French activists to the (radical) right and the (radical) left: are they different or similar?

Whether they are located at the far right or far left of the political spectrum, political activists constitute the ‘bread and butter’ of political parties and social movement organisations (Tarrow 1998; Rucht 1999). The activists shape a political group's programme. They organise the group's daily business, participate in meetings, discussions, protest activities and elections as well as provide financial resources (Mouriaux 1983). Aware that if we want to comprehensively understand the actions, positions and discourses of right-wing groups like the French National Front (FN) or left-wing groups such as the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Help of Citizens (Attac) we also have to know the activists, the literature on both social movements and political parties has quite extensively studied these groups from the inside. For over 30 years, research has tried to uncover the socialisation process of mainly left-wing activists; their personal characteristics, their values and beliefs, and their motivations for engagement (see Klandermans 1986, 1997). Studies (e.g. Goodwin 2010; Art 2011), focusing on right-wing activists, while fewer in numbers and more recent, have also attempted to holistically comprehend the members of these political organisations.

However, despite their analogous focus, the two literatures discussing left-wing and right-wing activists do not really talk to each other. There is no study that systematically compares activists engaged in a leftist group with those in a rightist group. Are these two types of activists similar or different? Based on a comparative study of the members of Attac France – a leftist organisation with considerable political visibility – and the FN – France's main radical rightist political group – I attempt to do both: (1) detect similarities and differences between members and activists of these two groups and (2) determine how the members of both groups fit into their respective literatures. Based on 88 in depth semi-structured interviews conducted with Attac activists in the spring and summer 2009 and 44 interviews conducted in the winter, spring and summer 2013 with members of the FN, I find that the members of the two groups are rather different. Even more importantly, I also discover that the members of Attac confirm the literature's description of left-wing activists. However, the same is not true for the FN members, who are much more diverse than described in the radical right-wing literature. In more detail, my results indicate that the majority of Attac members are politically socialised before turning 25; they have high civic skills, expose post-materialist- and humanistic values (e.g. solidarity with the Global South) and display instrumental and ideological motivations to justify their engagement. In contrast, FN members come from various social and economic backgrounds; they have acquired their affinity toward the FN in various stages in life, have an ethnocentric worldview and are driven by ideological calculations, as well as group identity processes.

This article proceeds as follows. In the next section, I will present the current literature focusing on party and social movement activists on the left and right and formulate some theoretically driven expectations. In the third part, I will present the two empirical referents for this study, Attac France and the FN and shortly explain why these organisations are well suited for my research. In the following forth section, I will then explain the research methodology and the sampling procedures. Fifth, I will empirically juxtapose the members of the two organisations and draw empirical and theoretical conclusions. Finally, I will summarise the main findings of this research and provide avenues for future research.

In this section, I will review four main aspects of the activists’ life and trajectory (i.e. political socialisation, the activists’ societal standing, their values and beliefs, and their motivations for engagement) that might explain why individuals become and remain engaged in political organisations of the right and left of the political spectrum.

The literature on political socialisation of left-wing activists (e.g. Jennings and Stoker 2004), lists three main political socialisation mechanisms: (1) political socialisation can occur during one's adolescence, mainly through family, at an age when individuals become politically interested and form their identity (Gaiser and Rijke 2008). (2) Political socialisation during one's college years, a period in life where young adults live outside of the supervision of their parents rendering them cognitively available for new ideas, is another frequent socialisation mechanism (McAdam 1988). (3) Political socialisation of previously unengaged individuals can occur through formative events in an individual's adult life. These milestone events include, but are not limited to, marriage, a new job or a job loss, being a victim of aggression or through a change in social status (Sigel and Hoskin 1977).

The empirical literature on leftist activists finds support for all three mechanisms. For example, referring to what they call the ‘diaper generation’, Kaplan and Shapiro (1998) affirm that many individuals, who grew up to radical left-wing parents in the 1950s, continued their activism in their later life and played a major role in the leftist movements in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g. in the mobilisation against the war in Vietnam). In other contexts, social background factors such as family socialisation during childhood and adolescence only play a minor role in individuals’ socialisation into a left-wing milieu (e.g. Dohms and Paul 2008). For example, based on his case study in South Korea, Lee (1997) affirms that college student experience has been the main factor in students’ decision to join left-wing student organisations and to participate in protest activities. Finally, scholars examining the triggers for individuals, who start social activism in their adult life (e.g. Avenell 2012) convincingly show that milestone events (e.g. the nuclear catastrophe in Tschernobyl, the fall of the Berlin Wall, or the beginning of the Iraq War) have driven previously apolitical and unengaged people toward activism in movements including the peace or environmental movement.

