Rise and fall of elites: professionals as movers?

During the last decades, there has been a resurgence of sociological research on elites. The mounting interest in studying elites has been nourished by various social developments and events: inter alia the collapse of the communist regimes, the international financial crisis, the EU crises, as well as the growth of inequalities in several countries. Modern elite research encompasses several different topics. For instance, scholars have carried out large empirical studies of the overall elite structure in particular countries (Hoffmann-Lange 1992; Bürklin, W. and H. Rebenstorf u.a. 1997; Gulbrandsen et al. 2002; Ruostetsaari 2015). Elite researchers have conducted extensive comparative studies of elite structures, elite education and recruitment (Hartmann 2004; 2010). Sociologists have collaborated with political scientists about studying political elites (Best and Cotta 2007), and there have been carried out a large number of studies on economic and business elites (for instance Burris 2005; Winters and Page 2009; Mizruchi 2013; MacLean et al. 2010). Inspired by the writings of Mills and Bourdieu, many scholars have been concerned with how education contributes to the production and reproduction of elite groups (Schleef 2006; Gatzambide-Fernandez 2009; Stevens 2009; van Zanten 2009; Kahn 2011), and elite researchers have called attention to the emergence of new elite groups (Savage and Williams 2008). Scholars have also drawn attention to new themes, such as elites’ subjective elite identity (Mangset 2015; Ljunggren 2016), elite culture (Warde and Bennett 2008; Jarness and Friedman 2016), elite institutional trust (Gulbrandsen 2007) and elite residential segregation (Holmqvist 2015; Toft and Ljunggren 2016).

A significant topic within elite research deserving more attention is the issue of the ‘rise and fall of elites’. This subject addresses changes in the composition of elites, the emergence of new elites and the decline of established ones, and covers questions like: In what ways do particular groups climb to elite power and status? What may explain the rise of new elite groups? Why do established elite groups lose power and elite status? What characterises the agents that are involved in such changes? Which elements in the political-institutional context in a particular society may favour the ascent of new elite groups, and the erosion of power of other elites? In this paper, the focus is upon the role of professionals in the processes of elite ascent (and descent).

In the sociology of professions, there are basically two approaches to why professionals rise to elite status. One approach is that the rise is a result of demand for the professionals’ qualified services. Other scholars claim that professionals’ high status is due to closure, i.e. that the professionals have been able to establish occupational monopoly and to restrict access to the profession. By analysing empirical cases of elite ascent, I will in this paper discuss the validity of these two approaches.

Elite research has operated with varying conceptions and definitions of elites. Within recent research scholars have, however, primarily concentrated upon two different notions of elites. Firstly, in line with Mills (1956), elites have been seen as individuals who hold command positions in powerful institutions and organizations in society. An alternative understanding sees elites as groups and individuals who control disproportionally large amounts of vital resources (Kahn 2012), such as monetary and economic capital, as well as cultural and social capital (Bourdieu 1984). One special form of capital is political capital, embracing elements like personal charisma and the possession of a large network of contacts and supporters.

Both conceptions of elites are relevant. CEOs in large private companies, senior civil servants, and senior military officers are, for instance, elites by virtue of their holding top leadership positions. Rich people too constitute an important and powerful segment of the economic elite (Page et al. 2013), as well as prominent authors who may similarly be seen as significant elements of the cultural elite in a particular society.

Nonetheless, I contend that in modern societies, with their dependence upon large and efficient organizations, elites primarily consist of holders of top leader positions in these organizations. Top leaders include, in addition to the groups mentioned above, bishops, generals, newspaper editors, university rectors, supreme court judges, cabinet ministers and leaders of large civic organizations. Moreover, most of these elite persons are employed or elected by principals in the organizations, for example members, owners or voters. In other words, they have been delegated or authorized to exercise the power inherent in the respective command positions. Even within private business, the group of rich or super-rich persons is small compared to the large number of employed CEOs and elected chairmen of the board. In fact, most rich people are dependent upon hired managers to look after their assets. As elected or employed holders of power positions, elites are therefore first and foremost supposed to represent their principals, and not their own private interests.

