SURVEILLANCE IN GERMANY AFTER 9/11: The case of immigrants from Turkey

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, surveillance pressure on immigrants increased considerably. The trend was the globalization of surveillance of the world population but especially of immigrants. 9/11 was not a turning point, however, since surveillance was already headed towards being globalized. The post-9/11 context accelerated this process. The economic and political developments that have taken place after 9/11 demonstrate that the processes of globalization, immigration and surveillance are closely linked. Today, immigrants from Turkey in Germany experience surveillance within this context. The regulations of the European Union, the policies of the German government and global political-economic processes play interdependent roles in this surveillance which is now more intensified, focused, arbitrary and widespread. Those groups who are economically, religiously, politically, and culturally marginalized are the primary targets of surveillance. The case of immigrants from Turkey can be used to exemplify the surveillance of immigrants in advanced capitalist countries.

Immigrants from Turkey in Germany have been among the obvious targets of surveillance practices. A surveillance-based sociological analysis is crucial to better explain how changes in the social context after the attacks on 9/11 have affected them. Surveillance regimes show the complex relations between globalization and immigration processes. Surveillance is a key sociological concept to understanding the wider social context of immigrants from Turkey in Germany. This paper conceptualizes surveillance based on both classical and contemporary figures (Foucault 1979, 1995; Lyon 1994, 2001; Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Dean 1999; Bigo 2001b). Surveillance involves the production and control of knowledge of individuals and groups through registration systems, databases, monitoring and checking procedures. This production is essential for controlling the movements of people and managing the associated risk stemming from their movements.

The focus of this paper is the surveillance experiences of immigrants from Turkey in Germany during the post-9/11 period. This paper does not argue that this type of surveillance is unique. Nor does it claim that the post-9/11 conditions of immigrants in Germany have been different from those of immigrants in other advanced nations. This paper suggests that the case of immigrants from Turkey within the German context may help clarify the characteristics of surveillance practices over immigrants in advanced capitalist societies. The paper does not give a complete comparative history of surveillance over immigrants from Turkey in order to keep the focus on the 9/11 context. Instead, it offers a concise illumination of surveillance history to show that surveillance after 9/11 has become more intensified, arbitrary and focused.

After a short methodological note on the immigrant associations conducted for interviews, the paper proceeds with an explanation of the relationship between the processes of immigration and surveillance during the second half of the twentieth century. Then, it provides a brief historical background of surveillance over immigrants from Turkey in Germany. The paper continues with an analysis of surveillance in Germany and Europe at the turn of the twenty-first century with special emphasis on the post-9/11 situation. Afterwards, the present social context is illuminated, arguing that surveillance is now more globalized and intensified. Last, the paper examines current surveillance regimes in Germany. The basic concern of the paper is to offer a picture of the surveillance effects of the post-9/11 political-economic environment on immigrants by relying on the real-life experiences of immigrants from Turkey in Germany.

The empirical data on which this article is based were collected during fieldwork in Turkey in 2004 and in Germany in 2005. The interviews were conducted in Berlin and Cologne, Germany. I contacted 12 immigrant associations, the chair of a project, a journalist from a Turkey-based newspaper, and a Turkish academic. In total, I conducted 16 interviews. Nine associations have been continuing their activities for more than 20 years. During all these years, considerable information has been accumulated within these associations about the lives of immigrants. These associations have been the centres for preserving cultural experiences of immigrants and places where the problems of immigrants were solved. The representatives of these associations have been dealing with the problems of immigrants for a long time. They connect the daily experiences of immigrants to the institutions. They are quite knowledgeable about the policies and applications of federal and provincial governments.

In terms of political affiliation, most of these associations hold leftist-secular profiles. However, their positions are in fact varied. For example, although the Populist Revolutionary Union and the Turkish Social Democrats Association both have social democratic orientations, the standpoint of the latter can be described as more nationalist. The associations that can be located politically close to the centre are the Berlin-Brandenburg Society of Turkey, the Women's Union of Turkey and the Turkish-German Businessmen Association in Berlin-Brandenburg. The Turkish Community in Berlin and the organization attached to the Turkish state address the concerns of conservative-nationalist sections of immigrants from Turkey.

