ABSTRACT
Is the sense of obligation we feel towards our parents comparable to the one we feel towards our children? Most studies of normative solidarity measure only filial norms, that is, norms for children's obligations towards parents, whilst largely ignoring parental norms, that is, norms for parents’ obligations towards children. This article quantitatively investigates parental and filial norms in 20 countries within 5 European regions. The article examines the question of whether the family cultures of North-West Europe can be understood as cultures of descending familialism, that is, cultures in which parental obligations are emphasised over filial obligations, as opposed to cultures of extreme individualism. The article contributes to the literature on family norms theoretically by showing that family cultures should be differentiated not merely by their strength but also by their direction, and methodologically by highlighting the importance of developing precise measures of both parental and filial norms. For the Nordic countries in particular, the analysis shows that the family culture is pluralistic, with the question of intergenerational responsibilities being one likely to provoke discussion in these societies for years to come.
1. Introduction
How much self-sacrifice do we owe to our parents and our children? All over Europe, ageing populations and a crisis-ridden economy challenge families and governments to meet the needs of care-dependent citizens, both young and old. In many countries, the established ways of caring for these groups are threatened, and reforms are necessary. The success or failure of such future reforms will greatly depend on the configuration of norms in the various countries, that is, to what degree people accept moral responsibility for family members, and whether they feel responsible for older and younger generations equally.
The concept of directionality in intergenerational exchange practices has been developed in several studies in Asia, Europe and the US (e.g. Kreager and Schröder-Butterfill 2008; Fingerman et al. 2012; Lin and Yi 2013), but few have explored the question of possible corresponding variations in the directionality of intergenerational norms. Likewise, while measuring the overall strength of family norms is standard in studies of intergenerational relations, (e.g. Cooney and Dykstra 2011), less attention has been paid to their directionality.
I argue that looking at the directionality of norms resolves the apparent contradiction between, on the one side, the supposedly weak family norms of the North and, on the other, those recent studies showing a complex picture of intergenerational exchange practices with both close-knit and more distant families existing in all European countries (Bordone 2009; Dykstra and Fokkema 2011) and some studies even indicating that relations in the ‘individualistic’ North are more often perceived as satisfactory than is the case in the ‘familistic’ South (Brandt and Deindl 2013).
One reason for the apparent discrepancy between norms and practices is that most studies of normative solidarity measure only filial norms, that is, norms for children's obligations towards parents, whilst largely ignoring parental norms, that is, norms for parents’ obligations towards children (e.g. Goerres and Tepe 2010).1 This one-sided attention to filial norms is problematic in two ways. Firstly, the exclusive focus on filial obligations implies that the parents are always the weaker party, that is, more or less passive objects for filial care or neglect. This premise is questionable, as European parents on average are net-givers to their adult children for most of their lives (Mudrazija 2016). Secondly, equating family norms with filial norms ignores a body of literature that suggest that the weighting of parental and filial norms may vary between cultures, that is, that cultures appearing ‘weak’ when measured by filial norms may appear ‘strong’ when measured by parental norms, or vice versa (e.g. Aboderin 2005).
This article quantitatively investigates parental and filial norms in 20 countries within five European regions, each comprising between three and five institutionally and culturally similar countries corresponding to recognised welfare regime typologies. The article examines the question of whether the family cultures of North-West Europe can be understood as cultures of descending familialism, that is, cultures in which parental obligations are emphasised over filial obligations, as opposed to cultures of individualism. The analysis uses data from the European Values Study (EVS) 2008 wave, which includes measures of parental and filial norms for these 20 countries.
The article contributes to the literature on family norms theoretically by showing that family cultures should be differentiated not merely by their strength but also by their direction, and methodologically by highlighting the importance of developing precise measures of both parental and filial norms. For the Nordic countries in particular, the analysis portrays a pluralistic family culture, where the question of intergenerational responsibilities is likely to be provoke debate for years to come.
The article is organised as follows: I review the literature on differences in European family cultures, followed by an overview of the scholarly interpretations of these differences. Then I present the data, methods and analytic strategy, after which I present the results of the analysis, the conclusion and discuss the academic and policy-oriented implications of the results.
2. European regional family cultures
In studies of European regional variations in normative solidarity, the Nordic countries rank consistently the lowest and the Mediterranean countries the highest (e.g. Lowenstein and Daatland 2006; Kalmijn and Saraceno 2008). The changes in family patterns known as the second demographic transition came early in the Nordic countries and gained widespread acceptance both formally and informally (Sobotka 2008; Lesthaeghe 2014). The formal changes include the recognition of unmarried cohabitation and the institutionalisation of same-sex unions (Syltevik 2010, 2014; Fernández and Lutter 2013). The informal changes include a general culture of sexual permissiveness (Therborn 2004; Liefbroer and Billari 2010) and acceptance of homosexuality, abortion and single parenthood (Halman et al. 2011; Minkov et al. 2013; Masterson and Hoobler 2015).
That individualism is strong within the Nordic societies is evident (Esping-Andersen 1990; Inglehart and Baker 2000; Therborn 2007; Halman et al. 2011). Empirical rankings of countries, from the most collectivist to the most individualist, generally place the Nordic countries at the extreme individualist end of the spectrum, closely followed by the Netherlands and the UK (Lin 2005; Inglehart 2008; Liefbroer and Billari 2010). Following a long tradition of legal individualism, the Nordic welfare regimes have been termed ‘de-familialising’ in that they regard the individual, not the family, as their basic unit (Esping-Andersen 1999; Craveiro et al. 2013). The Nordic and Mediterranean regions are the most extreme cases in Europe of, respectively, generational independence and co-residence (Albertini and Kohli 2012; Isengard 2013).
Scholars have raised the question of whether the strong individualism found in the Nordic countries is detrimental to family solidarity. The ‘crowding out’-hypothesis suggests that strong family norms are superfluous in generous welfare regimes (Yamagishi and Yamagishi 1994; Ganjour and Widmer 2016), spurring concerns that decreasing economic dependencies between generations weaken family ties to the detriment of care-dependent groups (Wolfe 1989; Popenoe 2009; Billari and Liefbroer 2010).
Other studies, however, complicate the straightforward categorisation of Southern ‘strong’ versus Northern ‘weak’ family cultures (e.g. Jappens and Van Bavel 2012). As regards institutions, Leitner (2003) demonstrates that familialism and de-familialisation are not opposite poles as much as separate policy dimensions. She identifies three ideal-typical welfare regimes in Europe – Explicit, Implicit and Optional. The Explicit Familialism-regimes of Austria and Germany support family carers through paid leave and pension recognition of care periods, but do not provide public alternatives to family care. The Implicit Familialism-regimes of Italy and Spain neither support family carers nor provide public alternatives, leaving the family to care by default. The Optional Familialism-regimes of Denmark and Sweden offer de-familialising services such as public care facilities alongside familialistic policy measures such as paid leave for carers (Leitner 2003; Craveiro et al. 2013).
