Bridge over troubled waters: Family, gender and welfare in Portugal in the European context

Does it still make sense to identify Portugal as ‘familialistic’ when it comes to characterise the country within southern European welfare regimes or even when referring to family and gender relations, practises and attitudes? Or does ‘familialism’ only apply to certain aspects of the Portuguese social model and social relations but not to others?

First, changes in practices and attitudes regarding family life will be the main focus, concentrating on the nineties of the past century but with special interest on the first decade of the twenty-first century. These changes are assessed using both European Social Survey data from different rounds (2004, 2006 and 2008)¹ and national official statistics.

Secondly, the centre of attention will be specifically drawn on the Portuguese social, family, care and gender equality policies and on the welfare state development up to the present. It is argued that, after a late start and the institutionalisation of a broader social protection system, the last two decades are marked by an expanding coverage and a ‘modern’ approach to family and gender issues. The impact of these policies, however, is limited by the combination of several factors: underfinancing and financial pressures on welfare provisions, economic and social structural features and the persistence of gender inequalities, namely concerning the combination of paid and unpaid work.

How can we explain that same-sex marriages have been approved in countries like Portugal (2010) and Spain (2005), where the majority of the population identifies with the catholic religion, when they are not recognised in countries with more liberal traditions? And how can we explain that in Portugal the majority approved, through a referendum, the right to abortion at the woman's request (2009)?

One could argue that, for Portugal and also for Spain, these and other measures going in the same direction have been approved by left wing parliaments. But especially some of them were also vehemently opposed by the more conservative parties and movements linked to the Catholic Church. So it could perhaps be expected that, in another political juncture, with right wing majority, these laws could be reverted or change to more conservative terms.

However, other research results seem to point out to the fact that these laws have an important social base of support cutting across different parties and political forces. This seems to be the obvious conclusion from an analysis of several demographic indicators in Portugal and also in Spain. In fact, they show very rapid changes in representations, values and practices, in certain dimensions of personal and family life that have been analysed already in several studies and through different research results (Torres et al. 2008; Guerreiro et al. 2009; Wall, Aboim e Leitão, 2010b).

The younger generations, both in Portugal and Spain, strongly approve the idea of not condemning having children and living with an unmarried partner (Torres e Lapa 2010). In the same direction, we identify a trend cross-cutting three different generations strongly supporting the possibility of having children with unmarried partner, in line with other European countries (Tables 1 and 2).

The average age of mothers having their first child also rose as much in 10 as in 30 years (from 24.4 to 26.5 between 1970 and 2000 and to 28.6 in 2009). There has also been a drop in the fertility rate, a rise in the divorce rate and an increase in step-families and single-parent families or those who choose alternative forms of living alone (Guerreiro et al. 2009; Torres 2010).

Thus, if anything, the first decade of the twenty-first century has deepened the pace and width of a large scale change. Such a quick transformation in the beginning of the twenty-first century can be explained, at least partly, by the fact that a younger generation born in the seventies, the eighties and even the nineties of the twentieth century is arriving now at the age of marriage, cohabitating or having children with a different approach than older generations concerning these life events. They were brought up in a more open and non-traditional environment, following the 1974 democratic revolution and the Europeanisation process. They reveal more individualised and diverse perspectives concerning family formation, life styles and institutions. These changes are also patent in politics, since renewed party configurations and agendas, especially on the left (see section 2.2.), have had significant impact on these issues.

The fact that these younger generations are much better educated compared to the older ones can also help to explain more cosmopolitan and much more open and globalised views than their parents. In fact, as we see in Figure 4, in spite of the fact that the Portuguese are still in 2010, in average, the less educated among the large European countries they are also the ones with the greater differences for the better in years of education between generations.

Signs of change can also be observed in attitude's surveys concerning family and gender issues. In line with the general European trend, Portugal, but also Spain and Greece, show rejection of some of the classical and traditional gender stereotypes.

On one hand, the relevance of the family and the role of men in care and domestic life are both highly rated and the ones conveying greater convergence of opinions among all countries in Europe. Two ideas have high levels of widespread agreement: family being the first priority in live and that men should have the same responsibilities in childcare and domestic life as women did (Figure 5). While we had already observed the predominance given to family in all countries (Torres et al. 2008), the second statement brings, however, some innovation.

