MAPPING THE ACTIVISM OF ETHNIC AND NATIONAL MINORITIES IN POLAND

Civil society actors from Eastern and Central-Eastern Europe were deprived of the opportunity to legally voice their demands in the public sphere for long decades of communist rule. Before 1989, neither minority groups nor other civil society actors were allowed to address the need to enforce particular rights for ethnic and national communities. The fall of the Iron Curtain resulted in an institutional change whose profound consequences were experienced by society as a whole and the non-governmental sector in particular.¹ Among the civil society actors that instantly began to set up organizations and establish networks with similar associations abroad were ethnic and national minorities. Simultaneously, questions concerning the situation of ethnic groups in Poland opened to public discussion. These ground-breaking changes in the political and social fabric of Polish reality pose a set of questions that I address in this article in order to map the ethnic relations field in Poland. First, I describe the method and explain the reasons behind my focus on Poland. Next, I explore the boundaries of the national discursive structure in the minority rights area aiming to distinguish the factors that have shaped its current character. My prime objective is to determine which elements of Polish history, culture and social attitudes exert an impact on the boundaries of legitimate discourse in the ethnic politics field. By exploring the cultural, social and historical settings that define what can be legitimately said on ethnic issues, my research illuminates the link between the national macro structures and people's agency. Further, I look at the identity of actors who contributed to the debate in the field of ethnic politics in Poland. Finally, I discuss the subjects that dominated the public discourse on minority groups. This article portrays general trends in ethnic and national minorities’ claims-making. I do not explore the variation in the types of distinct ethnic groups’ demands. My findings show that minorities address the auxiliary function of ethnic languages although this issue provokes negative reactions of parliamentary representatives and of common Poles. This finding is significant since it reveals that actors lacking major resources may at times carry symbolic weight that can influence public discourse.

This article relies on the results of empirically analyzing claims in the public sphere with the claims-analysis method. The source for my data is Gazeta Wyborcza, an independent, quality broadsheet that systematically covers international and domestic issues. I analyzed newspaper data from 1992 to 1999 and from 2002 to 2006.² One could argue that drawing on only one data source can fail to represent well the Polish print media scene. As past investigations have shown, however, the comparison of alternative newspaper sources brings differences only in rates of coverage, but not in distributions of variables (Koopmans et al. 2005). Thus, the analysis of one newspaper source that is abundant in data on claims on ethnic issues can provide a valid picture of public discourse in the ethnic relations field.

The sample period provides an opportunity to cover an ample range of publicized demands put forward in the ethnic relations field. During those years, Poland institutionally prepared for integration with European and supranational structures, entered the European Union in 2004, and adopted legislation to regulate the observance of ethnic and national groups’ rights.³ The new institutionalist scholarship posits that institutional adjustments have social consequences, such as changes in the actors’ identity and interests (see Checkel 2001). It predicts that social actors adapt to opportunities at the national and European levels and learn how to strategically seize them to enhance their position. Drawing on insights from the new institutionalist literature (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Nee 1998), one could thus expect that ethnic groups frequently addressed minority issues. Indeed, my analysis reveals that claims advanced by ethnic and national minorities’ representatives account for 44% of about 900 publicized demands presented in the Polish ethnic relations field. I will return to this issue later in the article.

Poland provides a promising ground to study ethnic political mobilization. First, because of economical, political and cultural reforms that occurred after 1989, minority issues became open to public debate and deliberation. Examining claims advanced shortly after Poland had embarked on the democratization process provides a chance to illuminate the content of the previously suppressed discourse on ethnic issues and to explore its evolution until the post-EU accession period. Second, although Poland is commonly identified as a nationally homogenous country, it has a number of ethnic and national minorities that are linguistically and culturally different than the Polish majority. It counts 471,500 members of ethnic and national minorities, which represent 1.23% of the country's population (Lodzinski 2005a: 94–95). According to the 2002 Census, 15 minority groups inhabit Poland: Silesians (172,200), Germans (147,100), Belorussians (47,600), Ukrainians (27,200), Gypsies (12,700), Lemkos (5800), Lithuanians (5600), Kashubs (5000), Russians (3200), Slovaks (1700), Jews (1000), Tatars (500), Czechs (400), Armenians (300), and Karaims (40).