As regards family practices, 80% of parents in the North and 90% of parents in the South have weekly contact with an adult child (Ogg and Renaut 2006; Bordone 2009, 2012). In the North, intergenerational exchanges are more frequent, but less intense than in the South (Albertini et al. 2007; Brandt 2013). ‘Familistic’ family types make up more than half of late-life families in all 11 countries studied by Dykstra and Fokkema (2011), and their ‘autonomous’ type, in which relatives have little contact and weak norms of obligation, is more common in France and Switzerland than in the ‘individualistic’ countries of Scandinavia and The Netherlands (Dykstra and Fokkema 2011). The ‘familism’ of the Mediterranean region is tempered by a widespread desire for state support (Ganjour and Widmer 2016); and a tentative shift towards situational norms is occurring even in Spain, generally considered a stronghold of familism (Caïs and Folguera 2013). In sum, both close-knit and more distant families exist in all countries.
While studies of intergenerational exchange practices recognise as a matter of course that resources may flow both from parents to children and vice versa, most studies of family norms assume that filial norms are an adequate indicator of the strength of family norms in general. Bengtson's model of family solidarity defines normative solidarity as ‘expectations regarding filial obligations and parental obligations’ (Bengtson 2001: 8, my emphasis). Nevertheless, most studies either include only measures of filial norms, ignoring parental norms (e.g. Bengtson and Roberts 1991; Kalmijn and Saraceno 2008; Calzada and Brooks 2013) or they combine both types into a single measure of family norms without taking directionality into account (Alesina and Giuliano 2010; Ganjour and Widmer 2016).
The implicit assumption that parental norms are always strong ignores the hypothesis that normative solidarity may take different forms in different cultural settings. In other words, some cultures may perceive the parent–child relationship as asymmetrical and thus be ‘strong’ on parental norms and ‘weak’ on filial norms, or vice versa. Several qualitative studies indicate that this may be the case. Aboderin finds an illustrative case in Ghana, where people ‘repay’ obligations to parents by giving to their own children (Aboderin 2005), and Finch and Mason find that parent–child commitments are strongest down the generations (Finch and Mason 1993: 30–1). Dykstra and Fokkema's ‘descending’ family type is more common compared to the ‘ascending’ type in the North, whilst the opposite is true in the South (Fokkema et al. 2012). Moreover, in one of the few quantitative studies including measures of both sets of norms, Daatland et al. find that parental norms are relatively stronger in France, Germany and Norway, and filial norms relatively stronger in Bulgaria, Georgia and Russia (Daatland et al. 2011, 2012). Thus, to conceptually grasp the diversity of normative positions, scholars must expand the dichotomy of ‘individualistic’ and ‘familistic’ cultures to include categories of ‘ascending familialism’ (where filial obligations are stressed over parental obligations) and ‘descending familialism’ (where the reverse is true).
I hypothesise that the family cultures of North-West Europe can be more accurately understood as cultures of descending familialism than as cultures of extreme individualism. I explore this hypothesis by analysing parental and filial norms in 20 countries within 5 European regions.
3. Data and methods
I use data from the EVS 2008 wave.2 The EVS has been conducted since 1981, with subsequent data collection waves in 1990, 1999 and 2008. The number of countries covered has increased from 16 in 1981 to 47 in 2008. Data are collected with face-to-face interviews with standardised questionnaires in representative samples of the populations over 18 in the participating countries. Full documentation including country questionnaires, errata and patches is available from the data repository at ZACAT – GESIS Online Study Catalogue. I weighted data for gender and age using the standardised weights constructed by the EVS (EVS 2011a, b).3
3.1. The dependent variable: intergenerational obligations
Three dichotomous items in the EVS questionnaire measure intergenerational norms (Table 1).
Concept . | Wording . |
---|---|
Children's emotional obligations towards parents absolute or situational | Which of these two statements do you tend to agree with? A: Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them. B: One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes. |
Children's practical obligations towards parents absolute or situational | Which of the following statements best describes your views about responsibilities of adult children towards their parents when their parents are in need of long-term care? A: Adult children have the duty to provide long-term care for their parents even at the expense of their own well-being. B: Adult children have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their parents. |
Parents’ obligations towards children absolute or situational | Which of the following statements best describes your views about parents’ responsibilities to their children? A: Parents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being. B: Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children. |
Concept . | Wording . |
---|---|
Children's emotional obligations towards parents absolute or situational | Which of these two statements do you tend to agree with? A: Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them. B: One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behaviour and attitudes. |
Children's practical obligations towards parents absolute or situational | Which of the following statements best describes your views about responsibilities of adult children towards their parents when their parents are in need of long-term care? A: Adult children have the duty to provide long-term care for their parents even at the expense of their own well-being. B: Adult children have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their parents. |
Parents’ obligations towards children absolute or situational | Which of the following statements best describes your views about parents’ responsibilities to their children? A: Parents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being. B: Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children. |
For each item, answer ‘A’ represents an absolute position and answer ‘B’ represents a situational position. The items are directional in that two of them measure filial norms (practical and emotional obligations, respectively), whilst the third measures parental norms. Using these items I have constructed a dependent variable with four discrete values, defining a typology of four exhaustive and mutually exclusive normative positions (Lazarsfeld 1937; Kluge 2000; Szelewa and Polakowski 2008). For simplicity I have merged both types of filial obligations, leaving four ideal-typical normative positions (Table 2).
. | Filial obligations absolute . | Filial obligations situational . |
---|---|---|
Parental obligations absolute | 1. Symmetrical familialism Parental obligations absolute Some or all filial obligations absolute | 2. Descending familialism Parental obligations absolute Filial practical and emotional obligations situational |
Parental obligations situational | 3. Ascending familialism Parental obligations situational Some or all filial obligations absolute | 4. Situationalism Parental obligations situational Filial practical and emotional obligations situational |
. | Filial obligations absolute . | Filial obligations situational . |
---|---|---|
Parental obligations absolute | 1. Symmetrical familialism Parental obligations absolute Some or all filial obligations absolute | 2. Descending familialism Parental obligations absolute Filial practical and emotional obligations situational |
Parental obligations situational | 3. Ascending familialism Parental obligations situational Some or all filial obligations absolute | 4. Situationalism Parental obligations situational Filial practical and emotional obligations situational |
The resulting typology distinguishes between symmetrical normative positions (symmetrical familialism and situationalism) and asymmetrical normative positions (ascending and descending familialism).
As Table 3 shows, symmetrical familialism is the most common position in the sample, accounting for almost two-thirds (64.7%) of the responses, with the remaining third divided between descending familialism (14.8%), ascending familialism (11.5%) and situationalism (9.1%).