Europeans tend to adopt an egalitarian perspective of men and women's roles in the family, and that is also the case for Southern European countries. Undoubtedly, this points out to the erosion of the breadwinner model (Crompton 2006) as a general trend accepted by all Europeans and a ‘non-traditionalist’ perspective regarding the need for the involvement of men in family daily life and childcare in opposition to the traditional breadwinner role (Sullivan 2004; Wall 2005; Wall, Aboim and Cunha, 2010a).

The topic of equality between men and women concerning paid work also conveys high agreement. The majority of the Europeans reject that ‘Men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce.³ However, Portugal and other southern and eastern countries seemed to reject it less than others. The answers to the idea of the indissolubility of marriage or relationship due to the existence of children – Children in home, parents should stay together even if don't get along – follow almost the same pattern.

The cornerstone showing a clear divide among countries comes when the scenario of the sacrifice of women's paid job was at stake for the sake of the family. The idea that a woman should sacrifice herself in favour of the family well-being seems to be better tolerated by the majority of the Europeans and only the Nordic countries refuse it clearly.

Thus, the centrality of the role of the mother within the family and of women in care activities still stands even in Portugal, a country where women, and mothers, have full time jobs. Moreover, this attitude converged with data showing the amount of hours of unpaid work that Portuguese working women do (Amâncio 2007). Even if for younger generations this is less so (Wall, Aboim and Cunha, 2010a) the reality is that gender inequality concerning unpaid work is still very entrenched in Portugal.

The explanation may reside in the persistence of a feminised vision of family and care responsibilities in Portugal and in other southern European countries. So, if equality between men and women concerning paid work seems an acquired value, and even if there is great agreement concerning the need for an increased role of men in care and domestic responsibilities, the caring role of mothers in the family continues to be considered central⁴ (Saraceno 2000; Fahey and Spéder 2004; Wall 2005; Tobio 2001, 2005; Crompton 1999, 2006; Wall, Aboim and Cunha, 2010a), not alleviating the bulk of paid and unpaid work that Portuguese women do.

Looking at the whole picture, and to the answers to the five attitudes’ questions, the overall portrait shows a trend towards egalitarian gender attitudes and relations at European level. Considering the role of women in the family, however, we observe an European divide. Only Scandinavian countries clearly reject the idea of women sacrificing their paid work for the sake of the family.

Focusing on southern countries, this might be a sign of the persistence of the idea of the fundamental caring role of women in the family but it also reveals different institutional, economic, political and cultural contexts. As a result of the tension between a greater involvement of women in paid work in southern countries, the lack of sufficiently developed policies for the conciliation of family with paid work and a ‘familialistic’ tradition some authors qualify mainly as ‘ambivalent’ the attitudes of women and men concerning these topics (Moreno 2010: 97).

Trying to summarise the relevant changes we have been discussing one may reach some paradoxical conclusions. Concerning changes in practices, laws and attitudes – fall of catholic marriage or birth out of the wedlock, etc. – and their large social acceptance, especially by younger generations, it could be argued that traditionalism or ‘familialism’ does not apply anymore as a correct characterisation of what happens in the country.

Considering other indicators, however, we could conclude differently. On one hand, there are still high numbers of young people still living with their parents and the family is still important as ‘social shock absorber’ as it has been documented (Saraceno 2000; Karamessini 2008). These are signs of the centrality of the family in a role that has not been fully replaced by the welfare state or other institutions, as it happens in Scandinavian countries a trend that could represent the persistent ‘familialism’.⁵

On the other hand, however, the idea that family networks still support and replace the lack of other formal support in young households has been contradicted. Research findings show that because of high rates of emigration – and migration within the country to find adequate jobs – considerable number of young families cannot count on grandparent support (Torres and Silva 1999; Torres et al. 2001; Wall 2005; Vasconcelos 2005). Many grandparents are simply not there to help on a daily basis; and anyway many are still in the labour market. Thus, the most common situation is that they do it as a complement and not as replacement of childcare facilities (Torres and Silva 1999; Torres et al. 2001).

