Far-right activism in Hungary: youth participation in Jobbik and its network

The Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) qualifies as one of the most successful far-right organisations in contemporary Europe. Through its swift rise in popularity and entry to parliament, the ‘movement party’ has been able to alter the Hungarian public discourse, existing patterns of party competition, additionally exerting effects on the government’s policy agenda. At least part of these effects should be attributed to Jobbik’s popularity among the youth; its overrepresentation among those aged below 30 is, by now, an established fact within national politics. The article argues for a broader understanding of youth participation in far-right politics and sets two principal research goals. First, to reconstruct the breeding ground of far-right youth activism at the grassroots level, by unveiling potential links between the subcultural, social movement, and party arenas. The study will chart far-right milieus in Hungary and their overlap with Jobbik: thus, it will introduce supply-side factors that contributed to its popularity among the youth. Second, we seek to investigate Jobbik’s appeal through the role of different elements used to justify joining a particular movement. The article uses primary data drawn from interviews and focus groups with students, and in-depth interviews with leaders of Jobbik.

Recent developments in Hungary elevated the post-communist country to a crucial case in the study of contemporary European politics. The 2010 elections marked a momentous turning point for a political context otherwise distinguished by substantial stability (e.g. Enyedi and Benoit 2011; Casal Bértoa 2014). Through a landslide victory, the Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség (Hungarian Civic Alliance, Fidesz) turned into the dominant political party of Hungary and single-handedly implemented fundamental legislative changes. And yet, the roots of the party’s success seem to come from afar. It has been argued that Viktor Orbán’s takeover was carefully crafted on the ground after the electoral defeat of 2002 (Greskovits 2017). The Civic Circles launched by Fidesz in the early 2000s have, among other things, provided the party with the essential grassroots support to defeat the Magyar Szocialista Párt (Hungarian Socialist Party, MSZP).

At the time of writing, the far-right Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (Movement for a Better Hungary, Jobbik) comes across as the most persuasive opposition force, not least due to its populist anti-establishment profile and its ability to exert influence on Fidesz’s political trajectory (Pirro 2015; Enyedi and Róna 2017). Grassroots mobilisations clearly played a central role in Jobbik’s breakthrough. Indeed, members of the far-right organisation spearheaded the anti-government street protests that broke out in the Autumn of 2006, while in 2007 its now-former chairman Gábor Vona was responsible for setting up the Magyar Gárda (Hungarian Guard) – the paramilitary-like organisation that propelled Jobbik into the limelight. It is not by chance that, upon establishment of the Magyar Gárda Egyesület (Hungarian Guard Association), Gábor Vona referred to Fidesz’s Civic Circles as a model for grassroots penetration (Greskovits 2017: 28). The anti-Roma and anti-corruption crusades articulated outside institutions combined elements of ethno-nationalist xenophobia and anti-political-establishment populism deemed essential to the resonance of a potent far-right master frame (Rydgren 2005); and clearly proved instrumental in granting Jobbik access to the European and national parliaments (e.g. Bíró Nagy and Róna 2011; Pirro 2014a). All these elements call for a closer look at the movement dynamics of one of the most successful far-right collective actors around today. From our vantage point, the toolkit offered by social movement theory presents an enviable – and yet neglected – perspectives into far-right mobilisations.

Besides the elements of novelty of its formula and its so-called blackmail potential (Sartori 1976: 122–3), Jobbik’s translation of social movement practices to the electoral arena might qualify the Hungarian organisation as a ‘movement party’ (Kitschelt 2006). This first element, often neglected in the analysis of far-right organisations, substantiates why it is important to take a social movement approach in the study of Jobbik – and, thus, look beyond developments in the electoral arena. A second important element relates to Jobbik’s remarkable success among younger cohorts (Szabó et al. 2015). Following the political watershed of 2006, a sizeable portion of the Hungarian youth has indeed looked rightwards for radical alternatives. We believe that this aspect acquires own sociological standing for the analysis of forms of political activism, and thus place youth activism in Jobbik and related groups at the heart of our enquiry.

