but also illiberal in terms of the restriction of political and civil rights, notably the right to dissent. From the prognostic point of view, there is however the perception that turbulent times have a revolutionary potential that needs to be stimulated at national and transnational levels. Motivational frames point to the need to catalyse a convergence of struggles against precarity and exclusion, inequalities and repression. If the left-wing, long-lasting commitment to internationalism makes the search for another Europe resilient, even faced with the increasing importance of national dynamics, a discourse of solidarity with comrades struggling in other European countries does not translate into the building of European collective identities.

In sum, while the ESF was conceived as a process of Europeaniation from below, Blockupy focused on the aim of triggering important moments of convergence in the struggles for social justice In a context where the perceived closure of EU institution towards those claims, the development of Euroscepticism on the right, made the articulation of a critique of the EU more difficult. In this situation, Blockupy can be seen as aiming at creating a political moment through the use of disruptive forms of action that could catalyse solidarity in action. In this sense, besides the perception of a closure of opportunities at both the European and domestic level, given the growth of racism and the radical right, turbulent times are seen as critical moments in which monsters are born, but also in which alternative progressive visions emerge. Notwithstanding the perception of a loss of collective resources for a transnatialisation path towards Europeanisation, moments of disruption as in the Blockupy days of struggles are framed as useful cracks, fuelling transnational solidarities by catalysing attention toward the common enemies.

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.