This article calls attention to the fact that most of these holders of command positions are professionals. (At the same time, one should not forget that very few professionals have elite positions.) They have university educations which have supplied them with specialized expert knowledge. In turn, this expert knowledge has given them access to particular occupations. With a basis in these occupations, they have climbed to the top in their respective organizations. The elite professionals include individuals trained as lawyers, clergy, military officers, engineers, economists, and journalists. Moreover, several of these elite professionals work in institutions and organizations which are dominated by their own profession or occupational group, for example the judiciary, the church, the military services, newspapers, and the health sector. In such cases, the holders of the command positions act as spokespersons for the values and goals of their respective institutions. As Scott (2008) emphasizes, professionals function as institutional agents, as definers, interpreters and appliers of institutions. At the same time, elite persons who are professionals are representatives of their profession. As such they often, according to Scott (2008), embrace and espouse positions that are rather more disinterested – having to do with the use of knowledge to advance the collective good – than directly self-interested. In contrast, the British historian Harold Perkin stated that professional society also presents professional elites with ‘egregious opportunities for exploitation’ (1996: 26). Moreover, he claimed that top professionals have amassed more power than any previous generation of elites.

The implications of the fact that members of elites are also professionals have, however, not been sufficiently heeded within the sociology of elites. Other scholars have admittedly also pointed out that holders of command posts are often drawn from professions, for instance, Zald and Lounsbury (2010). Their observations have led them to recommend studying the production and reproduction of elite experts – and their world views – as a significant part of the analysis of command posts. In their article they do not, however, follow up their own recommendation.

Recognizing that elites are also professionals raises several interesting questions, amongst others: Are particular groups of professionals predominant within the national elite? How have these professional groups come to elite power and status? To what extent has the professional affiliation of elite individuals been beneficial in their rise to elite positions in society? To what degree are the values and ideology of their profession (still) embodied in the elite person's thinking and orientation? Are their decisions as holders of specific command positions influenced by their professional training? In this paper, I will focus upon the first of these questions, and will discuss to what extent, and in which way, professional groups may be drivers behind particular instances of elite ascent – and descent.

The (potential) significance of professions for changes in the composition of national elites invites for drawing upon theories and empirical findings within the sociology of professions. In general, contributions of scholars of professions may shed new light on several topics which are central to the study of elites. In this paper, the focus is upon approaches within the sociology of professions which may offer a new understanding of the rise and fall of elites.

Professionals are practitioners who draw on expert knowledge. This expertise is composed of formal, abstract principles which the professionals apply to solve concrete problems. The professionals have acquired the expertise through education on an academic level.

Many of the professions which professionals exercise are characterized by limited access. To acquire access, an individual must meet certain educational requirements and/or have licence to practice the profession. Frequently, this licence is granted by public authorities. Another attribute of many professions is that the members themselves define the content of work and the norms of conduct for proper professional behaviour. Self-governing associations of professionals have in many cases been delegated by public authorities to manage and regulate this autonomy. By authorizing the professions to control the access to, and content of, particular occupations, the state thus underwrites the legal boundaries of the professions (Saks 2016).

Scholars advocating the neo-Weberian approach to the study of professions emphasized that control of access to certain occupations represents occupational monopolies (Freidson 1970; Johnson 1972; Larson 1977). Moreover, they contended that the professionals had obtained these monopolies through interest group politics, often in competition with members of other occupations vying for the same occupational jurisdictions (Abbott 1988). It was also underscored that the professionals legitimized their claims for particular occupational jurisdictions by advocating the benefits of their expertise to clients and society at large. They professed to hold a normative orientation to the service of others.

As Sørensen (1996) has pointed out, occupational monopolies provide a basis for ‘rent’, i.e. pure profit which goes beyond what is necessary for compensating the input of the owners of the human capital. This rent is, thus, not deserved but a result of limited competition. Typically, members of many professions enjoy high incomes and status. Similarly, Perkin (1996: 7) stated that because particular expertise becomes scarce, the expert can command a rent as ‘surely as the landlord or owner of industrial capital’ (Perkin 1996: 7).

Both Adams (2014) and Saks (2016) maintain that a neo-Weberian approach encourages the exploration of the social process through which professionals acquire and maintain status and privileges. The neo-Weberian scholars considered this process to be politically competitive and not shaped by the depth of knowledge possessed by the professionals (Saks 2016). This approach also invites to focus upon how processes and outcomes can vary across social-historical contexts.

Neo-Weberian scholars have been criticized for having been too preoccupied with the relatively small cluster of occupations that have gained exclusionary social closure (Evetts 2013; Saks 2016). In the same vein, Gorman and Sandefur (2011) contend that the same research questions within the sociology of professions must apply to both traditional professions and occupations which do not share the same characteristics.

