Europe is struggling over the relationship between abundance and general well-being. It is by now clear that abundance not only constitutes a natural limit to ‘growth’ but, at the same time, does not resolve the problem of distributing social positions equitably. After the first post-war decades of social mobility, the lines of social division became increasingly rigid again and respective forms of malaise have emerged across European societies. ‘It's the economy, stupid’ as the victorious Democratic Party slogan put it; it is, in fact, the disengagement of the economy from society and its hegemonic establishment as an independent ‘technical’ realm which produces competitive change, startling wealth and – inevitably – numerous everyday tragedies. At a time when even neoliberals accept the need for ‘compassion’ in managing the economy, critics seem so disoriented as to continue to address the problem in the exclusive terms of class antagonism, blaming the bankers and the financiers, thus brushing aside the benefits of Polanyi's classic analysis and his thoughtful warning:
… against relying too much on the economic interests of given classes in the explanation of history. Such an approach would tacitly imply the givenness of those classes in a sense in which this is possible only in an indestructible society. It leaves outside its range those critical phases of history, when a civilization has broken down or is passing through a transformation, when as a rule new classes are formed, sometimes within the briefest space of time, out of the ruins of older classes, or even out of extraneous elements like foreign adventurers or outcasts. Frequently, at a historical juncture new classes have been called into being simply by virtue of the demands of the time. Ultimately, therefore, it is the relation of a class to society as a whole which maps out its part in the drama; and its success is determined by the breadth and variety of the interests, other than its own, which it is able to serve. Indeed, no policy of narrow class interest can safeguard even that interest well – a rule which allows of but few exceptions. Unless the alternative to the social setup is a plunge into utter destruction, no crudely selfish class can maintain itself in the lead. (Polanyi 1962 [1944])
One would expect sociology in this context to take the lead in explaining that the naturalised precedence of the economic sphere is a hegemonic illusion and that hundreds of millions of people cannot fail if they agree to a certain extent on their basic political objectives. These simple sociological assertions have not gained any public visibility and we seem to accept the two subordinate roles that we are given as either vague, inconsequential critics of inequality or valorous escorts of social suffering. But we have not advanced even a little since Polanyi's time in turning the tables on the issue of subjecting economic policy design to social priorities. We have failed to communicate as an epistemic community our very basic knowledge, e.g. that ‘social problems’ are not anomalies in an otherwise realistic political and economic framework but genuine expressions of the inadequacies of that framework. For example, ‘unemployment’ is constantly construed as a problem whilst its recurrence reasonably indicates that what late modern societies might need is in fact an economy with significantly less work. Subordinating the economic to the social is of course a political choice but informing the citizens that this choice is in fact available to them is also a scientific mission for sociology. A reflexive economic conscience is indispensable for repoliticising the current condition of European societies in particular. The recurrent ‘crises’ and the paradoxical increase of uncertainties in the safest and wealthiest societies in our history must be analysed as the outcome of intentional or emerging priorities, which can be changed. Sociology is well-equipped to demonstrate that the alternative is not ‘utter destruction’ and that people can ‘use information and […] develop reason in order to achieve lucid summations of what is going on in the world’ (Wright Mills 2000 [1959]). It is perhaps a shared hope among sociologists that the research published in journals like this one will contribute to a public impulse towards conceiving of the economic sphere as a mere social instrument and not as the essence of society itself.
In this issue, there are several inklings to guide thinking in this direction. Despite the hegemonic influence of economic competition, the fundamental currency for building social relations is trust; there is actually fine evidence to show that trust is not merely a matter of cultural resemblance and anticipation (Kolodziej & Kolodziej-Durnas). At the same time, despite the influence of a liberal world, irreversible and collective associations – such as epigamy – may continue to be regulated via social control structures and belief systems, especially for women (Carol & Teney). Gender-related action is at the centre of proving that social change can counter the vicissitudes of unplanned liberalism. Crucial in that process is the effect of collective values on which the attitudes of individual women are built (Uunk). Conversely, planned organisational and institutional performance is necessary in reducing the inequalities of gendered attitudes (Da Roit, Hoogenboom, & Weicht). For, it is invariably confirmed in every domain that pure competition is merely a form of concentrating resources at the top; even business graduates must endure this effect like everyone else (Borgen). However, there seems to be an unsettling link between economic conditions and political participation. Affluence and existential security during youth appear to be significant in terms of favouring political participation over one's entire life. Still more worrying, there is a permanent negative effect on political participation throughout the lifetime of the generations that experienced uncertainty and insecurity at a young age (Chauvel & Smits).
References
Michalis Lianos, University of Rouen