Normative position . | N . | Per cent . |
---|---|---|
Symmetrical familialism | 15,413 | 64.7 |
Descending familialism | 3514 | 14.8 |
Ascending familialism | 2729 | 11.5 |
Situationalism | 2161 | 9.1 |
Total | 23,817 | 100.0 |
Normative position . | N . | Per cent . |
---|---|---|
Symmetrical familialism | 15,413 | 64.7 |
Descending familialism | 3514 | 14.8 |
Ascending familialism | 2729 | 11.5 |
Situationalism | 2161 | 9.1 |
Total | 23,817 | 100.0 |
3.2. Independent variable: region
I have constructed the regions according to Leitner's classification of optional, explicit and implicit familialism-regimes (Leitner 2003). Great Britain, the Netherlands and Switzerland are notoriously difficult to classify within welfare regime typologies. Therefore, following Manow (2004), I have placed these in their own region of mixed welfare regimes. I include four post-communist countries to compare the normative configuration in this region with the more well-known familialism-regimes in the West. Table 4 shows the resulting regions:
Type . | Countries . | N . | Per cent . |
---|---|---|---|
Nordic (optional familialism) | Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. | 4918 | 16.4 |
Central (explicit familialism) | Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg. | 8205 | 27.4 |
Mediterranean (implicit familialism) | Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. | 6072 | 20.3 |
Eastern (post-communist) | Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic. | 6353 | 21.2 |
Western (mixed) | The Netherlands, Switzerland and Great Britain. | 4387 | 14.7 |
Type . | Countries . | N . | Per cent . |
---|---|---|---|
Nordic (optional familialism) | Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. | 4918 | 16.4 |
Central (explicit familialism) | Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg. | 8205 | 27.4 |
Mediterranean (implicit familialism) | Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain. | 6072 | 20.3 |
Eastern (post-communist) | Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and the Slovak Republic. | 6353 | 21.2 |
Western (mixed) | The Netherlands, Switzerland and Great Britain. | 4387 | 14.7 |
The post-communist societies of East and Central Europe have been included only to a limited extent in research about family patterns in Europe. Before 1990, these countries were examples of relatively de-familialising institutional regimes, with, for example, public child care more universally available than was the case in Western Europe. However, since the transition from communism, national policies have diversified (Kocourková 2002; Robila 2004; Szelewa and Polakowski 2008). Recent studies indicate that family cultures in East Europe are more similar to those of the Mediterranean region than to those of North-West Europe (e.g. Calzada and Brooks 2013; Borsenberger et al. 2016).
4. Analysis and results
Table 5 shows the distribution of the normative positions by region. Symmetrical familialism is the most common position in all regions. In all but the Nordic region an absolute majority of respondents support this position. The ranking of the regions follows the familiar pattern, with the Mediterranean region having the largest share of respondents supporting symmetrical familialism, and the Nordic region the smallest. The Mediterranean region exhibits high normative consensus, with the symmetrical familialism position accounting for 84% of the responses. The consensus is slightly less pronounced in the Central and Eastern regions, where approximately two-thirds of the responses support symmetrical familialism.
. | Normative position . | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Symmetrical familialism . | Descending familialism . | Ascending familialism . | Situationalism . | Total . | ||||||
Region . | N . | Pct. . | N . | Pct. . | N . | Pct. . | N . | Pct. . | N . | Pct. . |
Nordic | 1475 | 40.9 | 1353 | 37.5 | 285 | 7.9 | 498 | 13.8 | 3611 | 100 |
Western | 2017 | 56.0 | 936 | 26.0 | 330 | 9.2 | 318 | 8.8 | 3601 | 100 |
Central | 4151 | 62.7 | 792 | 12.0 | 943 | 14.3 | 731 | 11.1 | 6617 | 100 |
Eastern | 3396 | 70.9 | 218 | 4.6 | 737 | 15.4 | 436 | 9.1 | 4787 | 100 |
Mediterranean | 4374 | 84.1 | 215 | 4.1 | 434 | 8.3 | 178 | 3.4 | 5201 | 100 |
Total | 15,413 | 64.7 | 3514 | 14.8 | 2729 | 11.5 | 2161 | 9.1 | 23,817 | 100 |
. | Normative position . | |||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Symmetrical familialism . | Descending familialism . | Ascending familialism . | Situationalism . | Total . | ||||||
Region . | N . | Pct. . | N . | Pct. . | N . | Pct. . | N . | Pct. . | N . | Pct. . |
Nordic | 1475 | 40.9 | 1353 | 37.5 | 285 | 7.9 | 498 | 13.8 | 3611 | 100 |
Western | 2017 | 56.0 | 936 | 26.0 | 330 | 9.2 | 318 | 8.8 | 3601 | 100 |
Central | 4151 | 62.7 | 792 | 12.0 | 943 | 14.3 | 731 | 11.1 | 6617 | 100 |
Eastern | 3396 | 70.9 | 218 | 4.6 | 737 | 15.4 | 436 | 9.1 | 4787 | 100 |
Mediterranean | 4374 | 84.1 | 215 | 4.1 | 434 | 8.3 | 178 | 3.4 | 5201 | 100 |
Total | 15,413 | 64.7 | 3514 | 14.8 | 2729 | 11.5 | 2161 | 9.1 | 23,817 | 100 |
Notes: χ2: 3546.424; df: 12; p = .000. Bold type is used to emphasise values that are divergent from the marginal distribution.
In contrast, the Nordic and Western regions exhibit normative pluralism, with no more than about half of the respondents supporting any one position. However, those not supporting the majority position do not support a position of situationalism, either. In both the Nordic and Western regions the second-most common position is one of descending familialism, which accounts for 37.5% of all responses in the Nordic region and 26.0% in the Western region. Situationalism accounts for 13.8% in the Nordic region and 8.8% in the Western, and ascending familialism for 9.2% and 7.9% respectively.