With this article, we wish to reinstate the role of grassroots politics in the fortunes of far-right collective actors. Especially in a context where (radical) nationalism has become the common denominator among the largest portion of the Hungarian electorate,¹ at least a part of the political struggle between contenders may depend on the participation opportunities offered to their supporters. A successful mobilisation strategy should then reveal a far-right organisation – in our case, Jobbik – able to satiate the needs of its grassroots. In this respect, the article takes into account Jobbik’s supply side beyond the electoral arena as well as its demand side among younger cohorts. It particularly seeks to highlight the distinctive modes of extra-parliamentary mobilisation articulated by Jobbik and provide an overview of the movement party’s presence on the ground. Following this preliminary survey, we intend to investigate whether these novel and alternative forms of political socialisation are consistent with young activists’ decisions to support Jobbik. In fact, prior to Jobbik’s emergence, the Hungarian far right – represented by the Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (Hungarian Justice and Life Party, MIÉP) – had made no discernible investments in grassroots and youth politics. No party seemingly conceived of grassroots activities (e.g. festivals, forums, and camps) as opportunities for political socialisation and participation; as a movement party without significant media coverage, access to state subsidies, and recognisable ‘brand’, grassroots activities had been the only valuable resource Jobbik had prior to 2009.² We will therefore delve into the Hungarian youth’s motives to participate in the far-right organisation. In answering these questions, we resort to original in-depth interviews and focus groups conducted with young far-right activists, as well as surveys with university and college students.

The article is structured as follows: we first present the state of the art and address the twofold value of focusing on grassroots politics and youth activism in the study of the far right; we present the data and methodology of this study; we then move on to map Jobbik’s supply side; and successively elaborate on youth activism in Jobbik and its network (i.e. the demand side). We conclude by summarising the most important results.

Almost every aspect surrounding the European far right has been scrutinised. Initially concerned with macro-level explanations behind the rise of far-right parties (e.g. von Beyme 1988; Betz 1994), the scholarship swiftly expanded to address issues such as their ideology (e.g. Mudde 2000a), electoral performance (e.g. Carter 2005), their impact (e.g. Williams 2006), and internal organisation (e.g. Heinisch and Mazzoleni 2016). An older and better-known phenomenon in Western Europe – at least, in its contemporary form – the range of contributions has eventually grown to include newer political organisations in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Minkenberg 2017). Despite the continuous interest prompted by far-right politics, at least two aspects have received relatively less attention – especially in relation to the rapid changes witnessed in post-communist countries: grassroots mobilisations and, partly related, forms of youth activism within far-right milieus.

The opportunity to delve into these manifestations rests in the apparent distancing between far-right parties and politics, and the concomitant status acquired – or, better, regained – by street politics (Mudde 2016). The relevance of extra-parliamentary mobilisations may be attributed to the progressive diversification of far-right collective action and its arenas of contention. The far right has been already identified as a ‘collective actor’ taking different organisational clothes, i.e. political parties, social movements, and subcultural milieus (Minkenberg 2002). While the prevalence of one organisational form over the other has been commonly linked to a country’s opportunity structure (Minkenberg 2003), we hold that strong parties and movements can coexist and mutually reinforce each other by responding to different socio-political demands. Moreover, whether the primacy of extra-parliamentary networks actually signals heightened levels of militancy and anti-democratic values (Mudde 2000b), we believe, remains very much an empirical question.

As a step further in this direction, both Kitschelt (2006) and McAdam and Tarrow (2010) have called attention to the multiple arenas of contention of political organisations emerging from the social movement sector. Whereas the first referred to ‘movement parties’ as those political organisations translating movement-like practices to the electoral arena, the second has convincingly theorised social movements’ transition to institutional politics. Against a backdrop of contributions advocating an idiosyncratic organisational configuration of the far right (e.g. Gunther and Diamond 2003), the interpenetration between movements and parties should only partly surprise. Overall, the far right has been widely perceived to field candidates like parties, but mobilise on particular issues like social movements (Minkenberg 2002).

In particular, we wish to look at those developments pertaining to a far-right organisation that emerged from the social movement sector and has successfully taken the electoral option. By looking at what happens outside the electoral arena, we aspire to fill a long-standing gap between studies on social movements and the contemporary far right. Indeed, despite sparse attempts to offer a ‘social movement take’ on the far right (Caiani et al. 2012), the two areas of enquiry have suffered from little mutual exchange (Rydgren 2007).

Appraising the far right through social movement theory might prompt us to take contextual elements and resources available to nativist collective actors into account (e.g. McAdam 1999). Elements of the political opportunity structure, such as the openness or closure of formal political access, the prevailing strategies of political parties, the shifting of political alignments, or the constellation of opponents and allies, have been alternatively seen to encourage or discourage movements to use internal resources to take action (e.g. Tarrow 1996). Notwithstanding the growing dissatisfaction with established parties, a cursory look at these factors would demonstrate that the Hungarian political context may have provided discouraging signals to far-right activists amid (at best) limited and circumscribed openings of political opportunities (see Mikecz 2015; Casal Bértoa and Enyedi 2016). Even so, we wish to stress the ability of the far right to craft its own fortunes and circumvent formally closed opportunities, inter alia, through a strong presence at the grassroots level and the articulation of activities in the multi-organisational field. Precisely for this reason, we value Jobbik’s own agency in deploying internal resources³ and, thus, set out to explore far-right activism beyond the electoral arena.