The immigration pattern between 1946 and 2000 can be described as ‘constrained mass migration’. During this period, the receiving countries formulated four fundamental policies. The first policy was ‘guestworker systems’ implemented especially during the post-World War II years. The second policy represented a passage to worldwide quotas. Receiving countries, at least seemingly, abandoned the previous systems based on national origins. Third, humanitarian issues were influential in decisions on immigration. As a consequence of this policy, some receiving countries issued amnesties for illegal immigrants. The last policy was that countries began to grant visas ‘on the basis of skills’ (Chiswick and Hatton 2003: 74–101).

European countries have restrictive immigration policies and diverse approaches for the inclusion and exclusion of migrants. The integration of European countries is an important factor in the formation of these policies. During the second half of the twentieth century, European countries have decided to cooperate on migration control. The core countries of European integration, such as Germany, France, Italy and The Netherlands rapidly developed common strategies. Nonetheless, they have limited common inclusion measures for immigrants due to the discrepancies between national frameworks (Geddes 2000: 172). The function of European borders is to differentiate between desirable and undesirable flows (Andreas 2000: 4) and to permit skilled immigrants to be a part of the European production and consumption systems. Border controls are employed not only on territorial borders, but at a variety of places including consulates, transportation companies, third countries, the police and other public authorities (Anderson 2000: 24). Thus, European borders have more than a territorial character. There is a system border (Engbersen 2001: 242).

The position of immigrants is weakened by both nation-states and the European Union (EU). Immigrants are seen as people who must be subject to control, so immigration becomes a control issue. This is because most developed countries and the EU perceive immigrants as a risk factor. Immigration is conceptualized as a problem that should be solved rather than as a social phenomenon that should be examined and understood. Immigrants all-too-easily become stereotyped as troublemakers who must be subjected to constant surveillance. The aim of such surveillance is the reorganization of immigrants’ movements in line with the requirements of receiving countries. ‘Immigration policy becomes control policy’ (Guiraudon and Joppke 2001: 15). Selection criteria are established to pick less ‘deviant’ individuals who can adapt to the ‘normal life’ in receiving countries. All immigrants are still seen as a risk factor. The aim is to reduce the possible negative effects of these risk factors through various policing strategies. In the example of the EU, Didier Bigo suggests that the policing of immigration is undertaken by means of numerous networks. The first is ‘administrative networks’ that are composed of ‘customs officers, immigration officers, consulates, private transport and security companies, national police forces and gendarmes’. The second is ‘technology (computing, video-surveillance) and information networks (Interpol, SIS, and Europol)’. Third, ‘administrative personnel networks’ include the representatives of governments in a foreign country, such as ‘liaison officers, European department heads in the Interior and Justice Ministries, security attachés in embassies’. Finally, there are ‘semantic networks’, the aim of which is to generate opinions on the administration of so-called ‘abnormal’ groups (Bigo 2001a: 135–6; see also Bigo and Guild 2005; Ceyhan 2005).

The Netherlands, Germany and England are using biomedical technologies in registration procedures against illegal immigration. The Netherlands employs internal border control in conjunction with external border control. ‘Street-level bureaucrats’ who work in labour agencies, schools, housing agencies, welfare departments and hospitals are involved in policing illegal immigrants (Engbersen 2001: 241–2). Private and public control organizations effectively exploit information and communication technologies. Especially after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the utilization of these technologies reached a massive scale. A global surveillance network is emerging to control immigration movements. The main partners of this surveillance network are advanced capitalist nations. According to Manuel Castells, today's new economy has three key characteristics. It is ‘informational, global and networked’ and it is ‘certainly capitalist’ (Castells 2000: 10–1). Castells's defining characteristics can be also used to describe contemporary surveillance. The global capitalist order necessitates a global society of surveillance. It needs ‘mobile, flexible workers who are willing (or obliged) to cross borders for employment’. Intelligence is crucial for this order. Surveillance gains importance since it enables the global order to apply a system of social sorting that provides essential categorizations related to intelligence (Lyon 2001: 104).

Surveillance over immigrants from Turkey primarily began with the recruitment agreement between the Turkish and German governments. The permits for residence and employment would be limited to two years. These permits could be renewed up to three years. Potential workers had to go through a full practical examination that tested their professional skills and pass a detailed medical check-up (Eryılmaz 2002: 1–2). Successful candidates signed bilingual contracts and were given a German identification card. When they arrived in Germany, they had to ‘register with the police and apply for a residence permit’ (Bendix 1985: 28–9). During the initial years, the recruitment of guestworkers was arranged in accordance with ‘the Nazi Auslanderpolizeiverordnung of 1938’ (Joppke 1999: 66). The Aliens Act of 1965 maintained the contents of the 1933 Alien Employee Order and the 1938 Alien Police Order (Hoffmann 1999: 363). The Act comprised only issues of entry, temporary stay, deportation and few political rights (Ansay 1991: 834–40). When Germany started to recruit foreign workers in 1953, it concurrently established a central database, the Central Foreigners Register or ‘Auslanderzentralregister’ (AZR). The register was automated in 1967. The AZR law in 1994 legitimized the legal and technical status of the database. This database has a considerable amount of information on every foreigner living in Germany (Weichert 1995: 1–2).

