Restricted religion. Compliance, vicariousness, and authority during the Corona pandemic in Switzerland

According to the sociologist Mark Chaves (1994), secularisation can be conceptualised as a decline in religious authority. This decrease in authority can take place on different levels: religion can lose its ability to structure society as a whole, it can cease to be the basis for the formation of influential organisations, and/or its influence on the actions and beliefs of individuals can decrease (cf. Chaves 1994: 765–769).

For Chaves’ position, one starting point is the theory of functional differentiation, which assumes that religion has lost its role as a canopy that covers society in all its aspects and has, instead, become one sphere of society among others (cf. Chaves 1994: 751). The second starting point is Weber's sociology of religion (cf. Chaves 1994: 754; Weber 2013) in its focus on religious authorities who gain their power by controlling the access of individuals to the goods of salvation.

The control of these goods and the access to them are regulated through rituals. According to the ritual theorist Catherine Bell (1997) – who was influenced by Pierre Bourdieu's theory (1971) of division of religious labour, which was again, like Chaves, influenced by Weber – religious authorities mainly exert their influence on the laity by including them in rituals. In a process that she calls ritualisation, people are incorporated in formalised, traditionally legitimated, and (more or less) invariant interactions. Through this, a religious habitus¹ is imposed and the role of the specialists that prescribe and preside over these ritual interactions, as well as the worldview that defines their religiously superior position, is enacted and confirmed.

The COVID-19 pandemic has direct consequences on the role of religious authorities: in functionally differentiated and therefore, in Chaves’ understanding, secular societies, religion no longer has the power to define a shared vision for how the crisis is perceived and how people should react to it. Simultaneously, religion is confronted with restrictions, issued in secular spheres like politics and medicine, that make its ritual reproduction impossible. This poses a challenge to the religious authorities, whose influence is based on the interpretation, organisation, and performance of these rituals.

Therefore, as other authors emphasise (cf. Sulkowski and Ignatowski 2020), examining the way religious authorities deal with these challenges is an important part of the sociological understanding of the consequences of the Corona pandemic on religion. Several questions will be discussed: how do religious authorities react to the rules that the political authorities issued? In case of the acceptance of the restrictions, how do the religious authorities legitimise the interruption of centuries-old religious practices? What structural properties of the religious communities – like the organisational structure or the degree of establishment within the societal context – have an influence on this reaction? And what consequences does this have for the religious authority?

The theoretical starting point of this paper is Bourdieu's concept of the religious field in which authority structures and the symbolic power of religious actors are central in the reproduction of religious communities and their role in society. The following discussion of the research questions is based on the empirical analysis of two traditions and corresponding communities. The two cases are situated in the same geographical and administrative region: first we look at the Roman Catholic Church in Zurich, which is established in the Swiss cultural context in an ecclesial form with a differentiated administrative hierarchy and forms the largest religious community nationally, with respect to membership (cf. Federal Statistical Office 2016). The second case is the VIOZ, a Muslim umbrella organisation,² which represents the religion of a minority, which has been present in Switzerland since the 1960s.

Methodologically, this paper is based on discourse analysis as it is proposed by Rainer Diaz-Bone (2006, 2010), combining a Foucauldian perspective on discourse with Bourdieu's approach to the social world: following Diaz-Bone, the discussion of the theoretical approach (1) and the formulation of the research question, was followed by an exploratory phase (2), in which an overview of the field in question was achieved. In this step, based on the analysis of official announcements, a timeline concerning the restrictions issued by the government in reaction to the pandemic was created (see Appendix A) and, looking cursorily at different religious traditions, an overview of the reactions of religious communities in Switzerland was gained. In the next step, a corpus of data (3) was created that focused on the cases that were selected for a closer analysis: the largest Christian (the Roman Catholics) and the largest non-Christian community (the Muslims) in Zurich, the largest city of Switzerland (cf. Department of the Mayor 2018). The data consisted of the publicly communicated decisions issued by the religious authorities of the communities in question (see  Appendix B). In a first analytical step, named surface analysis (4) by Diaz-Bone (cf. 2006: 258) and following qualitative content analysis according to Mayring (2007), central codes and topics were identified. In our data, as will be elaborated further upon below, the categories of change, shift, and cancellation in the modification of rituals and the accompanying strands of argumentation concerning medicine, state, and religion proved to be central. The pivotal step in the analysis was the reconstruction of the discursive relations (5), in which the relations between the different categories of ritual modifications and the various arguments are reconstructed. This served as the basis for an analysis of the positions and structures ordering the discourse in question.