By mapping the extra-parliamentary field, we move a first step towards tackling the question of diversification of the far-right supply side, contending that those activities articulated at the grassroots level effectively provide additional channels for political socialisation and/or attractive opportunities to participate beyond voting alone. Clearly, movement organisations present individuals with other goals than the traditional ones of office seeking and/or policy pursuit that political parties set for themselves. The analysis of the Hungarian case seems even more compelling in the face of the restructuring to which civil society has been subject since the establishment of Fidesz’s Civic Circles in the early 2000s as well as the evident rightward shift taken by the electorate at large (Enyedi and Benoit 2011). While disentangling the causes behind oscillations of electoral regimes goes beyond the remit of this study, we, however, argue that the Civic Circles initiative responded to a top-down organisational effort initiated by Viktor Orbán, while those occurred on the radical fringes of the political spectrum essentially preserved a bottom-up grassroots character.

Another neglected issue outside the ethnographic scholarship is far-right activism (but see Klandermans and Mayer 2005) and, in particular, youth activism. Very little attention has been paid to the motives behind far-right activism among younger cohorts, often looking at their cultural bases or proclivity for violence (e.g. Watts 2001; Dechezelles 2008). By far-right activists, we specifically refer to:

We seek to redress this shortcoming by focusing on the young activists of Jobbik – indeed, a successful case of youth mobilisation within the Hungarian political context.

The opportunity to focus on youth activism in Jobbik and its network concomitantly rests on the age composition of its supporters as well as the prospects for participation among younger cohorts. Public opinion surveys have consistently returned significant approval rates among those aged below 30: in 2014, Jobbik voters belonging to this cohort mounted to 29%, while in 2016 and 2017 to 23% (Róna and Molnár 2017). This prompts us to explore some of the reasons underlying Jobbik’s appeal. Partly related, likelihood of engagement in grassroots politics is heightened at a younger age, when activists may have more time on their hands. As such, we do not inherently consider youth activism a distinct form of activism, but rather as participation occurring at a moment in which it might be easier to access and engage in certain political activities. As we will illustrate below, the leadership of Jobbik comprises activists with a record of militancy in far-right youth organisations, hinting at a continuity in activist commitment across different age groups.

Activism has been traditionally explained on the basis of instrumentality, identity, and ideology (Klandermans and Mayer 2005: 7–10; see also Tarrow 1998). The first motive refers to the perception that participation in a social movement can contribute to change the surrounding social and political environment. The second refers to participation as an expression of identification with a group, i.e. the sense of belonging that activists derive irrespective of perceived costs and benefits of group membership. With the third motivation, people engage in order to express their ideas and values. We additionally argue that participation in a (fairly ostracised) far-right group may come from the provision of rewards, or so-called club goods, i.e. ‘goods available for consumption to the whole membership unit’ (Buchanan 1965: 3). Put differently, ideology alone may only partly explain participation and reasons for involvement should be also sought elsewhere. Following cues from some recent ethnographic work conducted with English Defence League (EDL) members (Busher 2015; Meadowcroft and Morrow 2016), far-right organisations may attract activists on the basis of their ability to provide access to self-worth, group solidarity, yet also specific opportunities to take action (e.g. demonstrate, sign a petition, etc.).

Having outlined the theoretical contours of our contribution, we shall use these insights to guide our analysis into the grassroots politics of Jobbik and its network. In the following section, we move on to present the data and methodology of this study.

Our article revolves around the notion that Jobbik and its network have been able to satiate a demand for (youth) participation at the grassroots level – thus, reinstating the value of collective action beyond the electoral arena. Our enquiry therefore looks at two sides of far-right activism: the supply side, referring to those organisations, events, and activities either directly or indirectly linked to Jobbik; and the demand side, consisting of the motives underlying participation to far-right activities. In order to reconstruct the extra-parliamentary field (i.e. the supply side), we rely on substantive knowledge of the case at hand, news items, in addition to secondary data and information drawn from far-right organisations themselves up to the year 2017. The second part of our empirical investigation places the motives to participate (i.e. the demand side) at the heart of enquiry. This portion of the study combines different primary data sources (interviews and focus groups with activists of Jobbik and related groups part of its network⁴), collected between December 2011 and May 2015. Fieldwork for this study took place along a phase of party ‘institutionalisation’; data are thus time-sensitive. As Jobbik has made significant investments in delivering a more moderate self-image throughout the 2014–2018 term (Bíró-Nagy and Boros 2016), we cannot rule out that this strategy may bear consequences for the future configuration of its movement.

