ABSTRACT
The role of the Vatican in the mobilization against the so-called gender ideology is structural and well established in the public arena, in Italy as in Europe. However, signs of a growing ambivalence in its attitude towards the protest have lately emerged, for example in relation to the visibility of far-right movements and aggressively right-wing parties within the movement. The paper investigates the same ambivalence among Italian Catholics groups and networks involved in the anti-gender fight. The analysis is based on 17 interviews with Catholic mothers and/or teachers who attended anti-gender conferences in 2015 and expressed their willingness to engage in school surveillance in order to prevent allegedly pro-gender activities. Results show a broad convergence towards the idea that the ‘ideology of gender’ exists and represents a serious danger for children. At the same time, interviewees express different political and cultural stances in relation to their protest. The dissimilarity detected in anti-gender narratives shed some lights on the different ways Italian Catholic activists try to oppose, manage, or solve issues related to state secularization and sexual pluralism.
Introduction
The protest to prevent the so-called ‘gender ideology’ from entering Italian schools has been playing a crucial role in the anti-gender mobilization since its emergence in 2013 (Trappolin 2015; Garbagnoli 2017; Garbagnoli and Prearo 2018; Trappolin and Gusmeroli 2019; Lavizzari and Prearo 2019). Similar protests have been seen in other European countries and elsewhere in the world (Kováts and Põim 2015; Kuhar and Paternotte 2017, 2018).
Opposition to allegedly pro-gender school activities is still very lively in Italy, mostly at local level. A dossier launched by the anti-gender organization Pro Vita & Famiglia in 2020 denounced more than 150 pro-gender educational initiatives since March 2013.1 To give a recent example, the right-wing party Fratelli d’Italia joined forces with anti-gender organizations in November 2020 to speak out against the Turin Local Authority's decision to provide structured and continuous gender-sensitive training for educators working with young girls and boys (0–6 years old).2 Such protests are the result of a strategy openly pursued by anti-gender organizations and some political parties, also with the involvement of parents and teachers (Garbagnoli and Prearo 2018).
The Vatican has a structural and well-established role in what is called the anti-gender ‘crusade’. The discursive apparatus sustaining the mobilization in the public arena was forged by the Vatican itself at the turn of the century (Garbagnoli 2016). Since then, its representatives have been referring to it to promote the primacy of the family against secularization, individualism (represented by abortion) and the recognition of LGBT parenting and families.
Nevertheless, in recent years has become more and more visible the ambivalence in the Vatican's attitude towards anti-gender campaigns in Italy. For example, the Vatican refused to clearly sponsor events like the Family Days of 2015 and 2016, or the World Congress of Families (WCF) held in Verona in 2019, where far-right movements and aggressively right-wing parties were highly visible.3 Research on anti-gender mobilization has interpreted this different attitude by the Vatican – and by Pope Francis in particular – as a ‘change in emphasis, not in position’ (Case 2019: 649) when it comes to matters of gender and sexuality. In fact, when the Vatican hierarchies have publicly distanced themselves from radical anti-gender groups, they took issue less with the content, and more with the form in which the protest was expressed.
A more nuanced position of the Vatican in supporting anti-gender mobilization led by radicalized and far-right parties and organizations emerges also in relation to the occasional ‘desire for dialogue’ with feminist and LGBT groups declared by the same Catholic hierarchies. To give an example, in 2019 the Cardinal Marcello Semeraro hosted (and participated in) the sixth edition Italian Forum of LGBT Christians.4 Besides, since a few years, Italian ecumenical Christian groups (Catholics included) participate in the International Day against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia, organizing prayer vigils and gatherings to condemn anti-LGBT hostility and support the victims (Gusmeroli and Trappolin 2020).5
Therefore, on the one hand, the Catholic hierarchies seem to be uncomfortable with the appropriation of anti-gender campaigns by far-right parties and movements – including ultra-conservative Catholic groups – that have taken the forefront of the protest in Italy and other European countries (Kuhar and Paternotte 2017). On the other hand, the positioning of the Vatican towards the anti-gender protest is also conditioned by the political and cultural pluralism referable to the longstanding visibility of a ‘Catholic feminism’ (Della Sudda 2016) and, more recently, an LGBT Christian grassroots activism worldwide (Kane 2013; Gross and Yip 2010; Heywood 2015).