The geographical and organizational situation of distinct ethnic groups in Poland varies significantly. Minorities are dispersed across Poland and inhabit municipalities with substantially distinct levels of economic growth. The Germans and the Silesians concentrate in Upper Silesia, one of the richest regions in Poland, whereas the eastern districts where Belorussians and Lithuanians live are economically underdeveloped. Several minorities, such as Germans, Lithuanians and Slovaks, live in compact communities that facilitate ethnic organization and political participation.⁴ Meanwhile, Ukrainians and Lemkos are dispersed across the western provinces as a result of the ‘Action Wisla’, implemented between 1947 and 1950 that aimed at resettling large Ukrainian and Lemko populations from the south-eastern part of the country to its western side.

Minority groups differ considerably in their level of organizational development. For instance, the German and Ukrainian minorities are well structured internally. In both instances we find an umbrella association with a branch of local subdivisions and autonomous organizations that collaborate with the main one. Peak organizations of both minorities have integrated into the domestic political culture and are present both at local and national levels. In contrast, Belorussians did not set up complex hierarchical and horizontal structures.

This section discusses the meaning and impact of the national discursive structure on the opportunities and content of ethnic groups’ demands. The national discursive structure, as defined in this article, belongs to the general opportunity structure (along with its institutional counterpart: domestic legislation and policies). It includes common national public representations, widely adopted attitudes, stereotypes, concepts of national identity and national myths. In a nutshell, the national discursive structure sets the boundaries of legitimate behavior; that is, it defines what types of demands are seen as appropriate in a given polity. Cultural in essence, it influences people's choices and strategies in a way usually attributed to culture because it ‘shapes action by defining what people want and how they imagine they can get it’ (Swidler 2000: 270). I verify whether minority groups always strictly follow the discursive rules of public speech. My research shows that at times minorities are indeed able to withstand it by straying beyond the discursive boundaries of legitimate action and demanding wider rights in the contentious area of linguistic politics.

In order to examine the discursive boundaries of legitimate action in the Polish public sphere I first explore the aspects of Polish culture, identity and history that may influence the content of ethnic groups’ demands. The symbols of Polish ethnicity, heavily influenced by the Catholic Church, permeate the discourse in the national public sphere, marking the boundaries of discursive opportunities. The fundamental role of history cannot be ignored since ‘national mythology is structured by historical events and embodied in visual and material cultures, which in turn frame national subjects’ understanding of the present’ (Zubrzycki 2010: 1).

I then examine how Polish identity and minority rights are perceived by the national audience. I argue that these widely held attitudes towards minorities are reflected in the public sphere (in newspapers, television news, etc.) and shape ethnic groups’ perceptions of the limits of acceptable statements on their rights.

Poland's history has been heavily marked by the experience of foreign domination, partitions and wars. Two countries that left an indelible imprint on Polish collective memory, Russia and Germany, used minorities that dwelled in Poland for their own political purposes.⁵ The remnants of these policies survived as stereotyped associations of Germans with the Nazi ‘Fifth Column’ or of Jews as communists. Surveys from the beginning of the 1990s indicate that fears that Germans would reclaim Polish western territories were widespread (CBOS 1989, 1990a, 1990b). These fears stemmed also from the Polish state's ideological legitimization during the communist regime which was deeply anti-German. Notably, the communist regime took a hostile attitude toward West Germany while aiming at cultivating good diplomatic relations with East Germany (Ruchniewicz 2003). Polish researchers have observed that the association of minorities and ethnic rights with war and state dismemberment still persists (Simonides 1996; Lodzinski 2005a). These historical and cultural influences have had an impact on the political representatives’ position on the Silesians’ and Kashubs’ demands for recognition (as a national and ethnic minority respectively). Arguments deployed during parliamentary debates over the legislation on minority rights suggest that ethnic groups are still, at times, perceived as a threat to the state and to national sovereignty (Lodzinski 2005a: 149, 153).