After an analyis of the responses of these two communities to the restrictions of their ritual practice (section 2 and 3), the aforementioned questions are discussed (section 4) and four conclusions are drawn (section 5).

In studying religious rituals during the Corona crisis, three modifications regarding copresence, time, and place can be identified: change refers to modifications in ritual form without suspension of physical copresence. Shifts refer to modifications that do not change the temporal frames of the rituals, but the place shifted when physical copresence was waived. The third concerns the cancellation of the ritual without any replacement.

One conclusion concerning the importance of rituals can already be drawn: both communities attempted to hold on to interaction as long as officially permitted, although, unlike theatres or cinemas, they were not necessitated by a transfer of material goods to maintain the community. Exemplarily, the VIOZ did not suspend physical co-presence but changed the ritual form of Friday prayer: they recommended to pray in jackets and to enter the prayer rooms with socks to reduce physical contact (cf. VIOZ: 12.3.20). Similarily, the Catholic Church suspended the Communion on the tongue, shaking hands for the rite of peace and the concelebration during Sunday service. Instead, an alternative form was proposed distributing the Communion via hand and dipping the eucharistic bread in wine to replace the drinking of mass wine out of a shared cup (cf. SBK: 13.3.20).

According to Randall Collins’ theory of interaction, ritual chains, the ascription of relevance to the rituals via bodily presence can be understood as indispensable for the production of positive emotions and group solidarity. This production is based on a mutual focus of attention (cf. Collins 2004: 48), which permits the immediate observation of others present and thus the synchronisation of physical movements and vocalisations. In the collective effervescence of rituals based on this synchronisation, individuals experience safety and confidence in their acting. Group solidarity forms which creates longer-lasting positive emotions like self-assurance, strength, and enthusiasm among the participants. These positive emotions are ultimately the basis for participating in rituals and for attributing relevance to its community (cf. Collins 2004: 49).

In addition to emotionality, ritual theories also postulate repetition as a feature characteristic of ritual practice (cf. for example, Bell 1997: 150; Rappaport 1999: 36). Like emotionality, traditionality was also jeopardised by the modifications imposed by the government. This explains why the two communities tried to maintain their regular ritual practice for as long as possible. But due to the stricter state measures, the holding of Sunday services and Friday prayers was at some point no longer permitted, despite the changes made. The VIOZ reacted by initiating a shift of place by referring to a prayer alternative which prophet Mohammed is said to have proclaimed under bad weather conditions. Instead of calling for prayer in the mosque (haya’ alas-Salah), the VIOZ encouraged people to pray in their own houses (sallū fî buyūtikum) (cf. VIOZ: 16.3.20). A similar pattern of shift can be identified for the Catholic Church, which suggested a spiritual Communion instead of a Communion ceremony which was to take place independently at home:

Only a minor portion of all the offline rituals were transferred to online performances. Those not shifted to an online mode had to be cancelled by the authorities as a last resort. The VIOZ cancelled the Friday prayers (cf. VIOZ: 13.3.20) and closed the mosques (cf. VIOZ: 16.3.30). The chronology of cancellations implemented by the Catholic Church shows how first administrative meetings such as the Pastoral Congress or parish meetings (cf. Catholic Church Canton Zurich: 12.3.20, 14.3.20) were suspended and only in a second step weekly Sunday services and central holidays such as Easter were cancelled (cf. Diocese Chur: 17.3.20).

The medical argument has an explanatory character whereby the VIOZ and the Catholic Church both pointed out that physical contact should be reduced to prevent infections (cf. VIOZ: 12.3.20, 13.3.20; SBK: 17.3.20). With the argument referring to the authority of the state, the religious communities justified their ritual restrictions. The religious communities did not question these governmental measures, but adopted them directly in an act of compliance (cf. VIOZ: 16.3.20; SBK: 17.3.20). However, the religious argument demonstrates how both communities displayed a need to also provide a religious justification for the measures adopted. Thus, the Diocese of Chur established a theological link to the apostle Paul by referring to the Epistle to the Romans to justify the authority of the state (cf. Diocese Chur: 17.3.20). The VIOZ also explicitly referred to religious figures to legitimize the compliance with the restrictions ‘Such behavior corresponds to the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad.’ (VIOZ: 12.3.20, translation ours). With this argumentation strand, the religious communities reinforced their own authority.

