Why small ethnic minorities participate in politics: comparing Jews and Poles in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In ethnically divided consociational societies small minorities opt for different channels of political participation. They may do so to increase the importance of their group or challenge the consequences of limited participation channels, thus navigating the exclusion-amid-inclusion dilemma. However, it remains unclear how and why individuals belonging to small ethnic minorities with limited political opportunities, engage in politics. This article aims to explore and explain the levels of political participation of Jews and Poles in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It seeks to understand why some members of these communities choose to participate actively while others engage only in voting practices or refrain from getting involved. This is outlined using four different criteria: whether the act communicates a message about an individual's political preference, the potential degree of conflict, the effort put into the activity and the degree of cooperation with other people involved in the action. The qualitative analysis of this study relies on a series of semi-structured interviews and focus-groups conducted among the two ethnic communities.

Research on political participation explains that in established democracies people turn away from engaging in politics, notably from voting and political party membership (Putnam 1993, 2000; Norris 2002; Mair and Van Biezen 2001; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002, 2005; Stoker 2006). In new democracies or transition countries, the common emphasis is placed on the argument that the rates of political participation are astonishingly low among the general population (Van Biezen 2003; Millard 2004; Howard 2003; Kirbiš et al. 2012; Bačlija and Haček 2012; Marchenko 2016; Ekman et al. 2016). Studies capturing the dynamics of political participation generally concur that full rights to political participation represent a cornerstone of any democratic society – it is a right offered to the people, who then, in turn, enhance democratic stability and legitimize the system. But what happens in democratic power-sharing systems in which the right to political participation is reserved only to larger groups is a question that has been mostly dismissed in this plethora of scholarly work.

What is more, relatively little attention has been paid to the political engagement of small ethnic minority groups who have increasingly sought more collective rights in the post-communist contexts, including the right to political participation. In this constellation, previous research on political participation of ethnic minorities in post-communist space is rather scarce and so far, it has concentrated on the patterns (Caluser 2008; Kirbiš et al. 2012), participation models (Petričušić 2008; Visoka 2008; Bačlija and Haček 2012) or representation and conflict (Alonso and Ruiz 2005; Bieber 2008). What is more, empirical studies relating to participation in the post-Yugoslav context mainly analyse the role and meaning of ethnic political parties and the forms they take in ethnically diverse societies.

Correspondingly, the focus has been on the extent of participation – how and with what consequences national minorities participate – but little is known about the causes (i.e. why national minorities participate). This flow from ethnic minority context to political participation has been documented in a few studies which have predominantly focused on ethnic minority party formations and representation in post-conflict states of Western Balkans (Petričušić 2008; Visoka 2008; Taleski 2008; Sindik 2008; Kirbiš et al. 2012). However, these studies account for theoretical examinations and practical implications of legally enshrined mechanisms for political participation of national minority groups, an approach that is relevant for understanding national-level policies towards ethnic groups and the stances the latter form towards the state. Yet, understanding the interaction between political processes and individual trigger factors which spur political participation has been left out of such findings, and remarkably even more so when it comes to small national minorities that constitute large ethnic communities across the Balkans.

Considering that social and political experiences of national minorities in post-conflict and post-communist societies significantly differ from majority populations, understanding their present-day political activism in ways that not only monitor the levels but also present their trigger factors is a gap in knowledge that this work aims to address. Furthermore, there is a missing link between examining national minorities’ understanding of political participation processes and their importance for a group's political effectiveness. This article addresses this gap by explaining why ethnic minorities engage in political participation. It fills the empirical void by presenting an empirical case study of Jews and Poles from Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), thus emphasizing the empirical dimension of political participation of ethnic minority groups in a divided post-conflict and post-communist space.

