ABSTRACT
Despite the preponderance of men within radical-nationalist circles, an increase in women's participation has recently been observed. Considering the general anti-feminist statements voiced in nationalist milieus, it is crucial to find out how women, in particular, frame their nationalist involvement and, more generally, their role in society. Based on an analysis of articles published by female nationalists, this article explores the discursive strategies used by these women in the construction of gender roles and women's position in the society. The article thus highlights the heterogenous character of women's involvement in nationalism, and distinguishes two main wings among female nationalists: (dominant) nationalist conservatives and (less present) nationalist quasi-feminists. On the one hand, female nationalists perceive women as keepers and reproducers of culture, and their activities can be understood as a kind of alternative emancipation linked to a rejection of (liberal) feminism. On the other hand, certain female nationalists attempt to negotiate between notions of conservatism and feminism, calling for new (right-wing) spaces of female political involvement.
In October 2016, a massive Women's Strike (the so-called Black Protest) took place in Poland, part of a mass mobilization against a legislative initiative introducing a total ban on abortion (see Korolczuk 2016). Although a more restrictive law on abortion was ultimately passed in 2020 following a Constitutional Tribunal verdict, similar ideas continue appear in the public discourse, pointing to the growing tensions between liberal and illiberal civil society (Kopecký and Mudde 2003). While the former is defined by progressive, liberal forces, the latter includes, among others, anti-gender, anti-feminist, anti-LGBTQ+, and Catholic movements (see Korolczuk and Graff 2018; Kováts 2017). The women's protests in 2016 and 2020 were met with criticism from such milieus as the Confederation Liberty and Independence, the radical-right coalition, and various radical-nationalist movements (such as the All-Polish Youth and the National Radical Camp). Interestingly, while nationalists have skewed predominately male, an increase in women's participation has recently been observed. Although there is still a gender gap in female support for radical-right parties, it has narrowed considerably (see Gutsche 2018) – a change that was noticeable in the October 2019 Polish elections. The Confederation, a radical-right party, achieved 6.81% of the vote and elected 11 male MPs to parliament. In terms of female electoral behaviour, 9% voted for Confederation. The largest number of women (43%) voted for the governing right-wing party, Law and Justice (PiS). Importantly, although PiS resists the (liberal) feminist concept of women's strategic gender interests (e.g. greater gender equality through access to power and overturning existing gender stereotypes), it also advances certain practical gender interests (improving women's economic position by increasing family benefits) (Grzebalska and Zacharenko 2018: 87). One of the main welfare instruments supporting families is the government programme Family 500 plus.1 In the case of the free-market Confederation, female voting behaviour is likely also motivated by their economic views, e.g. support for lower taxes and a smaller welfare state – ignoring the sexist comments on women made by Janusz Korwin-Mikke, one of the party's leaders. Electoral behaviour reflects some of the general tendencies and attitudes in Polish society; it is thus crucial to explore the female face of the nationalist involvement. Although women's participation in the radical right has been met with a growing interest (Minkenberg 2017; Pettersson 2017; Norocel 2018; Campion 2020), there is still a gap in the literature on female participation in extra-parliamentary radical nationalist movements (Félix 2017; Coffé 2018), especially in Central and Eastern Europe. This article is thus focused on female nationalists: women who do more than vote and are actively involved in radical-nationalist organizations – as its members and publicists. Radical nationalism – part of a broader radical-right world – is understood as a discourse based on nativism, defence of a (ethnically, culturally, religiously) homogenous nation, and rejection of liberal democracy (seen as one of the threats to their desired vision of the nation) (Kajta 2020).
The institutionalization of women's extra-parliamentary nationalist activism began in earnest in 2013, after the establishment of the National Movement and the initial success of the Independence Day Marches, reflecting a desire to attract potential supporters and create spaces for ‘women's issues’ (such as the anti-abortion fight) within the movement. Within the National Movement, a dedicated organization (Women for the Nation) and a women's section were established, although both soon ceased to exist due to internal conflicts, and the National Women's Organisation, a reference to the interwar women's organization, was founded instead. Beyond these female-oriented structures, women belong to other nationalist initiatives such as the All-Polish Youth and National Radical Camp. There is also another – relatively new but not yet fully institutionalized – female nationalist wing, represented by former members of the National Radical Camp, among others. One of its members also founded a new anti-capitalist and nationalist organization, Polish Labour. Based on an analysis of articles published by women on websites connected to radical-nationalist milieus, this article contributes to the ongoing discussion on gender and the radical right. However, instead of analyzing wider statements about gender by radical-right organizations, it explores the voices of female nationalists themselves. How do they discursively construct femininity and masculinity? How do they understand gender roles, and what arguments are used to justify their positions?
