Capabilities and Childbearing Intentions in Europe: The association between work–family reconciliation policies, economic uncertainties and women's fertility plans Open Access

In contemporary Europe, policy makers are increasingly concerned with the demographic sustainability in countries facing an aging population with low fertility (European Commission 2005). Today nearly all European countries have a fertility below replacement level (2.1 children per woman), but the country differences are substantial. However, the ideal family size of two children is relatively consistent across European societies (Testa 2006). Researchers have noted a decrease in average ideal family size among younger cohorts and a gap between ideal family size and realised fertility (Goldstein et al. 2003; Hagewen and Morgan 2005). The decrease in ideal family size has been attributed to a growing acceptance of childlessness and less traditional lifestyles (Sobotka and Testa 2008). The gap between the ideal family size and realised fertility has been explained by the postponement of childbearing (Kohler et al. 2002), related to the increased aspirations among women to be both earners and carers (Dorbritz 2008), and the incoherence between women's increased labour market opportunities and a lack of institutional arrangements for work–family reconciliation (Hobson and Oláh 2006; McDonald 2002). Studying childbearing intentions can provide us with a better understanding of fertility behaviour, as intentions are strongly associated with subsequent fertility. The relationship between women's employment and fertility has been widely recognised, but the association between economic uncertainties and childbearing intentions is less studied, especially in a European comparative perspective.

This article focuses on the relationship between women's short-term childbearing intentions considering (1) economic uncertainties at individual level and (2) the work–family reconciliation policies in 10 European countries. Several related questions are addressed: to what extent are women's short-term childbearing intentions associated with their labour force participation, perceived job and income insecurity? Do these factors influence childless women's and mothers' intentions differently? Can we detect differences in women's short-term childbearing intentions across different work–family reconciliation policy configurations? The theoretical framework is inspired by the capability approach (Sen 1992, 1993).

The first section of this article outlines the rationale for studying childbearing intentions and why the capability approach is a relevant strategy for analysing them. The second section discusses the theoretical underpinnings in the core dimensions relating to childbearing intentions: economic uncertainties, individual resources, and work–family reconciliation policies. In the final section I present the results from the individual-level analysis of short-term childbearing intentions and the macro-level analysis of work–family reconciliation policies and childbearing intentions.

According to the socio-psychological theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen 1991), intentions are a motivation to act. Strong intentions increase the probability that people realise their intentions. This relationship applies also to childbearing, as several studies have found a strong association between childbearing intentions and realised fertility (Schoen et al. 1999; Hagewen and Morgan 2005). Childbearing intentions should not be confounded with childbearing preferences. Preferences most often revolve around ideal family size and the number of children one would like to have, which reflects social norms (Hagewen and Morgan 2005) irrespective of the possibilities for actualising the ideal family size. Childbearing intentions more directly relate to whether a person intends, plans or expects to have a(nother) child (Hagewen and Morgan 2005; Philipov et al. 2006). According to the theory of planned behaviour, intentions are influenced by individual characteristics, attitudes and norms and perceived behavioural control, suggesting that not only available means and resources, but also a person's assessment of his or her ability to act is an important factor (Ajzen 1991). When women are asked about their childbearing intentions, their current life situation is taken into account, for instance, the economic situation and aspirations. Consequently, childbearing intentions reflect opportunities and constraints (Morgan and Rackin 2010), and given that most women in European societies will be in employment before having children, the possibilities to combine work and motherhood has become an important dimension in assessing childbearing intentions. Nevertheless, the current theorising on planned behaviour lacks a framework for analysing childbearing intentions within a broader societal context. It fails to take into account that perceived behavioural control and the processes shaping childbearing intentions can be institutionally embedded. The capability approach provides the conceptual tools for incorporating the role of institutions, particularly the potential role of work–family reconciliation policies, and can provide deeper insights into women's childbearing intentions.

The capability approach is a framework for evaluating disparities in capabilities related to well-being (Robeyns 2003; Sen 1992, 1993) and offers a multi-dimensional perspective that helps us to understand how the interplay of individual life situations and institutional factors shape people's capabilities to realise valuable activities (Hobson and Fahlén 2009). The approach focuses on people's capabilities to achieve what one considers valuable. It diverges from the utility approach, which focuses on achievements, overlooking people's real freedom to achieve (Sen 1992), and a resource based-approach, which fails to take into account that people can differ in their capabilities to translate resources into achievements (Robeyns 2003).