Finally, yet importantly, the Catholic faith is often invoked as a crucial aspect of Polish national identity. It became important because of the association that developed between religion and the struggle for national sovereignty while the territory of former Poland was partitioned between Prussia, Austria and Russia. To quote Mach, ‘the Church created a coherent symbolic model which linked Catholicism with Polishness and was viewed by ethnic Poles as the main agent of Polish nationalism and national identity’ (Mach 2000: 4). Catholicism became, as Morawska (1984) puts it, a vehicle of ‘romantic civil religion’. Catholicism and the messianic martyrdom offered ‘a communal way of seeing the world in consistent terms, sharing a host of reference points which provide the basis for everyday discourse and action’ (Edensor 2002: 19). In this model there was no place for ethnic diversity. A similar process operated in the decades following 1945 when the Catholic Church sought to turn Catholicism into the core element of Polish identity, thus alienating groups of distinct confession, such as Jews, Ukrainians, Lemkos or Belorussians. This pervasive national narrative, still shaping the self-understanding of common Poles, underlines the particular role of the country as a ‘bulwark of Christendom defending Europe against the infidel’ (Zubrzycki 2010: 5). Zubrzycki convincingly argues that Poland underwent ‘a peculiar form of the secularization of religion and religious symbols, through their political instrumentalization, and then their resacralization, now as national symbols’ (Zubrzycki 2006: 134). Fused religious and national symbols prevent ethnic groups from participating in national mythology, mobilize national discursive repertoires that resonate with common narratives and thus shrink the symbolic opportunities available to ethnic groups.

In 1989 minorities and other civil society groups gained unrestricted access to the public sphere. Before, acting in the public arena risked political repression as a consequence. This risk, however, changed as a function of the state's policy shifts. Ethnic groups were able to act publicly as long as their actions unfolded within the cultural framework. Their activities were not punished if ethnic leaders refrained from open declarations of ethnic identity and demands for rights. As a result, minorities struggled to maintain their traditions, customs and language in the private sphere, leaving for the public arena only their ‘acceptable’ folkloric aspects, such as dances or traditional parties. The state gave the right to set up socio-cultural organizations to only eight minorities: Belorussians, Czechs and Slovaks, Lithuanians, Roma, Russians, Ukrainians and Jews. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, however, controlled these associations and prohibited them from openly expressing their ethnic identity. Communist authorities played on society's fears of German occupation and of the instability of the Polish–German border. I argue that the patterns of relations between the Polish majority and minorities shaped before 1989 have left an imprint on the attitudes of Poles towards ethnic groups. These patterns still co-organize the national discursive field. Namely, as nationwide surveys demonstrate, respondents oppose granting specific rights that safeguard ethnic languages’ presence in the public sphere, such as the right to use minority languages in contacts with state officials and double-naming of places in regions inhabited by minorities.

The resistance towards linguistic diversity is common in Central and Eastern Europe. For instance, Slovakia under Meciar implemented restrictive language legislation (passed in 1990 and 1995) that hindered the opportunities to use minority languages in the public space (Tesser 2003). In 1998, Latvia proposed a language law requiring all enterprises to carry out their daily activities in Latvian that sparked strong criticism in the European Union. In Estonia, the amendments passed in 1999 ‘made mandatory for private sector employees, nongovernmental organizations, and even self-employed entrepreneurs the use of Estonian at a level of proficiency established by the government’ (Kelley 2004: 100). The post-communist states’ reluctance to protect minority languages is perhaps not wholly surprising if one takes into account that these countries regained full political independence only in 1989. As Dawisha and Parrot emphasize, the nationalist wing of the newly established elites believed that ‘their hard-won independence could easily be subverted by political actions of the non-native residents’ (1994: 77).

The political and social situation of ethnic organizations before the fall of the Iron Curtain stands in stark contrast to the opportunities that emerged after 1989. Official initiatives contributed to the incorporation of minorities into the political and social public life.⁶ Nevertheless, although opportunities for ethnic mobilization in the new democratic Poland have expanded, boundaries of acceptable action persist. Currently, the negative attitudes towards active ethnic presence in the public arena are among the most important factors that shape the national discursive structure.