Along with the recruitment ban in 1973, the children and partners of migrant workers who came to Germany after December 1, 1974, were not granted work permits. It was forbidden to move into the districts where the population of foreigners was more than 12 percent. Family reunification was possible only when migrant workers proved that they had a housing arrangement adequate for their family (Rist 1979: 100–1). In 1981, the regulation on the naturalization of ‘the second generation foreigners’ was strongly resisted by the conservative parties in Germany (Marshall 2000: 144–5). The conservative government accepted the return law in 1983 (Mehrlander 1994: 10). Until the adoption of the 1992 Foreigners Law, German citizenship was directly inclusive for ethnic Germans and exclusive for non-German immigrants (Klopp 2002: 42). In summary, Germany had three aims related to the immigration issue during the 1980s and the early 1990s. Immigration was to be restricted. The existing number of immigrants was to be reduced. The remaining immigrants were to be integrated into German society (CTS 1993: 75).

In 1963, the Ankara Agreement was signed between Turkey and the European Community, giving a direct reference to the free movement of workers between Turkey and the EC. The Additional Protocol, signed in 1970, indicated that freedom of movement for workers between Member States and Turkey would be realized in due process in accordance with the principles in the Ankara Agreement. Decision 2/1976 and 1/1980 of the Association Council argued that Turkey and the Community countries would give priority to each other's workers in their labour market (Berksü 1999). The interpretations of the Ankara Agreement, the Additional Protocol and decision 2/76 and 1/80 by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) differentiated rights of immigrants from Turkey, revealing ‘conditional and directly applicable’ cases. The ECJ also specified that the EC/U law would override national laws regarding the situation of migrant workers from Turkey. However, the member states always accentuated their sovereign rights on the matters of ‘the access to the labour market, residence and employment’ (Çiçekli 1999: 309–18).

The Trevi Group, as the first multinational initiative, aimed to start cooperation among EC/U countries against international terrorism. The Single European Act in 1986 solidified the stress for a common European policy on ‘the entry, movement, and residence of’ third country nationals. With the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the member countries launched cooperation on ‘foreign and security policies and justice and home affairs’ (Den Boer 1996: 394–401). The first Schengen Agreement had been signed in 1985. In 1990, the ‘implementation agreement’, which declared plans for the Schengen Information System, followed this. This agreement was put into effect in 1995 by seven EC/U countries, Germany, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal (Occhipinti 2003: 241–3). The border controls between these countries were to be removed; but, new measures were introduced to compensate for this removal (Thiery 1997: 2).

In summary, surveillance practices for immigrants from Turkey in Germany in the 1960s were shaped in accordance with bilateral agreements between Turkey and Germany. German authorities searched for simple data directly related to their economic productivities. In the 1970s, 1980s and the early 1990s, the influential surveillance-related applications were constructed through the multinational agreements between Turkey and the European Community/Union, and the national policies of Germany. The status of immigrants was determined both nationally and multinationally. Their economic capacity was still the primary concern. Nevertheless, while the economic capacities of immigrants were an issue of inclusion, ethnic and religious attributes were a matter for exclusion. Compared to the early years of migration from Turkey to Germany, surveillance was more widespread but still not embracing every aspect of life. Although there was a powerful surveillance network composed of German and European institutions, this network had an exclusionary approach rather than an integrative perspective.