In the Central, Eastern, and Mediterranean regions, ascending familialism is the second largest position. In the Mediterranean region, ascending familialism accounts for 8.3%, descending familialism for 4.1% and situationalism for 3.4% of the responses. The distributions in the Eastern and Central regions are very similar. In the Eastern region, 70% support symmetrical familialism, 15.4% ascending familialism, 9.1% situationalism and 4.6% descending familialism; in the Central region, 62.7% support symmetrical familialism, 14.3% ascending familialism, 12% descending familialism and 11.1% situationalism.4
4.1. Multivariate analysis
4.1.1. Control variables
As control variables, I include age, gender, education, parenthood, religious affiliation and religious practice, all of which are known to influence family norms. Table 6 shows the operationalisation and distribution of the control variables, as well as the expected direction of the influence of each.6 The first category of each variable is the reference category.7
Variable . | Mean . | SD . | Median . | Mode . | N . | . | Hypotheses . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Age | 47.03 | 17.88 | 46.00 | 30 | 29,803 | Older people more familistic (Liefbroer and Billari 2010; Daatland et al. 2011) | |
Variable | Categories | N | Per cent | Hypotheses | |||
Gender | M | 13,708 | 45.8 | Women more situational (Liefbroer and Billari 2010; Daatland et al. 2011) | |||
F | 16,215 | 54.2 | |||||
Education | Lower | 8970 | 30.3 | The higher education, the more situational (Liefbroer and Billari 2010) | |||
Middle | 13,732 | 46.3 | |||||
Higher | 6945 | 23.4 | |||||
Parenthood | No children | 8653 | 29.6 | Parents stronger on parental norms than non-parents (Aboderin 2005; Daatland et al. 2011) | |||
Has children | 20,543 | 70.4 | |||||
Religious affiliation | None | 8846 | 30.0 | Protestants, non-affiliates more situational (Inglehart 1990; Halman and Riis 2003) | |||
Catholic | 11,900 | 40.3 | |||||
Protestant | 5850 | 19.8 | |||||
Other | 2920 | 9.8 | |||||
Religious participation | Frequent (weekly or more often) | 4807 | 16.2 | Practitioners more absolute (Friedman et al. 2008; Gans et al. 2009; Liefbroer and Billari 2010; Sabatier et al. 2011; Aassve et al. 2013) | |||
Infrequent (once a month or less) | 13,575 | 45.8 | |||||
Never/practically never | 11,275 | 38.0 |
Variable . | Mean . | SD . | Median . | Mode . | N . | . | Hypotheses . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Age | 47.03 | 17.88 | 46.00 | 30 | 29,803 | Older people more familistic (Liefbroer and Billari 2010; Daatland et al. 2011) | |
Variable | Categories | N | Per cent | Hypotheses | |||
Gender | M | 13,708 | 45.8 | Women more situational (Liefbroer and Billari 2010; Daatland et al. 2011) | |||
F | 16,215 | 54.2 | |||||
Education | Lower | 8970 | 30.3 | The higher education, the more situational (Liefbroer and Billari 2010) | |||
Middle | 13,732 | 46.3 | |||||
Higher | 6945 | 23.4 | |||||
Parenthood | No children | 8653 | 29.6 | Parents stronger on parental norms than non-parents (Aboderin 2005; Daatland et al. 2011) | |||
Has children | 20,543 | 70.4 | |||||
Religious affiliation | None | 8846 | 30.0 | Protestants, non-affiliates more situational (Inglehart 1990; Halman and Riis 2003) | |||
Catholic | 11,900 | 40.3 | |||||
Protestant | 5850 | 19.8 | |||||
Other | 2920 | 9.8 | |||||
Religious participation | Frequent (weekly or more often) | 4807 | 16.2 | Practitioners more absolute (Friedman et al. 2008; Gans et al. 2009; Liefbroer and Billari 2010; Sabatier et al. 2011; Aassve et al. 2013) | |||
Infrequent (once a month or less) | 13,575 | 45.8 | |||||
Never/practically never | 11,275 | 38.0 |
Table 7 shows the results of the four regressions.
. | . | Symmetrical familialism . | Descending familialism . | Ascending familialism . | Situationalism . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Region | Nordic | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Western | .4292206 *** | −.3562383 *** | .1658585 | −.3021457 ** | |
Central | .6136357 *** | −1.317219 *** | .7702528 *** | −.0803156 | |
Eastern | .9308287 *** | −.2.2499681*** | .9100746 *** | −.1383626 | |
Mediterranean | 1.46466 *** | −1,968932 *** | .1876905 | −.974706 *** | |
Rel. practice | Frequent practitioner | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Infrequent practitioner | −.6233902 *** | .5503627 *** | .3857391 *** | .7643944 *** | |
Non-practitioner | −.8474942 *** | .8984222 *** | .2990215 ** | .9275764 *** | |
Education | Lower (<complete secondary) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Middle (complete secondary) | −.3716663 *** | .316395 *** | .0876337 | .4436364 *** | |
Upper (some tertiary)3 | −.4086572 *** | .5017789 *** | −.0290434 | .3637885 *** | |
Parenthood | No children | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Has children | .1293644 ** | .3964698 *** | −.3915782 *** | −.3307561 *** | |
Gender | Male | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Female | −.1738512 *** | .2252228 *** | −.0017091 | .1302132 ** | |
Rel denom. | None | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Catholic | .3267097 *** | −.32346 *** | −.0662618 | −.3917068 *** | |
Protestant | −.0609079 | .0171378 | .0721109 | .0637927 | |
Other (Muslim, Orthodox) | .3700246 *** | −.7923088 *** | .2057688 * | −.3657233 ** | |
Age | −.0006331 | −.0006352 | .001414 | .0008868 | |
Constant | .6686497 | −1.8419344 | −2.6884746 | −2.883199 |
. | . | Symmetrical familialism . | Descending familialism . | Ascending familialism . | Situationalism . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Region | Nordic | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Western | .4292206 *** | −.3562383 *** | .1658585 | −.3021457 ** | |
Central | .6136357 *** | −1.317219 *** | .7702528 *** | −.0803156 | |
Eastern | .9308287 *** | −.2.2499681*** | .9100746 *** | −.1383626 | |
Mediterranean | 1.46466 *** | −1,968932 *** | .1876905 | −.974706 *** | |
Rel. practice | Frequent practitioner | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Infrequent practitioner | −.6233902 *** | .5503627 *** | .3857391 *** | .7643944 *** | |
Non-practitioner | −.8474942 *** | .8984222 *** | .2990215 ** | .9275764 *** | |
Education | Lower (<complete secondary) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Middle (complete secondary) | −.3716663 *** | .316395 *** | .0876337 | .4436364 *** | |
Upper (some tertiary)3 | −.4086572 *** | .5017789 *** | −.0290434 | .3637885 *** | |
Parenthood | No children | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Has children | .1293644 ** | .3964698 *** | −.3915782 *** | −.3307561 *** | |
Gender | Male | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Female | −.1738512 *** | .2252228 *** | −.0017091 | .1302132 ** | |
Rel denom. | None | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Catholic | .3267097 *** | −.32346 *** | −.0662618 | −.3917068 *** | |
Protestant | −.0609079 | .0171378 | .0721109 | .0637927 | |
Other (Muslim, Orthodox) | .3700246 *** | −.7923088 *** | .2057688 * | −.3657233 ** | |
Age | −.0006331 | −.0006352 | .001414 | .0008868 | |
Constant | .6686497 | −1.8419344 | −2.6884746 | −2.883199 |
Notes: Italic type indicates parameters that are not significantly different from 0. *p < .05; **p < .010; ***p < .000.
4.2. Regression results
4.2.1. Symmetrical familialism
The largest differences in the propensity to support the symmetrical familialism position are found between regions; since all logit differences are positive, living in any region but the Nordic increases the probability.
Of the control variables, religious participation is the most important, followed by education, religious affiliation, gender and parenthood. Age is not significant. Both infrequent religious practitioners and non-practitioners are significantly less likely than frequent practitioners to support symmetrical familialism. Compared to persons with the lowest level of education, those with the medium or highest level of education have less likelihood of supporting symmetrical familialism. Both Catholics and Others (predominantly members of Muslim or Orthodox communities) are more likely to support symmetrical familialism, while Protestants are not significantly different from those with no religious affiliation. Women are less likely than men to support symmetrical familialism, while parents are more likely than are non-parents to support symmetrical familialism.
4.2.2. Descending familialism
Again, region is the most important contributing variable. As expected, Nordics are significantly more likely than all others to support this position, whilst Easterners are the least likely. Mediterraneans and Centrals are close behind, whilst Westerners are somewhat closer to Nordics but still significantly less likely.