Scholars have maintained that recent changes in professional domains and professional work have challenged the traditional image of professions and professionalism (Adams 2014; Gorman and Darfur 2011; Saks 2016; Noordegraf 2013). In several professional fields, large organizations have, for instance, become dominant as employers or clients of professionals. One result of this development is that professionals to an increasing extent have become ordinary employees subjected to bureaucratic governance and more centralized control (Brock et al. 1999). This change implies that the control of professionals is increasingly performed by organizations, and not by their own professional associations. A second noticeable change is that technological innovations have enabled codification of professional work in ways that allow for routine tasks to be delegated to less-trained individuals (Morris 2001). Thirdly, many scholars have been concerned with how the spread of neoliberalist thinking has affected professionals’ work, and weakened the status and influence of professionals. Spurred by politicians, international management consulting firms and business schools, public services have been privatized, and market-like mechanisms of governance have been introduced into the public sector. Management by objectives, cost control, consumer satisfaction and financial efficiency have become new ways of evaluating the work performed by professionals. In several cases, this development is accompanied by the ‘invasion’ of management and business school-trained leaders who take over top leader positions previously held by professionals. Fourthly, Noordegraf (2013) has called attention to how the various changes have fragmented many professional fields, and made the traditional image of a professional as a person with a strong technical base and clear identity less relevant. He has also demonstrated how tensions between professional values, e.g. autonomy and quality and managerial principles like efficiency and earnings, have stimulated the emergence of hybrid forms of professional organizations (Noordegraf 2015).

Elites who are members of a profession have a variety of advantages afforded them by way of their membership: (1) They have behind them a professional association which works for the interests of its members. This association frequently makes efforts to improve the rewards of all of its members and to obtain a collective occupational advancement. The association may, however, also endeavour to establish specific elite command positions reserved for a few selected members of the profession. The professional association behind an elite person may thus be instrumental in paving his or her way to an elite position. (2) Professionals are trained to master a particular expertise and are socialized to adopt a special professional ideology, both of which influence how they perform their work tasks. Also, elite persons in command probably draw on their professional expertise when making decisions. Their expertise may be a significant basis of their personal influence, in addition to the power inherent in their position and in the organization which they are heading. (3) The same professional expertise and ideology which functions as a power base for the elite individuals also serves to legitimate their positions and their actions. In other words, the profession furnishes the professional elite persons with suitable arguments to justify their exercise of power in society.

But also, persons/groups who are elites by virtue of their control of economic or political capital are frequently professionals. The super-rich may for instance be trained as business economists or lawyers. Many politicians have some form of professional education. What then differentiates these elites from professionals holding command positions? Firstly, the professionals’ occupational associations work for their members’ interests qua possessors of a particular education and/or professional occupation and not for their interests as wealthy persons or influential politicians. Secondly, even if super-rich persons have benefitted from their professional expertise during their careers, it does not constitute a significant basis of their power. Lastly, holders of economic capital cannot refer to their professional education when attempting to legitimize their power and actions. They have to provide such legitimation on other grounds, for instance by referring to general meritocratic principles. That is, they may argue that they deserve their wealth because they have worked hard for it or because they have supplied society with jobs.

A central element in Vilfredo Pareto's writings on elites is his theory of the circulation of elites (Pareto 1916/1963). He asserted that the history of human beings is a history of the continual circulation of elites. As one elite group emerges, another falls into decline. This idea has many similarities with the much older wisdom of the rise and fall of empires or regimes (e.g. as formulated by Ibn Khaldun (Baali 1988)). A recent example of research on elite circulation is the study of the replacement of the old communist elites by new elites when the communist regimes of Eastern Europe collapsed at the end of the twentieth century (Higley and Lengyel 2000).

The concept of ‘elite circulation’ is, however, somewhat misleading as it may also refer to the circulation of powerful individuals between different sectors. An example of this form of elite circulation is the horizontal mobility of elite individuals between the main power centres in USA, as discussed by Mills (1956). He observed for instance, that many senior military officers moved into top positions within politics.

Elite circulation may also refer to what may be termed as elite circulation between generations. Empirical research has documented that individuals with an upper-class background have privileged access to elite positions. Moreover, this composition of elites is to a large extent reproduced from one generation to the next (Ruostetsaari 2015(Finland); Hoffmann-Lange 1992 (Germany); Bürklin and Rebenstorf et al. 1997 (Germany); Hartmann 2004; 2010 (England, France, Japan, Germany and USA); Christiansen et al. 2001 (Denmark); Gulbrandsen et al. 2002 (Norway)).

In the following, I thereby prefer to talk about the ‘rise and fall of elites’. In an international perspective, this is an important issue. Around the world, there are continually instances of political and structural changes which imply that old elites lose power and new ones take over the ‘throne’. Often this takes place in dramatic ways. The dramatic changes may for instance involve competing or opposed religious and ethnic groups or military groups struggling for power with civilian power groups. Elite sociology is an activity which to a large extent is practised in Western societies. Because these societies are politically and socially relatively stable, it is easy to overlook the more gradual and calm changes in the composition of elites that nonetheless take place. In these societies, significant examples of the rise and fall of elites more readily implicate different groups of professionals.