The new citizenship law of Germany, effective as of January 1, 2000, allowed the German-born children of foreigners to keep dual citizenship on the condition that one of the parents had had lawful residence status for at least eight years or had had an ‘unlimited residence permit’ for at least three years. These children would choose one type of citizenship – German or other – before their 23rd birthday. Foreigners could apply for naturalization after eight years of legal residence. At the outset, they had to acknowledge that they would be loyal to the German constitution. Applicants must have adequate financial means to support themselves without any social benefit and must be able to speak and write sufficiently in German.¹ The new Immigration Act of Germany, effective since January 1, 2005, determines two types of residence statuses: residence permit (limited) and settlement permit (unlimited). Highly qualified migrant workers receive the settlement permit as soon as they reach the country. Exceptions to the recruitment ban for qualified workers and for some sectors that need low-skilled labour were preserved. The act makes it essential for immigrants to have sufficient German language skills and the knowledge of social and legal aspects of German life. Immigrants who come to Germany for the first time have to take integration courses. The federal government or the highest provincial offices can make a deportation decision if there is a threat against the interests of the federal state. If deportation is not possible for political reasons, it may be ruled that the respective immigrants go to the nearest police station to declare their presence every day. The court may also restrict the immigrants’ rights of communication and free movement.²

The Amsterdam Treaty, signed in 1997 and effective since 1999, was a significant step in cooperation between the EU countries. The treaty aimed to create common plans regarding third countries and forced an increase in cooperation on immigration and asylum issues (Van Oudenaren 2004: 47). The Tampere summit in 1999 focused on ‘asylum and immigration policy, the creation of a European area of Justice; and the fight against transnational crime’ (Monar 2002: 191). Immigration was now to be considered the responsibility of both the EU and the member countries (Lorentzen 2004: 166). The 9/11 attacks significantly augmented the attempts of the EU to develop common surveillance policies. According to the 2002 report of the European Commission, common standards on immigration comprised concerns about legal immigrants’ situations in residence issues, movements of third country nationals, illegal immigration, smuggling and trafficking and the conditions of refugees (CEC 2002: 17). The proposal of the Commission in 2004 for the Visa Information System (VIS) aimed to help exchange data with the objective of precluding ‘threats’ against the member states (CEC 2004a: 2–43). In conjunction with the VIS, the EU was planning to extend the application of Eurodac (fingerprint database) to third country nationals and EU citizens (Aus 2003: 4–31). In February 2004, the European Commission prepared a proposal to determine the principles for security issues and the use of biometrics in EU citizens’ passports. The long-term aim of this proposal was to construct a central database that would include information about all travel documents (CEC 2004: 1–8). The Hague Programme, agreed in November 2004, put considerable emphasis on security measures in the name of ‘strengthening freedom’, giving little place for the issues on ‘fair treatment of third country nationals’ (Balzacq and Carrera 2006: 5–6). In December 2004, the Council of the EU issued a directive based on the proposal of the Commission prepared in February 2004 (CEU 2004). In its report of September 1, 2005, on migration and development, the European Commission proposed to create a ‘migration profile’ for willing developing countries (CEC 2005: 35–7). The common agenda declared by the Commission on the same day argued that successful integration necessitated that immigrants acquire ‘basic knowledge of the host society's language, history and institutions’ (CEC 2005: 15–7).

The terrorist attacks on September 11 rendered Muslim immigrants the main target of surveillance in Germany. According to the decision of the Tiergarten Peace Court, systematic searches must be directed at social groups composed of Muslims who create an impression of being innocent, who travel a lot, who are financially independent, and who take/took airplane piloting lessons (Kutscha 2001: 6) irregardless of whether they are part of a fundamentalist group. In the aftermath of 9/11, almost all Arab students in the universities and some immigrants from Turkey were interrogated. The annual report of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution indicates that in 2003, of 3,700 foreign Islamic fundamentalists in Berlin 2,900 were from Turkey (see also Jonker and Amiraux 2006).³ The reaction to 9/11 initiated arbitrary surveillance practices. An event that Merih Ünel experienced is frightening. Ünel currently has an administrative position in the Populist Revolutionary Union (HDB). Founded in 1973, the HDB is the first social democrat association of immigrants from Turkey in Germany struggling for equal legal, political and social rights.

About 25 years ago, Uğur Mumcu,⁴ a Turkish journalist, requested information from Ünel about an Islamic group in Germany. Ünel asked this group whether they could send their magazine to him. They not only sent a copy of their magazine but continued to send every issue over the last 25 years for free. After 9/11, this group was a significant target of the German police. One night in early 2004, the police broke into the house of Ünel with the accusation of his being a member of this Islamic group:

The developments during the late-1990s were crucial signs of a more integrative approach emerging towards immigrants both in European and German contexts. The significant point was that there were more specific and comprehensive criteria in terms of integration of immigrants, which necessitated the realization of more pervasive surveillance practices. The social context after 9/11 accelerated this process. The surveillance network targeting immigrants spread in influence. The effects of its administrative aspect expanded through the post-9/11 implementations of the EU and Germany. Furthermore, the utilization of technological (VIS, Eurodac) and personnel (the Commission's initiatives) networks increased. Finally, semantic networks, for instance the German courts, augmented their effects across a broader public. Thus, surveillance became more specific, prevalent and focused.