Functionings and capabilities are central components in the approach. Within Sen's framework, functioning is an achievement, while capabilities can be defined as the ability to achieve (Robeyns 2003). In this study, short-term childbearing intentions are regarded as an indicator of women's capabilities to enter motherhood or to have additional children. Given the fact that the vast majority of European women want to have at least one child and that intentional childlessness is a preferred ideal by a very small proportion of women in Europe (Testa 2006),¹ actual childbearing can be regarded as a valued achievement (functioning), although this lies beyond the scope of this study, as does intentional childlessness and infecundity. Short-term intentions reflect the perception of effective options and are therefore related to the sense of risk and security regarding the present situation and future prospects.

Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual framework for analysing the factors influencing women's short-term childbearing intentions. Institutional factors (e.g., policies, rights and regulations) can strengthen or weaken women's capabilities to be both earners and carers. They can diminish the risks and costs of children, for instance, through generous benefits and services for reconciling employment with childbearing (Hobson and Oláh 2006), which in turn can influence women's childbearing intentions. A lack of economic incentives or little implementations of work–family reconciliation policies can therefore undermine capabilities, and affect economic uncertainty as women may be reluctant to exercise their rights at the workplace (Fultz and Steinhilber 2003; Hobson et al. 2011).

Turning to individual factors, specifically human capital, we know that educational attainment not only influences a woman's prospects at the labour market, economic returns and employability, but also her perception of economic risk and security. Compared with more skilled women, less educated women tend to have fewer job opportunities and hold insecure work contracts with less pay, which can obstruct their family plans (Kotowska et al. 2010). These women may also have fewer options to combine work and motherhood and weaker capabilities to make claims for work–life balance at the workplace. In addition, working women with fewer resources are likely to be more dependent on institutional support for work–family reconciliation to enhance their capability to make such claims (Hobson et al. 2011). Other individual factors that may influence the capability to make childbearing plans is age, partnership status, the number of children already born and the partner's labour force participation. However, in this study, the main individual factor of interest is educational attainment.

Beyond having employment, whether one's job and income are perceived as secure clearly are connected to the sense of risk and security regarding the present situation and future prospects. The sense of risk and security can be regarded as an effect of perceived economic uncertainty. The perceived life situation reaches into the cognitive level of what is understood as real feasible options (Hobson and Fahlén 2009), hence economic uncertainties can therefore constrain women's childbearing plans.

Within the framework of capabilities for short-term childbearing intentions, represented in the model, three factors are of interest in this study: economic uncertainty, individual resources and work–family reconciliation policies.

Beck's (1999) well known term ‘the risk society’ underlines the increasing risks and uncertainty people confront in many industrialised societies. The idea that economic security is a precondition for having children is salient in fertility research. According to dominant economic theory, childbearing decisions are based on cost–benefit calculations (Becker 1993). If the direct and indirect (opportunity) costs of having a(nother) child are perceived as high, people will postpone or avoid having children (McDonald 2002). The opportunity costs of having children are assumed to be higher for high educated women (Engelhardt and Prskawetz 2004). Though high educated women have greater risk of childlessness, a tendency observed in several European countries is that once they have entered motherhood, they are equally or more likely to have additional children as less educated women (Thomson et al. 2009). There is also growing evidence that the more educated not only have high fertility intentions but also have the resources to realise them (Mills et al. 2008). Further, women tend to partner men with similar socio-economic situation (Drobnič and Blossfeld 2001), so even when faced with economic uncertainty, high educated women are likely to have a partner providing more stable support. In contrast, low educated working women are more likely to have uncertain economic futures, which may hinder their family plans (Kotowska et al. 2010).

The cost–benefit approach assumes that future costs of parenthood are known. In contrast the risk aversion approach maintains that the costs and benefits lie in the future and are incalculable in advance. If future prospects are uncertain – an unstable labour market, high incidence of temporary jobs and unemployment – people will seek to reduce uncertainty by investing in security in terms of education, labour market attachment and experience (Hobcraft and Kiernan 1995; McDonald 2002). These approaches highlight the relevance of risk in decision processes, yet they do not take into account that perceptions of risk and security can be contextually embedded. By including the role of institutional contexts, the capability approach can provide a broader framework for analysing economic uncertainty and childbearing decisions.