Poles generally approve of a civic rather than an ethnic concept of nationhood. When asked what features should decide whether one can be considered a Pole, their answers clearly lean towards this option (CBOS 2005). Specifically, 69% declare that in order to be a Pole, one must feel Polish. The next most popular answer refers to holding Polish citizenship (34%). Twenty-five percent of respondents emphasize the necessity of having Polish descent (at least one Polish parent) and 23% think that it is essential to live in Poland. Speaking Polish is seen as an indispensable condition by 20% of respondents and being Catholic, by 14%. In short, subjective criteria and citizenship are seen as the main criteria to be a Pole. These findings are important since the construction of national identity impacts on policies directed at minorities. According to the 2005 survey results, Poles are in favor of an open national community, based on a civic conception of nationhood. It is necessary to underline, however, that people's verbal and non-verbal behavior may significantly differ from the declarations they express in public opinion polls, particularly when surveys address sensitive issues. One has to cautiously weight the role of declarations elicited by opinion polls because citizens may often refrain from expounding views that are commonly perceived as populist or racist. On the other hand, the analysis of public opinion polls depicts the changing patterns in people's beliefs, directing our attention to the general trends in attitudes towards ethnic diversity. Deploying the civic/ethnic distinction helps capture the shifting conception of the nation in the Polish setting.

The evolution of Poles’ opinions on the attributes of Polish national identity is striking. Namely, the 1994 nationwide survey on Polish identity revealed that 71% of respondents thought that speaking Polish is very important, 64% stressed Polish citizenship, 51% mentioned the fact of being brought up in Poland and 47% highlighted Polish descent (mother or father) (CBOS 1994). The comparison of 1994 and 2005 surveys suggests that the criteria of Polish identity are gradually evolving from ethnic towards civic-centered.⁷ Nevertheless, in 2005 25% of respondents still mention language and descent, classical attributes of the ethnic vision of nationhood, which suggests that some ethnic dimensions still play a role in the definition of ‘Polishness’. The importance of language is clear when one examines the Poles’ opinions on the spectrum of rights that minorities should obtain. I turn to this issue in the paragraphs below.

The Poles’ attitudes towards minorities are ambiguous (CBOS 2005). Asked if it is good that in one country only people of one nationality live, 56% of respondents answered ‘I agree’ or ‘I strongly agree’. Respondents are similarly divided on whether non-Poles living in Poland should assimilate to the majority language and culture – 46% declared that they ought to; 42% disagreed with this statement.

Survey findings describe the types of rights that Poles are willing to confer on ethnic groups’ members. The vast majority think that minorities should have the opportunity to be taught in their mother tongues in schools (82%). A more limited yet still large number of Poles agree that ethnic groups should have the right to take subjects in their own language (61% agree, 29% oppose). More controversial is the issue of using minority language in public offices in regions inhabited by ethnic groups – only 37% would grant minorities this right, while 52% are against. The thorniest topic, however, concerns the possibility of double-naming places (putting signs in ethnic languages along with the Polish equivalent) in areas inhabited by minorities: 63% reject this option while only 26% agree.

Summing up, Polish policies on ethnic minorities after 1989 have primarily rested on civic principles. Nevertheless, certain elements of Polish history and culture still exert an impact on public debates in the ethnic field. I have presented evidence of links between Poles’ vision of their national identity and the range of rights that they are willing to grant minority members. Namely, the ability to speak Polish is one of the most frequently invoked prerequisites. Also, double-naming of places in regions inhabited by ethnic groups has sparked major public controversy. Further, Poles oppose the use of a minority language in contacts with public authorities. It thus seems that public expression in ethnic languages sets the boundaries of legitimate action in Poland (see Lodzinski 2005a). This interpretation is supported by the tensions that followed a proposal to include rights involving language into the bill on national and ethnic minorities, finally approved in January 2005. Representatives constantly criticized the proposal during parliamentary debates by arguing that the implementation of language rights would endanger Poland's territorial integrity and sovereignty (Lodzinski 2005b: 26). Poland's historical legacy helps explain the significance of language for Poles and their reluctance to accommodate the presence of minority languages in the public sphere. In the eighteenth century, Austria, Prussia and Russia partitioned Poland, banning the usage of Polish. As Brubaker explains, ‘the increased salience of language as a nation-building diacritical marker reflected the experience of prolonged statelessness, which prevented the development of a state-oriented, state-framed, “civic” or “territorial” understanding of nationhood’ (1996: 85). In the independent Poland, this close link between national language and national identity still co-organizes the public life.

In the section below I rely on claims-analysis to investigate the link between the linguistic dimension of cultural macro-structure and the content of publicly advanced demands. My analysis shows that ethnic groups do not refrain from demands for broadening their linguistic rights.