I suggest that the ascent (and decline) of new elites may take place in three basically different ways:

1. One type is the replacement of individuals holding existing elite positions by new individuals from another social or ethnic group, class or clan. Or the new elite persons may be recruited from a different educational or professional background. Some of the most interesting cases of elite ascent or decline involve the substitution of members of one profession with members of another profession. A prominent example of such an elite ascent in Norwegian history is the takeover by economists of positions in the public sector that previously primarily were held by lawyers. See more below.

   In the case of elite decline, members of one professional group may lose their grip on central power positions, while the members of another one rise to the pinnacle of power. An example of such elite decline in Norway is the displacement of engineers and lawyers from top leader positions in private business. They were replaced by business economists and management trained leaders. (Nygaard 2014).

2. Elite ascent may take place through the establishment of new powerful positions in existing institutions and organizations. Should these new positions primarily be filled by members of a new social or professional group, then this group experiences a rise to elite status. One such example of elite ascent is that of public relations (PR) and communication practitioners filling the positions of communication directors in both private and public organizations. On the other hand, elite groups may decline as a result of the dismantling of the elite positions which they previously held.

3. A third form of elite ascent is the emergence of new elite groups through the appearance of new powerful (elite) organizations occupied by members of a specific social or professional group. This process may involve the advent of new industries or types of businesses in the economy, or of new powerful agencies in the public sector. The emergence of large and powerful corporations within public accountancy illustrates this form of elite ascent. In these cases, a minority of the members of a distinct occupational group – public accountants – ascended to influential and profitable positions because their organizations acquired more power in society.

What explains the various forms of rise and fall of elites? In general, those studying elites have often traced elite ascent and decline to fundamental socioeconomic changes. Putnam (1976), for instance, discussed how the industrial revolution transformed the composition of elites in various countries. At the same time, he emphasized that political and cultural factors have been important independent and intervening variables affecting the relationship between socioeconomic change and elite transformation. In the elite literature, less attention has been given to how specific agents have contributed to the promotion of changes in the elite structure.

The neo-Weberian approach within the sociology of professions (cf. above) propounds in particular elite ascent to be a result of collective efforts from groups of professionals to gain occupational control. Accordingly, it can be seen as an ‘action’ approach to the study of elites, in line with the ideas of Reed (2012). In the section below, I will discuss the virtues of this approach by presenting three empirical cases of elite ascent in Norway: the rise of economists, communication practitioners and public accountants. The description of economists is based upon various historical studies. The other two case histories are based upon empirical studies carried out by the author.

In the review of these empirical cases I will attempt to answer the following questions: (1) Why did these professional groups ascend to positions of power? (2) What aspects of Norwegian society predisposed the granting of power to these professionals?

An example of this form of elite ascent is the gradual upsurge of economists as an elite professional group within the public sector in Norway. Shortly after the Second World War economists rose to power in the public sector (Berg and Hanisch 1984). They came to dominate leading positions first in the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank of Norway and Statistics Norway, later also in several of the other ministries. In the Ministry of Finance, they replaced civil servants who in the interwar period largely were lawyers. Admittedly, by 1960 there were still less than 100 economists in the various government ministries, though many of them occupied strategic positions (Bergh and Sejersted 1987). They became significant advisors to the politicians.

One may ask what brought about such an ascent to elite positions? In line with neo-Weberian ideas within the sociology of professions, the economists themselves did much to promote their expertise. They presented themselves as custodians of exclusive expertise on how to govern the national economy and on how to promote welfare to society (Helland 2014). Their primary instrument of governance was the national budget, and their training in mathematics and the use of complex theoretical models made them particularly apt for operating this budget. They also introduced new concepts for evaluating policy alternatives, for instance macro-economic efficiency and profitability, which significantly influenced how politicians from all sides talked about politics.

The ascent of the economists was particularly promoted by the leading Norwegian professors of economics during the first post-war years. They were inspired by Keynesian economic thinking about stimulation of demand, economic planning and state intervention in the economy. They were, however, also instrumental in developing economics as an academic discipline. Two of them, Ragnar Frisch and Trygve Haavelmo, were later recipients of the Nobel Memorial Prize in economic sciences. Their particular academic contribution was the development of mathematical models for describing complex interrelationships in the national economy, and for forecasting economic development. These models were used to make politicians aware of political challenges and to help them discuss the allocation of scarce resources.