According to Bourdieu, the religious field is structured by the relations between the laity and religious actors, i.e. prophets and priests. The laity is consuming goods of salvation for which they rely on producers. On the production side, a body of specialists emerges who are in competition with each other in the accumulation of religious capital. Bourdieu understands religious capital as the ‘product of accumulated religious labour’ (1991: 23), as the labour that ensures the continued existence of religious capital. On the consumer side is the laity, who is excluded from the production and management of the goods of salvation (cf. Bourdieu 1991: 9, 23f.). Consequently, a power gap develops between specialists and laity, which constitutes a precarious balance that can be challenged and has to be legitimated especially in times of crisis.

In the case of the Roman Catholic Church, a hierarchy of priests took on the decisions and their justification. They reclaimed a priestly monopoly on ‘an instructional or sacramental capital of grace’ (Bourdieu 1991: 23; italics his), from which ‘an authority (or a grace) of office (or of institution)’ (Bourdieu 1991: 23; italics his) is derived. Through this institutionally anchored form of authority, the hierarchy has the ability to justify the ritual modifications within the system.

According to Bourdieu, religious capital justifies both the monopoly on the management of the goods of salvation as well as the power to impose a religious habitus on the laity (cf. 1991: 22). By modifying and not just abandoning rituals, the SBK and the Chur Diocese reaffirmed their influence over the religious habitus of the laity. For example, the form of prayer was changed by asking individuals to pray in the name of all (cf. Diocese Chur: 13.3.20). Moreover, shifts were induced within the religious habitus by recommending spiritual Communion (see section 2). The hierarchy that decided on the ritual modifications was already religiously legitimised in its very existence, which permitted it to impose the demands stemming from the secular world without any religious framing of the situation or the implemented measures. Further, as the hierarchy consisted of religious specialists, they could freely draw on a religious vocabulary to modify rituals and add interpretations.

Opposition to this assumption of medical and state demands was scarce. Where it appeared, it took on the form of a prophetic challenge: Marian Eleganti, the auxiliary bishop of the Chur Diocese, criticised the ritual modifications and argued for the maintenance of the religious habitus despite the corona pandemic. He rejected restrictions as meaningless because faith would protect believers. Thus, the reception of Communion or contact with holy water could not pose any threat (cf. Meier 2020: 12.3.20). Even if Eleganti does not fall completely into the category of a prophet, his case does indicate how prophets, according to Bourdieu, advocate the ‘de-banalisation’ (1971: 6) of the priestly order that complied with secular instructions. The prophetic auxiliary bishop insisted on the independence of the religious field and an accompanying delimitation of measures that are decided in the political field.

The Chur Diocese responded to the measure by invoking the internal church hierarchy with its symbolic power. The possibility of exercising symbolic power is based on the possession of symbolic capital. According to Bourdieu, this enables actors to determine which services are awarded value and which not (cf. 2006: 242). Posing as the recognition of higher truth and not as man-made, symbolic capital is based on its misrecognition as a form of power (cf. Bourdieu 1991: 13f.; cf. Swartz 1996: 77). Based on the traditional claim to that capital, the Chur Diocese could order Eleganti to express himself publicly in the future only in line with internal agreements. Eleganti, drawing in his position as auxiliary bishop on the traditional symbolic capital, lacked enough personal or charismatic power to challenge it and had to accept this condition and accordingly adopted a compliant attitude (cf. Aschwanden 2020: 18.3.20). This underscores how the prerogative of interpretation belongs to the authoritarian structure of the Catholic Church.

While the Catholic Church had, at its disposal, an established, religiously legitimated authority, the VIOZ lacked symbolic power. It did, like the Catholic Church, indeed attend to organisational interests in the exercise of religion. But that organisation was neither religiously legitimated as a structure nor run by priests. Expressed in Bourdieu's terminology, the VIOZ therefore had to strive for symbolic capital, which was necessary for the implementation of its own perspective. Therefore, the VIOZ referred, in its justification of ritual modifications, to canonical material. To put it again in Bourdieu's terms, the VIOZ was run by lay people that merely organise religious rituals which were then run by religious experts that again were not involved in the organisation. Through this separation of religious and organisational expertise, members of the VIOZ did not have ‘an authority (or a grace) of office (or of institution)’ (1991: 23; italics his). Thus, ritual modifications could not be justified on the basis of office. Using religious references, however, the VIOZ referred to the logic of Islam,⁵ to provide legitimation for its own position in the religious field and its unavoidable meddling in a fundamental religious affair (see section 3).