This section examines discourse in Poland's field of ethnic relations through empirical analysis of the public sphere with the claims-analysis method. I have coded the full spectrum of claims relating to the situation of ethnic and national minorities in Poland. Before I move to the analysis, it is worth emphasizing that, according to the guidelines outlined in the ‘Codebook for the analysis of political mobilization and communication in European public spheres’ (Koopmans 2002: 2), claims can be broken down into distinct variables (e.g. time when the claim was made, place where it was advanced, author and form of claim). I added to the original codebook new variables and subvariables. After completing the coding phase, I repeatedly read all claims and on the basis of this knowledge designed the new variable and subvariable values. Open codification allowed for the coding of the entire spectrum of original verbal and non-verbal actions advanced in the public sphere and helped me avoid oversimplification.

I first focus on the distribution of actors in the ethnic relations field. Table 1 classifies these actors along various functional and political categories.⁸

The first general remark is that minorities in Poland are not inert beneficiaries of state policies. On the contrary, more than a third of all claims in the minority field have minorities as authors. If we add the legislative and state actors from ethnic groups, this share is even bigger, amounting to 44%. This finding indicates that minorities’ opinions and demands are no longer confined to their ethnic environment. It suggests that the democratization process launched at the beginning of the 1990s had a crucial impact on the minorities’ perception of the state. Ethnic groups realized that the risks related to the public articulation of their views and to being conceived as a member of a minority group had become negligible. The democratic transition and the state's determination to join the European structures, together with the need to comply with international norms on minorities’ protection, created a window of opportunity which, as the results show, was eagerly seized by ethnic actors. I argue that the high number of claims made by minority members may also be explained by drawing on the fact that Poland tolerates cultural diversity and provides ethnic communities with opportunities to maintain and develop their respective cultures.

Interpreting this finding with the language of the political opportunity structure approach, I would conclude that regime change and pressures from international institutions have created important ‘legal/institutional openings’ and at the same time provided ethnic groups with powerful ‘elite allies’ both at the national and supranational levels (McAdam 1996). Also, the ‘state's capacity and propensity for repression’ has sharply declined. The political opportunity-structure approach also contributes to understanding the general trend in the minorities’ public involvement by linking the supranational with the national level. The Polish state's adoption of the supranational legislation on minority protection has opened new windows of opportunity for ethnic groups, and strengthened their position in relation to the state.

State actors – that is, members of government and other executive state agencies and representatives of both chambers of parliament – account for approximately 30% of the claims. This means that the ethnic relations field in Poland is dominated by debate between the ruling authorities and minority leaders. One would expect that other actors would have also taken a stance on ethnic issues. However, actors other than minority organizations and state actors account for small percentages of the claims. Solidarity and human rights organizations, for instance, account for 2% of the claims, scientific research professionals for 4%, and historical heritage protection and regional groups for 2% of the claims. This may be interpreted as showing that minorities do not attract the attention of non-state actors, or that the non-governmental actors rely on different channels to influence policy on minorities, such as lobbying (not captured by the claims-analysis method). Alternatively, it may be the case that public channels are blocked for those other than ethnic and state actors. Given prevailing democratic standards, however, this is highly unlikely.

The low involvement of parties other than minority and state actors in the debate on ethnic issues can also be interpreted as depicting the weakness of the civil society in Poland. This reading resonates with results of a cross-national study of several post-communist countries carried out by Barnes (1998). His findings show that Poland has the lowest level of organizational membership within all the post-communist states included in the study. By and large, the evidence of Polish civil society actors' limited involvement in the public discourse within the ethnic relations field supports a broader observation that vibrant civil societies have not developed in the post-communist states (Morjé Howard 2003; Uhlin 2006).

The fact that discussion on ethnic groups’ rights related to the establishment of rules of legitimate action explains that minority and state actors were the main claimants. Indeed, a lot was at stake, since the ethnic relations field in Poland at the threshold of the 1990s had no clear-cut benchmarks on minority rights. The state's role and ethnic privileges were not set. Also, the Constitution and specific bills on minority protection awaited enforcement.⁹ Consequently, minority leaders had a reason to be deeply interested in intervening as soon as possible in shaping the classifications and policies that would impact on their communities. Once established, the national categorization and legislation would be hard to modify.