Is the ambivalence of the Catholic church towards the anti-gender campaign to be found also among the audience to whom the protest is addressed in order to solicit participation? According to scholars such as Simon Massei (2017) – who studied anti-gender protest in France through a bottom-up approach – the mobilization against the so-called gender ideology encompasses a plurality of motives, stakes, and way to participate. Our paper follows this perspective through an explorative study on Catholic mothers and teachers who have been involved in one of the main fronts of the protest: the surveillance of school activities to stop allegedly pro-gender programs.
Methodological notes
This article is based on 17 in-depth interviews conducted with mothers and/or teachers identified as Catholics and alarmed by the introduction of ‘gender ideology’ in Italian schools. The interviews were held in 2015 in a small city (with a population of around 15,000) in central Italy.6 Teachers and parents have been intercepted, through a snowball strategy, among the audience of anti-gender conferences held between May and June 2015. All the women interviewed had attended at least one of these conferences.
By concentrating on the audience, rather than on representatives of the organizations promoting the conferences, our aim was to investigate the anti-gender rhetoric from the point of view of the strategic audience (parents and teachers) it addressed. Involving the public attending the events – and not the organizers – also made it easier to gain access to the ethnographic field of conservative groups, which can sometimes prove difficult (Avanza 2015; Lavizzari 2019). For the same reason, we choose not to ask the interviewees to disclose ‘sensitive’ and personal information – such as political orientations or adherence to specific groups – that would have characterized them in relation to the protest.
The absence of men (fathers and/or teachers) from our research sample was no accident. The anti-gender discourse supporting the need to supervise school affects settings where women are clearly protagonists. In Italy, women make up the large majority of the school workforce, especially in kindergarten and primary schools where they exceed 96% (Ottaviano and Persico 2019). Furthermore, as mothers, they are most often delegated to represent the family in relations with educational institutions (Mantovani and Gasperoni 2017). Martina Avanza (2020: 561) also recognizes a rather rigid gender order in conservative organizations (such as pro-life), with women activists ‘predominantly located in care roles’, and men ‘more commonplace in political ones’. For all these reasons, we can assume that investigating the point of view of women (mothers and teachers) would make it easier to detect forms of mobilization that are partially independent of the rhetoric promoted by anti-gender movement leaders.
At the time of our interviews, the Italian anti-gender movement had been established for a couple of years and was clearly visible in the public debate. The specific protest of interest here was against new legislation (the ‘Buona scuola’ [Good School] law 107), which was suspected of facilitating the implementation of ‘pro-gender’ projects in schools, such as activities addressed to pupils/students or teachers and aimed at preventing discrimination, bullying and violence based on sexual orientation and gender stereotypes. In a period of lively contestation, this issue was also one of the topics used to recruit participants for the upcoming Family Day in Rome (20 June 2015).
The organizations involved in this ‘crusade’ included, among others, groups that identify within the Catholic area such as Sentinelle in piedi (Standing sentinels), CitizenGo, La Manif pour tous Italia (later renamed as Generazione famiglia [Generation family]), Giuristi per la vita (Lawyers for life), and the Comitato difendiamo i nostri figli (Defend our children committee), which subsequently became the Associazione Family Day – Difendiamo i nostri figli (Family Day Association – Defend our children). The support of right-wing parties such as the then Lega Nord (Northern League), Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy) and the neo-fascist Forza Nuova (New Strength) was also in evidence, as was that of some dioceses and local Catholic association networks. Numerous anti-gender conferences were held all over the country thanks to a cooperation between the Catholic pro-life movement and the most prominent anti-gender organizations (Avanza 2015; Garbagnoli and Prearo 2018). The main speakers at the conferences held in the area where our research was conducted were leaders of the anti-abortion Catholic movement that joined the anti-gender mobilization.