For broad comparative purposes with young activists of other political allegiances, we also rely on three surveys conducted among Hungarian college and university students. Although these surveys do not constitute the bulk of our enquiry, they provide essential background information about the sociodemographic and attitudinal profiles of young far-right activists in Hungary. The three rounds of surveys, either conducted online or face to face, relied on representative samples of 1600 (2011), 1300 (2013), and 800 (2015) students, respectively. Jobbik’s popularity among the sample mounted to 19% in 2011 and 2013, and 20% in 2015. Jobbik proved to be the most popular party among university and college students every year.⁵

The main data sources for this study are interviews and focus groups. We believe that, within the context of social movement research, interviews with activists not only allow us to reconstruct the dynamics of micro-level participation but also gain information ranging from mobilisation strategies to internal dynamics (della Porta 2014a). At the same time, focus groups have the advantage of stimulating the debate, with the help of a moderator, on central topics such as participation, investigating collective opinions (della Porta 2014b). As the information drawn from these strategies range from individually to collectively debated aspects of far-right activism, they provide important insights into participation in Jobbik and its network.

Semi-structured face-to-face interviews were held with leaders of Jobbik, its youth organisation (Jobbik Ifjúsági Tagozat, Jobbik IT), and far-right groups part of its network, for a total of nine interviews (see  Appendix). Although membership to these organisations is non-mutually exclusive (e.g. HVIM 2002), Jobbik IT membership ideally precedes the one in Jobbik. Interviewees were asked to explain their position within the organisation, describe the structure of the organisation, and introduce their and their groupmates’ motives to participate, their social background, pathways to socialisation, and media consumption. They were ultimately asked to compare their modes of participation with other forms of political activism and elaborate on the reasons behind Jobbik’s popularity among the youth. Our interviews addressed far-right (young) activists and leaders providing first-hand insights into participation in their organisation. While access to far-right activists can be hardly controlled by outsider researchers, we believe that our interviews offer a fairly accurate view of activism in Jobbik and Jobbik IT, not least due to the ranks filled by the interviewees within respective organisations. Among them, we list five local Jobbik IT leaders and two high-ranking Jobbik officials.

As for focus groups, seven discussions were arranged across the country in the main academic centres, usually including 8–9 students. The principal themes addressed were radicalism (i.e. relationship towards democracy and the political elite, anti-Roma sentiments, and ‘law and order’ attitudes) and value systems. Additional information tapped into motives to participate and patterns of political socialisation. Each topic was first addressed through open-ended questions. Out of the seven focus groups, we particularly concentrate on a ‘homogenous’ far-right one including Jobbik young activists, within which similar positions could be solicited and debated. The Jobbik focus group took place in Miskolc, a traditional far-right stronghold in the country. Most of the participants were first-generation male intellectuals, whose families hardly discussed political events at home. These features are representative of the sample of Jobbik supporters included in the student survey. In the following sections, we elaborate on the empirical part of the study.

Jobbik has made substantial investments to rejuvenate the Hungarian far right, not only at the ideological (Pirro 2014b) but also at the organisational level. The meteoric rise experienced after the poor showing at the 2006 national elections cannot leave out of consideration the grassroots movement complementing its electoral activities. In its strategic efforts, Jobbik has stimulated the setting up of new groups and forms of activism; at the same time, it provided pre-existing movements and groups with an electoral point of reference, de facto granting continuity within the far-right milieu. In what follows, we delve into Jobbik’s qualification as ‘a network of networks with a distinct collective identity’ (Minkenberg 2002: 338); we present the most relevant subcultural articulations (i.e. activities and groups) of the far right and their links to Jobbik.

The Hungarian far right has been long active at the extra-parliamentary level. The first skinhead groups appeared already in the late 1980s; the so-called folkish radicalism (Bárány 1994) emerged in the 1990s in concomitance with the MIÉP; finally, other relevant groups would include the ‘new radicals’ – protesters involved in the 2006 demonstrations, many of whom eventually became Jobbik politicians (Mikecz 2015). Until Jobbik’s rise to prominence, the far-right subculture consisted of many groups attracting thousands of youths, yet generally constrained by poor organisational skills and bound to political marginality.