Currently, surveillance mechanisms are spreading especially in first world countries. But, there are several indications of the trend towards a global surveillance society. The first one is the profiling of Muslims, immigrants and visitors by the United States. The second is the creation of population registration systems by means of biometric passports. The third is the construction of systems to control movements of people. Fourth, an infrastructure is being built to further track electronic communication. The fifth is that all government and private databases are increasingly converging at national and international levels. Sixth, the mistakes and abuses within surveillance systems are increasing. The seventh is that there is a growing convergence between the policing elements of different countries and the military operations of the United States (see Bunyan 2005). Eighth, surveillance has become a huge business with an extensive market. The ninth is the attrition of ‘democratic processes’ such as the presumption of innocence. Finally, the tenth is the erosion of ‘moral’ approaches, regarding privacy and civil liberties, as a result of controversial procedures and as a consequence of ‘social control’ (ICMS 2005: 3–30).

The EU is expanding its information networks. Proposals were made for the Schengen Information System (SIS) to hold more data for more purposes and with more access (Statewatch 2005: 1). On December 1, 2005, the European Council reaffirmed that the member countries must adapt the same minimum standards for passports and identity cards, and must develop collaboration through the regular exchange of information (CEU 2005: 29). On December 21, 2005, the European Commission suggested a policy for constructing common definitions of rights for all legally employed immigrants. It was decided to advance the European Job Mobility Portal network, to promote integration, to encourage ‘circular and return migration’, and to increase cooperation with sending countries (CEC 2005: 10–15). In March 2006, the Council of the EU announced the draft regulation for the plans for the second generation SIS. The Council reaffirmed the purpose as ‘a high level of public security, including national security’ within the EU borders (CEU 2006: 2). In October 2006, the Council decided to establish a mutual information mechanism among the member states on the issues of immigration and asylum (CEU 2006: 27). In December 2006, the Council emphasized the importance of the continuing efforts of the member states towards integrated border management composed of border checks, detection of border crimes, measures in third countries, cooperation between related authorities, and cohesion between the institutional activities of the member states and the Union itself (CEU 2006: 26–7). The Council decided in February 2007, that third-country nationals have to provide their facial image and two fingerprints as biometric identifiers to the member states (CEU 2007: 2).

While the EU is fortifying its surveillance substructure, it simultaneously assumes a more integrative approach towards immigrants. The demands of capitalist organizations force national governments to adapt strategies for satisfying the labour requirements of the market forces (Favell and Hansen 2002: 586). Consequently, the mobility of labour increases and the member states start to implement control ‘within society’ (Jordan et al.2003: 204). Suitable immigrants are selected within the power networks of capitalist organizations and the states. Corporations expect every state to render its nationals as employable as possible (Jordan and Duvell 2003: 89). The Hartz IV law that the Social Democrat–Green government accepted is a major event concerning the rights and responsibilities of the labour forces. Another attempt is the agreement between the federal and provincial governments and unions. In 2005, it was decided that federal employees in West Germany would work for one extra hour and employees in the municipalities for extra two hours. Employees can work up to 45 hours per week and up to 12 hours per day. There will be no wage increase for extra hours.⁵ At the end of 2003, the overall poverty rate in Germany was 15 percent. While this statistic was 12 percent among Germans, it was 23 percent among immigrants.⁶

In their report in 2004, some human rights associations in Germany claimed that Germany has turned out to be a ‘police state’. The report indicates that the new political agenda are wearing down the social state model.⁷ Federal Adviser for Data Protection, Peter Schaar, asserts that the government is collecting too much personal data without any protection or privacy consideration by making it possible to control the customer list of banks, tourism agents and transportation companies.⁸ The Federal Minister of Interior Affairs in the new government, Wolfgang Schauble, announced that the anti-terror laws of the previous government would be solidified. The new regulation will allow people to be punished without concrete evidence. Schauble claims that it might be necessary to limit the rights preserved by the ‘state of law’ in some cases.⁹ The policies of the previous and current German governments are tending towards less freedom and more control. They are still utilizing the post-9/11 traumatic atmosphere to launch new control mechanisms. In addition to surveillance, the neo-liberal agenda is being pushed to the limit by dismantling the welfare rights of citizens and immigrants.