As in other research on grassroots mobilization, semi-structured interviews were used to ‘gain access to the motivations and perspectives of a broader and more diverse group of social movement participants than would be represented in most documentary sources’ (Blee and Taylor 2002: 93). The interviews focused on: defining the problem the interviewees were mobilized against; suggesting solutions to the problem identified; and expectations regarding current or future school policies. In other words, the information obtained concerned both how the interviewees received the message conveyed by the conferences, and how they interpreted the broader context of anti-gender mobilization.
The sociological debate on anti-gender mobilization in Italy
How the anti-gender message is received by its target has gone almost unexplored in the Italian and international sociological literature. So far, anti-gender mobilization has largely been investigated from the perspective of the narratives emerging from the collaboration between institutions, political actors and NGOs.
In the case of Italy, sociologists have followed up two main lines of research. One of these lines has concentrated on deconstructing the anti-gender rhetoric, tracing its origins, and looking at how it becomes differently nuanced once it has been adopted by different subjects. Scholars agree in recognizing the original and historical role of the Vatican in ‘inventing’ the threat of gender theory/ideology as a strategy in order to reiterate the moral value of maternity and the protection of human life, and to oppose LGBT rights (Ozzano and Giorgi 2016; Garbagnoli 2016, 2017; Gennero 2017; Garbagnoli and Prearo 2018; Lavizzari and Prearo 2019). The main steps in the Vatican's development of its rhetoric against gender ideology are detectable in the series of un world conferences held in the 1990s on population and women's rights (see Bracke and Paternotte 2016; Case 2019), or in the publication by the Pontifical Council for the Family of the ‘Lexicon on family, life and ethical issues’ in 2003. This last document (originally published in Italian) is generally thought to convey the definitive Vatican doctrine on gender ideology.
Researchers have also paid attention to right-wing social and political actors who have embraced the core elements of the Vatican's discourse and adapted it to their purposes (Garbagnoli 2016; Bellè, Peroni and Rapetti 2016; Bellè and Poggio 2018; Garbagnoli and Prearo 2018). Proof of this connection emerges from their focus on two topics. One concerns their positive attitude to traditional gender relations, linking the ‘naturally’ complementary roles of men and women to a scientific discourse that disregards gender inequalities. The other has to do with demonizing anyone promoting the de-naturalization of gender and sexuality, beginning with the LGBT community. Researchers have noted that interpreting gender, LGBT and queer studies as an ‘ideology’ helped right-wing parties and conservative organizations to adopt a typical populist tone (Mény and Surel 2002; Bellè and Poggio 2018). In this sense, attributing occult political motives and economic interests to any supranational institutions, national movements or parties plays an important part in a rhetoric aiming to counter the advance of gender equality and sexual citizenship.7 There have also been reports of anti-colonial discursive frames frequently being co-opted and used against an allegedly global ‘dictatorship of gender’ (Graff 2016; Korolczuc and Graff 2018).
Another line of research has retraced the political networks sustaining the protest, which are not always visible to a wider audience. At first sight, in Italy as elsewhere, the fight against gender ideology has become a symbolic glue for a vast array of organizations, including Catholic groups, pro-life organizations, right-wing parties and movements, and neo-fascist groups (Garbagnoli and Prearo 2018; Lavizzari and Prearo 2019; Prearo 2020). Some conservative Catholic organizations and individuals have accepted this connection. Other subjects (the Vatican among them) have taken what we have called an ambivalent stance, precisely because of the visibility afforded to radical right-wing and nationalist subjects and contents.
Getting involved: sex panics at school
Our analysis starts from the motives and the paths that led the women interviewed to become alarmed about the threat of the so-called gender ideology in schools attended by their children, or where they work as teachers.