An illiberal transformation and anti-gender mobilization
In Poland, since at least few years, the activity of illiberal civil society has increased (see Kotwas and Kubik 2019). The radical nationalist milieus - framing itself as a defender of traditionalism and national identity - play significant role in that process – part of a broader illiberal transformation also visible in other Central and Eastern European states, where the ‘rejection of liberal democracy is a way of opposing globalization, neoliberalism, the monopolization of political processes by elites, as well as the influence of transnational institutions like the EU or UN on national politics and values’ (Grzebalska and Pető 2018: 2).
One component of these broader processes undermining liberal values in Europe and beyond is the recent rise in anti-gender mobilizations. The campaign against ‘gender ideology’ began as a Catholic project as ‘a response to the recognition of sexual and reproductive rights in the UN rights system at the 1994 UN conference on Population and Development in Cairo and the 1995 Beijing conference on Women’ (Paternotte and Kuhar 2018: 10). Today, this resistance to ‘gender ideology’ or ‘genderism’ has manifested itself in the struggle against sex education, abortion, LGBTQ+ rights, antidiscrimination policies, government gender policies (e.g. the Istanbul Convention), sexual liberalism and the notion of gender itself. Although the shape of anti-gender mobilizations depends on a given political and cultural context, ‘politics of reproduction, kinship and hierarchy of power between genders are always at the center’ (Graff and Korolczuk 2022: 6). Gender, as a symbolic glue, functions here as ‘a symbol of everything that is wrong with the current state of politics’ (ibidem; cf. Kováts and Põim 2015; O’Sullivan and Krulišová 2020). Both radical-nationalist and anti-gender movements (often co-created by the same organizations and people) draw on ‘politics of fear’ (Wodak 2015) and are driven by cultural and political narratives that respond to people's needs and give them a sense of belonging, national pride and symbolic recognition (Kajta 2020).
Mobilization on the radical right. Why do women participate?
As a whole, studies exploring the radical right's mobilization engage on three analytical levels: the macro (economic, cultural and political conditions), the meso (organizational factors), and the micro (individual motives and values) (Caiani 2019). With its focus on the writings produced by nationalists, this article intertwines the meso and micro, without overlooking wider, regional and gender-based macro explanations. Previous research has focused on three explanations for the success of the radical right in various countries. Firstly, scholars argue that economic deprivation, neoliberal economics and the global economic crisis led both to a growing number of grievances and a wider sense of insecurity (Ost 2005). Secondly, many argue that political detachment, dissatisfaction with existing political systems and a growing lack of interest in institutions and political elites (including the EU) have also increased the appeal of radical-right politics. Thirdly, scholars highlight the significance of specific cultural moments – sparked by specific national and regional historical legacies and post-1989 experiences (Bustikova and Kitschelt 2009; Pankowski 2010), transnational issues such as the refugee crisis, multiculturalism, globalization and post-modernization, and social conflicts – that subsequently unleashed a ‘cultural displacement’ in response to various identity dilemmas (Giddens 1991). The latter are expressed in the division between (neo)traditionalism and liberalism (Norris and Inglehart 2019; Melito 2021) and between nativism and ethno-cultural pluralism (see Caiani 2019).
Against this backdrop, this article focuses on the intersection of the radical right and gender to explore the discourses on gender reproduced within the radical-nationalist movement – one of the actors involved in anti-gender mobilizations. Although the research questions addressed here do not focus on women's voting behaviour or their participation in parliamentary politics, it draws inspiration from the body of comparative research on gender and radical-right parties. Interestingly, these studies focus on the gender gap to understand why fewer women than men support these parties. Moreover, most studies discussing the gender gap focus on Western European countries (Coffé 2018; Immerzeel et al.2015); few scholars compare the Western and Central Eastern Europe (Harteveld et al.2015). Importantly, generalizations are difficult due to the crucial importance of cultural legacies and national, regional, and historical contexts (Immerzeel et al.2015; Minkenberg 2017).