Based on the Hartz IV law, the labour offices are investigating more unemployed people who want to apply for unemployment benefits. Unemployed people have to go through an interview following the preliminary data collection. They are questioned about their relations with friends and neighbours, their membership in associations, and the frequency of and reasons for visits to their doctor. The unemployed cannot get a job unless they give the necessary information to labour offices.¹⁰ The effects of the Hartz IV law may be more severe for foreigners. In April 2005, Yusuf Bingöl was deported to Turkey since he did not have sufficient financial means to provide for his living. Bingöl had not had an unlimited residence permit although he had resided in Germany for 35 years.¹¹ Although the law provides unemployment benefits for migrant workers from Turkey, the benefit is given only to those who can meet the criteria. The officials of the Federal Employment Office claim that some migrant workers from Turkey are getting unemployment benefits although they do not deserve to. Their allegation is that migrant workers from Turkey are concealing information about their property in Turkey. Immigrants must prove that they have no real estate in Turkey in order to be eligible for social help. Moreover, immigrants have to sign a consent form that gives permission to German labour offices to investigate information that immigrants have provided (HDB 8.6.2005).

A recent surveillance-consequential event is the decision of the provincial government of Baden-Wurttemberg to apply a ‘conscience test’ in order to determine whether immigrants are eligible for German citizenship. Among the questions are: ‘what are your thoughts about the 9/11 attacks?’, ‘what reaction would you have if your daughter wanted to marry a non-Muslim?’, and ‘what would you do if your son told you that he was homosexual?’¹² It seems that the purpose of the ‘conscience test’ is to learn more about the thoughts of the members of a particular religious group. The Federal Parliament has rejected the counter-proposal given by the Green Party and continues to apply the conscience test. Some members of parliament have mentioned that the test is turning all Muslims residing in Germany and those planning to come into potential criminals.¹³ The European Council has also warned Germany to differentiate between the struggle against terrorism and the rights of foreigners.¹⁴

A similar application is the ban on other languages in some secondary schools. While some immigrants from Turkey and German politicians think that the ban is harmful for integration, others support it, on the grounds that the German language is essential to achieve a career.¹⁵ The ban indeed overlooks the conditions of immigrant students. Ghettoization, poverty and close links to the so-called home country, especially in the case of immigrants from Turkey, make it difficult for them to learn German. Furthermore, the ban triggers a counter-response among conservative immigrant groups to promote the language of their home country over German (Özdemir 2006). A more recent development is the decision made by the ministers of internal affairs of 16 provinces to force foreigners to attend courses on German culture, language and values in order to be eligible for German citizenship.¹⁶ In February 2007, the German government decided to strengthen the immigration act. According to the new regulations, newcomers have to attend and pass language courses. Immigrants who want to enter Germany by means of marriage must know German.¹⁷

Ali Uçar, an educational psychologist and professor of pedagogy, who carried out extensive studies on immigrants, elaborates on prejudices of Germans and immigrants from Turkey towards each other. He argues that prejudices are created so that Germans will not deal with social and political problems for which immigrant population is portrayed to be responsible (Uçar 23.5.2005). Prejudices are functional for the German state in order to implement surveillance practices more easily. Especially during unusual social circumstances such as 9/11, these prejudices may be subtly supported. Erdoğan Kaya from the DIDF (Federation of Democratic Workers Associations) gives further insight. Kaya is a public employee in the transportation sector. The DIDF was founded in 1980 by various worker associations. Although the members are mostly migrant workers from Turkey, the DIDF defines itself as an association for all workers. Kaya says:

The common perception among immigrants from Turkey is that there is informal surveillance over them. This surveillance is not necessarily written or uttered openly, but it is felt and experienced by immigrants. The chair of the TBB (Berlin-Brandenburg Society of Turkey), Kenan Kolat, maintains that in the German constitution, while there are exceptional limitations to freedoms of German citizens, the opposite is true for foreigners. The TBB is an umbrella association which struggles for equal rights for immigrants, especially those from Turkey. The work of the TBB is mainly directed towards German politics. Kolat argues that a serious ‘institutional racism’ separates Germans and foreigners (TBB 24.5.2005).