The emphasis on the case of BiH is relevant from the perspective of post-conflict consociational spaces and legally enshrined limitations for the participation of non-majority communities. In addition, BiH struggles with the exclusion-amid-inclusion (EAI) dilemma whereby institutional inclusion of large groups necessarily implicates the exclusion of smaller groups or others (Agarin et al. 2018).¹ This situation allows for an examination of motives for the participation of marginalized ethnic groups in highly ethnically polarized societies, or as Agarin et al. (2018) point research on ‘how Others navigate the EAI dilemma under power-sharing rules’ (300). In order to assess this, the focus in this work is on conventional political participation forms.² The analysis is motivated by the question: why do citizens of a particular state participate in politics albeit institutionalized discrimination in a form of limitations for participation? The answer is approached empirically, through qualitative analysis at the individual level. Interviews and focus groups with members of two studied groups explore the reasons behind their political engagement and are used to explain the patterns of groups’ political participation. By examining the motivations for political participation and understanding whether they participate more as individuals or groups, this work seeks to identify the factors that trigger political participation. It aims to understand the importance and patterns of these groups’ political participation, as well as point to new and emerging trends among different generations in both communities. More generally, this work posits the political participation of small ethnic minority groups within the context of the EAI dilemma and contributes to understanding why and how small ethnic minorities engage in politics in a deeply divided society.

The rest of the article is structured as follows. The first section reviews the literature on motives for political participation under consociational arrangements, closely focusing on arguments relating to ethnic minority reasons for engagement. A short section discussing the methodological approach is followed by research design which is presented with a focus on gathered qualitative data. The third section includes a detailed discussion on trigger factors or better, explains the reasons for which the observed groups participate in politics in described contexts. The conclusion summarizes the main results, discussing the wider implications of studying small minority group political participation in post-conflict, divided settings, elaborating on possible new research paths.

In conventional political science literature on political engagement (Verba and Nie 1995; Barnes and Kaase 1979), formal political participation is most broadly described as a form of political engagement ‘that a dominant political culture recognizes as acceptable and that is related to institutionalized actions’ (Conway 1991). It is presumed to take place in an ordinary and politically stable society and as part of democratic development. Yet, in consociational systems dominated by constitutional power-sharing arrangements, the ‘ordinary’ and ‘stable’ implicate the assurance of peace and stability alongside democracy. Such spaces are mostly a product of deep ethnic divides which must translate into forms of power-sharing and joint governing. In this constellation, ethnic identities are disputed; what emerges is a political identity that is relevant for those groups who are recognized under such constitutional arrangements, but not for ‘others’. As Lijphart (2008) and McCulloch (2014) argue, in such systems exists a pre-selection – the number of included groups is predetermined as well as their corresponding level of influence. As Juon (2019) points ‘micro-minorities have been a frequent victim of such institutional ‘sidelining’ in power-sharing systems’. They are small enough to be clearly demarcated from larger groups and are statistically irrelevant to form a constituent group (McCrudden and O’Leary 2013; Stojanović 2018).

In BiH, the above conclusions transfer into reality, since Dayton Peace Accords which ended the 1992–1995 war and divided the country into two entities,³ also set a constitutional premise for power-sharing in an ethnically divided society in which the three main ethnic groups (i.e. ‘constituent peoples’ – Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs)⁴ share full rights to representation and participation in politics. Alternatively, a fourth constitutional category of ‘Others’ has limited such rights, which extend to their inability to run for the Presidency or be appointed to the second chamber of Parliament. In cases in which an ‘Other’ wishes to run for these two positions, he/she can exclusively change the ethnic declaration and become either a Bosniak, Serb or a Croat. As Stojanović (2018) points, in such cases, the real magnitude of political discrimination is limited, notably in instances wherein the primary reason behind a consociational arrangement is stability and peace in a deeply ethnically-divided context.

This status-quo of BiH's constitutional arrangement was challenged on several occasions, the first one being in 2009, when Dervo Sejdić, a prominent Roma representative and Jakob Finci, the leader of the Jewish community, filed a lawsuit against BiH at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). The Court ruled that the Presidency and the House of Peoples do not respect the ECHR because of reserved seats only for the three constituent groups. In addition, there is a legal prohibition for ‘Others’ to run for these two offices, but not for others at state or substate levels. This case⁵ prompted a challenge for the power-sharing arrangement in BiH and revealed that ‘Others’, albeit minuscule communities, may challenge consociational arrangements. In instances in which limited political rights are present, thus, small groups choose to navigate the EAI dilemma through higher institutional means (e.g. ECHR). Hence, the institutionalized political limitation is a motive that advances participation.