The economists’ promotion of their expertise is, however, not an adequate explanation of their rise as an elite group within the Norwegian public sector. Their rise came about as a result of leaders of the Labour Party – the dominating political party at the time – recognizing that economists commanded an expertise that could help the party in reaching its political goals. Moreover, the economists’ theories and policy advices were in line with the political thinking which emerged in the Labour Party during the 1930s, and which was consolidated during the war (Slagstad 1998). The international economic crisis that unfolded during the 1930s hit Norway with force. Unemployment was high, and the labour leaders were convinced that it was necessary to overcome the crisis with planned efforts and intervention from the state. Significant members of the party were inspired both by the Soviet planned economy, the theories of Keynes and the centrally planned production in the USA during the war. The Norwegian economists were able to meet these politicians’ perceived needs for a new economic policy with a well-suited toolkit of theories, models and policy instruments. The concrete fusion of the interests of the Labour Party and the economists materialized when the first Minister of Finance after the war was appointed. He was a central member of the Labour Party and himself an economist, and soon set about making the Ministry of Finance accessible for the economists.

During the last decades, a new occupational group has emerged – communication and PR practitioners. Admittedly, individuals working with communication and PR have been around during most of the twentieth century. The specifically new development is the strong growth of job positions specially designated for professionals responsible for communication and PR. These communication and PR practitioners are involved in formulating and communicating messages to the general public or to particular audiences on behalf of an employer or a principal. They are employed in ministries, directorates, municipalities, voluntary organizations and in private and public enterprises. Some of the communication practitioners have made a career within their organization, and have become communication directors, chief communication officers or vice-presidents for communication and PR (Gulbrandsen and Eriksen 2013). In those positions, the communication practitioners are important advisors to CEOs and cabinet ministers. The communication directors have thus become members of the elite in private business and within the public sector.

What may account for this ascent to elite status for members of this new occupational group? Influential corporate communication and PR practitioners have themselves long promoted the idea that communication specialists should be included in the top management teams of large enterprises. The vanguard of the ‘campaign’ for this outcome was made up of academic scholars who were prominent within the corporate communications and PR field. James Grunig (Grunig and Hunt 1984; Grunig 2006) argued for instance, that on the organizational level, PR must be part of the strategic management team. If not, he claimed, PR will always be asked to defend decisions which they have no part in.

This understanding for the need of communication practitioners to be represented in the top management teams soon became common wisdom within both the academic and professional community. In the next round, this understanding was ‘translated’ into claims and recommendations to employers and top managers from the academics, associations of communication practitioners and PR firms.

The endeavours of significant communication ‘ideologues’, followed up by the professional associations, illustrate the significance of the ‘interest politics’ of the profession itself. However, it constitutes only one among several factors which pushed communication practitioners into elite positions. More important were social changes which increased the demand for their services (Gulbrandsen and Eriksen 2013). Five such changes may be mentioned: Firstly, during the last decades, Norwegian legislators have extended the rights of citizens to be informed about public decisions and public policies. In order to meet these rights, public authorities have employed an increasing number of communication advisers. Next, there has been an expansion in the realm of mass media, and the hunt for news has become a 24-h activity. This expansion has implied increased pressure upon politicians and upon leaders in business and the civil society, to respond to mass media requests and critic. Communication advisers have been employed to help politicians and leaders to ward off this pressure. Thirdly, in step with this development there has emerged a much stronger focus upon individual politicians. Appearance has become as important as the content of the policies, increasing the significance of communication advisers who can help the politicians ‘shine’. Fourthly, in politics, lobbying directed against politicians and senior civil servants has increased considerably, and the demand for PR practitioners specializing in lobbying has followed suit. Lastly, in a society where trust has become a significant but precarious asset many top leaders and politicians hire communication specialists to help bolster their reputation.

Professions or occupational groups have also been instrumental in promoting new elite organizations. An illustration of this is the forming of very large and influential firms within public accountancy (Gulbrandsen 2014). This development has given the senior partners in these firms high incomes and a basis for considerable power within private business. They have become influential advisors to other business leaders in matters like financial management and financial structure of the companies, mergers, etc. In this way, they have become members of the national business elite. Accountants are now important economic actors in their own right.

Auditing of the accounts of public and private enterprises is reserved for professionals with an academic education and a licence from public authorities. Originally, they worked in small firms with a couple of partners and a few assistants. The emergence of large and powerful accountancy companies started in the 1980s with a wave of mergers between existing accounting companies, primarily on the international level. The mergers were, however, soon followed up in Norway as well. The mergers reflected the general changes in the economy towards bigger production and service units (Gulbrandsen 2014). When the clients became larger, auditing the annual balance of accounts required the efforts of much more personnel and more time. At the same time, the big clients started to call for more advanced services. All this could only be accomplished within the framework of large accounting firms. The international affiliations were also promoted by the internationalization of the clients. The more Norwegian companies established operations in other countries, the more the Norwegian accounting firms needed collaboration with the international accounting giants.