Of the control variables, religious practice is again the most important, while religious affiliation, education and parenthood are approximately equally important, and gender less important still. Age is not significant. Both infrequent practitioners and non-practitioners are more likely than frequent practitioners to support descending familialism. Catholics and Others are less likely to support descending familism than are Protestants and the unaffiliated. Those with more education and parents are more likely to support descending familialism than are non-parents and the less educated. Women are more likely than men to support descending familialism.
4.2.3. Ascending familialism
Centrals and Easterners are significantly more likely to support ascending familialism than are Nordics, Westerners and Mediterraneans. Parents are significantly less likely to support ascending familialism, compared to non-parents. Both infrequent practitioners and non-practitioners are more likely than frequent practitioners to support ascending familialism. Of religious affiliations, only the groups of Others are significantly more likely to support ascending familialism, but the effect is only just significant. Neither education, age nor gender are significant.
4.2.4. Situationalism
Westerners and Mediterraneans both have less likelihood of supporting situationalism than Nordics, with Mediterraneans the least likely. There is no difference between Centrals and Easterners and Nordics. Infrequent religious practitioners and non-practitioners are both more likely than frequent practitioners to support situationalism. Any degree of education increases the likelihood of supporting situationalism. Catholics and Others are less likely to support situationalism than are Protestants and the unaffiliated. Parents are significantly less likely to support situationalism than are non-parents, while women are slightly more likely to do so than are men. Age, again, is insignificant.
4.3. Intra-regional differences
The regression confirms the inter-regional differences and points to interesting intra-regional differences. After region, religion (religious practice and religious affiliation) is the most important variable. Frequent religious practitioners support symmetrical familialism much more wholeheartedly than do infrequent and non-practitioners, both of which groups are divided between all three alternative positions, with non-practitioners being slightly more strongly represented as supporters of descending familialism and situationalism. Catholics and Others consistently support more binding norms than do Protestants and the unaffiliated. Education decreases support for symmetrical familialism and increases support for descending familialism and situationalism. Having children means more support for descending familialism and less support in particular for ascending familialism and situationalism. Gender is of relatively little significance, with women being somewhat less likely to support symmetrical familialism and somewhat more likely to support descending familialism and situationalism than are men.
4.4. Predicted probabilities
Table 8 shows predicted probabilities for selected groups.8
. | . | Symmetrical (%) . | Descending (%) . | Ascending (%) . | Situationalism (%) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Practicing Catholic male without children, low education | Mediterranean | 91.91 | 1.53 | 7.58 | 1.47 |
Eastern | 86.95 | 1.16 | 14.46 | 3.32 | |
Central | 82.91 | 2.90 | 12.81 | 4.10 | |
Western | 80.13 | 7.23 | 7.43 | 2.83 | |
Nordic | 72.42 | 10.02 | 6.37 | 3.79 | |
Non-practicing Protestant mother, high education | Mediterranean | 67.74 | 13.75 | 7.69 | 6.53 |
Eastern | 55.18 | 10.75 | 14.64 | 13.88% | |
Central | 47.28 | 23.43 | 12.98 | 16.71 | |
Western | 42,72 | 44,44 | 7.54 | 12.04 | |
Nordic | 32.68 | 53.32 | 6.46 | 15.62 |
. | . | Symmetrical (%) . | Descending (%) . | Ascending (%) . | Situationalism (%) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Practicing Catholic male without children, low education | Mediterranean | 91.91 | 1.53 | 7.58 | 1.47 |
Eastern | 86.95 | 1.16 | 14.46 | 3.32 | |
Central | 82.91 | 2.90 | 12.81 | 4.10 | |
Western | 80.13 | 7.23 | 7.43 | 2.83 | |
Nordic | 72.42 | 10.02 | 6.37 | 3.79 | |
Non-practicing Protestant mother, high education | Mediterranean | 67.74 | 13.75 | 7.69 | 6.53 |
Eastern | 55.18 | 10.75 | 14.64 | 13.88% | |
Central | 47.28 | 23.43 | 12.98 | 16.71 | |
Western | 42,72 | 44,44 | 7.54 | 12.04 | |
Nordic | 32.68 | 53.32 | 6.46 | 15.62 |
Note: Bold type is used to highlight the most frequently occurring profiles for each group.
Practising Catholic fathers with relatively little education have a very high probability of supporting symmetrical familialism, whilst highly educated, non-practising Protestant mothers have the lowest. The predicted probabilities in Table 8 show the normative positions taken by typical members of these extreme opposites in the five regions. In the Mediterranean region, even highly educated, non-practising mothers have a 67.7% probability of supporting symmetrical familialism, whilst the less educated, practising fathers have 91.9% probability. Nordic, less-educated practitioners are almost as likely to support symmetrical familialism as are the highly educated non-practitioners in the Mediterranean region, whilst the highly educated Nordic non-practitioners are more likely to support descending familialism than symmetrical familialism. In the Eastern and to some degree in the Central region, ascending familialism is relatively stronger than elsewhere.
5. Conclusion and discussion
The inclusion of control variables leaves unchanged the initial regional differences, with the Nordic and Western regions exhibiting a marked normative pluralism and the Mediterranean, Eastern and Central regions much more normative consensus. However, for those in the pluralistic Nordic and Western regions who do not recognise symmetrical family obligations, the alternative is not situationalism but a position of descending familialism; one that views parental norms as absolute but filial norms as situational. In contrast, ascending familialism is particularly strong in the Central and Eastern regions.
Given these results, talking about one set of family norms in the North-West of Europe in general and in the Nordic countries in particular is neither meaningful nor useful, because these regions clearly exhibit normative pluralism; and even in this pluralistic normative climate, no support exists for the hypothesis that North-West Europe is heading towards the general dissolution of family norms: indeed, the most common normative position remains one of symmetrical familialism, a stance that holds the obligations of both parents and children to be absolute. In so far as symmetrical familialism has lost ground, descending familialism appears to be the alternative. Situationalism is the position of a small minority.
The importance of religious practice and religious affiliation underlines the salience of institutional, rather than individual, characteristics in the reinforcement of norms. Religious practice generally takes place in group settings, and religious groups, all other things being equal, emphasise normative obligations over individual preferences. The results for parenthood support the altruism hypothesis that parenthood makes people lower their expectations of children and increase their expectations of themselves as parents; the result can be interpreted either as a realistic adjustment of expectations or as an expression of true altruism, where the interest of others are put above one's own.
The marked pluralism found in the Nordic region is surprising, given the reputation of these small and relatively homogeneous countries for bring high on consensus. One possible interpretation might be that, whilst many aspects of the ‘new family’ of the second demographic transition are uncontroversial in the Nordic countries, the inhabitants of that region have not yet found their stance in the area of intergenerational obligations. The generations who pioneered the SDT are only now reaching the age of retirement and increasing dependence on their adult children. Following the development of the normative positions in future waves of data collection should prove enlightening.