The specific characteristics of the Portuguese decline in fertility illustrate the complexity of the changes undergone. To begin with, unlike many other European countries, women's labour market participation is mostly full-time, not without consequence (Oliveira et al. 2012). Plus, the last decade has witnessed a further drop in fertility rates to extremely low levels, arguably due to factors such as the steady rise of the female unemployment rate, alongside general unemployment, and an increasingly dual labour market, with atypical or precarious contracts affecting in particular younger generations (Alves et al. 2011). Uncertain life projects and economic insecurity, material and economic constraints, the rising cost of having children and education have also been associated with further delays in fertility decisions (Cunha 2005, 2007; Karamesini 2008).

Portugal witnesses a constrained fertility model defined by a parental project reduced to one child due to the difficulty to fulfil conditions perceived as necessary to structure a children's life: economic stability and time and everyday life management (Fahey and Spéder 2004: 33; Cunha 2005, 2007). Portuguese women are thus caught by the motherhood penalty, which combines gender and economic constraints produced in the interface between work and family: mothers are committed with the normative expectation to engage in intensive mothering, with children above all other activities; but at the same time they must perform accordingly to labour market normative demands about the ideal worker, who would sacrifice all other concerns for work (Correll et al. 2007).

So, if the traditional gender stereotypes seem to be rejected we detect for the Portuguese case a very difficult compromise between the role of mothers in the family and at the same time the full acceptance of equality with men concerning paid work, at the cost of serious inequalities. Rather than ‘familialism’, it seems more adequate to talk about ‘ambivalence’ and ‘inequality’ concerning gender roles in the family, as mentioned above.

Since these processes of change and continuity are still operating and complex, rather than classifying Portugal, or other southern European countries, in the ‘familialistic’ group or to reject in block this characterisation, what fits and what does not fit in the picture should be subject to careful analysis.

How have policy arrangements’ responded to these changes? And, more broadly, how do these changes fit into the historical trajectory of relatively recent Welfare-states?

Southern European countries are often located on under-developed conservative and generally ‘disadvantaged’ welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990, 1999), leading many authors to speak of a ‘southern Europe’ model, even if many of its characteristics are not entirely shared (Ferrera 1996; Ferrera et al. 2000; Silva 2002; Karamessini 2008).⁶

These countries tend to be perceived as being driven by a gender inequality ideology and traditional family and gender structures, placing the main onus of childcare and caring for elderly on family support networks and, particularly, on women. However, a rising number of women in paid work in southern countries as well as broader formal childcare coverage has been witnessed (Karamessini 2008). And, in Portugal, labour market has displayed comparatively high employment rates and a massive full-time participation of women since the 1970s, providing specific elements that hardly fit ‘Southern European’ label.⁷ Plus, family life and configurations have themselves changed, even while equality in access to paid work contrasts in the persisting overburden of women in unpaid work. At the same time, and especially since 1995, while some limitations lingered, policy designs have been much more concerned with reconciling work and family issues, childcare and even gender equality.

By assessing and analysing policy pathways of change in the late twentieth century and in the beginning of the millennium we can draw a different picture: (i) the late start of a comprehensive welfare-state allowed, at least in Portugal and Spain, for the introduction of policy designs concerned with work-family balance policies and gender equality, with arguably less rigid and constraining ‘path-dependence’ effects (Pierson 2000; Pierson 2002; Pierson and Scockpol 2002) in adapting to cultural and gender-balance changes, with the policy-shaping forged in not fully consolidated institutional and policy architectures; (ii) welfare-state limitations persist but they are more the effect of underfinancing constraints of an immature welfare state system and of a restrictive economic context of ‘permanent austerity’ (Pierson 2002) than of traditionalist or ‘familialistic’ policy makers perspectives; (iii) the effect of these limitations has been the persistence of some aspects of ‘familialism’ and gender inequality not so much as an ideology but as a reality resulting from the combination of Portuguese women combining long hours dedicated to paid work with most of the unpaid care responsibilities.