Some elements show that these women have previously been largely uninvolved in any pro-life associations, right-wing parties or other organizations leading the anti-gender mobilization. Most of them reported having only ‘recently’ and ‘suddenly’ become aware of the issue which, as one of them put it, ‘now takes the stage in every conversation’. The ways in which the interviewees had become sensitive to the protest – to the point of deciding to attend the anti-gender conferences – could hardly be attributed to any political or ideological affiliation with the above-mentioned actors. The interviewees spoke of the importance of other informal recruitment channels, by word of mouth among parents, or participation in parish activities. Some teachers only came up against the issue because it was discussed at school board meetings at the request of some parents. The Catholic background they have in common is obviously relevant too, not only in this shared ethos, but also in providing a concrete, direct link to the anti-gender movements’ networks. Francesca and Lorena exemplify the above-mentioned aspects:
I became aware of the problem a year ago at most, thanks to people, friends and acquaintances, kind of opening my eyes to this thing. (Francesca, mother of two children)
In my opinion, this ‘gender’ problem began to come up last year. I heard about it because there was a meeting organized by the nuns, and held by some parents … and a lady who went to the meeting told me about it. (Lorena, teacher)
The interviewees stress the sense of alarm that prompted their active involvement, citing information retrieved online, and circulating among parents in the form of flyers and in social networks.
Basically, I heard about ‘gender’ from a flyer, which arrived at my house. It was maybe a little too alarmist, but it immediately drew my attention to some strange things. Like, there was talk of sex being explained to children, even in kindergarten, even masturbation. All things a bit … well, when parents read them, they panic and say: ‘Oh my God, what's going on?!’. (Matilda, mother of two children)
As emphasized in the literature (Bellè and Poggio 2018), anti-gender protests make abundant use of arguments relating to the victimization and early sexualization of children in order to emotionally charge their call to arms. In a context such as Italy, where studies show the persistence silence on sexuality-related topics within the family (Bertone 2020), the issue of sexual education proves to be very effective.
The narratives we collected confirm how this emotional dimension is associated with the circulation of ‘sex panics’ (Herdt 2009). The promoters of the anti-gender message directly address the ethos of parents’ and teachers’ responsibilities, regardless of their political or religious affiliations. Studies conducted in other settings identified the same ‘apolitical’ explanation for women justifying their mobilization as a ‘maternal, visceral reaction to an ideology posing a danger to children and the sustainability of the traditional family model’ (Massei 2017: 18, authors’ translation).
The decision to attend a conference does not always arise from any immediate adherence to a moral panic. The interviewees are concerned by a confusing situation, where word of mouth and unverified information create a ‘smoke cloud’. Exposed to a cacophony of discourses coming both from below (such as conversations within Catholic informal networks and groups, or between parents) and from above (such as those promoted by right-wing politicians or members of the Catholic church), these mothers and teachers primarily lament their own disorientation. This would confirm, in our sample, the close link between a personal sense of alarm and a subsequent phase of information-seeking and investigation (see Massei 2017). The two phases seem to feature a strong circularity, especially when people rely for their information on the same anti-gender subjects who were spreading the moral panic. A number of mothers and teachers said that, when they looked for objective information on the matter, they could find nothing except the conferences held by ‘experts’ engaging in the fight against ‘gender theory’. These same ‘experts’ are invited by parish communities and patronized by local public institutions guided by right-wing parties. The conference promoters and speakers thus gain the opportunity to manage a small capital of legitimacy, which lends them greater authority. Even when openly invited and sponsored by local parishes, these speakers present themselves as professionals, mixing religious rhetoric with a ‘legal’ or ‘scientific’ defense of ‘good sense’.
The conference audience is heterogeneous, as demonstrated also by the fact that it was easy to intercept the voice of mothers who disagreed with the speakers’ message. To give an example, Katia – a mother who defines herself as a practicing Catholic – was exposed to the moral panic through social media. She tells us that: ‘They [the anti-gender activists] even said that pro-gender movements are trying to legalize pedophilia’, and that is why she goes to one of the anti-gender conferences. What she witnesses reinforces her distrust of the message and the subjects associated with this ‘crusade’. As a Catholic, and former history student, she clearly distances herself from what she labels the movement's sexophobic and anachronistic approach.