5.1. Limitations of the study
One limitation – common to all large-scale, multiple-topic surveys – is that the number of items measuring intergenerational norms is necessarily limited. A comparison with the findings of Daatland et al. shows that the results are robust, even though the items used are slightly different: Daatland et al. find 57% of Norwegians acknowledging filial responsibility is 57%, while the share in the Nordic region in this study is 59%, indicating that another data set would probably not have yielded very different results (Daatland et al. 2011). Nevertheless, including more items in future surveys is desirable for more precise measurements of parental and filial obligations, as well as more precise measures for varying types of obligations (emotional, practical, etc.). Analysis of future waves of EVS data will show whether the trend towards more situational perceptions of family obligations is continuing, or whether the economic hardships of the intervening years have made families more inclined to take care of their own.
6. Implications for further research and policy
Intergenerational obligations engender normative turbulence in the usually consensual Nordic region, to a degree where notions of general Nordic family norms is no longer meaningful. Whilst a surprisingly large group in these countries still support the traditional normative ideal of mutual responsibilities, a large minority supports an ideal of descending obligations, in which adult children only help parents from choice and inclination, not from a sense of sacrifice, duty or obligations. As reforms forcing adult children to, say, take on heavy care burdens will lack legitimacy both amongst the adult children and their dependent parents, policy makers should review policies in areas such as housing, transportation and work–life balance to allow families to build those committed relationships that will enable the voluntary assumption of responsibilities. Especially in the coming decades, when large groups of migrants from strong reciprocity cultures will grow old in countries where descending familialism is strong, normative clashes are likely to occur between parents’ expectations and those of their adult children socialised in the norms of the new country.
The configuration of norms and institutions in the Nordic countries increases the salience of the moral identity of the ‘good parent’ whilst decreasing the salience of the corresponding identity of the ‘good child’. When people do not acknowledge absolute filial obligations, those frequent intergenerational interactions and exchanges that occur take on a new significance in that they affirm the emotional qualities of the relationship and confirm that the parents have done a good job of raising their children. In other words, when one's children do not have to visit one as a duty means that if they do it anyway, one has been a good parent: their act of visiting confirms one's moral identity. Investigating to what degree this logic is present in the minds of parents and children in the Nordic countries should prove fruitful indeed.
Acknowledgements
I thank Margaretha Järvinen, Peter Gundelach and Kristian B. Karlson as well as two anonymous referees for constructive comments and advice on earlier drafts of this article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Bella Marckmann is Assistant Professor in the Department of Sociology at the University of Copenhagen. Her research interests are in the areas of family sociology, intergenerational relations, everyday life, housing, social capital, survey research and mixed methods research. She is currently working on a project entitled ‘The Moral Economy of Families’ funded by the Danish Council for Independent Research (DFF).
ORCID
Bella Marckmannhttp://orcid.org/0000-0002-4212-850X
Footnotes
Another reason, as Eekelaar (2012) points out, is that many writers fallaciously assume that the withdrawal of institutional dominance over the individual equals egoism and a weakened sense of moral obligation. This discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
Unfortunately, no comparative survey has yet been conducted with both good measures of intergenerational norms and data from all or most European countries. The Generations and Gender Programme (GGP) includes a number of items measuring intergenerational norms, but this survey has not been conducted in as many countries as the EVS, and several of the regions compared in the analysis are represented by one country only. Appendix 1 contains a detailed overview of data sets considered for the analysis.
The weights also compensate for disproportional sample sizes in regions of Germany and Belgium. I have not weighted by population size, that is, smaller countries contribute as much to the analysis as larger countries. As the countries in the analysis represent institutional and cultural entities, it would defeat the purpose of the analysis to weight by population, since this would mean that the larger countries would entirely drown out the smaller ones, thus obscuring the intra-regional differences and giving a too homogeneous picture of each region. This would obviously be especially problematic in regions comprising both large countries such as Germany with a population of more than 80 million and Luxembourg with one of less than 1 million.
The regions are not entirely distinct, as variation within each region makes for a certain overlap. Appendix 2 shows the distribution of normative positions within each country. The most striking case is the Netherlands, which has a normative profile that more closely resembles those of the Nordic region than those of Switzerland and Great Britain.
Opinions differ as to the type of regression appropriate for binary dependent variables. Appendix 4 shows the results obtained by linear regression for comparison. Linear regression has the advantage compared to logistic regression that the resulting regression coefficients are readily interpretable, being probability differences (Rothman 1986; Hellevik 2009).
Appendix 3 shows details of the categories of the education variable.
Regression parameters are included only in the calculation of predicted probabilities for those positions where they are significant.
References
. | EVS (European Values Study) . | Oasis (Old age and autonomy: the role of service systems . | GGP (Gender and Generations Programme) . | SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe) . | ESS (European Social Survey) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Year of most recent data collection wave | 2008 | 2000–2003 | Wave 1: 2004–2008 Wave 2: ?? | Wave 1: 2004 Wave 5: 2013 | |
No. of countries included | 20 | 5 | Wave 1: 19 countries, wave 2: 10 countries (bold) | 20 countries | |
Names of countries included | Nordic: DK, FI, NO, SE Central: AU, BE, FR, GE, LUX Med.: GR, IT, PO, SP East: CZ, HU, PO, SL West: NL, CZ, GB | Nordic: NO Central: GE Med.: SP, IL West: GB | Nordic: NO, SE Central: AU, BE, FR, GE Med.: IT East: CZ, HU, PL, BU, ES, LT, GO, RO, RF West: NL Other: AU, JP | Nordic: DK, SE Central: AU, BE, FR, GE, LUX Med.: GR, IT, PO, SP, IL East: CZ, PL, HU, SL, ES West: NL, CH, IR | |
Variables measuring intergenerational obligations/norms | Three binary items: two filial, one parental | Only filial | Both waves: Parental: -Grandparents look after grandchildren if parents are unable to do so -Parents should provide financial help adult children when in difficulty -If adult children in need, parents adjust own lives to help them Filial: -Children should take responsibility for parental care if parents in need -Children should adjust working lives to the needs of their parents -Children should provide financial help if parents financial difficulty -Children should live with parents when no longer look after themselves [When parents in need, daughters should take more caring responsibility] | Actual help given/received, feeling of appreciation, no questions about norms | None |
Population age groups in sample | 18–80 | 18–80 | 50+ | ||
Comments | Good repr. of both N/W and S/E | Nordic, Mediterranean, Western under-represented, so not possible to make the comparisons I want between ascending/descending family cultures | Nordic, Western under-represented |
. | EVS (European Values Study) . | Oasis (Old age and autonomy: the role of service systems . | GGP (Gender and Generations Programme) . | SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe) . | ESS (European Social Survey) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Year of most recent data collection wave | 2008 | 2000–2003 | Wave 1: 2004–2008 Wave 2: ?? | Wave 1: 2004 Wave 5: 2013 | |