National-rock music plays a crucial role in far-right milieus. The main themes covered by these bands are generally the restoration of national glory and irredentism: in their lyrics, they protest against the Trianon Treaty;⁶ accordingly stress brotherhood with Hungarians living in neighbouring countries; and express nostalgia for the old ‘glory days’ of medieval Hungary. These songs depict the Hungarian nation as being threatened by alien forces – globalisation as well as various out-groups including foreign powers, the Roma, and sometimes the Jews – hence calling for a constant readiness to defend and take action. These elements usually provide and instil a sense of pride and identity among the youth (Feischmidt and Paulay 2017). The most popular bands include Kárpátia, Ismerős Arcok, Hunnia, Romantikus Erőszak, though there is a significant variety, ranging from neo-Nazi skinhead bands (Oi-kor, Egészséges Fejbőr, and Magozott Cseresznye) to other established groups (FankaDeli, Kowalsky). These bands – sometimes even neo-Nazi ones – frequently perform at Jobbik rallies (444.hu 2014; Magyar Naranc 2017). Their most prominent gathering event is, however, the Magyar Sziget Fesztivál, where many far-right politicians regularly give talks. The bands performing at the festival dominate the airplay of Szent Korona Rádió and Pannon Radio, which are also important points of reference for the far-right audience.

Besides the opportunities for political socialisation offered by the far-right music scene, Jobbik does organise its own youth forums and camps, where the abovementioned bands are frequently invited. Overall, Jobbik devotes considerable effort and resources to appeal to the Hungarian youth. For instance, the movement party invests in the production of leaflets, the organisation of community programmes, and invites distinguished guests at the annual festival of Hungarian university students (EFOTT). Most of our interviewees confirmed that similar investments represent a top priority for Jobbik.

In addition to the solid grassroots-level organisation, the most important forum for the far right remains the internet. According to the official reports of the national media authority (NMHH 2017), Jobbik has been heavily underrepresented in the mainstream media, even after entry to parliament in 2010. As a result, the internet serves as an indispensable outreach tool for the far right in general, and Jobbik in particular. The far right in Hungary relies on a large network of websites – many of them referencing each other and only a few linking to the ‘outside world’ (Jeskó et al. 2012). The key platform is undisputedly kuruc.info, a website with pronounced racist and anti-Semitic contents, which attracts 60,000–80,000 users every day (Róna and Sőrés 2013).⁷ According to one of our interviewees, kuruc.info ‘may be brutal, but it is the only credible source where we can read about the truth which is usually hidden by the mainstream media’ (Interview E). Kuruc.info and the far-right web galaxy ostensibly contributed to craft an alternative outlook on society and boost the electoral prospects of Jobbik.

Jobbik and other far-right groups are also Facebook-savvy. Jobbik has more followers than any other party in Hungary.⁸ Jobbik’s youth division (Jobbik IT) has more followers than all of other parties’ youth organisations combined.⁹ The internet and social media significantly contributed to Jobbik’s success among younger cohorts, since the Hungarian youth is much more prone to use the internet, and especially Facebook, as a primary (and many times the only) source of political information compared to older generations (Karl 2017).

Continuity between Jobbik and the extra-parliamentary far-right groups is easy to identify. Perhaps the most evident example comes from Jobbik’s chairman between 2006 and 2018; Gábor Vona has indeed repeatedly reclaimed paternity of the Magyar Gárda. And yet there are other far-right groups, among which the oldest and one of the most significant is the Hatvannégy Vármegye Ifjúsági Mozgalom (Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement, HVIM). László Toroczkai, the founder and honorary president of HVIM, has served as one of Jobbik’s vice-presidents until 2018. Adrián Magvasi, another leader of HVIM, is also the president of Jobbik’s electoral district in Budapest VII and the editor-in-chief of Alfahír, Jobbik’s official news portal. The Farkasok (Wolfes) organise military drills with airsoft weapons alongside combat trainings; its leader, Gábor Barcsa-Turner, serves as the co-chair of HVIM and also founded the Szent Korona Rádió. Zsolt Dér, one of the leading figures of the Farkasok and a member of Betyársereg (Army of Outlaws), worked as the assistant of Tamás Sneider, the Jobbik-affiliated vice-president of the National Assembly (now party chair), in April 2015 (Szent Korona Rádió 2016). János Volner, the former vice-president and parliamentary group leader of Jobbik personally attended the ‘yearly enumeration’ event of the Betyársereg in 2016 in the quality of special guest.

While far from exhaustive, these overlaps in personnel have much deeper roots. Already in 2009, Jobbik had signed an official cooperation agreement with the Betyársereg, Magyar Gárda, and HVIM. Observers have already noted that the role of these organisations to Jobbik’s own success has been essential: without the clamour catalysed by the Magyar Gárda, Jobbik would have failed to turn into a significant electoral force (Karácsony and Róna 2011). These organisations had been instrumental during electoral campaigns; they helped collecting signatures and supplied the backbone of activists willing to run for office, hence enabling Jobbik to field candidates across the country.