In contrast, the literature focusing on rightist activists finds almost unanimous support for the thesis that the family transfers right-wing ideologies and ideas during childhood and adolescence. For example, as early as the early 1950s, Adorno et al. (1950) argue that right-wing extremism is ‘a syndrome of authoritarian attitudes, formed during childhood by dominating parents’ (6). For Klandermans and Mayer (2006), the socialisation of extreme right-wing activists is rooted in the family; an environment par excellence where individuals develop their personality and identity based on the traditions and culture in which they grew up (see also Orfali 1991). For Klandermans (2013: 64) too, the family is the ideal cradle to nurture a subculture of radical right-wing beliefs, in particular, in countries with a viable right-wing extremist movement, like France, Italy and the Flanders community in Belgium (64). Specifically, focusing on the FN, Bizeul (2003) and Crépon (2006, 2012) confirm that right-wing ideologies are passed on through the family (for a similar finding on racial activism in the US see Blee 2005).

The civic skills approach is frequently applied to explain political engagement in leftist groups. It assumes that an individual's level of civic skills predisposes a person's likelihood to participate in political organisations. By emphasising the qualitative increase in political awareness of the higher cohorts in societies, this approach implies that protest activity should be higher among the better educated and politically sophisticated (Burns et al.2001). In other words, those who have the political and monetary resources should be more likely to engage in political parties and social movements (Inglehart 1977). This ought to apply even more so, if we consider that the more educated and wealthier individuals normally have increased exposure to political news (e.g. through print, TV and Internet) (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995). The empirical literature on the activists in leftist movements such as environmentalist or women's groups (e.g. Abigail et al.1998; Barkan 2004) generally finds that the activists have relatively high education, political interest and knowledge.

Instead of the civic skills approach, I deem the social isolation hypothesis likely to explain the societal standing of right-wing activists. It argues that by offering populism, nostalgia and scapegoating, (far) right-wing organisations are well suited to gain the confidence of the so-called losers of modernisations; individuals with low education, who struggle in the current globalised labour market (Arzheimer and Carter 2006; Mudde 2010). According to Rydgren (2007), these individuals with low skills suffer the most from the need for economic mobility, outsourcing, foreign competition in the labour market and the increasing inequality gap; all factors that might render them attuned to simplistic slogans and populism. There is also support in favour of this stipulation in the empirical literature on the FN. For instance, Bizeul's (2003) study on the membership of the FN indicates that, in 2002, working class and unemployed individuals made up 30% and 38% of the party membership, respectively (65). Similarly, Goodwin et al. (2012) suggest that the membership of radical right-wing parties is concentrated in areas with large numbers of unskilled workers, the unemployed, poorly educated and lower middle class citizens, on the basis that these groups are more economically insecure and thus feel threatened by fast socio-structural change and resentful toward mainstream elites (889).

The literature is unanimous that activists of the left and right should have different values and beliefs. Since the post-materialist twist in the 1970s, activist in leftist groups have a progressive agenda. Among others, these groups fight for social justice, environmental protection, peace and indigenous rights (Della Porta 2007). Organisations such as Attac support the struggle of indigenous movements in Latin America, reject free-trade agreements, sweatshop labour, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and fight against income inequalities at home and abroad (Hammond 2007). In particular, the rhetoric and actions of these leftist groups are directed against the negative processes of economic globalisation and liberalisation embodied in international organisations such as the European Union, the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund (Smith 2009).

In contrast, right-wing organisations such as the Front National have a regressive agenda. In the words of Jost (2009), members of the radical right are characterised by uncertainty avoidance, integrative complexity, need for order, structure, closure and fear of threat. Art (2011) adds that the members of the radical right have an ethnocentric worldview. They believe that different ethnic and religious communities cannot live together. In support of this view Crépon (2006) argues that the members of the FN define being French based on family heritage. Immigrants, because they have a different non-French family background are not considered French. They are seen as a plague that threatens the coherence of France (Crépon, 2012). Bizeul (2003) mentions two additional traits of right-wing activists: (1) an authoritarian personality and (2) the glorification of France's past.

Klandermans and Mayer (2006: 8–9) cite three motivational factors why individuals become and remain engaged in political organisations: instrumentality, identity and ideology (see also Klandermans 1986, 1997, 2004). Instrumentality refers to those individuals who decide to participate in a political group because they think they can change the social and political environment. This type of activists – while they believe in the discourse of the organisation, group or party – is less interested in ideology than in the visibility and the success of the movement and the campaigns (Art 2011). Identity, or the awareness of belonging to a valued group, is the second motivating factor for participants in political groups. According to Klandermans and Mayer (2006: 9), identity defines an ‘in-group’ that members identify themselves with and an ‘out-group’ which they distance themselves. The activists gain a positive social identity from their participation in the social movement and thus feel committed to the movement, the other members of the movement, and the leader of the movement. Ideology constitutes the third motivating factor for participation in political and social groups and refers to members engaging in political discourse and expressing their views. Individuals with strong ideologies frequently do not participate in organisational activities to affect actual policy change, but rather to express their views or frustrations, or to maintain their dignity (Gould 2003).