No. of countries included | 20 | 5 | Wave 1: 19 countries, wave 2: 10 countries (bold) | 20 countries | |
Names of countries included | Nordic: DK, FI, NO, SE Central: AU, BE, FR, GE, LUX Med.: GR, IT, PO, SP East: CZ, HU, PO, SL West: NL, CZ, GB | Nordic: NO Central: GE Med.: SP, IL West: GB | Nordic: NO, SE Central: AU, BE, FR, GE Med.: IT East: CZ, HU, PL, BU, ES, LT, GO, RO, RF West: NL Other: AU, JP | Nordic: DK, SE Central: AU, BE, FR, GE, LUX Med.: GR, IT, PO, SP, IL East: CZ, PL, HU, SL, ES West: NL, CH, IR | |
Variables measuring intergenerational obligations/norms | Three binary items: two filial, one parental | Only filial | Both waves: Parental: -Grandparents look after grandchildren if parents are unable to do so -Parents should provide financial help adult children when in difficulty -If adult children in need, parents adjust own lives to help them Filial: -Children should take responsibility for parental care if parents in need -Children should adjust working lives to the needs of their parents -Children should provide financial help if parents financial difficulty -Children should live with parents when no longer look after themselves [When parents in need, daughters should take more caring responsibility] | Actual help given/received, feeling of appreciation, no questions about norms | None |
Population age groups in sample | 18–80 | 18–80 | 50+ | ||
Comments | Good repr. of both N/W and S/E | Nordic, Mediterranean, Western under-represented, so not possible to make the comparisons I want between ascending/descending family cultures | Nordic, Western under-represented |
Appendix 2. Distribution of normative positions within each country
Region . | Country . | Symmetrical familialism (%) . | Descending familialism (%) . | Ascending familialism (%) . | Situationalism (%) . | Total (%) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Nordic | 208 Denmark | 36.90 | 31.30 | 12.30 | 19.50 | 100.00 |
246 Finland | 42.40 | 29.60 | 9.90 | 18.10 | 100.00 | |
578 Norway | 48.60 | 40.00 | 4.10 | 7.40 | 100.00 | |
752 Sweden | 39.40 | 48.50 | 3.90 | 8.30 | 100.00 | |
Western | 528 Netherlands | 48.50 | 34.10 | 8.10 | 9.30 | 100.00 |
756 Switzerland | 60.20 | 22.30 | 8.70 | 8.90 | 100.00 | |
826 Great Britain | 61.80 | 20.40 | 9.30 | 8.50 | 100.00 | |
Central | 40 Austria | 48.80 | 14.10 | 19.90 | 17.20 | 100.00 |
56 Belgium | 62.90 | 12.60 | 15.00 | 9.50 | 100.00 | |
250 France | 73.10 | 9.10 | 13.80 | 4.00 | 100.00 | |
276 Germany | 53.30 | 11.80 | 12.70 | 22.30 | 100.00 | |
442 Luxembourg | 72.10 | 10.90 | 11.30 | 5.70 | 100.00 | |
Eastern | 203 Czech Republic | 59.30 | 4.50 | 19.70 | 16.50 | 100.00 |
348 Hungary | 70.30 | 7.30 | 15.30 | 7.00 | 100.00 | |
616 Poland | 80.30 | 2.70 | 11.20 | 5.70 | 100.00 | |
703 Slovak Republic | 71.90 | 3.90 | 16.10 | 8.10 | 100.00 | |
Med | 300 Greece | 79.50 | 3.60 | 12.50 | 4.40 | 100.00 |
380 Italy | 86.80 | 4.30 | 6.50 | 2.50 | 100.00 | |
620 Portugal | 85.40 | 3.40 | 8.20 | 3.10 | 100.00 | |
724 Spain | 82.10 | 6.40 | 7.80 | 3.70 | 100.00 |
Region . | Country . | Symmetrical familialism (%) . | Descending familialism (%) . | Ascending familialism (%) . | Situationalism (%) . | Total (%) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Nordic | 208 Denmark | 36.90 | 31.30 | 12.30 | 19.50 | 100.00 |
246 Finland | 42.40 | 29.60 | 9.90 | 18.10 | 100.00 | |
578 Norway | 48.60 | 40.00 | 4.10 | 7.40 | 100.00 | |
752 Sweden | 39.40 | 48.50 | 3.90 | 8.30 | 100.00 | |
Western | 528 Netherlands | 48.50 | 34.10 | 8.10 | 9.30 | 100.00 |
756 Switzerland | 60.20 | 22.30 | 8.70 | 8.90 | 100.00 | |
826 Great Britain | 61.80 | 20.40 | 9.30 | 8.50 | 100.00 | |
Central | 40 Austria | 48.80 | 14.10 | 19.90 | 17.20 | 100.00 |
56 Belgium | 62.90 | 12.60 | 15.00 | 9.50 | 100.00 | |
250 France | 73.10 | 9.10 | 13.80 | 4.00 | 100.00 | |
276 Germany | 53.30 | 11.80 | 12.70 | 22.30 | 100.00 | |
442 Luxembourg | 72.10 | 10.90 | 11.30 | 5.70 | 100.00 | |
Eastern | 203 Czech Republic | 59.30 | 4.50 | 19.70 | 16.50 | 100.00 |
348 Hungary | 70.30 | 7.30 | 15.30 | 7.00 | 100.00 | |
616 Poland | 80.30 | 2.70 | 11.20 | 5.70 | 100.00 | |
703 Slovak Republic | 71.90 | 3.90 | 16.10 | 8.10 | 100.00 | |
Med | 300 Greece | 79.50 | 3.60 | 12.50 | 4.40 | 100.00 |
380 Italy | 86.80 | 4.30 | 6.50 | 2.50 | 100.00 | |
620 Portugal | 85.40 | 3.40 | 8.20 | 3.10 | 100.00 | |
724 Spain | 82.10 | 6.40 | 7.80 | 3.70 | 100.00 |
Appendix 3. The education variable
Highest educational level attained respondent (eight categories) (Q110) * education level (Q110) (recoded)
. | Education level (Q110) (recoded) . | Total . | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 Lower . | 2 Middle . | 3 Upper . | ||||
Highest educational level attained respondent (eight categories) (Q110) | 1. Inadequately completed elementary education | Count | 2124 | 0 | 0 | 2124 |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 10.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.2% | ||
2. Completed (compulsory) elementary education | Count | 6594 | 0 | 0 | 6594 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 33.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 9.8% | ||
3. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type | Count | 11,251 | 0 | 0 | 11251 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 56.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 16.7% | ||
4. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type/secondary | Count | 0 | 6335 | 0 | 6335 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 0.0% | 20.2% | 0.0% | 9.4% | ||
5. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type/secondary, | Count | 0 | 7849 | 0 | 7849 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 0.0% | 25.0% | 0.0% | 11.7% | ||
6. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type/full secondary | Count | 0 | 17,175 | 0 | 17175 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 0.0% | 54.8% | 0.0% | 25.6% | ||
7. Some university without degree/higher education – lower-level tertiary | Count | 0 | 0 | 9473 | 9473 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 59.8% | 14.1% | ||
8. University with degree/higher education – upper-level tertiary | Count | 0 | 0 | 6370 | 6370 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 40.2% | 9.5% | ||
Total | Count | 19,969 | 31,359 | 15,843 | 67,171 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
. | Education level (Q110) (recoded) . | Total . | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 Lower . | 2 Middle . | 3 Upper . | ||||
Highest educational level attained respondent (eight categories) (Q110) | 1. Inadequately completed elementary education | Count | 2124 | 0 | 0 | 2124 |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 10.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 3.2% | ||
2. Completed (compulsory) elementary education | Count | 6594 | 0 | 0 | 6594 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 33.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 9.8% | ||
3. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type | Count | 11,251 | 0 | 0 | 11251 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 56.3% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 16.7% | ||
4. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type/secondary | Count | 0 | 6335 | 0 | 6335 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 0.0% | 20.2% | 0.0% | 9.4% | ||
5. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type/secondary, | Count | 0 | 7849 | 0 | 7849 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 0.0% | 25.0% | 0.0% | 11.7% | ||
6. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type/full secondary | Count | 0 | 17,175 | 0 | 17175 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 0.0% | 54.8% | 0.0% | 25.6% | ||
7. Some university without degree/higher education – lower-level tertiary | Count | 0 | 0 | 9473 | 9473 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 59.8% | 14.1% | ||
8. University with degree/higher education – upper-level tertiary | Count | 0 | 0 | 6370 | 6370 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 0.0% | 0.0% | 40.2% | 9.5% | ||
Total | Count | 19,969 | 31,359 | 15,843 | 67,171 | |
% within education level (Q110) (recoded) | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
Appendix 4. Regression parameters and predicted probabilities from linear regression.