Relatively little is known about the association between perceived economic uncertainty and fertility decisions across societies. Kreyenfeld (2010) has found that perceived job insecurity have a negative impact on first births for women in East but not in West Germany. Studies on Spain and France show that temporary employment has a negative impact on first births (De la Rica and Iza 2005; Pailhé and Solaz 2011) and additional childbearing (Adsera 2011). Previous studies addressing the impact of economic uncertainty, in terms of labour force participation or income, on childbearing are inconclusive. Studies on Nordic countries find a positive association between women's labour force participation or income and the transition to motherhood (Andersson et al. 2009; Andersson and Scott 2005), among women over 30 years (Vikat 2004), or the timing of additional children (Kravdal 2002). Other studies of Norway and France, however, find no impact of unemployment on first births (Kravdal 2002; Pailhé and Solaz 2011). Findings from Poland, Italy and Germany, suggest that labour force participation interacts with education; to be unemployed and low educated accelerate the transition to motherhood, while unemployed women with high educated postpone this transition (Kreyenfeld 2010; Matysiak and Vignoli 2010).

The differences in results on economic uncertainties discussed above can partly be explained by different methods and measures, but nevertheless suggest that there is no universal pattern regarding the impact of economic uncertainty on fertility. Cross-national variation can also be attributed to women's aspirations to be both earners and carers and the institutional constraints they confront in realising this goal (Kreyenfeld 2001). Previous studies have also suggested that the presence of children influence whether a woman is in paid work or not. In contemporary Europe, most women leave work for some time during childbirth. The time away from paid work is closely linked to the parental leave system and the availability of childcare (Plantenga and Remery 2009) which influence women's ability to return to work. This illuminates the importance of accounting for the institutional context for understanding childbearing decisions.

Fertility variations across Europe have been linked to women's ability to reconcile employment with having a family (Brewster and Rindfuss 2000). The selected countries in this study represent different welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990; Korpi 2000) and fertility regimes (Kohler et al. 2002). In 2004,² Denmark, Finland, Sweden, The Netherlands and the UK was classified as low fertility regimes with a total fertility rate (TFR) below the replacement level (2.1) but higher than 1.5 children per woman. Germany and Spain were defined as very low fertility regimes, with a TFR of 1.3–1.5. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were regarded as lowest low fertility regimes with a TFR below 1.3.

To capture the gender dimension of welfare regimes it is important to consider policies directly linked to women's ability to combine work and motherhood. Therefore, for this study, the framework of familialism is used as a heuristic device for considering policy configurations across European societies (Leitner 2003; Saraceno and Keck 2010). Leitner (2003) identifies four ideal types, based on parental leave benefit and childcare provision; (1) implicit familialism with low provision of formal childcare and a shortage of financial care support, (2) explicit familialism with low provision of formal childcare but with financial care support, (3) de-familialism with high provision of formal childcare but a shortage of financial care support, and (4) optional familialism with high provision of formal child care and financial care support. The parental leave and childcare are regarded as institutional factors influencing women's capabilities to reconcile work and family life.

The parental leave systems and the provision and cost of childcare for the youngest children vary across the 10 countries (Table 1).³ The specific policies are those in place in 2004/05 when the European Social Survey (Round 2) was launched.⁴ A comparative measure of leave systems is the full-time equivalent (FTE) of paid leave, the duration of paid leave if it were paid in 100% of previous earnings (OECD 2008). All countries have paid maternity leave, but the generosity ranges from 12 to 19 weeks of FTE of paid maternity leave. Paternity leave is implemented in several countries, but only Finland and Sweden have FTE of paid paternity leave for more than a month, which is part of the parental leave. The parental leave varies from 0 to 56 weeks of FTE of paid leave (Table 1). The demand for childcare services exceeds the supply, except in the Nordic countries, where childcare is regarded as a social right (Plantenga and Remery 2009). In 2005 the enrolment rates ranged from 2 to 73%. In The Netherlands, the UK and Spain, the majority of children attend childcare on part-time basis. The cost of formal childcare varies from about 4 to 30% of an average wage (Table 1).