Nonetheless, it is possible to point to a few major explanations why women tend to be significantly less represented among radical-right voters than men. Firstly, socio-structural differences, including occupational status: Compared to men, women (who are more likely to be employed in the public sector) are less likely have strong class-based attachments or compete with migrants on the labour market, and thus, are less attracted to anti-migrant radical-right discourses (Coffé 2018). Interestingly, this socio-structural component of the gender gap is larger in post-communist countries than in others (17 per cent v. 5 per cent) (Harteveld et al.2015). Secondly, as radical-right parties tend to reproduce traditional gender roles and see women as mothers and wives, many women prefer to follow more emancipatory movements. But, as mentioned above, for women whose economic situation is less stable, women's rights and gender equality become less important than ensuring better social welfare programmes for them and their families. Thus, radical-right parties with family-oriented welfare plans (as Law and Justice) are able to attract economically disadvantaged female voters. Thirdly, some argue that women are more empathetic and less authoritarian than men (Coffé 2018). However, other studies show that although women – no matter where on the continent they live – generally do not differ from men in their level of authoritarianism, nativism, and discontent with democracy, radical-right issues are less salient for them (Harteveld et al.2015). Fourthly, women's greater involvement in religious practices and church life is considered a potential factor in why they are less likely to vote for the radical right (Coffé 2018). Importantly, the relationship between right-wing politics and the church differs depending on the national context – unlike in Western Europe, the Church in CEE countries tends to be an ally of radical-right actors and thus, religiosity can have the reversed effect there (Pankowski 2010). What these studies lack are the perspectives of right-wing women themselves, which would allow for more satisfactory explanations about the motivations behind women's political choices. Taking into account both the narrowing gender gap (Gutsche 2018) and the growing proportion of women within the nationalist movement, this study refers not to voters but activists who dedicate a portion of their lives to time-consuming organizational work.
Some argue that the presence of women is merely the result of their own passivity or a desire to soften the image of the movement – in short, that ‘they are duped or coerced by men into participating’ (Mattheis 2018: 129). While following the path of a family member is a popular explanation for the turn toward nationalism, it is often presented not as reflective process, but simply as the absorption of a male family member's worldviews. However, studies show that women's involvement is in fact a personal choice, rather than the result of persuasion (Blee 1996; Félix 2017; Kajta 2020). Women are able to ideologically support the radical right due to the coherence between their own worldview and the movement's discourses. Similar to the cultural backlash thesis (Norris and Inglehart 2019), female involvement in the radical right can be understood as a defensive reaction to changing gender roles and the ostensible hegemony of liberal discourses (Melito 2021). Female radical-right supporters ‘seek to be understood as “modern” women who have overcome what they see as the “false-consciousness” of leftist movements such as feminism, multiculturalism, and anti-racism’ (Mattheis 2018: 138). Mattheis also points to the existence of ‘tradwife’ culture and the broader framework of a ‘new maternalist logic’, rooted in ‘women's social, economic and political claims in their role as mothers’ (2018: 154). Conservative women interested in reproducing traditional gender roles can experience ‘emancipation fatigue’ or feel devalued by feminists and consequently find themselves better represented on the political right (cf. Dietze 2020). Considering that women's political involvement is often viewed in contradiction to the picture of gendered nationalism (with its clear division between public-male and private-female2) (Yuval-Davis 1997), ‘women's engagement in radical-right movements can be explained by how these women make sense of politics: they regard the state as an analogy of the traditional family and transfer its hierarchical and gendered roles into politics’ (Petö 2010 in Pettersson 2017: 19). Simultaneously, studies conducted in Western Europe show the growing significance of femonationalism, understood as a convergence between right-wing nationalists, feminists, and neoliberals who – with reference to the protection of women's rights – share a politics of Islamophobia, based on the belief that gender relations in the West are more advanced than in patriarchal Muslim cultures (Farris 2017: 7–8). Some radical-right female politicians and activists thus see themselves as ‘protectors’ of women's rights and are attracted by newer radical-right discourses that combine a less traditional vision of gender roles and anti-immigrant sentiments (Pettersson 2017).