But the rise of the accountancy companies was also instigated by strategic ideas and choices on the part of the leading partners of the big international accounting firms. From the 1970s onwards, they were systematically looking for new business opportunities (Klarskov Jeppesen 1998). During the 1970s and 1980s, they expanded rapidly within the areas of information technology, law and management consulting. Moreover, during the 1990s, they started offering to audit the business strategies of their clients. The expansion into various forms of consulting represented a challenge to the jurisdiction of established law firms and management consulting businesses. In this manner, the big accounting firms’ actions illustrate Abbott's (1988) analysis of how professions manoeuvre to obtain occupational control. While the accounting firms grew steadily as a result of their inclusion of new services, the partners’ per-share revenues rose considerably. Indeed, the opportunity for partners to increase their incomes seems to have been a significant motivating factor behind the expansion of the big accounting firms into various forms of consulting (Gulbrandsen 2014).

The occupational privileges and rewards of the public accountant cannot, however, be exhaustingly explained by reference to the structural changes in global capitalism and to the actions of the profession itself. The favourable occupational position of public accountants is first and foremost a result of the state's and the business community's continual discontent with their lack of independence of clients. The work of public accountants contributes significantly to produce trust in the economy by verifying the financial information presented in the annual reports of private and public enterprises. However, to trust the auditors’ verifications, the users need to be sure that the public accountants have executed their task independently of the interests of the enterprises. However, since the occupation of auditor or public accountant emerged during the second half of the nineteenth century, their independence from their clients has always been an issue (Innstilling til lov om revisorer 1924; Maltby 1999; Schuetze 1994). Public authorities and the business community in general have repeatedly been impatient with the public accountants’ tendency to compromise their independent role in order to obtain more assignments and higher incomes from their clients In order to ensure that they act independently, public authorities have introduced various measures over the years, for instance registration and certification, educational requirements, restrictions on who can own a public accounting firm, and restrictions on selling consultancy services to accounting clients. Indirectly, these measures have made it possible for public accountants to establish independent firms, obtain an occupational monopoly and raise their status. Public policies, backed by the general business community, have thus helped practitioners to obtain a professional advancement and become an elite group within the business sector.

Economists, public accountants and communication and PR practitioners are three occupational groups that in different periods advanced to higher status and influence in Norway. Within each of these groups a minority of the professionals climbed to elite positions within society. They became, for instance, permanent secretaries and general directors in civil service, senior partners in large auditor firms, or communication directors on the staff of ministers and CEOs. In other words, these cases illustrate that ascent of new elite groups often took place through the rise of distinct groups of professionals.

Only one of the three occupational groups described above is fully a profession in the traditional sense of having an occupational monopoly guaranteed by law – the public accountants. Economists have no exclusive rights to particular occupations or jobs in the civil service, or elsewhere. However, in practice they have a preferential access to certain jobs, but this privileged access is not guaranteed by law. Neither do PR and communication enjoy any occupational monopoly. Nor do they control particular professional institutions or organizations, as do the other two groups. Moreover, there are no specific educational requirements for being employed as, for instance, a communication director. Many of them have an academic degree within communication, but just as often they have a background within journalism or an education within social science or the humanities. Furthermore, within PR and communication firms specializing in lobbying, it is common to engage previous politicians.

In other words, two of the described groups of professionals did not require occupational monopoly to advance collectively, and to capture elite positions. It was primarily their expertise which helped some of the members of these groups to reach the pinnacles of power. This fact contrasts the neo-Weberians’ tendency of downplaying the significance of the professionals’ expertise for their collective advancement (Saks 2016).

Scholars within the study of professions have frequently focused upon the role of professional associations as drivers behind collective advancement of occupational groups (Gorman and Sandefur 2011). In the cases discussed above, the professional associations were not sitting in the driver's seat, but were involved at a later stage in the process. Instead groups of distinguished professionals were spearheading the campaigns for conquering new jurisdictions and positions. It was the internationally renowned Norwegian professors of economics, the leading partners in the large auditing firms, and the leading academics within PR and communication who were the significant first players in these campaigns.

These cases demonstrate that groups of professionals may contribute to the promotion of the ascent of new elite groups in society. At the same time, it was evident that this ascent primarily took place because more fundamental economic and political changes led to an increased awareness of, and demand for, their expertise. The growth of large multinational companies in the global capitalism produced a need for similarly large and global auditor firms, propelling their leading partners into elite status in the business world. The grave economic crisis during the 1930s created a demand for economists who could help politicians govern the national economy. The growth of mass media emphasizing a watchdog function motivated business leaders and politicians to employ PR and communication specialists to help them counterbalance the media pressure.