Reality rarely fits ideal types, they are however useful for identifying cross-national variations in policies. Table 1 indicates that the Nordic countries are closest to optional familialism, with generous FTE of paid parental leave and widespread provision of childcare. The strong support for working mothers is reflected in high maternal employment rates, yet lowest in Finland,⁵ with a relatively high incidence of long part-time work (30–39 hours a week) (OECD 2007). The CEE countries display features of explicit familialism with generous FTE of paid maternal/parental leave but low provision of childcare. Part-time work is not an option at most workplaces (Saxonberg and Sirovátka 2006), reflected in low incidence in part-time work and low maternal employment rates in these countries (OECD 2007, 2009). The remaining countries bear traits of both implicit familialism and de-familialism (when compared to the Nordic and the CEE countries), with unpaid or short FTE of paid parental leave, expensive and intermediate levels of childcare provision but mainly on part-time basis (Table 1). These countries have relatively high maternal employment, particularly on short part-time basis (less than 30 hours a week), except for Spain where the maternal employment rate is relatively low (OECD 2007). The diversity in these policies reflects variations in conditions for women to be both earners and carers.

Given the theoretical framework and findings from previous studies, regarding economic uncertainty and childbearing, discussed above, I expect: (1) Women who perceive their job or income as insecure are less likely to intend to have a(nother) child within the next three years than women with a secure job or secure income. However, economic theories and empirical findings suggest that labour force attachment interacts with educational attainment in regard to childbearing; in some countries high educated unemployed women postpone childbearing, while low educated women respond to this situation by becoming mothers. In other countries having a job is a precondition for having children, regardless of educational attainment. I therefore expect that: (2) the impact of employment on short-term childbearing intention interacts with educational attainment and by countries.

Within the framework of capabilities, institutional support for work–family reconciliation can reduce the risks and cost of childbearing. I therefore expect that: (3) Working women in countries with stronger support for work–family reconciliation display higher probabilities to intend to have a(nother) child than working women in countries with weaker support for work–family reconciliation. However, it has been suggested that high educated working women have more resources to realise their childbearing intentions. In contrast, less educated working women, due to less job opportunities and employment security may find it more difficult to combine work and family life, i.e., the capability to be both an earner and a carer can hinder their family plans, especially in countries with weaker rights for work–family reconciliation. Such rights may be more important for less educated working women with an uncertain economic situation, as such policies can enhance their capabilities to reconcile work and family life. Given this assumption about low educated working women, the association between institutional context, economic uncertainty and childbearing intention is analysed with a specific focus on low educated working women.

The empirical analysis is based on data derived from the second round of the European Social Survey (ESS) conducted in 2004/05, applied in 26 countries. The sample is representative of all persons older than 15 years in each country. The analysis includes a subsample of total of 3184 women from 10 European countries, aged 20–45 years, having at most two children living in or outside the household and the youngest child less than 14 years of age.⁶ Logistic regression models are applied and the dependent variable, short-term childbearing intentions, is operationalised in the question: Do you plan to have a child within the next three years? Responses ‘probably yes’ and ‘definitely yes’ are coded as 1, all else equals 0. The main variables of interest are labour force participation, job security, income security. Labour force participation is divided into four categories; in paid work, not in paid work (unemployed, permanently sick and retired with no labour force participation), in education, full-time housework/care-work⁷ and others (unspecified activities). Job security and income security are self-evaluations of the employment situation and economic resources. Perceived job security is operationalised by the statement ‘My job is secure’, in terms of an actual or implied promise of continued employment. The responses not at all true and a little true is regarded as perceived job insecurity and quite true and very true equals a perceived job security.⁸ Perceived income security is based on the respondent's perception of the present household income. Responses finding it difficult and finding it very difficult to live on present income is regarded as perceived income uncertainty. Coping and living comfortably on present income is interpreted as perceived income security. Education is divided into three categories, lower secondary level (or less), upper secondary level and tertiary level. The countries are included as dummy variables. Previous studies have shown that age, number of children and not having a partner reduces childbearing intentions (Mills et al. 2008; Philipov et al. 2006). These variables are included in the analysis as control variables together with age of the youngest child and partner's labour force participation.