Unfortunately, the literature offers little guidance as to the absolute and relative importance of any of the three motivational factors for both groups of activists (e.g. see Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2007). I deem it likely that the identity factor should play less of role in explaining the participation patterns of left-wing activists. After 1968, society has considered participation in leftist groups a legitimate means of political engagement. In addition, leftist groups are considered an integral part of the pluralist western societies. As a result, individuals, who believe in environmental protection, more equality between the genders or social justice are not stigmatised in Western societies and can express their views freely. They do not necessarily need to find a group of likeminded individuals to express themselves. For right-wing activists, the situation is different. For example, Klandermans (2013) states that right-wing activists are stigmatised by family members, close friends, by state institutions or other social movements. Hence, individuals believing in the ideologies of the radical right need to find individuals, who share their views. According to Lafront (2001: 177), this enables them to form a cohesive group on the fringes of society (see also Stockemer 2014).

Without juxtaposing them directly, both the social movement and political party literatures draw quite a different picture of left-wing and right-wing activists. Left-wing activists are characterised by various socialisation mechanisms, high levels of civic skills and post-materialist values, for whom ideology and instrumentality might be the dominant motivational factors. In contrast, the literature sees right-wing activists as individuals socialised by the family, who live at the fringes of society as so-called losers of modernisation. Their values should be characterised by anti-immigration, nationalism, more authoritarianism and anti-elitism. It is also likely that the identity factor weighs strongly in their strife for engagement. In this research, I test to what degree these stipulations apply? Are left and right-wing activists like apples and oranges, like two different species that have very little in common, or do these activists possibly have more in common than prior research suggests? This question becomes the more important given that several radical right-wing groups including the Front National in France have adopted a decidedly leftist-economic policy (Ivaldi 2015). Equally importantly, the radical right has experienced a wave of success in the past decade in many European countries doubling or tripling its membership. This asks the questions, whether the profile of members of radical right-wing parties is still the same in the 2010s as it used to be before? To test these stipulations, I have chosen two contemporary and relevant political actors within the same country, Attac as an example of a leftist group and the Front National as an example of a right-wing group.

The empirical referent for a leftist group is Attac (l’association pour la taxation des transactions financières pour l'aide aux citoyens), the most politically significant and best organised of all recent anti-globalisation groupings worldwide, which is recognised as ‘the most public face of the anti-globalisation movement in much of Europe’ (Klein, 2002 194–195; Waters 2006). In 1998, Attac France emerged as the first Attac branch worldwide, as a critique against the disenchanting and oppressive effect of capitalism and a direct result of the worsening of social cohesion (Birchfield and Freyberg-Inan 2004). Pushed by the growing opposition of parts of the French population against unrestricted liberalism and thanks to the popularity of some of the organisation's initiatives (e.g. the Tobin Tax) the membership numbers swelled in the early years of the group's existence (Wintrebert 2007); within a few months of its creation the organisation had 5000 members, in 2002 around 30,000. However, as a result of an internal crisis in 2005 and 2006 and due to the fact that part of Attac's platform became politically mainstream, the membership numbers began to decline in 2006 to currently 10,000–15,000 members (Stockemer 2013). Despite this decline in membership, Attac France remains a relevant and important political organisation; a kind of umbrella organisation for leftist activists of all colours.

The radical right-wing group, I have chosen is the Front National (FN). Since its foundation in 1972, the FN has shaped the rightist political spectrum in France. Directed by Jean Marie Le Pen (1972–2011) and his daughter Marine Le Pen from 2011 onwards, the party has become a significant political force in France over the last three decades (Albertini and Doucet 2013). With its signature themes, anti-immigration, anti-Brussels, anti-Islam, populism and charismatic leadership, the party has generally won upwards 10% of the vote in various types of elections (e.g. parliamentary-, presidential- or regional elections) (Mondon 2014). Despite some electoral drawbacks such as the European Elections in 1999 or the parliamentary elections in 2007, in both of which the party gained a mere 4% of the general vote, the party has generally come out of these crises stronger than before, successfully fighting off competing right-wing groups. For example, in 2002 just three years after the FN splinter movement, the Mouvement National Républicain, split the FN membership in half, FN founder Jean Marie Le Pen had the strongest showing since then in any presidential election gaining 16.9% of the vote and advancing to the second round in the presidential election (Crépon 2012; Dézé 2012).