In two of the cases – the public accountants and the communication practitioners – the societal changes that prompted the demand for their services were common to all Western societies. In the case of the economists, the particular political situation in Norway was essential for their rise to status and influence. In Norway, the Labour Party was the dominating political party during the first two decades after the Second World War. The power of the party was buttressed through its close relationship to a union movement with an extensive membership. The theories and policy ideas of the post-war generation of economists fit like a glove the Labour Party's ideological preference for a strong state and for state intervention in the economy. And the Labour Party had sufficient power to carry out the necessary adjustments of professionals within the civil service.

The awareness and demand for the services of various professionals grew forth in powerful groups in the Norwegian society, specifically the general business community, the politicians, the state and the Labour Party. In other words, the three groups of professionals rose to higher status because significant powerbrokers saw their own interests best served by drawing on the professionals’ expertise. In literature on professions, the focus has frequently been upon the power imbalance between experts and their clients – the latter often having scarce knowledge of the content of the professionals’ expertise. In the three cases presented above, the balance probably is more even. The clients have the ability to influence content and monitor the qualities of the services, thereby countering the power inherent in the professionals’ expert knowledge.

In the above, reference is made to recent studies demonstrating changes of the professional world. Have these changes threatened the status and power of professional elites? Has the transformation become a seed-bed for elite decline?

The three groups of professionals discussed above have to varying degrees been affected by the changes in the professional world. Economists in the civil service have not been replaced by professionals from other professions or by ‘managers’. Their work has scarcely been routinized, and their professional autonomy is relatively intact. Moreover, their power does not seem to be overly threatened. Admittedly, their failure to foresee some of the previous economic crises has to some extent weakened their previous supremacy. However, politicians and decision-makers are still dependent upon their analyses and economic policy advices. Moreover, the crises have opened up a new labour market for elite economists. Large banks and financial institutions as well as some very large business enterprises have perceived a need for macro-economic expertise in their top leader teams. As a result, many of these institutions and enterprises have created ‘chief economist’ positions responsible for following the macro-economic situation nationally and internationally. In Norway, many of these chief economists have been recruited from the Ministry of Finance or the Central Bank of Norway.

Admittedly, neo-liberal ideas, with their emphasis on policies such as privatization, deregulation, and reduction in government spending, have also penetrated the thinking of Norwegian economists. At the same time, traditional macro-economic ‘wisdom’ has been institutionalized in the form of significant policy models, an example of which is an incomes policy model introduced in 1992 called the ‘Solidarity alternative’ (NOU 1992: 26). Constituting coordinated wage bargaining where both the main parties in the labour market and the state are involved, the aim of the bargaining has been to obtain a moderate growth of costs and prices. This incomes policy model has up to the present day contributed to a stable economic development in Norway. Moreover, it has become an important underpinning of the Norwegian corporatist system of industrial relations.

Communication practitioners constitute a recently established group of professionals. They illustrate adequately several of the changes in the professional world that scholars have described. Most of these professionals are employees in large organizations, occupied with relatively mundane work tasks. They function as an auxiliary group, serving the needs of, and controlled by, other groups within their employing organization. As emphasized above, they have no occupational monopoly, they have diverse educational backgrounds, and many of them have volatile careers. Their knowledge base seems to be feeble, illustrated by their self-reported need to learn more about organizational subjects, management and economics rather than communication (Gulbrandsen and Eriksen 2013). All these characteristics of their professional situation seem to create a fragmentation within the group

The weak professional status of communication practitioners does not restrict the elite status and influence of the small group of communication directors. They are involved in strategic discussions and decisions at top level in their respective organizations. Some of them have even become close sparring partners to their CEO or ministers. These communication directors operate in a world which is very different from the one experienced by their lower ranked colleagues. This state of affairs exacerbates the fragmentation within the professional group as a whole.

Most public accountants today work in large accounting firms. As several scholars have demonstrated, they have become ordinary employees subjected to quite tight control of their work, and with less elbowroom for practising their professional values. In contrast, the senior partners of these firms have benefitted considerably from the growth of large accounting firms, and this development has given them substantial incomes and significant elite positions in the private business elite. Furthermore, the public regulations of the accounting industry guarantee that top leader positions in the firms will continue to be filled with professional auditors.

Due to a reconfiguration of their work roles and professional profiles, senior partners in accounting firms have, however, moved away from their lower ranked colleagues (Noordegraf 2013). Such partners in the accounting industries are usually distinguished practitioners in their profession. At the same time, they are involved in management and general firm policy. Moreover, some of them have acquired considerable knowledge about general business and policy issues – a knowledge which makes them more valuable as advisors to CEOs in other business companies. As amongst communication practitioners, senior partners and midlevel public accountants now operate in two different professional worlds.