Regression parameters from linear regression
. | . | Symmetrical familialism . | Descending familialism . | Ascending familialism . | Situationalism . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Region | Nordic | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Western | .1110915 *** | −.0936618 *** | .014282 | −.0317117 *** | |
Central | .1525415 *** | −.232694 *** | .0750192 *** | −.0051333 | |
Eastern | .2228598 *** | −.2969413 *** | .0912946 *** | −.0172131 | |
Mediterranean | .30397 *** | −.263971 *** | .0175027 | −.0575017 *** | |
Rel. practice | Frequent practitioner | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Infrequent practitioner | −.1024614 *** | .0315539 *** | .0363193 *** | .0345883 *** | |
Non-practitioner | −.1522853 *** | .075288 *** | .0270437 ** | .0499536 *** | |
Education | Lower (<complete secondary) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Middle (complete secondary) | −.0727095 *** | .0333582 *** | .0081245 | .0312269 *** | |
Upper (some tertiary)3 | −.0816375 *** | .0613927 *** | −.0034575 | .0237023 *** | |
Parenthood | No children | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Has children | .0256014 ** | .0437301 *** | −.0413003 *** | −.0280312 *** | |
Gender | Male | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Female | −.0364543 *** | .0253676 *** | −.0001789 | .0112657 ** | |
Rel denom. | None | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Catholic | .074212 *** | −.0299652 *** | −.0081974 | −.0360494 *** | |
Protestant | −.0130202 | .0016832 | .0069509 | .004386 | |
Other (Muslim, Orthodox) | .1841744 *** | −.0686353 *** | .0177506 | −.0332897 *** | |
Age | −.00015 | −.0000508 | .0001268 | .000074 | |
Constant | .5995713 | .2509651 | .0633929 | .0860707 |
. | . | Symmetrical familialism . | Descending familialism . | Ascending familialism . | Situationalism . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Region | Nordic | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Western | .1110915 *** | −.0936618 *** | .014282 | −.0317117 *** | |
Central | .1525415 *** | −.232694 *** | .0750192 *** | −.0051333 | |
Eastern | .2228598 *** | −.2969413 *** | .0912946 *** | −.0172131 | |
Mediterranean | .30397 *** | −.263971 *** | .0175027 | −.0575017 *** | |
Rel. practice | Frequent practitioner | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Infrequent practitioner | −.1024614 *** | .0315539 *** | .0363193 *** | .0345883 *** | |
Non-practitioner | −.1522853 *** | .075288 *** | .0270437 ** | .0499536 *** | |
Education | Lower (<complete secondary) | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Middle (complete secondary) | −.0727095 *** | .0333582 *** | .0081245 | .0312269 *** | |
Upper (some tertiary)3 | −.0816375 *** | .0613927 *** | −.0034575 | .0237023 *** | |
Parenthood | No children | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Has children | .0256014 ** | .0437301 *** | −.0413003 *** | −.0280312 *** | |
Gender | Male | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Female | −.0364543 *** | .0253676 *** | −.0001789 | .0112657 ** | |
Rel denom. | None | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Catholic | .074212 *** | −.0299652 *** | −.0081974 | −.0360494 *** | |
Protestant | −.0130202 | .0016832 | .0069509 | .004386 | |
Other (Muslim, Orthodox) | .1841744 *** | −.0686353 *** | .0177506 | −.0332897 *** | |
Age | −.00015 | −.0000508 | .0001268 | .000074 | |
Constant | .5995713 | .2509651 | .0633929 | .0860707 |
*p < .05.
**p < .010.
***p < .000.
Predicted probabilities for selected groups based on linear regression
. | . | Symmetrical (%) . | Descending (%) . | Ascending (%) . | Situationalism (%) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Practicing Catholic male without children, low education | Mediterranean | 97.07 | <0 | 7.87 | <0 |
Eastern | 88.96 | <0 | 15.25 | 3.63 | |
Central | 81.93 | <0 | 13.62 | 5.86 | |
Western | 77.78 | 12.49 | 7.54 | 2.18 | |
Nordic | 66.67 | 21.86 | 6.12 | 5.35 | |
Non-practicing Protestant mother, high education | Mediterranean | 63.87 | 19.21 | 7.59 | 9.33 |
Eastern | 55.76 | 15.91 | 14.97 | 13.36 | |
Central | 48.73 | 22.33 | 13.34 | 15.60 | |
Western | 44.58 | 36.24 | 7.27 | 11.91 | |
Nordic | 33.47 | 45.60 | 5.84 | 15.08 |
. | . | Symmetrical (%) . | Descending (%) . | Ascending (%) . | Situationalism (%) . |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
Practicing Catholic male without children, low education | Mediterranean | 97.07 | <0 | 7.87 | <0 |
Eastern | 88.96 | <0 | 15.25 | 3.63 | |
Central | 81.93 | <0 | 13.62 | 5.86 | |
Western | 77.78 | 12.49 | 7.54 | 2.18 | |
Nordic | 66.67 | 21.86 | 6.12 | 5.35 | |
Non-practicing Protestant mother, high education | Mediterranean | 63.87 | 19.21 | 7.59 | 9.33 |
Eastern | 55.76 | 15.91 | 14.97 | 13.36 | |
Central | 48.73 | 22.33 | 13.34 | 15.60 | |
Western | 44.58 | 36.24 | 7.27 | 11.91 | |
Nordic | 33.47 | 45.60 | 5.84 | 15.08 |
Note: The results of the linear and logistic regression are, as expected, very similar as to which variables they point out as significant and the relative magnitude of their effects. The predicted probabilities do differ slightly in the predictions of the proportions supporting the descending familialism position in the Nordic and Western regions, where the linear regression tends to overestimate the probabilities for the practicing Catholic males with low education and underestimate those for the Protestant, non-practicing mothers with high education. This may be due to the very low number of observations in the group of practicing Catholic males in these regions.