In the final analysis, reconciliation policies and aggregated childbearing intention probabilities are analysed.⁹ A standardised index has been constructed, based on the indicators in Table 1, i.e., FTE of paid maternity, parental and paternity leave, total share of enrolled children younger than 3 years in formal childcare, the proportion of children enrolled for 30 hours or more a week, and the childcare fees of a 2-year-old as a percent of average wage.¹⁰ High scores indicate more institutional support for work–family reconciliation.

At the outset, descriptive statistics are presented on childbearing intentions and the variables related to economic uncertainties. Table 2 reveals that there are no major differences between the proportion of childless women's and one-child mothers' intentions to have a(nother) child within the next 3 years (about 40%). Only about 9% of the two-child mothers intend to have an additional child, which reflects the prevalent two-child norm. A slightly higher proportion of women in the Nordic countries expect to have a child, compared to the other countries. In the Nordic countries the vast majority of women are in paid work, regardless of the number of children already born. Full-time housework/care work is most frequent in Germany, the UK, Spain and the CEE countries. A higher proportion of childless women perceive their job as insecure compared to mothers, and perceived job security is most prevalent in the Nordic countries, The Netherlands and the UK. However, perceived income insecurity is more frequent among mothers and in Germany, the UK and the CEE countries.

The association between women's short-term childbearing intentions and perceived economic uncertainty is analysed with logistic regression models. Separate models are computed for childless women, one-child mothers and two-child mothers.

As one would expect, perceived job insecurity decreases the probability to intend to have a(nother) child. The effect is slightly more evident for mothers. Perceived income insecurity reduces intentions for childless women and one-child mothers (Table 3). These results indicate that both childless women and mothers' short-term childbearing intentions are related to their perceptions of risk and security. When considering labour force participation, it is only childless students who are less likely to intend to have a child in the near future, compared to childless women in paid work. Furthermore, low educated childless women are less likely to intend to have a child than those with high education, which indicates that the less educated face greater economic risks, which in turn influence their childbearing intentions.

The control variables reveal that women aged 25–29 years are most likely to intend to have a(nother) child. Having a child below 3 years increases the intentions to have an additional child. Living with a partner who is not in paid work or still in education, decreases the intentions for childless women only (Table 3), suggesting that the transition to motherhood is influenced by the potential economic contribution of the partner.

The association between countries and short-term childbearing intentions display different tendencies depending on motherhood status. Childless women in Denmark, Finland, Hungary and Poland are more likely to intend to have a child than are childless women in Sweden (reference category). Mothers in Sweden are more likely than mothers in the other countries to intend to have a second and a third child (Table 3).

Previous research suggests that the relationship between labour force participation and childbearing vary by the woman's educational attainment, but that this interaction patterns differ across countries. In the second assumption, I therefore expected to find that this interaction applies also to short-term childbearing intentions, with different interaction patterns across countries. To test this assumption, interaction terms have been added to the logistic regression (table not shown). The coefficients have been recalculated into relative risks.¹¹ Interactions were found only for childless women. Figure 2 displays the relative risks within each country regarding short-term childbearing intentions for high and low educated childless women in or out of paid work (all other variables set at the zero categories).

The general tendency revealed in Figure 2 is that being in paid work increases the chance that a childless woman intends to have a child in the near future, yet the within country interaction pattern vary by women's educational attainment. Employment is an important precondition for entering motherhood in Sweden, Denmark and Hungary, regardless of educational attainment. In these countries, low educated childless women not in paid work are the least likely to intend to have a child within the next 3 years (compared with the other groups of women within these countries). Alternatively, in Finland, Germany, The Netherlands, the UK and Poland, this group of women are the most more likely to intend to have a child in the near future, especially if their partner is employed (the zero category of partner's labour force participation). This suggests that economic uncertainty in terms of not being in paid work have different impact on childless women's childbearing plans across the selected countries.

In the next analysis, I consider the association between aggregated probabilities of short-term childbearing intentions and work–family reconciliation policies. The calculation of probabilities is based on the regression results above (see also footnote 9).