Looking back, after the gale of new social rights after the 1974 revolution, under democracy and Europeanisation an expanding social protection system gradually took form and became institutionalised. New agendas and a new generation of social policies renewed this thrust from 1995 on, under centre-left social-democrats (PS) governments.⁸

However, the late development of welfare was not without consequence. In the long-term, it has resulted in a double structural pressure of contradictory forces (for a similar argument, see Ferrera et al. 2000: 46–8). On one hand, the needs and expectations of welfare expansion boosted by democracy and Europeanisation pushed for the expansion of social rights, higher levels of social protection and wider coverage of social risks. On the other hand, the economic and ideological context dramatically changed since the 1970s. The golden era of economic and welfare expansion gave way to the end of the ‘orthodox consensus’ around the welfare-state and an era of market-oriented ideological dominance and widespread ‘permanent austerity’ (Pierson 1994, 2000) with low economic growth and budgetary pressures began – a situation that the global crisis of 2008 – on has only heightened. Therefore, as Ferrera (2010: 618) correctly underlines, this ‘late and compressed’ modernisation has been especially ‘difficult’.

Thus, pressures for more market-oriented policies have become more prominent, clashing with the expectations towards improved coverage of different social risks. Policy instability and political strife over key welfare areas became more visible, with reforms and often counter-reforms taking place,⁹ even if path-dependence effects and the well studied and documented obstacles to welfare retrenchment (Pierson 1994; Levy 2010) have prevented radical changes. Specially in the last decade, these trends are clear. Following the 2008 crisis, the near-collapse of public finances has been a further step to sharpen them.

Despite the structural trend of an expansion of social protection systems, significant imbalances and weaknesses are patent. For example, the protection of old age became stronger than that of childhood or youth (see Table 3) and transfers such as family benefits, despite high coverage and rising amounts, remained relatively low when compared to other countries (Bradshaw and Finch 2002Bradshaw and Finch 2010); and access to the expanded network of care services does not go without the payment of monthly fees by families, in very significant amounts – even in the so-called ‘social sector’, where NGOs which own and run care services are in many cases highly subsidised by the State. In fact, the underfinancing of social services, common to other Southern European countries (Karamessini 2008: 47) is not only a matter of coverage; in Portugal it is visible in its cost for families as pointed out clearly when comparing European countries concerning cost of childcare to parents (Lewis 2009: 93).

More recently, the huge financial constraints that followed the 2008 financial crisis and eventually led to an Euro-area and IMF international support have been at the core of the political agenda. And while welfare reform has been pushed forward for budgetary reasons, ideological issues also seem to be entangled in financial arguments.

This being the overall context, what is interesting is that these changes and tensions seem to not have affected the structural trend of advancement in family policies and gender issues. Apart from cost-containment measures in family benefits to re-focus them on lower income families, other elements of these policies have barely been touched. Therefore, it is important to take a detailed look at these issues to have a full grasp of the width and depth of the transformations that have occurred.

As the welfare-state gradually expanded and matured throughout the 1980s and 1990s, even under oscillating economic performances, so did family and gender issues evolve with a gradual enlargement of social rights and services.

The already mentioned 1995 political cycle change that paved the way for longer periods of centre-left governments seems to have been a decisive factor. Plus, increased political competition between left wing parties may have also played an important role. From the late 1990s and early 2000s on, BE (Bloco de Esquerda, left of the social-democrat PS) emerged as a platform of smaller parties and gained considerable weight in Parliament, thus bringing fierce competition both to PS and PCP (Partido Comunista Português), an orthodox-minded communist party more focused on economic and labour issues. This reconfiguration favoured the renewal of the agenda and a coalition to support it: in women rights and gender issues the initiatives and votes of these three parties were the base for the new laws approved.

Besides an expansion of social benefits, namely family leaves and family allowances (Guillén et al. 2001), a gradual enlargement of family services for older people, children, and people with disability began, resulting in a much higher coverage of family services when the departure point was truly negligible. Concerning pre-school children, for instance (see Table 4), at present pre-primary school for those aged five has nearly universal coverage and kindergarten coverage has already met the Barcelona target for childcare of 33% (see, for instance, European Commission 2008; Plantenga and Remery 2009).

Also, the public education system has not only expanded its pre-school capacity to almost universal figures (for those age 5) but it now includes a program called ‘full-time school’ that has proven helpful in reconciling family responsibilities and working life by expanding the activities and time length children can remain at school.¹⁰ In fact, the Constitution itself included from 2004 the role of the State in the promotion of reconciling work and family life (art. 11°).