Minorities of migrant origin are conspicuous by their absence in the debate on ethnic-related themes. This is related to the fact that the national opportunity structure varies by social group. Ethnic and national minorities that hold Polish citizenship enjoy easy access to the public sphere whereas third-country nationals’ access to citizenship is difficult. The definition of ‘minority’ enshrined in Polish law clearly differentiates between ethnic and national minorities and third-country nationals. It emphasizes that only members of groups that dwell in the country for approximately a century (or three generations) and hold Polish citizenship enjoy the privileges guaranteed by national and European legislation on minority protection. As Łodziński (1999) rightly points out, ‘such citizen's clause is in conformity with the standards of minority protection established within the European framework (OSCE, the Council of Europe)’. While ethnic and national communities enjoy a wide spectrum of linguistic, political and cultural rights and the state's financial help, third-country nationals lack such rights. Poland's position on third-country nationals’ rights reflects the ambiguity of EU legislation. According to European law, each EU member state may decide which ethnic groups fall into the category of ‘minority’. The lack of migrants’ participation in the public debate on ethnic issues can also be interpreted by drawing on the small size of the foreign population in Poland. The 2002 Census recorded only 40,661 foreign citizens residing in Poland. Scholars have criticized the validity of the data on the stock of migrants provided by the national census, however, suggesting that the migrant population in Poland reaches at least 74,000 foreign citizens (Grabowska-Lusińska et al. 2010). Nevertheless, even the last figure depicts a very modest share of the migrant population in Polish society.

Concerning the forms of action used by ethnic and national minorities, there is little variation between the groups. Most frequently, minority actors seized on conventional forms of action including public statements, letters, interviews and conferences. This finding reflects maturity of the Polish democratic system that provides wide access to the public sphere, allowing actors to give up confrontational forms of action. As regards the scope of claims, demands put forward at the national level amount to 61.7%, whereas 21.4% of claims had a local dimension.

Although this article focuses on broad trends in claims-making over ethnic issues in Poland, it is useful to underline that in general larger minorities put forward more claims than the smaller ones. There are exceptions to this rule, however. For instance, the Germans made fewer claims than did the Ukrainians, despite having five times more members than the Ukrainian minority. Drawing on Fraser's categorization of claims, all minorities’ demands refer primarily to ‘recognition’ and ‘participation’ (Fraser 1999: 25–52). Claims that address the role of historic monuments, cemeteries and usage of language in the public sphere account for about half of demands advanced by Germans – 26 of 66 – and by Ukrainians – 33 of 72. On the other hand, Roma representatives refer to this issue in 15 out of 49 of their claims. They also focus on anti-Roma attitudes and behavior in Poland, and on the minority's economic situation. Silesians mostly refer to the 2002 Census and to Silesia's regional autonomy. On the other hand, Belorussians often address conflicts within their community and the triadic relations between Poland, the Belorussian minority and Belarus. Jewish representatives frequently focus on property restitution, history and relations with the Catholic Church.

I now move to the topics raised in the debate within the ethnic field. Table 2 and Table 3 display the distribution of topics. Table 2 shows the main subjects whereas Table 3 displays a more detailed list of subtopics. As the tables show, the spectrum of issues ranges from politics, culture, religion and education to economy.

Before we look at the distribution of topics, a technical comment is necessary. Table 1 shows shares of claims by actor types for all claims. Given that the method allows the coding of three actors as authors of one claim (when, for instance, a common petition is directed at state authorities signed by representatives of three minority organizations), coding only one of the minority actors would misrepresent the findings. The sum of the claims in Table 1 is much higher than the sum in Tables 2 and 3. It is like this because in Tables 2 and Table 3 I focus on the topics raised in claims (and one claim may have only one main subject, independent of the number of claim's authors). Accordingly, the number of claims in Tables 2 and Table 3 reflects the exact number of claims. As we can see, the most frequent topics are general politics (21.6%) and anti-minority politics (15%). Culture (10%), economy (3.49%), history (7.3%) and religion (1.12%) play a less significant role.