According to the third assumption, we should expect that working women in countries with stronger support for work–family reconciliation display higher probabilities to intend to have a(nother) child than working women in countries with weaker support for work–family reconciliation, and this would be especially evident for low educated working women. Institutional support for work–family reconciliation, such as paid parental leave and affordable childcare, can diminish the risks and the costs of children, and enhance women's capabilities to have children and to combine work and family life. Within a capability framework, those with more individual resources may have greater options to combine work and motherhood than women with fewer individual resources.

A comparison of short-term childbearing intention probabilities for high and low educated childless working women who perceive their job and income as uncertain with the same characteristics (aged 25–29 years, with a working partner) show that the high educated childless working women display 14–22 percentage point higher probabilities to have a child within the next 3 years (table not shown). The largest gap is found in Germany, The Netherlands, the UK and Spain, countries with weaker support for work–family reconciliation. The corresponding differences for one-child working mothers with a 0–3 year old child are 3–6 percentage points across all countries (table not shown). This suggests that high educated working women have greater capabilities to plan for a(nother) child, even when faced with perceived economic uncertainties, as their partner is likely to provide a more economic support than partners of less educated women. In the following analysis we focus on low educated childless women and one-child mothers who perceive their job and income as insecure (aged 25–29 years, with a working partner), as this group may be more dependent upon institutional support for work–family reconciliation, as legal support can decrease the direct costs and enhance the sense of entitlement to make use of such policies, even if the job and income are perceived as insecure.

Aggregated intentions are analysed in relation to a policy index including FTE of paid maternal, paternal and parental leave, and the availability and cost of childcare (see Table 1).

The country variation in childbearing intentions displays different patterns for the childless and one-child mothers (Figure 3). The intention probabilities for low educated childless women, with perceived job and income insecurity, are clustered into two main groups in relation to the work–family reconciliation policy index (Figure 3: left) and the correlation between the index and intention probabilities for the childless women is 0.49; i.e., weaker institutional support for work–family reconciliation corresponds to relatively low short-term intention probabilities. Lower probabilities of short-term intention can be observed in Germany, The Netherlands, the UK and Spain, which can be interpreted as a response to difficulties for working women who experience economic uncertainties to reconcile employment with family responsibilities. These countries have comparatively short or unpaid FTE of paid parental leave and relatively costly or low provision of childcare on full-time basis. Higher probabilities for short-term childbearing intentions are found in the CEE countries and the Nordic countries. Both country clusters have relatively generous parental leave systems, but the Nordic countries have extensive childcare provision compared to the low levels in the CEE countries.

For low educated one-child mothers with perceived job and income insecurity, we can see a different pattern (Figure 3: right). The correlation is still positive (0.39) however, the intention probabilities of one-child mothers in the CEE countries are closer to, or even lower than, the intentions probabilities in Germany, The Netherlands, the UK and Spain. All these countries have relatively little or costly provision of formal childcare, compared to the Nordic countries. In addition, part-time work is more available in Germany, The Netherlands, the UK compared to Spain and the CEE countries. Compared to the Nordic countries, both childless women and one-child mothers in Germany, The Netherlands, the UK and Spain have lower intention probabilities, though childless women in The Netherlands, the UK and Spain are less likely to intend to have a child in the near future compared to the one-child mothers in these countries. The result also suggests that perceived economic uncertainties, in terms of job and income insecurity, in the CEE countries have a greater impact on one-child mothers' childbearing intentions compared to childless women.

These results support the third assumption, but the positive association between institutional support for work–family reconciliation and intentions probabilities is more evident for the childless women.

In this study, I have explored how different work–family reconciliation policies and economic uncertainties are interrelated to women's short-term childbearing intentions. Through the lens of capabilities, I have argued that short-term childbearing intentions are influenced by the perceptions of risk and security, which are shaped by opportunities and constraints related to the current life situation, future prospects and institutional factors affecting women's capabilities to combine work and family life.

The results show that economic security is an important factor in the family building process, as suggested by Hobcraft and Kiernan (1995). However, the association between economic uncertainties and short-term childbearing intentions varies by the number of children already born (if any), educational attainment and the institutional context.