Finally, similar to male activists, clear identity-based motives can be discerned, including the search for spaces of belonging and a group of like-minded people (Fangen 1999; Linden and Klandermans 2007); a movement can become a safe, familiar space, offering a feeling of purpose through socially relevant grass-roots work. As the Polish radical-nationalist movement presents a heterogenous spectrum of activities, activists can position themselves as patriotic educators, social workers, and defenders of Polish history, tradition and identity (Kajta 2020). Aniko Félix has also noted this phenomenon in her research on women in Hungarian radical-right milieus, including Jobbik. The multifaced character of the radical-right constitutes a favourable space for women with different needs and gives them various opportunities to be recognized (2017: 98). Based on her interviews, Félix distinguishes three types of female activists: cultural keepers, focused on biological and cultural reproduction; fighters joining military or paramilitary organizations who appreciate the feeling of gender equality; and spiritual women who use radical-right ideology to generate a feeling of superiority for themselves (2017: 98). Similarly, Kristy Campion (2020) distinguishes six forms of women's participation: violent actors, thinkers, facilitators, promoters, activists, and exemplars who ‘find identity security through these varied forms of participation and by virtue of their interaction in extreme and radical right ecosystems’.
Methodological note
The core of this article is based on a discourse analysis of 36 selected articles, published between 2014 and 2020 by female nationalists on websites connected with nationalist milieus. After initial desk research, six websites (kierunki.info.pl, Narodowcy.net, Media Narodowe, Narodowa Łódź, Szturm!, Praca Polska) were selected: the key was the presence of female nationalist voices. Importantly, while some authors are known through their organizational activities, it was harder to uncover if others were formal members of specific nationalist organizations or were simply publishing on these websites; based on their visibility on these platforms, it can be assumed that they belong to radical-nationalist circles. In a next step, the articles written by women and dedicated to gender roles and women's position in the movement were sampled. The analysis – conducted with Atlas.ti software – focused on discursive strategies used in the construction of notions of masculinity and femininity and the definition of gender roles. Their strategies are understood as ‘a more or less intentional plan of practice (including discursive practice) adopted to achieve a particular social, political, psychological or linguistic goal’ (Reisigl and Wodak 2016: 33).
The analysis reveals the heterogeny of the movement, wherein the publication of these writings serves as a platform for an internal discussion between two distinguishable wings of female nationalists: (dominant) nationalist conservatives and (less present) nationalist quasi-feminists. Although nationalism constitutes the common ground for both types, the former is more closely linked to a conservative vision of society (moral conservatism promoting conventional family structures, traditional values and gender roles), whereas the latter is more critical and feminist-oriented, arguing for the enhancement of women's position within and outside the movement. While the first type is represented by women connected with well-known radical-nationalist organizations (the All-Polish Youth and National Radical Camp), the second type is a more radical voice represented by two activists, both former members of the National Radical Camp (8 out of 36 articles).
In the name of a gendered nation?
The analysis of the published material reveals that female nationalists tend to reproduce the concept of a gendered nation, according to which a woman's role is primarily as the biological and cultural reproducer of the nation (Yuval-Davis 1997; Graff 2008). They thus promote an image of women focused first on motherhood and then on social activism. One of the strategies here is to present maternity as a significant moral responsibility, a national mission, and a privilege taken from women by liberals and feminists:
Women have to take their mission of raising the future generation seriously, [the mission] is first of all carrying out motherhood, in preparing a man to live in society, in directing a new generation on the path of redemption by raising them with Catholic values and discipline. Giving life and bringing up a man is a deeply important task, extremely downplayed nowadays. [To Polish women]
Importantly, abortion is a major issues for both female nationalists and the nationalist discourse more generally (Graff 2008). Since women assure both the coherence and survival of a nation, ‘reproductive politics – particularly restrictive abortion laws – have become the territory on which conservative social ideologies play out fantasies of the ideal female-as-mother’ (Holc 2004: 756). Abortion is presented as murder and the rejection of the rights of the unborn. A myth widespread in nationalist discourses also holds that Adolf Hitler was the first to legalize abortion in Poland. This intertwining of abortion and totalitarianism is part of a more complex politics of fear (Wodak 2015), full of emotion and references to a dangerous ‘them’ destroying ‘our’ well-known world, killing ‘our’ children, and overtaking ‘our’ ontological security, where everyone's identity remains well-defined. Discussions about abortion also reveal an incoherence in the analyzed discourse. On the one hand, women have a significant role in the nation as keepers of biological and cultural traditions. On the other, they need to be educated and ‘guarded’ as they are easily manipulated – due to their ‘emotional nature’, which stands in opposition to the rationality of men – by potential enemies (such as feminists during the Black Protests) hostile to the ‘old order’:
Women are told that killing their children is their right. The truth is that they are forced to abort, and that is their biggest life tragedy and trauma. […] If feminists would have the goodwill to help women, they would not have defined a person's murder as a right, but do everything to protect women from being forced to do the ultimate. [The times of women's subjugation]
Let's promote activism among women, not passivity and inadequacy. A woman was created not only to be a mother and wife; she has to have her place on the barricades of national interest, not of leftist degenerations. There will be no great nation without great women. [To emancipate from emancipation]
Among the many pro-life activists, the vast majority are supporters of the minimal state, a savage capitalism that has no place not only for seriously ill children, but for less resourceful people in general. You don't care what the quality of life of the child and the family will be like once it comes into the world. You don't care about the drama of the individual. You only care about your petty bourgeois conscience and its peace. [Time for #ProSocialLife]
Femininity and masculinity: missing an imagined, conservative past?