Starting from 2013, however, Jobbik has recalibrated its electoral strategy and set out to moderate its self-image. Such a route was partly taken in response to the increasing radicalisation of Fidesz since its return to power – a move that had progressively reduced the political space available to the far-right organisation, besides putting into question Fidesz’s own commitment to liberal democratic principles (e.g. Bánkuti et al. 2012). Moreover, the Jobbik leadership may have realised that a sensible strategy to seize power depended upon capturing the ‘median voter’. In an attempt to present itself as a ‘people’s party’, Jobbik has toned down the most controversial aspects of its rhetoric (Bíró-Nagy and Boros 2016). Not only has this shift brought about substantial changes in the leadership but also set Jobbik and its original allies further apart. In occasion of the 2016 winter holiday season, Vona had sent Hanukkah greetings to the Hungarian Jewish community as a gesture of goodwill. Some 50 local Jobbik organisations protested against it. Among dissenting activists, Attila Szabó has recently launched a new political group (Erő és Elszántság [Force and Determination]) with the help of the Betyársereg and Identitárius Mozgalom (Identitarian movement), with the intent of becoming a political party.

After the 2018 elections, Vona resigned from the post of chairman, opening the way to new leadership elections in the month of May. Toroczkai, representing the more radical faction of the party, ran for chairmanship, losing to Tamás Sneider – a loyal ally of Vona. The radical faction of Jobbik, led by Toroczkai, then left the party in June 2018. Many local council members, a few mayors, a parliamentary group member, as well as several hundred members joined Toroczkai’s new party, Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland). Kuruc.info, HVIM, and other far-right subcultural groups openly endorsed Toroczkai.

As the mapping of the extra-parliamentary field has shown, it seems uncontroversial to deem different far-right groups part of an encompassing network with Jobbik as its main point of reference – at least, as far as the period of our fieldwork stretches out. The groups, platforms, and events presented above supply a whole range of items to far-right activists, who are in turn provided with opportunities to socialise politically and mobilise, both online and offline. While we are agnostic about the power relations subtending the different far-right actors part of this network, we argue that the extra-parliamentary field opens up chances for mobilisation beyond the electoral arena, while at the same time presenting a pool from which Jobbik can draw its younger ranks. Such a continuity is highlighted in full in the following section.

Having ascertained that the far-right extra-parliamentary sector is a thriving and multifaceted field, we set out to explore how such a supply is met by younger Hungarian activists. We were particularly interested to see whether the strategic investments made by Jobbik at the grassroots level bore fruit. The motivations underlying far-right activism were at the very core of our investigation; our first question always tapped into youth leaders’ attachment to Jobbik. On the basis of the interviews conducted, all three factors outlined in our theoretical framework (i.e. instrumentality, identity, and ideology) proved to be relevant for far-right mobilisation, but identity generally recurred more often:

In general, Jobbik activists were led to participate in order to be part of something, and were hence driven by a sense of belonging to a particular community, or group solidarity. This finding is broadly in line with recent research on the Hungarian far right. Previous studies on far-right online activism have indeed highlighted identity and group values among the most important reasons to support Jobbik (Bartlett et al. 2012).

Jobbik’s investments in grassroots mobilisation and in targeting younger cohorts resonate with the Hungarian youth. According to the leader of the national youth organisation (Jobbik IT), the extremely young age is a defining feature of activism in Jobbik, with half of their membership aged below 18 (Interview A). This is, in itself, an important element for an organisation accepting members aged between 16 and 35. Other interviewees indeed reported that, at the age of 20–22, they were the most senior members of their section (e.g. Interviews C, D, F, and G).

The student surveys revealed young Jobbik activists’ seeming lack of integration, especially compared to other (i.e. non-Jobbik) students. They often have less working experience and are less likely to be in a relationship, hence suggesting that they might have more time and energy than their older peers aged 23–35 (2011 and 2013 surveys). Despite their levels of engagement, moreover, the commitment of young activists is rather exclusive in nature: they are less likely to be members of other voluntary and civil associations besides Jobbik itself.

All of our interviewees confirmed that newcomers are often teenagers whose main goal is to find their place in a community. Their social background is fairly diverse, with only the intellectual elites of Budapest being under-represented. The overwhelming majority are male. Although the focus of our study is on far-right activism, it is important to note that the sociodemographic characteristics of Jobbik voters are in line with what reported so far. A typical Jobbik supporter would be young, male, and non-affiliated to other organisations (2011 and 2013 surveys).