The duration of family leaves has been substantially increased for both women and men throughout these decades. As late as 2009, a new reform established that, on top of a compulsory initial parental leave for fathers and mothers, the maximum duration of the subsidy, up to six months, can be granted only if both parents take up leaves, thus favouring gender equality in childcare.¹¹

At the same time, a number of important shortcomings do linger. The level of financial benefits remained comparatively low. Family benefits have been reformed from universalism to means-testing conditions to focus on lower income families from 2010 on, still under a centre-left government under enormous public finance pressures. Plus, while, as mentioned, there has been a very significant expansion of the social services networks (for the elderly, children, people with disability), which started from negligible figures to the current levels, many social services are private or ran by NGOs. Even in the latter case, these services, despite being highly subsidised by the State both in construction and operation itself, are often costly to families, thus limiting its accessibility.

Apart from family policies, gender issues continued to undergo vast and profound changes, which seem to have expanded and accelerated in the last decade, and especially between 2005 and 2011, with centre-left majorities in parliament and seemingly with a relevant influence from similar developments in Spain. In Portugal, this period witnessed the introduction of a ‘quota’ system for women in electoral lists (2007), the law on medically assisted reproduction (2006),¹² a more liberal abortion law following a referendum (2007), a liberal divorce law (2008),¹³ more rights to people not formerly married in common-law marriages (2010),¹⁴ deepening the legal recognition of cohabitation relationships outside marriage itself first introduced in 2001.¹⁵ Also, domestic violence became a public offence in the Penal Code revision of 2000.¹⁶

Plus, gay rights have also been enlarged, first with the recognition of homosexual couples not formally married (2001) and then with the legal permission of marriages between people of the same sex (2010).¹⁷ A more liberal approach to gender identity issues such as sex and name change in a Gender Identity Law was also passed in parliament (2011).¹⁸ The Constitution itself was changed: in 2004, it was amended to include ‘sexual orientation’ in its rather extensive list of anti-discriminatory safeguard criteria.¹⁹

To explain this ‘second wave’ of gender legal changes a number of factors can be pointed out. On top of the already mentioned party renewal and reconfiguration of the left-wing political space, and the arguably diminishing influence of the Catholic Church and conservative social sectors on the whole, the well-succeeded liberal moral and gender agenda pushed forward by the Socialist government of Zapatero in Spain, Portugal's only neighbour and a traditionally conservative country in family and gender issues, undoubtedly played an important role.

In short, gradual but extensive and pervasive change regarding family, work-family and gender policies has taken place. The evolution of women's status, of childcare and gender issues broadly underline this transformation. The modernisation of laws, policies and social and economic structures has been substantive and sustained. Inevitably, it has also been gradual and coexisting with more traditional elements, not least in family and gender issues, as well as insufficiencies and underfinancing of services (Meulders et al. 2007; Karamessini 2008). Plus, an ambivalence and tension between equality ideas with some echoes of traditional balances and the conditions to practice them is patent (Moreno Minguez 2010).

In this framework, and adding to the already mentioned obstacles to radical welfare change and retrenchment common to other countries, structural elements specific to the Portuguese case (above all, full-time participation of women in the labour market and family changes) seem to provide solid grounds for making changes difficultly reversible (in line with Daly's (2010: 147–8) assessment). On the other hand, tensions and imbalances resulting from the difficult match between social and economic transformations and a late catching-up process are not solved. These tensions are visible in the women's overburden resulting from reconciling full-time working hours and unpaid work responsibilities or in the long declining very low fertility rates.

Analysing changes concerning family and gender practices and attitudes taking place in Portugal, in the European context, the paper discussed the need for a more comprehensive approach if one wants to be able to specify what change and continuity really mean. We argue for the need to go beyond classifications like ‘traditionalism’ or ‘familialism’, given that special arrangements and combinations between practices, attitudes, institutional and social structural constraints have to be taken into account.

The evolution of demographic data from the last 50 years and, especially, from the last decade, challenges ‘traditionalist’ assumptions. The majority of the Portuguese no longer chooses Catholic marriage. First marriages also dropped significantly, helping to explain the vertiginous rise of births out of the wedlock; divorce rates are very high even though divorcees tend to remarry and remarriage has continued to grow. From 2006 until 2010 we also identified considerable law changes regarding family, gender and equality issues defying established common sense about Portugal as a catholic southern country. The approval of same sex marriages was only one of the most emblematic examples.