Drawing a line against ‘gender ideology’
Apart from Katia, all the other women interviewed show that they have adopted a common definition of what the anti-gender movement is opposing, and that is the so-called gender ideology. Going through the phases of alarm and investigation, the parents and teachers who are mobilized become convinced of the existence of this gender ideology, and fear that their children might be exposed to it. To be more specific, they share the belief that there is a unitary, well-organized, and identifiable theory (or ideology) of gender, and they emphasize its harmfulness when it informs pedagogical programs. Anti-gender organizations and parties have succeeded in objectifying an ideology as something that needs to be fought even if the danger it conveys is not perceived as imminent.
In the interviewees’ perception, ‘gender theory’ and its inherent dangers can be summarized in three main interpretative frames, all consistent with the lines of reasoning disseminated through the conferences. The first interprets it as a pedagogical program that threatens children's psychological wellbeing by supporting the defeat of gender binarism and heteronormativity.
I want my son to grow up contentedly. In addition to the thousands of problems and stressful situations that today's society imposes on our children, who must always be up to everything and run after everything, I don't want to give them yet another doubt, yet another worry, yet another stressful idea regarding their sexual identity. (Lara, mother of two children)
The second frame interprets gender theory as an educational approach that hinges on the early sexualization of childhood through ‘traumatizing’ games. These activities would expose young girls and boys to unsafe manipulation by adult educators. Risks of physical or psychological abuse are openly mentioned. Gemma, a teacher in a kindergarten, says:
I expect all this clamor to die down, and I don't think the school, and me as a teacher, are actually required to stimulate children to discover their bodies. I will never do it, and I will always refuse to do it. (…) For adults to take an active approach towards children's sexual exploration seems inappropriate to me.
My three-year-old child mustn't think it is normal for their school friends to have two mothers, or two fathers maybe, or maybe that their mum went to buy male semen in Holland in order to have a child. This is also explained in the ‘gender’ books – if we can call them that - or the books that adopt this ‘open-minded’ ideology.
When the narratives move from such a pre-political level to the explicitly political or religious sphere, the convergence on these basic interpretative frames leaves room for a more marked lack of homogeneity. Here, we find different ways of joining the protest and different degrees of agreement with the anti-gender rhetoric of the conference speakers. In the following pages, we distinguish between a radicalized adhesion to the protest based on a generalized alignment with the movement's rhetoric, and a moderate stance based on a more limited agreement. We assume that this distinction reflects a deeper difference – of some relevance in the Italian setting – in the ways in which Catholic political sub-cultures try to oppose, manage, or solve issues relating to the country's secularization and sexual pluralism.
‘Radicalized’ anti-gender narratives amidst conspiracy theories and a refusal of sexual modernization
In this section, we focus on the narratives denoting a radicalized adhesion to the anti-gender protest, often reliant on conspiracy theories. This adhesion is interpreted as the result of a profound acceptance of the anti-gender movements’ rhetoric and has been detected as prevalent in nine of the interviewees.
The conspiracy-fueled narrative insists on demonizing an ‘enemy’ (whoever they may be) accused of having a hidden agenda. This kind of narrative is animated by a distrust of democratic and liberal institutions, often paired with a very negative representation of homosexuality, considered as a (barely tolerable) deviance, a disease, or a vice. It clearly shows how anti-gender rhetoric can combine with wider populist frames, as the gender ‘dictatorship’ is attributed to powerful global lobbies like the WHO or supranational LGBT associations with specific economic interests to defend. Anti-discrimination activities against homophobia and violence against women are seen as an excuse to plagiarize the weakest, such as young children. The alleged top-down nature of this pro-gender revolution is a key point for this rhetoric, as already mentioned elsewhere in the literature (Case 2016). In Lara's words, those who accept pedagogical tools inspired by gender theory are portrayed as naive consumers, not necessarily ill-intentioned, but certainly unaware of the interests of those in high places:
In addition to those who want to be open-minded and propose these books to their children, there are lobbies. There is the commercial sector and the people who will earn money from it. Because today I can rent a womb for 20,000 euros. Tomorrow, if the turnover increases, there will be many others [customers]. I see it as a matter of money: nobody would lift a finger, and nobody would take the liberty of interfering with our children's education if something weren't up. Or, anyway, not unless there was the will to do so in high places … or the prospect of a very prolific trade at least.