In Switzerland, the laity complied with the modifications imposed by the religious authorities⁶ which provides a contrast to other foreign cases where the laity and their leadership were not of one accord.⁷ It can be assumed that the compliance of religious communities with state restrictions is connected to their position in society which can vary significantly depending on the structure of the religious field and its relation to the secular environment in different contexts.

For religious communities, authority within their own community stood in relation to their authority in a secular environment. Diverging positions in Swiss society manifested themselves in a varying use of different strands of argumentation pointed out in section 3.

In comparison to the Catholic Church, the VIOZ emphasised more strongly that it and the Muslim associations included in its organisation had a social responsibility that they had to observe. The VIOZ felt the need not only, as already seen, to reconcile their measures to their own religious context on the one hand, but also to the broader societal context on the other (cf. VIOZ: 16.3.20). They framed the call to social solidarity in a religious manner and proposed various actions including donating blood, neighbourhood help, and assistance with homeschooling for mosques to manifest solidarity (cf. VIOZ: 30.3.20). This communication can be interpreted as the VIOZ wanting to work against religious othering in order to be perceived as obtaining recognition as a legitimate religious organisation in a difficult starting position. Muslims in Switzerland form a religious group that is viewed negatively as Islam has been seen not only as ‘alien’ but also as a dangerous religion especially since 9/11 (cf. Schmid et al. 2018: 12, 15–17). Hence, the VIOZ stated ‘[…] it is up to all of us to make our contribution to society’ (VIOZ: 16.3.20, translation ours) calling for an active involvment of the mosques (cf. VIOZ: 30.3.20). Similar statements could not be identified for the traditionally embedded Catholic Church.

Both religious bodies explicitly reaffirmed the legitimacy of the governmental decisions through reference to the authority of government bodies. The Chur Diocese advanced theological justifications for the legitimation of government authority by invoking the apostle Paul to justify its cooperation with the state:

The crisis not only impaired the internal ritual workings of religion, but also the function it performs for wider society. While usually, religion can communicate a special competence in cases of misfortune and catastrophes through the performance of rituals (cf. Geertz 1973), this was not possible in the emergency brought about by the coronavirus.

Religious rituals play a role for wider society through the significance they have even for those who never attend a service. In Grace Davie's words, this can be called ‘vicarous religion’:

An exception to this were the Catholic monasteries. Through their isolation from the outside world as communities of place (cf. Tönnies 1991; Walthert 2020: 279–280), monasteries could also keep operating during the pandemic as the abbess of a monastery points out in an interview (cf. Flückiger 2020: 10.4.20). This was broadcasted in a, compared to normal times, enhanced way via the mass media, for which they could rely on the existing networks of the church.⁹ Thus, one might hypothesise, the monasteries could become the symbol of the upholding of ritual practices even during a crisis. Through this increased attention that was directed towards them, the significance of monastic communities rose relative to that of church congregations who, by and large, had to cease their ritual practice.¹⁰

The parishes, on the other hand, had to face the challenge, that their usual ways of providing pastoral ministry were also impaired by the restrictions: As reports from different countries show (cf. Byrne and Nuzum 2020; Peng-Keller, Roser 2020), and as our exploratory and preliminary findings for Switzerland confirm, there was a heightened demand for ‘pastoral closeness’ (Byrne, Nuzum 2020: 207), but it had become more difficult to achieve.

So it was not the engagement of priests in this world but the otherworldly lifestyle of monks and nuns that became the model that maintained vicarious religion. Further, the monastic way of life became an example of a lifestyle for the laity during the lockdown (cf. Hofer 2020: 27.3.20; Langer 2020: 30.3.20). The pandemic showed that nuns and monks and their position in the religious field differ from the priest in important ways – Bourdieu's model of the religious field would have to be supplemented by a corresponding type.

In contrast to that, the VIOZ could not draw on the vicarious performance of rituals. The communal Friday prayer was cancelled and did not shift to another place; nor were there any monastic-like institutions that maintained the performance of rituals in a vicarious and publicly observable way. The only thing left to do was to advise Muslims to pray at home (cf. VIOZ: 16.3.20).