To explain these transformations and their wide social acceptance we argued that their main agents were a generation born in the 1970s and 1980s, considerably more educated than their parents, with more liberal views concerning these private matters; a favourable political juncture and the convergence of a left majority in the Portuguese parliament approving these new laws was another key factor to be considered.

However, a non-traditionalist perspective coexists with the persistence of the centrality of the role of the mother in unpaid work. Thus, even if in the plan of ideals and expectations gender equality is highly rated, in practise, overburden is the daily reality of many Portuguese women mainly working in full time jobs and, especially, mothers of young children.

Some of these findings converge with others concerning southern countries showing that in spite of very clear advances concerning women's paid work (Karemissini 2008: 62) and attitudes clearly pointing out towards equality between men and women, there are still several institutional constraints resulting in ‘ambivalence’ and ‘moral dilemmas’ concerning women's role in the balance between family and work (Moreno 2010: 97).

Looking at the welfare-state pathway in Portugal, as other South European countries a latecomer, and pointing out its remaining limitations, we also underlined structural and pervasive changes concerning a wide range of laws and policies, especially visible in the last 15 years. Family-work balance and gender equality laws, in leaves and specifically the development of childcare services, as well as a more general new wave of gender rights (the latter from 2005 on), considerably changed the scenario of a country with a traditional image concerning family and gender issues.

However, the immensity of the country welfare catching-up and its institutional and financial limitations have perhaps contributed to the persistence of some characteristics that can be still associated to ‘familialism’, if not ideologically as such, at least in the sense of families still having to play a relevant role in welfare provision. Plus, in the current family structures and practices, since ‘families’ have themselves changed profoundly, this also implies important strains in the management of daily lives and specifically, as stressed before, inequalities between men and women, namely in unpaid work.

Nevertheless, we argue it would be blind vision to ignore the available data showing both (1) long-term huge transformations in welfare, and specifically in family and gender policies, and also that (2) changes concerning practises and attitudes towards family constitution and family relations changed considerably fast and are now far from the traditional image. Moreover, transversal generational effects in values and attitudes among younger generations seem much broader than the political and ideological majorities that approved many of the law and policy changes observed. Therefore, even if welfare faces strong financial pressures, a backlash in a less favourable political juncture would be unlikely. This is precisely due to a modernised symbolic and cultural environment but also to structural factors such as the massive full-time participation of women in the labour market.

Anália Torres, PhD in Sociology, is Full Professor of Sociology in ISCSP, School of Social and Political Sciences of the Technical University of Lisbon, Head of the Sociology Unit, researcher in CAPP (Centre for Administration & Public Policies) and founder in ISCSP of the CIEG (Centre of Interdisciplinary Gender Studies). She was President of ESA (European Sociological Association (2009–2011). She has been directing for long and within national and international research network research teams on family, gender, marriage, divorce, work and family, poverty, drug addition, youth and child protection system. She has 16 books published and more than 60 articles and chapters of books, some of them accessible in www.analiatorres.com. E-mail: [email protected]

Bernardo Coelho, Sociologist, researcher at CIES-IUL. He is also member of the CIEG (Interdisciplinary Centre for Gender Studies) executive committee. His current research interest are Sociology of family; gender social relations, intimate life and sexuality; sociology of financial markets. He Researcher of national and international research projects on these issues. Author and co-author of articles and chapters in books, published a book about prostitution (escort girls) in 2009. Currently he is preparing a PhD in sociology at ISCTE-IUL (Instituto Universitário de Lisboa) on escort girls and their customers. E-mail: [email protected]

Miguel Cabrita, Assistant at ISCTE – Instituto Universitário de Lisboa and reseacher at CIES-IUL. His main areas of teaching and research are contemporary sociological theories, the welfare-state and public policies, and more specifically family and social policy. He has participated in research projects on these topics and has also been involved in the evaluation of public and social policies in Portugal and is currently doing PhD research about fertility decisions. E-mail: [email protected]