While the conservatives highlight the complementarity of gender roles and simultaneously present equality as a fact, quasi-feminists avoid talking about gender differences and assigned gender roles entirely. The nationalist conservatives tend to confirm a traditional vision of gender roles, embedded in the division between public-male and private-female spheres (Yuval-Davis 1997): men should be strong and responsible for the family; women – sensitive, humble, caring. On the one hand, the nationalist conservatives see women as ‘a model of delicacy, subtlety, and beauty’, ‘a gift from heaven which needs to be cared, protected, and first of all respected’. Femininity is presented as something under threat in the contemporary world, requiring its defence. It is presumed that women (by adopting feminist ideas) have deprived themselves of their power and their status as ladies. On the other hand, some of the entries written by the conservatives and all of those written by the quasi-feminists promote the image of women as strong, active, and independent. Additionally, the latter avoid referring to an individual's appearance entirely, presenting discussions on women's clothing as naïve and irrelevant. One article openly opposed the stereotypical image of the Pole as a beautiful ‘Slav with a garland on her head standing in the middle of cornfields’ and instead promoted the image of the woman-fighter.
According to the conservative discourse, being a woman is a privilege that feminists and liberals aim to destroy by intentionally blurring gender differences:
Today, even the words ‘woman’ and ‘man’ are not so easy to define. Everyday life imposes on us tolerance for gender norms that discriminate against biological sex […] Feminization, metrosexualism, transsexuality, gender. All of that kills the image of a human being, his way of behaving and living in society. [Pathology, degeneration, and gender war]
A boy needs masculinity because his natural role is to be the family protector. Hopefully, it won't be necessary, but a man is the one who has to be responsible for being the financial pillar of the family and for standing on the right side of a gun during war. [Contemporary image of man – where did feminism lead]
Feminists as the enemies: between the rejection of feminism and negotiating nationalist quasi-feminism
Since female nationalists often define themselves in opposition to feminists, it is worth noting how they construct feminism discursively. Two main tendencies can be highlighted: a rejection of feminism as such and a renegotiation of a new definition of feminism suitable to nationalists. Each have the same starting point: the feeling that liberal feminists dominate the public discourse, appropriate the heritage of emancipation, present themselves as the voice of all women, and dictate what women should think and do. Female nationalists thus call for the recognition of a conservative/nationalist alternative:
Feminists do not care about women's rights, because they only care about their interests. Our voices need to be heard and cannot disappear within the screams of hysterical female individuals. Leftist activists have to know that they usurp the right [to speak on behalf of all women] and do not represent the voice of all Polish women. [National women have to have their voice!]
By framing feminism as an anti-woman ideology, which forces them to work, deprives them of their femininity, and rejects the primacy of child-rearing, conservative nationalists present themselves as the guardians of dignity, femininity, tradition, religion, and morality. Nationalists draw on a new maternalistic logic (Mattheis 2018), ‘emancipation fatigue’ (Dietze 2020) and arguments used by the anti-gender movement (Graff and Korolczuk 2022), that depict them as a voice for undervalued stay-at-home mothers who did not succumb to the pressure of neoliberal multitasking (expressed in a woman's fulfilment both at home and professionally):
We demand support for women who want to educate and reconcile their family life with it, as well as for those who, for the sake of their family, give up their professional life […] We do not agree with the contempt in the media, stigmatizing mothers who sacrifice themselves for the family as those ‘who sit at home and do nothing’. Feminists represent a different concept of femininity that cannot be defined as feminine. They do not fight for real women's rights. [Nationalist women must have a voice!]