Four conclusions in answer to the questions asked in the introduction can be drawn:

1. With the restrictions connected to the pandemic, the practice of religion was reduced in significant ways. Not only sociologists of religion but religious communities themselves consider religious rituals to be important, which is why they maintained the performance of rituals as long as possible through changes and shifts – which is true not only in Switzerland but also in other contexts.¹¹ Notwithstanding, the religious communities bowed to the political and legal prescriptions without questioning them on religious grounds, which meant that religious rituals were subordinated to the practice of society as a whole, as constituted in the lockdown. The grounding of religious interpretations of the world in transcendent realms is considered to provide religion with stability that can be maintained even during an inner worldly crisis (cf. Parsons 1964: 369). But, as the cases show, because the ritual practices and their organisation have to function within the worldly order, religion was affected by the crisis and has to face the challenge of finding new ways to fulfil what is often seen as its main function: offering comfort in times of crisis.

2. The religious field has to follow the directions given by the political field, which proves critical to religious authorities.¹² The acceptance of the ritual restrictions needed to be legitimised and so the religious authorities resorted to three strands of argumentation, referring to medicine, state and religion. The religious argument in particular aimed at preserving authority within their own community, although all decisional power resided in the medical and governmental authorities with which they complied. Together with the first conclusion, this shows that religious leaders could not claim any authority neither over the interpretation of the crisis nor the way it has been dealt with, even within religion itself. This can be interpreted as a sign of secularisation in Chaves’ understanding.

3. Two variables seem decisive for the way that this compliance takes place: first the degree of establishment of the religious community within its societal environment and second the relation between the organisation and the religious expertise within the community. Following political directions is less problematic for a religion that is established and has an organisational structure that is not separated from religious expertise. Under these circumstances, even prophetic challenges can be handled easily. The Muslim community is not well established in Swiss society and relies on decision-makers that are not religious experts. Therefore, the compliance had to be legitimated towards the inside by reference to a religious canon and actively communicated towards a sceptical outside.

4. As shown in (1), the external anchoring of arguments with respect to the structural link of the religious community to the outside world did not protect religious communities from the crisis. The monasteries of the Roman Catholic Church represent an exception to that. Their positioning enables them to continue the performance of rituals that guaranteed their functioning as vicarious religion with reliance on church and mass media structures.

We thank the anonymous reviewers for their careful reading of our manuscript and their many insightful comments and suggestions. We further thank Ben Greet and Alexandra Probst.

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Rafael Walthert is professor for religious studies at the University of Zurich.

Loïc Bawidamann and Laura Peter are studying religious studies at the University of Zurich.

Switzerland reported its first laboratory-confirmed case of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) on 24 February 2020. With regard to the growing number of infected people, the Federal Council enacted increasingly stringent measures to contain the spread of COVID-19. Based on the Epidemics Act (cf. SR 818.101, as of 1.1.17), the Federal Council banned public and private events with more than 1000 people throughout Switzerland on 28 February 2020 by issuing an ordinance (cf. 818.101.24, as of 28.2.20). On March 13, the number of people permitted at events was reduced to 100 (cf. SR 818.101.24, as of 13.3.20). In addition, in-class education was discontinued (cf. SR 818.101.24, as of 16.3.20). On 16 March, the Federal Council declared an ‘extraordinary situation’ in terms of the Epidemics Act (cf. SR 818.101, as of 1.1.17) by which it was given extensive powers to decree measures deemed necessary: Public and private events were interdicted and all stores, restaurants, bars as well as entertainment and leisure facilities were closed (cf. SR 818.101.24, as of 17.3.20). These restricitions directly affected religious communities in Switzerland since the ban of public and private events also applied to religious services: Meetings in churches, mosques, synagogue, and in rooms of other religious communities were no longer permitted. Only burials within the immediate family circle were allowed to be held. However, the officially recognized churches had to remain open (cf. FOPH, 28.3.20).

The Federal Council announced on 11 May a gradual relaxation of the measures taken. Teaching at compulsory schools was resumed and restaurants as well as stores were allowed to reopen with accompanying protective plans (cf. SR 818.101.24, as of 14.5.20). On May 11, no restrictions for religious communities were relaxed by the Federal Council. However, on May 20, the Federal Council announced that it would again permit the holding of all religious services by May 28. Nevertheless, restrictions on physical contact will remain in place for the time being (cf. FOPH, 12.8.20). Modifications of ritual practice will therefore continue to exist but the reactions by religious communities were not taken into account as they no longer fell into the period in which the data for this paper was collected.

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