Elites are groups and individuals with power. They have power by virtue of holding command positions in significant organizations, or by controlling disproportionally large amounts of capital, such as wealth. In any society, there are continual changes in the distribution of power, and in the positions and resources which provide the basis for power. These changes in turn lead to changes in the composition of elites. Elites rise and fall as the transformations in the society's power structure take place. In Western societies, changes in the composition of elites often involve various groups of professionals. In this paper, it has been discussed whether, and how, groups of professionals may influence the ascent and descent of elites. Within the sociology of professions, the so-called neo-Weberian approach has focused upon how groups of professionals strategically manoeuver to obtain control of a particular occupational jurisdiction. This approach seems to offer an interesting explanation as to how particular groups of professionals rise to elite status and power. To follow up the ideas in this approach, three cases of elite ascent which unfolded in Norway after the Second World War were discussed.

In these three cases of elite ascent, the groups of professionals, in line with the neo-Weberian approach, actively sought to promote their expertise, and to expand their occupational territory. It was, however, not the professional association, but rather the leading practitioners of the profession, who were the first movers in the ‘campaign’ to advance the power and status of the occupation. Nonetheless, the professionals’ own efforts to obtain collective advancement contributed to a lesser degree to their elite ascent than more fundamental economic and political changes in the Norwegian society. A selected group of individuals in the three groups of professionals rose to elite positions due to the fact that significant power brokers in the Norwegian society saw their own interests best served by drawing upon the professionals’ expertise.

Scholars within the sociology of professions have demonstrated that there have undergone significant changes in the professional world during the course of the last decades. These changes have also affected the three groups of professionals discussed in this paper. Public accountants and communication practitioners have become employees in large organizations, attending to relatively mundane work tasks and subjected to bureaucratic control. Professional values and ideals have frequently given way to the goals of their principals. The elite persons within each of the groups have not, however, been significantly affected by the transformation of the professional world. Their elite positions have been consolidated, but their professional profiles have been reconfigured. The result is that the elites and rank-and-file within each of the professionals groups operate and live in different worlds.

In the introduction of this paper, I referred to two basic approaches to or explanations of why particular groups of professionals obtain elite status – elite ascent as result of demand or closure. The three empirical cases discussed above demonstrate that both approaches are valid and useful for understanding professional elite ascent. Nonetheless, the empirical analysis demonstrates that the described professionals rose to power primarily because their services were required by powerful groups in society. In spite of the usefulness of a neo-Weberian approach, the Norwegian cases suggest that the focus must rather be on changes in the society which led to the demand for new skills. Moreover, we must identify the centres of power that perceived the need for these skills and gave the professionals room to climb to higher status and influence.

But is the Norwegian case generalizable to other societies? Not necessarily. Macro economists, communication practitioners and public accountants are prevalent in and enjoy a professional status in several countries in the world as well. In the Norwegian case, however, the state played a particular significant role for the demand and regulation of the services of these professions. The Norwegian state has traditionally been strong and with a high-quality and uncorrupted civil service. Throughout much of the twentieth century, this state was governed and backed by centre-left political coalitions. The strong role of the state can be traced back to the nineteenth century. At that time Norway had a weak bourgeoisie, and private companies were small with limited financial capital. The State had to step in to safeguard emerging industries, investing heavily in the infrastructure and assisting the establishment of a national banking system. The state thus had to compensate for the absence of an ‘organized capitalism’ (Sejersted 1993). At the turn of the twentieth century, the state elite, i.e. the politicians and the senior civil servants, took a leading role in modernizing and developing the new nation. Norway became an independent nation in 1905. For instance, the state shouldered the responsibility for establishing the necessary institutions for building trust in an emerging impersonal capitalism. A Companies Act and an Act on Auditors were examples of such institutions. The boosting of the power and careers of economists in the ministries after the Second World War and the recent extensive employment of communication practitioners in public sector are more modern testimonies of this vigorous state. In societies where state power is weaker, it is probable that professions establish themselves and grow with less public regulation and accordingly with more possibilities for rent-seeking. The unintended consequences of such a state of affairs may be a weakened trust in the relevant societies, to the detriment both of economic and political stability.

I am grateful for very useful comments and suggestions from the journal's two anonymous reviewers.

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Trygve Gulbrandsen Dr Philos. in Sociology from the University of Oslo. Research professor, previous positions include Senior advisor and special advisor in the Planning Department, Ministry of Finance. Professor II, Department of Sociology and Human Geography, University of Oslo.