As of late 2016, the FN is the only viable political force in the right-wing populist camp. It continues to take anti-immigrant and authoritarian positions, but does so under the guise of economics (Williams 2006: 96). In particular, Marine Le Pen's populist campaigns, which have persuaded citizens that immigration is intimately linked to socioeconomic hardship (Hewlett 2012: 404), has appealed to the frustrations of French citizens, who have felt ignored by mainstream politicians. For example, she emerged again as a strong candidate in the lead-up to the 2012 presidential elections (Goodliffe 2012: 137) and received 18.03% of the vote (compared with 10.44% for Jean Marie Le Pen in 2007). Although she did not come in second, as her father had done in 2002, she received 896,000 more votes than did Jean Marie Le Pen 10 years before (Hewlett 2012: 414). In the 2012 parliamentary elections, the FN received a total of 13.77% of the votes (compared with 4.29% in 2007). Yet, Marine Le Pen and the FN have not only been successful at the polls but also in attracting party members. Attracted by the populist antagonist discourse against the normative framework of the national and European political establishment, the party has gained the manpower of some 80,000 activists (Goodliffe 2015; Stockemer 2017). These activists provide the backbone of the party and, with their energy and dedication, have contributed to the party's recent successes (Checcaglini 2012).

Despite the fact that Attac is a social movement organisation and that the FN is a party, I maintain that the members of the two groups are comparable. Most importantly, both organisations are umbrella organisations, Attac on the left and the FN on the right. For example, Attac is a bridging organisation that brings together a wide variety of individuals and groups from the French left, including parties, non-governmental organisations, environmental coalitions, religious networks and issue-specific groups. It is also a common feature that Attac members have several organisational memberships, including party membership in parties such as Europe Ecologie, le Parti de Gauche or le Parti Communiste. Attac's broad appeal and its bridging character to other leftist organisations renders this organisation a good fit for this study.

When it comes to the FN, the party has a hegemonic position on the far right in French politics. It is the natural home of individuals, who want to oppose globalisation, immigration and European Integration and who strife for a more authoritarian state. Second, the FN is a party of activists (Stockemer 2017). Contrary to other French parties such as the Socialist Party or the Republican Party, the members are active throughout the year and not only during election periods. They organise rallies, distribute flyers, and are present on markets and public places all year around. The FN also organises summer academies, barbecues and parties. The party tries to organise a community of likeminded people; a community that is a bit outside of mainstream politics. The FN distributes its own information mainly through the new media and it uses alternative sources of information (Stockemer and Barisone 2017). The group is in many ways an anti-movement. It rejects both domestic and foreign elites, attacks neo-liberalism and the European Union, and favours a different more authoritarian society (Almeida 2014). As such the party, with its populist appeal, does not fit within the French mainstream party spectrum (Giminez and Schwarz 2016). Even if it has been weakening recently there is still a ‘cordon sanitaire’ around the FN and its members. Contrary to members of the mainstream parties, and because of the FN's standing as an alternative outside of mainstream politics, FN members are still outsiders in society or discriminated against. In fact, in his case study, Stockemer (2017: 85) reports that 50% of the activists report some kind of societal discrimination, which ranges from verbal insults, to the loss of friends to physical aggression. As such, FN members are not party members like others, they resemble more social movement activists than party activists. As such, they provide a good comparative case toward the Attac members.

The data for this comparative analysis come from two rounds of semi-structured interviews conducted in the spring and summer 2009 with Attac members and in the winter, spring and summer 2013 with FN members. For all interviews, I used the same interview guide, rendering the data, which I gathered from the Attac and FN sample, comparable. Under normal circumstances, I tried to retrace the respondent's activist career; I started the interview by asking questions about a person's political socialisation and politically and socially formative events that shaped an individual's value and belief system and, as the interview proceeded, I focused on an individual's motivations for involvement and his or her trajectory as an activist. At the end of the interview, I asked some demographic information. I normally transcribed all interviews in the course of three days and added analytical notes. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and more than 3 hours, with a median interview time of 45 minutes for the Attac activists and approximately 1 hour for the FN members.