Although none of the articles depict feminism positively, there are also some attempts, mainly by the quasi-feminist wing, to renegotiate its meaning by calling for a real welfare state and economic support for women and criticizing pro-life organizations and activists as unhelpful and ignorant. This does not imply support for the right to an abortion, but stems from the idea that the fight against the current law is counterproductive and immoral without real support for women with disabled children:
Today, feminism does not mean a fight against family or hatred towards men, but a kind of self-awareness, and such a feminism is definitely needed among nationalists as well! Why? There are a lot of reasons, but the most important is the fact that never before have so many women been involved in the activities of nationalist organizations. […] We cannot allow passiveness and weakness from any segment of us. [For feminism for Polish nationalism]
Despite these statements, it is still rare that nationalist activists call themselves feminists, likely because their image of an immoral, anti-women feminism does not allow for such a self-identification. They are also searching for new terms that can act as a substitute for ‘feminist’. One of the activists proposed the term ‘nrżetka’, which refers to national radicalism and suffragettes:
She is [nrżetka] strong, independent, conscious of her rights and duties to the nation and to her family. A love of life forces her to fight for those beings who, according to the current world, do not have a right to live, and empathy imposes the obligation on her to be socially active. She loves her nation and tries to do everything for its development. [Nrżetki – women of future]
Discussion
Based on the analysis of articles published by women on nationalist websites, this article explored the main ways in which female nationalists understand both gender roles in society and their involvement in the movement, revealing how their worldviews are connected to two main streams in female nationalism: a (dominant) nationalist conservatism and a (less present and more radical) nationalist quasi-feminism. Table 1 summarizes the main differences and similarities between them.
. | Nationalist conservatives . | Nationalist quasi-feminists . |
---|---|---|
Differences | cultural argumentation critics of blurred gender division (masculinization of women and femininization of men, nostalgia for the imagined past): the need to protect image of men as strong and responsible for the family, and women as humble, caring, and emotional presenting gender quality as an ‘already achieved’ fact – no need to fight for it | cultural and economic argumentation and ‘spaces’ of feminist thinking emphasis on practical gender interests: access to well-organized welfare state as a precondition for restricted abortion law, paying attention to systemic discrimination of women-mothers, anti-capitalist statements fighting for women's equal position within and outside the movement renegotiation of feminism and search for new categories that can combine nationalism and feminism |
They share: | common enemies: liberalism and feminism resistance to/escape from ‘emancipation fatigue’ (Dietze 2020) calling for recognition and respect for mothers and housewives presenting ethnic nationalism and anti-migrant statements presenting nationalist activity as a duty |
. | Nationalist conservatives . | Nationalist quasi-feminists . |
---|---|---|
Differences | cultural argumentation critics of blurred gender division (masculinization of women and femininization of men, nostalgia for the imagined past): the need to protect image of men as strong and responsible for the family, and women as humble, caring, and emotional presenting gender quality as an ‘already achieved’ fact – no need to fight for it | cultural and economic argumentation and ‘spaces’ of feminist thinking emphasis on practical gender interests: access to well-organized welfare state as a precondition for restricted abortion law, paying attention to systemic discrimination of women-mothers, anti-capitalist statements fighting for women's equal position within and outside the movement renegotiation of feminism and search for new categories that can combine nationalism and feminism |
They share: | common enemies: liberalism and feminism resistance to/escape from ‘emancipation fatigue’ (Dietze 2020) calling for recognition and respect for mothers and housewives presenting ethnic nationalism and anti-migrant statements presenting nationalist activity as a duty |
Generally, female nationalists and their organizations are more focused on issues such as the family, tradition, anti-abortion work, the patriotic education of new generations, emotional labour, and taking care of people in need. In the case of nationalist conservatives, women are pictured as cultural keepers of national (including Catholic) identity, which reflects a gendered vision of the nation (Yuval-Davis 1997; Graff 2008), and has sparked a call for a conservative, alternative emancipation (Félix 2017). Feminism is constructed as a modern enemy interested in abolishing traditional womanhood and the privileges of staying at home. Female nationalism can thus be situated within the framework of a cultural backlash (Norris and Inglehart 2019), a (neo)traditionalist reaction to cultural displacement (Melito 2021), and a nostalgia for a conservative society. In response to the complexity and uncertainty of the contemporary world, some search for strictly-defined points of references – including the imagined, ‘well-ordered’ past. The patriarchal family (with a strong, protective man and emotional, protected woman) – as a metaphor for the nation – can be understood as a guarantee of stability and ontological safety (Giddens 1991; Graff 2008).