Niyazi Öncel, who works as an educational expert in a public institution that focuses on the social and psychological problems of immigrant youth, claims that the principal method for controlling migrant workers is the not-lose-my-job attitude of the workers. Öncel is the representative of the ADD-Berlin (Atatürkist Thought Association in Berlin), whose main aim is to promote the thoughts of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey. Öncel clarifies:

The employers exploit this situation to diminish the social rights of both unemployed and employed immigrants. Such neo-liberal attacks are also directed at Germans. Hüseyin Avgan, the chair of the DIDF, argues that the employers as well as the German state provoke ethnic inequalities and competition among workers:Politically active immigrants are the usual targets of surveillance in Germany. This point is explained by the representative of the KKH (Cultural and Solidarity Association of Kurdistan). The KKH is organized primarily by the Kurdish population in Berlin. The KKH tries to solve the problems of Kurdish people stemming from the policies of both Turkish and German governments. The representative says:As exemplified in the quotations above, the general tendency among immigrants from Turkey is to think that informal surveillance exists over them. A considerable number of immigrants believe that Germans see them as foreigners. However, there are also somewhat different views. For instance, Niyazi Öncel from the ADD-Berlin argues that no significant change took place after 9/11. Öncel claims that the German state was very powerful and already knew everything about immigrants (ADD-Berlin 24.5.2005). Likewise, the representative of the KKH maintains that except for those who are politically active, immigrants do not experience much surveillance pressure:However, he immediately adds that it is very difficult for foreigners to leave the legal framework constituted by the German state; for this reason, surveillance is easy (KKH 27.5.2005). Another noteworthy comment on the post-9/11 social context was made by a Turkish official, who emphasizes that security is the concern not only of Germans but also of immigrants:S/he mentions that surveillance after 9/11 did not generate a significant pressure for immigrants, which is why there was not much counter-response (30.5.2005).¹⁹

According to Hüseyin Avgan, especially after the mid-1990s, along with the increasing economic attacks, capitalists are no longer content with the exploitation of other countries’ workers. At present, they attack the internal labour forces in their countries. Avgan asserts that surveillance was an early means for preventing social struggles directed against this process (DIDF 17.6.2005). The increasing poverty caused by the neo-liberal agenda is also the target of surveillance. Niyazi Öncel of the ADD-Berlin argues that the ‘harmful’ outcomes of poverty and the poor themselves must be under control in order to prevent a social uprising (ADD-Berlin 24.5.2005). Indeed, Celal Altun, the Secretary General of the TGB (Turkish Community in Berlin), says that there are suitable legal grounds for controlling almost everyone in Germany. Founded in 1983 with a conservative and nationalist outlook, the TGB functions as a lobby group to defend the political rights of citizens of Turkey and to support the policies of the Turkish government. Altun mentions that due to economic conditions, widespread control cannot be implemented (TGB 25.5.2005).

In the current context, the discourse of the war on terrorism and the still-effective post-9/11 atmosphere provide the proper conditions for the government and the employers to introduce new surveillance methods. The connection between the government institutions within the administrative network has been strengthened. More and more surveillance organizations have been included in the network. The use of technology for surveillance purposes (e.g., biometric measures) has been considerably reinforced and new and cooperative techniques are being introduced through joint initiatives by European governments. Likewise, the cooperation between various administrative networks within Germany and throughout Europe is being extended. Finally, gradually more groups and more people are being portrayed as potential threats which must be governed through various surveillance procedures (e.g., conscience tests and bans on native languages). Along with surveillance, neo-liberalism is also being tested to its limits. Immigrants exercise self-surveillance so that they experience the consequences of exclusion and discrimination less. The social context is being constructed with the consequence that those who are controlled most are the unemployed, poor, religiously and culturally marginalized, and politically active.

Azmi Durmuş, a high school teacher, from the TSD-Berlin (Turkish Social Democrats Association in Berlin) argues that immigrants from Turkey interested in the possibilities of resistance in the aftermath of 9/11 belonged mainly to the intellectual stratum. Founded in 1977, The TSD-Berlin supports the initiatives for equal living conditions for immigrants and Germans (TSD-Berlin 31.5.2005). In the present context, it is mainly politically conscious immigrant associations that generate resistance. However, according to Celal Altun of the TGB, their effect is being weakened since there are difficulties in developing a collective reaction against the policies of the German government (TGB 25.5.2005). Another problem is that although the number of Turkey-originating immigrant associations is considerable, the active members are few (BTKB²⁰ 3.6.2005). Awareness of surveillance among ‘ordinary’ immigrants from Turkey is not strong. Many of them do not have precise knowledge of laws with surveillance implications. In spite of this, they are developing counter strategies like concealing information from German institutions and misinforming German offices about their conditions. Interestingly, those who give incorrect information are generally less conscious of the surveillance consequences of laws. The tendency is to keep away from ‘trouble’ without worrying much about the implications of the trouble itself (DIDF 23.5.2005).