I had to cope with two caveats while conducting my interviews: (1) the representativeness of the interviews and (2) the trustworthiness of the interviewees. To tackle the first point, I am aware that it is impossible to retrieve a fully representative sample when conducting in-depth interviews. Nevertheless, I engaged in several procedures allowing me to render the sample as illustrative as possible of the two groups. First, I conducted more interviews than generally qualitative methodologists (e.g. Adler and Adler 1987; Guest et al.2006) suggest. Second, I travelled widely in France to conduct the interviews. For both organisations, I travelled to the organisations strongholds (e.g. Toulouse for Attac) or (Grenoble or Saint Etienne for the FN) and regions where both groups are rather weak (l’Alsace in the case of Attac and la Bretagne in the case of the FN). Third, I tried to diversify my sample as much as possible and engaged in purposive sampling techniques. For example, whenever possible I asked my interviewees or the local coordinators, if they know of any individual that at the precise moment could complement my interview data (Brannen and Nilson 2011).¹ Fourth, I think that, at least, for some aspects, my interview data has reached saturation. For example, I find remarkable consistencies in the member's personal and political values as well as their motivations for engagement for the two subsamples.

Second, when conducting interviews, there is always the possibility that the activists hide their real values and beliefs, presenting a more acceptable side of their convictions. Because of their position at the fringes of the French political system; this danger was more pronounced for the FN members. However, I have several strong indications that both Attac members and FN members communicated their ‘real’ beliefs. First, the activists are convinced that their worldview represents the truth; a truth they want to propagate and diffuse in society. Second, many interviewees, the FN members, in particular, were emotional during the interview, used strong language and showed great involvement. I never had the feeling that they were not authentic. Third, both groups and particularly, the FN members appreciated that some foreigner would come to France to study them. Especially, the FN members considered me as ‘neutral’, because I was not part of the ‘corrupt’ French elite. Finally, for the overall majority of the interviewees, the interview they conducted with me was their first interview ever. They do not know what others have written about them and have had no public relations training; hence it is unlikely that the deliberately hit some of their convictions from me.

I could retrieve a diverse sample for both Attac and FN members. For both groups, I did not interview professional stuff, but only activists, who do their activism in their free time. The sample of the 88 Attac activists consists of slightly more men than women (i.e. the ratio is approximately 60–40), activists of all ages (16 to over 83), but older activists were in the majority. The activists show various degrees of engagement; from less than 1 or 2 hours per months to 20 hours or more per week (although some of the individuals’ main engagement is not in Attac but in another organisation or party). Similarly, the FN activists come from all engagement levels (i.e. I talked to members, who only pay their membership dues, while others spend more than 20 hours in and for this radical right-wing party), age groups (19–69), backgrounds and genders (although men were also somewhat overrepresented) (see Table 1). This makes the two samples comparable when it comes to socio-demographics.

The analysis of the interviews provides interesting findings (partly) confirming some of the stipulations from the literature, while disconfirming others. For one, my interview data relatively closely matches the description of left-wing activists in the literature. In the majority, Attac activists are politically socialised during childhood or adolescence, have high amounts of civic skills, altruistic and classical leftist values and are motivated by a mixture of ideological and instrumental calculations. On the other hand, FN activists fit the literature's description of radical right-wing activists much less strongly. They have a host of political backgrounds and values, have rather strong nationalistic and anti-establishment values and are driven by ideological calculations, but also feel a strong group identity.

In the overall majority, the Attac activists follow the three socialisation schemes proposed by the literature. In contrast, the political socialisation of FN members was more complex and can only be partly pressed into the three categories laid out in the theoretical section of this article. For Attac, approximately 40% of interviewees (i.e. 39 members) were politically socialised into a leftist milieu during their childhood, mainly by their family. These activists for example, affirm that ‘politics was given to me in the cradle’, ‘I participated in my first demonstration in a stroller’, ‘my parents are Holocaust survivors and instilled the value of political engagement in me early on’. A slightly smaller group of activists (i.e. 37) acquired their political values during their college years. This mode of political socialisation was particularly present for activists who were young adults in the 1960s and 1970s. One activist, for instance, labels himself a son of the 1960s. Another one affirms that he got swept into the waves of protests. While not that prevalent as in the late 1960s, younger Attac members continue to be socialised during their university years. For example, one young Attac member describes her university time as a time of liberation from the conservative bonds of her childhood; a second one got hooked to the themes of the anti-globalisation movement by a lecture of Jean Ziegler. The third, socialisation mechanism – political socialisation through formative events in somebody's adult years – is minoritarian. Only nine individuals have followed this schema. For example, they affirm that they have been politically socialised through events at their work place such as cut-backs of jobs or through vacations in third world countries. Nearly absent from my sample of Attac members are activists, who got politically socialised after joining Attac. Only three members fit this category.