These conspiracy-inspired narratives can also include a harsh criticism of (sexual) modernization processes. In other words, they take an extremely negative stance on the cultural transformations of the last decades in the intimate and sexual sphere. The recognition of gender and sexual pluralism is perceived as a further element of corruption in a society that has lost its values, firmness and principles. Here again, the narrative takes on the populist tones of defending the life of ‘normal’ people against a top-down threat. In some cases, this is accompanied by the denial of any hostility towards homosexuals as a relevant issue (‘Now we’re all homophobes and racists? How can that be?!’).
When the anti-modernization attitude occupies center stage in the narrative, the unwanted emancipatory pressure is not necessarily perceived as being driven by hidden interests. It is activated in a rather more anti-capitalist and anti-colonial tone, mobilized to resist the emancipatory sexual politics imposed by a global North. The idea of a dystopian sexual hyper-modernity is adamantly rejected.
I hope we’ll never come to this foolishness in Italy (…). [I’m afraid of it] because we’re in a Europe, in an open-minded world where, sooner or later, even the bigoted Italy will have to adapt to European standards. If this is the meaning of being open-minded, I’m much better off being bigoted. [Lucia, teacher in a Catholic kindergarten]
The modernity reached elsewhere – in countries representing the global North like Germany, the Netherlands, Britain or the United States – is perceived as a project of sexual citizenship promoted even by the European Union, to which ‘we are obliged to conform’.
Adherence to this frame is even stronger when the women interviewed to comment on everyday life situations, such as those described by conference speakers or shared online. They report Italian examples of ‘pernicious’ education programs adopted at school, or of ‘pro-gender’ books even in the libraries of their own hometown. Some interviewees went online to look for evidence of institutional support for ‘gender ideology’ (as in the alleged case of the German police arresting parents for protesting because their children were being ‘forced to watch sex scenes’), or to find proof of its harmfulness. Some mothers, for instance, speak of the developmental problems of adolescents whose parents did not oppose their desire to transition from one sex to another.
A ‘moderate’ anti-gender activism?
In the narratives emerging from the interviews, there are also some ‘moderate’ stances on anti-gender activism. An area of weaker consent came to light, with some interviewees distancing themselves from the conference speakers’ message or the concerns expressed and circulated by the most alarmed mothers and teachers. Eight of the interviewees can be placed in this area of weaker consent.
A first feature of a more moderate adhesion to anti-gender rhetoric in our sample concerns the demystification of conspiracy theories openly promoted within illiberal populist frames. Some interviewees are unwilling to give credit to the most improbable accusations against pro-gender pedagogies (such as children being invited to masturbate at school or forced to watch sex scenes). Such accusations are labeled as exaggerations. Milena, a teacher who defines herself as a practicing Catholic, distinguishes between legitimate concern and an unmotivated alarm prompted by gross simplifications. In her opinion, the anti-gender discourse of the ‘healthy’ part of the Catholic church needs to be purged of the versions circulating online, which are often shared by the most alarmist parents but also exploited by some religious (Catholic) fundamentalists. While acknowledging the problem of gender education, Milena is critical of those making a mountain out of a molehill. Like her, other teachers are skeptical about the moral panic they see in some parents. Most of the teachers deny there is any truth in the claimed diffusion of a gender ideology in schools (where they work, at least).
Some teachers’ comments clearly show that anti-gender concerns may be associated with attempts to avoid extreme views. They also talk as professionals concerned about the possible reorientation of pedagogical guidelines regarding gender and sexuality. In short, their approach seems to be: ‘there is no cause for alarm, but the problem is real’. In their view, it is not only the children's education (the main reason for the mothers’ worries) that is at stake, but also the very exercise of their profession. They fear the possibility of the new mandatory educational practices disqualifying their own teaching.