Labour force participation mainly influences childless women's short-term childbearing intentions and interacts with education and by countries, as assumed. Thus, unemployment does not have the same effect on childbearing intentions for all women across countries. In countries with weaker work–family policies, such as Germany, The Netherlands, the UK and Spain, establishing oneself in the labour market before having the first child is most important for the high educated. I interpret these results in terms of strong aspirations among high educated women to combine having a career with motherhood and the constraints they face. Hobson and Oláh (2006) and McDonald (2002) refer this delay in childbearing to the incoherence effect: the gap between women's increased labour market opportunities and a lack of institutional arrangements for work–family reconciliation.

The analysis also reveals that low educated childless women not in paid work respond to this economic uncertainty differently. In Sweden, Denmark and Hungary, countries with stronger work–family policies, women delay their potential childbearing until they have a job, suggesting that paid work is a precondition for having children. In countries with weaker work–family reconciliation policies, such as Germany, The Netherlands, the UK, Poland and Finland, low educated women make use of their time out of the labour market by having children, perhaps as an alternative to unemployment or a response to less prospects at the labour market.

The macro-level analysis of work–family policies and the country-specific childbearing intentions, among low educated childless women and one-child mothers of a young child, who perceive their job and income as insecure, partly support the assumption that working women in countries with stronger institutional support for work–family reconciliation are more likely to intend to have a(nother) child than working women in countries with weaker policy support. The pattern across the selected countries varies by motherhood status, as this association is slightly stronger for childless women. This indicates that the provisions of reconciliation policies can reduce the direct costs of the first child and increase low educated working childless women's capabilities to have a child in the near future, even if they experience economic uncertainties. The result for one-child mothers is less straightforward, yet working mothers in the Nordic countries, with strong institutional support for work–family reconciliation, display higher intentions to have an additional child in the near future than women in Germany, The Netherlands, the UK and Spain, countries with relatively weak institutional support for work–family reconciliation.

In the CEE countries, economic uncertainty and institutional factors (the relatively long parental leave at an intermediate benefit level and a deficit of childcare facilities) combined with less individual resources place more constraints on one-child mothers' short-term childbearing intentions than on childless women's intentions, reflected in relatively large differences in intentions probabilities for these two groups. The difficulties in returning to work after being out of the labour force for several years increase the risk of unemployment that women encounter after they become mothers. Whereas the EU directive stipulates the right to return to the same job (Directive 96/34/EC) there is evidence that these rights are not fully enforced in CEE countries (Saxonberg and Sirovátka 2006). Fultz and Steinhilber (2003) state that women in these countries are increasingly reluctant to make use of their work–family reconciliation rights out of fear of job loss or relocation. This fear of job loss in itself intensifies the sense of insecurity that surrounds childbearing decisions.

In The Netherlands, the UK and Spain, we found a slightly different pattern among the low educated women facing job and income insecurity, compared to the CEE countries. Entering motherhood appears to be a greater life decision than to have an additional child, expressed in lower aspirations among the childless to have a child in the near future compared to one-child mothers. Here the weaker institutional support for work–family reconciliation coupled with economic uncertainty act as constraints for low educated working women's capabilities to enter motherhood.

The multi-dimensional capability approach is highly relevant for analysing intentions as it allows us to embed individual decisions in a broader social context, beyond theories of planned behaviour, cost–benefit calculations and risk aversion. The analysis have showed that economic uncertainties, individual resources and institutional context are interlinked in shaping women's intentions to have children, however there is no neat cluster fit between the various types of familialism or the conventional welfare regimes in this regard. Nevertheless, economic security is a key component for increasing women's capabilities to have children across different institutional contexts. This calls for policies that facilitate the transition to secure jobs, strengthen the job protection during and after the parental leave, and reduce the costs of childbearing through available and affordable childcare. This is particularly challenging in the midst of the current economic crisis, when women may be even more inclined to delay their childbearing.

I am grateful for comments and suggestions from Barbara Hobson and Livia Sz. Oláh. I also thank the anonymous reviewers for their constructive criticism.

Susanne Fahlén holds a Ph.D. in sociology from the Department of Sociology, Stockholm University. Her research focuses on gender and social politics in a European perspective with a special focus on parental work–life balance, childbearing intentions and realised childbearing.