In contrast to the literature's expectations, the FN activists’ political socialisation is multi-facetted and can only be partially pressed into the three political socialisation schemes presented above. In fact, contrary to the literatures’ predictions (e.g. Birenbaum 1992; Blee 2011), the majority of FN members do not have a right-wing family lineage. Only around 25% of my interviewees affirm to come from a rightist milieu (e.g. they are former Algerian colonisers, or have parents that have been engaged in the Poujadist movement in the 1950s or in favour of Tixier-Vigancour presidential run in the late 1960s). The second socialisation mechanism – political socialisation during school or university – is quite rare. The six interviewees, who mention this socialisation mechanism, have two distinct trajectories: (1) they studied in one of the few right-wing universities in France (e.g. the Paris Assas University), got socialised there and joined the right-wing student organisation, le Groupe Union Défense (GUD) there. Or (2) and quite contrary, they got interested in the FN as a result of the apparent diabolisation of the party in the education sector. For example, one activist wanted to know if the FN members are all fascists, as his professor affirmed, so he informed himself right at the FN and was convinced by their ideals.

Another group comprising seven members affirm to have become politically awakened by long-term societal tendencies. For instance, one police officer asserts that he was called constantly to immigrant districts because of burglaries, drug dealing, burning cars and petty crimes. According to him, the mainstream parties have not tackled this problem; therefore, he has slowly converted toward the ideals of the FN. Other members, who live in social housing so-called Habitation à Loyer Modéré, argue that they are constantly confronted with vandalism, noise, burglaries and broken windows at their cars. As a result, they have become frustrated with the mainstream French parties and converted to the FN. Mainly from a conservative or centre background, a third group of activists has tilted toward the FN because of dissatisfaction with the centre parties; either because of broken promises or policies or a general dissatisfaction with the inner-party life in the RPR or later UMP. For example, members that left the moderate right in favour of the FN cite 1981 when Jacques Chirac asked his supporters to vote for Francois Mitterrand instead of Valery Giscard d’ Estaing, in the round up of the presidential elections that year, or the Sarkozy presidency, who, according to some of my interviewees, promised to curb insecurity, but did not deliver on his promises. Those, who left the moderate right in favour of the FN because of some general dissatisfaction with party life and procedures list the hypocrisy in the ranks of the moderate right, as well as the elitism and corrupt behaviour in allocating mandates.

The four socialisation trajectories, outlined above, are not inclusive. Rather, there are more socialisation modes. For example, some members’ stream of thought has just become more right wing over the years or decencies. Others have felt a personal connection toward Jean Marie Le Pen or Marine Le Pen, a connection that has rendered them interested in politics. One member for example affirms that he has had a very bad image of politics and that he was not interested in political affairs. However, this changed when he listened to Jean Marie Le Pen, who could convince him with facts and his charisma. Similar to the Attac membership, activists, who joined and were politically socialised after joining the organisation, were not part of my FN sample.

In short, two points come to the fore from the discussion of both the Attac and FN members’ political socialisation. First, while the two socialisation mechanisms – childhood socialisation and political socialisation during one's college years – explain around 80 of political socialisation cases of Attac members, the situation is different and more complex for the FN members. In fact, less than 50% of the members had an affinity toward the FN or any radical right-wing organisation when they were 25 or younger. This implies that becoming a right-wing activist is no longer contained to individuals socialised into a right-wing family milieu. Rather contrary, individuals are drawn to the FN because of societal tendencies (i.e. problems with crime and immigration), individuals’ dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties (e.g. elitism, corruption) or because they develop an affinity to the FN's leader. Second and relatedly, this highlights that the traditional explanations (e.g. Birenbaum 1992; Klanderman's and Mayer 2006), which emphasise family socialisation, do no longer hold. Parties like the FN have not only increased their membership but also diversified their members.

The civic skills approach perfectly fits the membership of Attac. Compared to the French population at large, the Attac membership is highly educated (more than 75% of my interviewees have a least a university and around 15% of respondents either had a doctorate at the time of the interview or were working on their thesis) and belong to the upper echelon of the French society. Most of them work as (retired) medical doctors, teachers and engineers or in other well-paid jobs. Roughly half of those professionally active members work in the public sector in either health, education or social work, which also gives them the availability for sustained political involvement. In general, Attac members not only have the financial resources, but also the network connections to participate in the movement's activities (i.e. in more than half the cases the connections with the Attac network formed through the activists’ social or professional contacts).

As already hinted at by the diverse socialisation mechanisms, the FN membership has become multi-facetted when it comes to educational and social background. My interview data clearly indicates that the FN is not only a home for the economically deprived, the losers of modernisation and those that cannot cope with the transformations of modern society. Rather contrary, we find individuals of modest origins (e.g. secretaries or individuals that work in the blue-collar sector), citizens of the middle classes (e.g. individuals that work in the public or private sector middle range jobs) and individuals, who are high up the social or professional ladder such as lawyers, bankers and businessmen. The FN members are diverse; in the words of one activist, ‘inside the FN we are bunch of different people similar to the Gallic tribe in the cartoon Asterix and Obelix. Yet, we have some common convictions and we are ready to fight for these convictions’. In the next section, I will illustrate these values and beliefs for both the FN and Attac activists.