A second distinctive feature of the narratives expressing a limited adherence to the anti-gender protest concerns the representation of homosexuality and the attitude to LGBT groups’ claims. The more moderate interviewees try to combine an opposition to LGBT claims (perceived as having gone too far) with an avoidance of openly homophobic arguments. They also acknowledge that LGBT people experience social hostility and victimization. Several scholars have described such a rejection of an openly homophobic stance as a strategy used by anti-gender groups in many European countries, Italy included, to maximize consensus in public opinion (Fassin 2016; Graff 2016; Bellè and Poggio 2018; Lavizzari and Prearo 2019; Trappolin and Gusmeroli 2019). In our sample, the relatively gay-friendly approach recalls the distinction ‘between acceptance of individual gay or trans persons and acceptance of their demands for equal treatment under law’ that characterizes the dominant Catholic view, and particularly Pope Francis’ discourse (Case 2019: 651). This kind of rhetoric allows our interviewees to incorporate different degrees of sensitivity towards LGBT issues in their anti-gender position. Indeed, some interviewees interpret homosexuality as normal and deserving equal rights (agreeing, for example, that same-sex and heterosexual couples should be treated equally). Instead of directly opposing LGBT people, they justify their attitude to them by stigmatizing the perverse effects of a pluralism that has gone too far, driven by gender ideology. In her comments on the ‘Buona scuola’ law, Martina – a primary school teacher very involved in the anti-gender protest – combines a formal acceptance of homosexuality with an opposition to ‘excessive’ LGBT claims:
If someone is against this law, that doesn't mean they are against gender equality too, or that they are homophobic or whatever. Really, nobody is judging anyone! It is just about defending the true meaning of family (…). That means that … it's normal for a person to be homosexual. That's perfectly normal, I don't doubt it. But that's not the same thing as saying that a couple consisting of two homosexuals can be equated to a real family, with all that it entails for the upbringing of children too.
It wasn't a very nice situation because there were some gay people who tried to ask questions and he [the speaker] answered very rudely, proving to be a proper homophobe, even though he said he was not. It was very unpleasant, so I looked for more information elsewhere.
Monitoring schools: concluding remarks
Focusing on how the anti-gender discourse is received by one of its specific targets (Catholic mothers and teachers) brings out different positions within this mobilization setting. Our findings go in the same direction as other research, reiterating the need to avoid studying neo-conservative movements as homogeneous fronts (Avanza 2020).
Our analysis shows a clear convergence of the mothers and teachers interviewed towards a conviction that gender ideology exists and poses a tangible risk. The absorption of this message is favored by the fact that the women in our sample manage to interpret it in relation to everyday educational practices that they implement as mothers and/or teachers. They share an educational ethos that values particular models of family, gender, and sexuality as social goods to be transmitted to the next generation.
But sharing the same worries about so-called gender ideology does not mean a unanimous and unequivocal agreement regarding the content of the mobilization. Our sample's narratives reflect differences in both political and cultural terms. Some express a broad adherence to the anti-gender movements’ most radical content, based on conspiracy theories and claiming the urgency of defending ‘normal’ people's lives against influential unseen lobbies. Others take a more critical approach, refusing to criminalize LGBT people, and welcoming (albeit in limited terms) a pluralism of gender and sexual cultures. Rather surprisingly, some even call for the defense of pluralism in relation to their own cultural and religious preferences, which they describe as just ‘one among many others’.
The distinction between radicalized and moderate narratives reflects different attitudes to the public ethos of (sexual and gender) pluralism. The more radicalized forcefully reject ‘deviant’ ideas and subjectivities, and explicitly defend heteronormativity. The more moderate make strategic use of a pluralist ethos to defend a particular (heteronormative) sexual culture.
Nevertheless, this different way of framing their opposition to gender ideology takes shape in the mothers’ and teachers’ willingness to engage in the surveillance of school programs and activities. The importance they attribute to monitoring what goes on at school is expressed in two widely-shared calls: (i) for more information about school activities regarding the sexual sphere; and (ii) for parents to have the chance to grant or withhold their informed consent to their children's participation in these activities. These requests are the corollary of a more basic, shared demand that has been identified in other European countries: when it comes to sexual education, the family must take precedence over the school (see Kuhar 2015).