In fact, Germany does not have the power to exclude migrant workers’ associations. Seyit Ali Dikmen from the AAKM (Anatolian Alevis Cultural Centre in Berlin) illustrates this point. The AAKM is mainly an association of Alevi people from Turkey. The AAKM, as a well established association, provides a wide range of social services for all immigrants from Turkey. Dikmen says:

Today, immigrants from Turkey have considerable influence on the German economy. Nevertheless, despite this potential power the majority of them feel weak and weary (BTKB 8.6.2005). Additionally, they could be said to be largely indifferent towards surveillance-related issues in their lives (TDU²¹ 9.6.2005). Their resistance against surveillance practices is currently limited to the activities of the associations. Awareness of surveillance among ‘ordinary’ immigrants from Turkey is low. However, being aware of their potential to transform its policies and German society, the German government is trying to pacify them through both integrative and controlling measures.

This paper acknowledges that surveillance over immigrants from Turkey in Germany is not unique. It has been argued that their experiences during the post-9/11 period up to the present may help clarify the characteristics of surveillance practices regarding immigrants in advanced capitalist societies. It has offered a brief summary of surveillance over immigrants from Turkey from the early 1960s to the mid-1990s and demonstrated that surveillance after 9/11 has become more globalized, arbitrary and focused. Soon after 9/11, the EU and Germany developed very effective initiatives with the aim of disciplining immigrants. In this phase, immigrants from Turkey were gradually contained by a larger and more influential surveillance network. The administrative, technological, personnel and semantic aspects of the surveillance network were rendered more powerful, inclusive and extensive, which generalized and intensified surveillance. Today, the network is embracing more and more administrative institutions, utilizing more sophisticated technological measures and is identifying increasingly more groups and people as risky for its mechanisms. The existing trends show that administrative connections between various German and European institutions are becoming stronger. The containment of individuals and groups by the network can be expected to become more widespread. Surveillance technologies will be more complex and invasive. Besides the increasing number of people who are defined as risks, more everyday experiences of people will be considered as risky. The scope of risk definitions will be extended. While the network comprises more institutions, surveillance will gain new meanings within a wider social context.

The current tendency of the German state is towards less freedom and more control. The post-9/11 atmosphere is still being exploited to launch new control strategies. The social context after 9/11 has also accelerated the degree of neo-liberal attacks against society. The welfare rights of Germans and immigrants are being diminished. The unemployed are being turned into socially and economically one of the most marginalized sections of German society. Immigrants are compelled to cooperate with German institutions, which leads them to exercise self-surveillance. They are constructed as such that they become open to control. Surveillance also functions to control the increasing political activities, opposition struggles and the growing poverty. Surveillance targets marginalized groups in particular; the unemployed, immigrants, political activists, and the poor.

The resistance among immigrants from Turkey against surveillance since the mid-1990s onwards has not been powerful. This is mainly due to the pressure of the state with the discourse of ‘war on terrorism’ and the lack of a collective struggle among immigrant associations. Nevertheless, the politically conscious associations are the main agents of resistance against surveillance. Although the awareness of ‘ordinary’ immigrants from Turkey is not strong, the potential power of immigrants from Turkey to generate resistance is significant. The new social dynamics resulting from increased surveillance and exploitation across society could concurrently extend the sphere and potential for resistance.

This article is based on my Ph.D. study supervised by Professor David Lyon. I would like to thank him and Professor Elia Zureik whose comments helped me produce this piece. I would also like to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRCC) and Queen's University that supported my field research. Finally, I wish to thank two anonymous referees for their critical insights.

Çagatay Topal holds degrees from Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey. He completed his Ph.D. study in December 2006 in the Department of Sociology at Queen's University, Canada. His dissertation title is ‘Surveillance over Migrant Workers and Immigrants from Turkey: From the Disciplinary Society to the Society of Control’. His research interests include surveillance, information and communication technologies and immigration. He currently teaches in the Department of Sociology at METU.