As expected, the Attac and FN activists have opposite political values, but there are some common points when it comes to their personal beliefs. Peoples’ engagement in Attac is mostly driven by what I label ‘emotional affection’ with the degrading economic and social situation at home and abroad. As a rule, the Attac activists do not suffer from economic hardship, unemployment or poverty, but are rather appalled by what they perceive as an unjust political and economic system. In many instances, the interviewees’ feeling of social responsibility not only includes those that suffer in France but also citizens in third world countries. For instance, the respondents affirm that their heart beats for the Global South, or they consider it shameful how multi-national corporations treat their employees, particularly in countries such as Thailand, Bangladesh or Vietnam.

In addition, the activists fight against the dominant societal values such as individualism or greed and denounce our unsustainable ways of living. The Attac activists have the leitmotif ‘another world is possible’. They do not think that the path our societies has embarked on is irreversible and fight all political and economic institutions that push the neo-liberal agenda. Many activists also do not only give lip service to their claims; they try to live a sustainable way and buy organic food and are willing to make personal sacrifices. For example, more than 20 activists strongly favour tax increases to funnel money into social services. In addition, my respondents favour grass-roots democracy, which, according to them, would strip the power from multi-nationals.

The FN activists fight some of the same ‘vices’ (e.g. neo-liberalism and globalisation) than the Attac activists. However, they advocate fundamentally different solutions. For example, the FN members do not want to democratise or humanise the international and national political environment, but rather advocate populism, the retreat from the European Union and protective measures to stop, what they label the decadence of France's economy, culture and society. They have an ethnocentric worldview; they share the convictions that their nation state is reserved for them (i.e. individuals, who share the same ethnicity, culture, history and religion). Everything foreign to their history, culture and religion causes a danger to their nation and identity. In particular, the FN members perceive immigration and Islam as viruses, which try to destroy their French nation. For example, some members link immigration to increased insecurity, others portray Islam as a dangerous religion that creates conflict, whereas a third group thinks that the Christian white population in France is in a demographic fight for survival with the Muslim population.

Supported by their worldview is comes natural to many FN members to protect French nationals against immigrants. Among others, they favour the national preference in the allocation of jobs and social benefits or a change in the attribution of citizenship. In addition, the FN members see themselves as the sole representatives of the French people. Not only do they label their party as the only activist party, they also decry what they call the corrupt ‘UMPS’ network. According to many members, the two main parties the UMP (now called the Republicans) and the PS are elitist, corrupt and unrepresentative of the French people. In contrast, their party listens to the people, puts down good policy proposals and correctly decries the vices of the French society. In addition, the FN members believe that France's glory can only be restored through strong and charismatic leadership, more authoritarianism and a policy that favours law and order.

Whereas the FN and Attac members are very different in their worldviews, ideologies and beliefs, they share some of the same personal values and characteristics. For example, the members of both groups complain about a lack of honesty in politics, while they affirm at the same time that their group, by saying the truth, can re-establish political legitimacy. Even more altruistic, activists from both camps aim at creating a better society, a society, where their children and grandchildren can live more harmoniously. Finally, and more a general characteristic than a value, activism has become an integral part of many of my respondents’ life. It is like a positive drug; a drug that gives them the feeling that they are doing something positive for themselves, their environment and their society.

As expected, Attac activists are both instrumentally and ideologically oriented. I find members (i.e. 30%) for whom the instrumental factor is dominant; while they believe in the goals and positions of Attac, they see activism as a means to an end, and not just as means to express themselves. These members’ activism fluctuates with the political impact or media campaigns organised by Attac or any other organisation they participate in. Another 30% of Attac members are more ideologically driven. These members mainly show stable patterns of support and participate because they agree with Attac's goals and policy orientations. What counts for them is to express their views and to be able to live their policy convictions in their daily lives. A third group, comprising of the slight majority of activists, is both instrumentally and ideologically oriented. They are in Attac or any other political organisation for that matter, to express their convictions, learn more about liberalism and its disastrous effects on communities, while welcoming direct results of their actions. However, this group of activists is more patient in their assessment of policy change. They acknowledge that change is a rocky- and long-term process. In the words of one activist, ‘you have to be persistent to achieve it’.