Mothers in favor of a ‘non-bigoted’ sex education, and those who distrust the reassurances coming from school administrators and teachers (‘How do I know what that project really includes?’) would all like to see these demands met. Teachers recognize these demands as entirely legitimate, though they often complain about having to deal with some parents’ unrealistic concerns. Recalling the principle of ‘freedom of education guaranteed by the Constitution’, teachers also claim the right to conscientious objection when they fear being ‘obliged to teach gender ideology’.
As for the school settings, it is not difficult to find a continuity between the claims made by mothers and teachers and the strategies to resist the ‘gender dictatorship’ promoted by anti-gender associations and political parties. The conferences the latter hold tend to follow much the same script, and generally end with a call for surveillance in schools. The circularity between the call for mobilization spread by the anti-gender movement and grassroots activation may also relate to a crisis of legitimacy in Italy's education system. The issue of parental informed consent to school activities goes beyond concerns about pro-gender projects or curricula. Mothers want to be informed in order to protect their children from an institution that supports cultural approaches that do not respect their own choices. Teachers may go along with parents’ fears of being colonized by the so-called gender ideology, or they may consider them absurd. Either way, they perceive their response to these concerns as a litmus test of the quality of their relations with the parents.
Our results – that shed light on the presence of different levels of consent to the anti-gender protest from the point of view of concerned mothers and teachers – are useful not only for the investigation of the anti-gender mobilization. Two other fields of study could be mentioned. The first one corresponds to the research on the ongoing crisis of relationship between family and school (Guerrini 2018). In our analysis, the anti-gender issue might be seen as further exacerbating the delegitimization of school, and this interpretation could help explaining why some mystifications are easily given credit. The second field refers to the tradition of studies that have investigated both the strains within the Catholic institutions and the pluralism of the Italian community of Catholics (Garelli 2007; Marzano 2013; Ozzano 2016; Prearo 2020). From this point of view, we believe that the positioning of the Vatican hierarchies toward the anti-gender protest, as well as the different views of Catholic activists on the matter, will open up new perspectives for research.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Footnotes
The dossier is available at: https://www.provitaefamiglia.it/blog/progetti-gender-nelle-scuole-ecco-il-dossier [consulted 13 November 2020].
Il Giornale, 3 November 2020. https://www.ilgiornale.it/news/politica/torino-fdi-tuona-contro-listruzione-gender-assurdo-1900807.html [consulted 20 November 2020].
The first Family Day was held in Rome in 2007 – some years before the emergence of any anti-gender mobilization – by a network of Catholic Ngos called the Forum of Family Associations, with the public support of the Vatican (Prearo 2020).
Marcello Semeraro was recently (on 15 October 2020) appointed Prefect of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints, and made a Cardinal by Pope Francis (on 28 November 2020).
The expectations of part of the Catholic cultural area towards a greater openness of the Church towards LGBT rights and people emerged, for example, in the online meeting organized by the ecumenical journal ‘Confronti’ with the title Omosessualità e Vaticano, rivoluzione in corso?’ (Homosexuality and the Vatican, revolution in progress?), 27 October 2020.
The interviewees were between 30 and 50 years old (mean age 42). They spoke from the standpoint of mothers (5 cases) or public or private (Catholic) kindergarten or primary school teachers (9 cases), or both (3 cases). The names appearing in the text are fictional.
In December 2015, Italy's center-left government (Matteo Renzi) changed the wording on identity cards for minors, replacing the words father and mother with the terms ‘parent 1’ and ‘parent 2’. This prompted much debate also before the change was approved. This wording was abolished in 2018 by the Minister of Interior Matteo Salvini (Lega).
References
Luca Trappolin, Assistant Professor of sociology at the University of Padua. For several years he has worked on gender and sexuality studies. He is author of several papers on the social construction of homosexuality and homophobia, including ‘Confronting Homophobia in Europe. Social and legal perspectives’ (Trappolin, Gasparini and Wintemute 2012).
Paolo Gusmeroli is a Research Fellow at the University of Padua, he is working on LGBT family practices. His research interests are focused on gender and sexuality, sociology of family and social reproduction. Among his publications ‘Homophobia as a Keyword in the Italian Liberal Press (1979-2007). Debating New Boundaries of Sexual Citizenship’ (with Luca Trappolin, 2020).