‘Ethnic conflict’ is a major source of debate (8.42%). This reflects conflict between local or national authorities (or the majority population) and minority groups or organizations. The sources of discord were most frequently symbolic. Namely, a recurrent bone of contention concerned the building or conserving of historical monuments (commemorating soldiers killed in World War II or memorial plaques honoring the victims of Action Wisla) and cemeteries. Furthermore, it included conflict over the proposal to build a watchtower in Punsk, a town near the border of Lithuania with a large native Lithuanian population. Another source of contention was the attempt to establish a Catholic cross in Auschwitz, which met with opposition by Jewish leaders in Poland and abroad.¹⁰

These results provide evidence that conflicts are relatively frequent in the Polish ethnic relations field. It is not surprising in the light of what has been stressed above in the article regarding the share of different categories of actors in the overall distribution of claims. Namely, minority members and politicians are the two most visible players in the game of ethnic politics. Given that the main political stake during the 1990s was the founding of a new democratic order that would accommodate different national and ethnic groups, minority actors have repeatedly attempted to influence the emerging state architecture.

Claims about language account for 5.27% of the total number of claims. Interestingly, nearly half of these refer to the minority language serving as an auxiliary one in contacts with public authorities. As I remark above, this is one of the thorniest issues in the minority rights debate in Poland. It led to controversy in parliamentary discussions on the Minority Rights Act and triggered negative reactions from ordinary Poles, as illustrated by public opinion surveys referred to above. For minorities it appears to be an issue that draws comparable levels of attention to other popular themes, such as ‘electoral privileges’ or the ‘redemption of property’. This suggests that, although constrained by historical and cultural mythologies, minority actors challenge the widespread attitudes against the presence of ethnic languages in the public sphere. This finding is significant in what it tells us about public discourse and power relations. Actors lacking substantial social and economic capital succeed in accessing national media. By reaching the Polish public space, their claims have a chance of changing people's perceptions toward ethnic diversity and of influencing policies directed at minority groups.

The Polish institutional landscape on ethnic and national minorities’ issues has changed since the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Before 1989, ethnic and national groups’ opportunities to advance claims in the public sphere were strongly limited, given the communist states’ negative attitude towards ethnic diversity. This article has demonstrated that the political, economic and social transformation after 1989 has opened novel opportunities for minority groups. Moreover, it has revealed that ethnic groups and state representatives are the most active players in the game when the regulation of minorities’ social and political position in contemporary Poland is at stake.

This article has also discussed the discursive context within which claims-making activity takes place. I have examined aspects of Polish culture, identity and history that may have exerted an impact on the content of ethnic groups’ demands. Also, I have explored public opinion on the scope of ethnic rights deemed legitimate for Polish citizens, revealing that the boundaries of legitimate action lie in the area of linguistic rights. The analysis of claims shows that using minority language as an auxiliary one in contacts with public authorities and the issue of topographic double-naming are major sources of political contention. As I have discussed, the discursive opportunity structure is deeply embedded in Poland's history and is influenced by mental associations between minorities and war and state dismemberment. On the other hand, I have demonstrated that minorities address the auxiliary function of ethnic languages despite the fact that this issue triggers negative reactions of common Poles and of numerous parliamentary representatives. This finding is important because it demonstrates that actors lacking major resources may at times carry discursive weight that can shape public debates.

This article has also uncovered a significant contrast in the way Polish legislation differentiates between ethnic and national groups and ‘new minorities’ of migrant origin. Whereas ‘old minorities’ enjoy relatively easy access to the public sphere and have gained a wide spectrum of political, cultural and social rights, the situation of third-country nationals is far less favorable. As I have emphasized, these policies resonate with the European Union's legal framework, for it opens windows of opportunity for autochthonous groups but keeps them closed for the communities of migrants.

By and large, the article reveals a linkage between national structure and public discourse advanced within it. National history and culture shape the likelihood that some topics and not others be raised in this debate. The findings call for further inquiry into the complex interface between national institutions and discourse in order to specify the conditions under which access to the public sphere opens up for actors deprived of substantial resources.

Joanna Jasiewicz is a Junior Research Associate at the European Centre for Minority Issues. She earned her Ph.D. in sociology at the University of Barcelona in 2010. She has been a postdoctoral fellow at the Bremen International Graduate School of Social Sciences. Her research interests cover political and cultural sociology, migration, European integration, transnational networks, and ethnic activism.