The quasi-feminist nationalists do not share this conservative vision of gendered nation or the strong attachment to religion. As they challenge the conservative division of gender roles within the nationalist movement, present anti-systemic positions and focus more on practical gender interests, they can be understood as a peculiar kind of quasi-feminist nationalist thinkers. Although the representatives of both types search for agency within the movement, the quasi-feminists renegotiate the notion of feminism and call for new spaces of female political involvement. The latter vision of female nationalism is newer and still marginal within the nationalist movement. Their demands are more economically oriented, anti-capitalist, and less nostalgic about the ‘old order’. Compared to the Hungarian fighters described by Félix (2017), not all women here seem to perceive their equality in the movement as achieved and obvious. Thus, their fight takes place within the movement as much as outside it, which makes their alternative emancipation more complex.
In both types, we can see that radical-nationalist involvement can be a kind of resistance to/escape from the neoliberal pressures of multitasking, ‘emancipation fatigue’ (Dietze 2020) and the search for fulfilment in both private and professional spheres. Although both types are critical of feminism and liberalism, conservatives emphasize the notion that feminism is interested in forcing women to work and reproducing the image of strong, successful woman as the only ideal to follow, whereas quasi-feminists are more critical of capitalism and a poorly organized welfare-state. Against this backdrop, both nationalist conservatives and quasi-feminists call for the recognition of stay-at-home mothers and housewives. While they do not necessarily represent a more American tradwife culture, their claims can be seen as a part of a ‘new maternalist logic’ (Mattheis 2018). Interestingly, contrary to quasi-feminists, conservatives do not understand these wider economic and social inequalities and challenges in gendered terms.
In line with other research on the involvement of female nationalists (Félix 2017; Campion 2020), the activists presented above can be seen as promoters of radical-nationalist beliefs who reproduce a nationalist image of women as cultural keepers and thinkers by expanding the influence of radical-right narratives and renegotiating women's roles within the nation. Importantly, contrary to West European contexts, discourses (re)produced by female nationalists in Poland are (as of yet) not as focused on anti-migrations sentiments. Although they reproduce the need to defend an ethnically homogenous nation, and use anti-Islam statements, it is not a major line of argumentation in the discussion of gender roles. Instead of migrants, liberals and feminists play the role of enemy here, revealing one potential difference in the discursive opportunity structures between Central and Eastern and West European countries. While, in some countries, the radical right has developed a more nuanced stance on LGBTQ+ rights or gender equality (Pettersson 2017), the conservative-religious context of contemporary Poland does not require the radical right to move towards more liberal positions in order to achieve its goals.
Based on texts published by female nationalists, this article offers new insights into the discourses (re)produced by them on official nationalist websites. The analysis should be followed by further research on the biographies and everyday practices of female nationalists. How do they combine their political involvement and their personal lives? How do conservatives and quasi-feminists differ? Are they mothers and keepers of cultural norms themselves or do they follow other – less traditional – patterns? As the analysis covers texts published between 2014 and 2020, some of which critiqued the 2016 Black Protests, any discussions of the most recent women's strikes that followed the Constitutional Tribunal's restriction of the abortion law were not included. As the abortion debate constitutes a significant component of this discourse, it would be important to track any potential changes in the discursive strategies surrounding it: If and how has the new law influenced their arguments and goals? Furthermore, how has it influenced the quasi-feminist discourse, considering that some opposed the restrictions? Finally, considering the cross-national similarities in the arguments of female nationalists, a study of their transnational circulation is also a vital next step.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Footnotes
The program was created in 2016. A monthly benefit of 500 PLN is paid for every child under 18 years old, regardless of family income.
Importantly, based on the public opinion research (Gwiazda 2017), some elements of the concept of gendered nation are observable more generally in Polish society. Although a majority of Poles support gender equality (especially in terms of the labour market, the right to education, relationships, or women in politics), the perception of women's priorities is more traditional: 48% of men and 51% of women believe that marriage is more important for a woman than a career; 30% of men and 25% of women agree that more rights for women mean more problems for men, and 24% of men and 21% of women agree that women are too emotional to be leaders.
References
Articles analysed:
Justyna Kajta is a sociologist, working as a Post-doc in the ULTRAGEN project, at SWPS University. She is also a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Analysis of the Radical Right (CARR). Her research interests include youth, social movements, political engagement, social inequalities and biographical method.