Besides Jobbik’s own investments in nurturing a ‘far-right generation’ from below, we also contend that such a configuration of far-right support may not exclusively depend upon aging effects, but intergenerational value change based on cohort effects (Inglehart 1981). In fact, the largest share of members joined Jobbik after the electoral breakthrough at the 2009 European Parliament elections (Interview B), at a moment when the organisation started gaining nationwide visibility. As the formative years in political socialisation usually range between 14 and 18 (Mannheim 1972; Percheron 1993), those falling within this age bracket in 2009 were those between 17 and 25 years of age at the time of our fieldwork (December 2011–May 2015). Their overrepresentation in the student sample – and the relative underrepresentation of those above 25 (i.e. those who were not exposed to Jobbik prior to breakthrough) – would add further leverage to the cohort effects hypothesised above. Yet, it may as well be that far-right activism causes fatigue and disenchantment, especially within a rational calculus of benefits and costs of participation. Former members of the HVIM, then 25 and 27 years old, confirmed to have grown weary after years of grassroots activism. According to them, the issues at stake were often the same and it had become clear that many activists were ‘obsessional monomaniacs’ (Interviews H and I).

On top of questions related to ideological identification, Jobbik seems to have benefited from its investments in visibility and accessibility, besides its own clean political record. Against a backdrop of widespread disillusionment with mainstream politics, this is something that we partly reconcile with the idea that participation can contribute to change the surrounding social and political environment (i.e. instrumentality). According to our interviews and focus groups, most of the new members were attracted by member friends. While Jobbik membership increased at an exponential rate after its electoral breakthrough, figures were already in the order of 3000–4000 in 2009 (Interview B), for the organisation could rely on a strong grassroots presence and the endorsement of pre-existing far-right groups. Ahead of the 2010 national elections, Jobbik delivered the third strongest membership among Hungarian parties.

In addition, regarding opportunities to take (online and offline) action, the interested youth can gain access to the far right on the internet, on the streets (by signing up/collecting signatures for petitions, demonstrating, etc.), or at national-rock concerts: ‘All that matters is that they need to see a community, an organisation that is already working’ (Interview F). Grassroots activism thus goes hand in hand with the aspect of instrumentality. Jobbik activists joined because they wanted to have an impact: ‘I did not want to remain on the side-lines; I wanted to change things. I wanted to have an impact’ (Interview G). This view was also confirmed by the national leader of Jobbik IT; according to him, the common denominator among activist is their enthusiasm for public affairs (Interview A).

To be sure, this is not a sole prerogative of far-right parties (e.g. Art 2011), and this also holds true for Hungary. Jobbik’s success was, however, greatly enhanced by the lack of competition from other parties. Jobbik’s perceived activity and organisational strength was surpassed only by Fidesz (Table 1). Although the MSZP claims to have more members, most of them are passive and old; in 2015, the official membership of MSZP decreased to 20,000, whereas Jobbik’s increased to 17,000 (Blikk 2015). Jobbik’s stronghold in rural areas also reflects in the higher number of local organisations in these areas. As the university and college student surveys indicate, there are only two solid, active organisations, especially outside Budapest: Fidesz and Jobbik. Thus, the anti-establishment youth willing to engage politically virtually had no other choice apart from Jobbik.

Our focus groups substantiated the important role played by grassroots activities. With the only exception of Budapest, all participants claimed that Jobbik’s organisational strength is only rivalled by Fidesz. A participant also confirmed the essential role of activism:

Another local youth leader confessed that he tried to join Fidesz at first, but they did not answer his query (Interview C). Of course, this may be an isolated, but telling example.

There is at least another motivation relating to identity and self-worth to be taken into account; young activists feel appreciated in Jobbik. All of our interviewees took pride of the many social programmes and sport events held with local and even national party leaders. They sense a cordial and vivid connection with the leadership. This may be attributed not only to the fact that high-ranking officials are just slightly older than grassroots activists and youth leaders (even the former party chairman Gábor Vona was only 35 in 2013), but also to the prominence of youth affairs for the party. Following her fieldwork, Saltman (2014) has also noted that, among Hungarian parties’ youth camps, Jobbik’s were the most frequently visited by leading national politicians.

Besides its presence at youth festivals, Jobbik has regularly organised its own annual youth camp, whose main goal had been to enhance leadership and communication skills of its youth leaders. The internship programme of the parliamentary group also provides an excellent opportunity for the more ambitious activists; each year, they get involved in Jobbik parliamentary activities. The national leader of the youth organisation has additionally explained that being a member of Jobbik IT represents a clear advantage in the selection procedure (Interview A). According to our interviews with Jobbik and Jobbik IT leaders, Jobbik’s central organisation has always generously supported youth branches, for instance, through calls for funding. Still, the central leadership does not interfere with local issues; it only expects active participation from local groups.