In contrast to instrumental and ideological calculations, identity plays no or only a very minor role in individuals’ decisions to become and remain engaged in Attac. Attac activists are neither discriminated against in society nor stigmatised and can express their opinions freely in French society, so there is no need for them to create a community outside mainstream society. Of course, they want to be in a group where they can get along with other members, a group with an agreeable group atmosphere. Yet, this group cohesion is a necessary but highly insufficient condition for their activism. In the words of one respondent: ‘activism is no fun but hard work, if I want to have fun I will go to the bar and have some drinks with my friend, but not to an Attac meeting’.

For the FN activists, both the ideological and the identity factors are dominant in explaining FN members’ sustained activism. For example, nearly all activists affirm that they are engaged in the FN, because they believe in the party's values and goals. They would not change their degree of engagement, even if the party would have less success. Many members also feel very vigorously about their engagement (e.g. they perceive it as their ‘duty’ to fight for a different world) and are proud of being real activists. For them joining the FN is not like joining the Socialist Party. Aware that there are negative societal repercussions if they join the FN (e.g. it is nearly a constant for FN members to lose friends or acquaintances, being discriminated at work or shunned by neighbours), some members took months, if not years, to take their membership card. It takes a high degree of conviction to take this step.

Probably because they are still stigmatised in French society, group identity processes are very important for FN members. Nearly all members enjoy both their interactions with other members and the open and accommodating climate within the organisation.² After joining, FN members no longer need to hide their convictions. Rather their views are recognised, valued and supported. Inside the FN they are no longer marginalised, but respected. By organising a mixture of political and non-political activities (e.g. social get togethers and parties), the FN also offers members a very appealing outlet to spend their free time. In fact, it has not been uncommon that my interviewees refer to the FN as ‘a second family’, a kind of counter society where people interact with one another beyond politics; they make friends and acquaintances and sometimes even find their partner for life there.

This research informs the literature on activists in four ways. First, it highlights that prior works’ description (e.g. Gould 2003; Hammond 2007) of leftist activists is still correct. As expected, Attac activists are socialised during childhood, adolescence or young adulthood, have high amounts of civic skills, expose post-material values and are motivated by instrumental and ideological calculations. Second, I find that the FN activists deviate quite fundamentally from the literature's description of right-wing activists (e.g. Crépon 2006; Klandermans and Mayer 2006). Right-wing activists in France are no longer predominantly socialised by their family milieu nor are they the losers of modernisation (e.g. individuals with low education and low amounts of civic skills). Rather, the influx of many new members in the early 2010s diversified the FN membership. Current FN members come from various social backgrounds and societal classes. They have undergone various forms of political socialisation (e.g. childhood socialisation, dissatisfaction with the moderate right, societal developments). In fact, when it comes to membership, the FN has nearly become a catch all party.

Third, the comparison between the two groups also brings interesting nuances to the fore. Despite the fact that the two types of activists are at opposite ends of the political spectrum they share some commonalities; that is both types of activists share similar personal values for engagement including responsibility and altruism and both groups identify some of the same societal vices such as globalisation and neo-liberalism. However, they are also different when it comes to values and beliefs, and their motivations for engagement. For example, group identity is a strong motivational factor for the FN members, but not so for the Attac activists. Forth, and this adds nuance to our understanding of left and right-wing activists, I find that left-wing activists form a relatively homogenous group, whereas the same does not apply for right-wing activists. In more detail, Attac activists share certain features (e.g. similar political socialisation processes and high amounts of civic skills). The same is not necessarily true for right-wing activists, who come from diverse backgrounds and classes and, who have undergone various types of political socialisation.

Despite the fact that I have offered a comprehensive comparison of leftist and rightist activists, there is still space for future studies. For example, future research should continue to study right-wing groups from the inside. While leftist groups seem to have a stable and homogenous membership, parties, like the FN, have seen an influx of members in recent years; an influx that might change the composition of these parties in the long-run. Renewed research is necessary to determine whether this diversification of the party's membership is constrained to the FN or whether it has become a common feature of other rightist parties such as the Freedom Party in Austria, the Vlaams Belang in Belgium or the Swiss Peoples’ Party. More generally, more work on individuals in social groups over time is necessary. How do different motivations for engagements change over time and interact? How does the influx or outflow of individuals with various types of motivations change a party or organisation? What can a group, association do to draw individuals closer to the party and the leader? While asking more questions than providing answers, I still hope that this research has contributed to our understanding of leftist and rightist activists.

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Daniel Stockemer is Associate Professor in the School of Political Studies at the University of Ottawa. Daniel's main research interests are political behaviour, political representation and extremist parties. In these and related areas, Daniel has published 2 books, 1 edited and more than 75 peer-reviewed articles.