Of course, this is not to say that ideology does not play a role in far-right youth activism. The surveys highlighted how students with anti-Roma, nationalist, Eurosceptic, and ‘law and order’ attitudes are likelier to join Jobbik. These elements seem to suggest that activism in Jobbik also thrives on the definition of common goals and worldviews. Yet, as our interviewees pointed out, newcomers are rarely conscious of all elements included in the party manifesto upon joining the organisation; instead, they become ideologically aware through participation:

To sum up, the data gathered provided ample evidence of both identification and instrumentality – plus an intervenient role of ideology – in explaining far-right activism among the Hungarian youth.

Jobbik has swiftly surged to national and international prominence thanks to its meteoric electoral performance over the past decade. While the question of convergence between demand-side and supply-side factors has always been a main concern for scholars of the far right (e.g. Eatwell 2003), we argued for a broader – and hopefully deeper – understanding of political success by looking at developments beyond the electoral arena. As the appeal of the far right in Hungary very much rested in its ability to mobilise younger generations and consolidate its presence at the grassroots level, we wished to investigate the movement portion of a collective actor that operates in multiple arenas. Combining insights from social movement studies and the party politics literature, we then focused our attention on a particular form of grassroots mobilisation, i.e. far-right youth activism.

While a crucial portion of far right’s fortunes may depend upon far right’s own agency and organisational skills (e.g. Art 2011), the diversification of its supply side can greatly enhance prospects of success. Within a relatively stable supply side at the national level, and a growing relevance of street politics at the international one (Mudde 2016), Jobbik has articulated alternative and unconventional modes of political socialisation – at least, by Hungarian standards. Jobbik has, at the same time, managed to rejuvenate the nativist right and uphold links with key groups potentially useful to craft consensus on the ground. The ability of this strategy to take root remained, of course, an empirical question.

Jobbik’s diversified presence on the ground could in principle respond to needs of instrumentality, identity, and ideology (Klandermans and Mayer 2005); or the provision of ‘club goods’, such as access to self-worth, group solidarity, and opportunities to take action (Meadowcroft and Morrow 2016). Triangulating different primary data sources, our research indicated that Jobbik’s investments in extra-parliamentary youth mobilisation did pay off, responding to many of these needs. The accessibility of Jobbik, its visibility, and its solid organisational structure were repeatedly mentioned among motives to participate. This suggests that Jobbik’s supply aptly resonated with a demand side made up of youths with more time at hand, comparatively less integrated, and somewhat lagging behind in terms of political socialisation. Though certainly not negligible, ideology did intervene, though often at a later stage. Many of Jobbik activists familiarised with its ideological supply only after joining the organisation. The Hungarian youth interested to join Jobbik sought, above all, a community to fit in and belong to.

Instrumental in its sustained success, one of Jobbik’s most significant achievements has been to satiate a demand for participation coming from younger strata of Hungarian society. We believed to have moved a first step in the understanding of fortunes by looking at collective action in the extra-parliamentary arena. The attention and resources devoted to sustain its movement profile and nurture a far-right generation is likely to represent a crucial aspect of Jobbik’s future performance – especially in relation to other competitors in the electoral market. And it is on these aspects, combined with more traditional tools drawn from electoral studies, that future research efforts shall focus.

We would like to thank Pietro Castelli Gattinara and the two anonymous reviewers for the insightful comments on the previous drafts of this article. Dániel Róna’s research was supported by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA) Premium Post-Doctorate Research Program.

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Andrea L. P. Pirro is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Scuola Normale Superiore, and research affiliate at the Centre on Social Movement Studies (COSMOS). He is joint convenor of the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) Standing Group on Extremism & Democracy. His work appeared in different international peer-reviewed journals as well as a number of edited volumes. He has authored the monograph The Populist Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe: Ideology, Impact, and Electoral Performance (Routledge, 2015) and edited three special issues.

Dániel Róna is assistant professor at the Institute of Political Science, Corvinus University of Budapest. In 2017, he received the Premium Post-Doctoral Fellowship and he is currently a researcher at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (MTA). He won the Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship grant (2013) and the Aurél Kolnai prize for the best political science publication in Hungary (2017). His research focuses on political sociology, public opinion polling, far-right parties, and xenophobic attitudes.

Interview A – Gergely Farkas, chairman of Jobbik IT and Jobbik MP

Interview B – Gábor Szábo, deputy director of Jobbik

Interview C – Anonymous, leader of Jobbik IT section

Interview D – Anonymous, leader of Jobbik IT section

Interview E – Anonymous, leader of Jobbik IT section

Interview F – Anonymous, leader of Jobbik IT section

Interview G – Anonymous, leader of Jobbik IT section

Interview H – Anonymous, former member of HVIM

Interview I – Anonymous, former member of HVIM