Precisely, when it comes to the motives for political participation, it is clear that they differ greatly in stable and unstable political systems. In traditional literature on measuring political participation,⁶ the motives for engagement are divided into two main groups. The first represents the so-called purely political motives, which are founded on people's notions about the necessity of political participation and the feeling of participation (the sense of civic duty). Of course, this scenario is based on the idea of a perfect citizen (homo politicus). According to Verba (1995), political participation is closely related to standards of active citizenship. Hence, only highly self-conscious individuals will also show high levels of political self-consciousness. Alternatively, there are non-political, ‘rational-selfish’ motives for political involvement. These motives rely on the assumption that people participate in politics in order to resolve their personal problems, which most often relate to their social status, prestige and feeling of significance. Translating this into consociational arrangements in deeply divided societies, it becomes clear that ‘purely political motives’ are not enough to drive participation of ‘Others’ due to limited rights. This indicates that the established system shapes their participation, and consequently representation, but also impacts their participation experiences (Agarin et al. 2018). Yet in so-called ‘corporate’ consociational systems (McCulloch 2014; McGarry and O’Leary 2009; O’Leary 2005), which aligns with Lijphart's (2008) notion of ‘pre-determination’, groups are assumed to be fixed, homogenous and externally constrained. Hence, as Stojanović (2018) points ‘it is clear that the challenge for Others primarily concerns corporate consociations’ (347). This is so because consociations put former belligerents at the center of political participation with the aim to preserve peace. As such, consociations do little to accommodate ethnic, linguistic and other identities, but instead fortress group identities that are made politically relevant (Agarin 2019a, 2019b). Yet, such arrangements, as in the case of Sejdić-Finci, spur the motives for political participation among smaller (unaccommodated) groups.

In cases in which conventional political participation is incited by latter motives, the underlying argument is that no form of political participation will occur if there is only group benefit or, in other words, if the personal benefit is missing or has to be shared with the group. Hence, we can talk about selective stimuli for political participation, or the ones referring to any actions that individuals find appealing enough to motivate them to engage in political processes. Notwithstanding the specific contextual basis of this article, but consistent with the previous claim, I want to reiterate that I employ a bottom-up minority-led approach which leaves space for their personal interoperations of the motives leading to participation, as well as their own view of political engagement. As it is quite clear, ‘Others’ are at the centre of political participation process as they, in the words of Agarin (2018) ‘must … decide how to position themselves with respect to power-sharing’ (305).

Ever since Putnam (1993, 2000) discussed the importance of social capital as a key variable in exploring political trust and participation, the social capital approach has become fashionable also in terms of studying the political participation of ethnic minorities. Hence, if operationalized in a sense of associational life within belonging to the social network, social capital is seen as an important feature that can influence both political trust and participation. Fennema and Tillie (1999, 2001) argue that different political participation of ethnic minorities can be tied to differences in the civic community, which is the amount of participation in ethnic associational life of groups. The latter is especially salient in consociational systems, as ‘Others’ must either find channels for participation from within the structures that are available to them, such as ethnic associations or seek to establish their own political parties. But in BiH, ethnic minorities are small. Thus, the latter option has never been prominent, but the former remains crucial. In examining the reasons for political participation of ethnic minorities, this interplay between social capital and associational belonging brings on about the cohesion of members. What this means is that individuals who choose to join an ethnic association will be exposed to more information, which can provide more political knowledge and increase chances for participation (Huckfeldt 2001). Nagle (2018) discusses three available strategies when it comes to positioning ‘Others’ within a power-sharing system and proposes the possibility of ‘constructive engagement’ whereby participation of ‘Others’ is said to occur for the purposes of pushing for reforms and ‘active resistance’. This calls for remedying the consequences of power-sharing induced marginalization.

Although the conducted studies are not specific to Eastern Europe, on which there is a critical lack of literature on the motives for the participation of minority groups, these works indicate that belonging to social networks increases the likelihood of political participation. The situation in post-conflict states of former Yugoslavia generally concurs with these findings, as shown in works by Visoka (2008), Taleski (2008) and Sindik (2008). Although their interpretations are quite general and limited to forms and patterns of political participation of national minority communities in post-Yugoslav contexts and descriptive in terms of explaining ethnic political party belonging and organization, they are useful for understanding that political activities often form the core of ethnic community life in countries where there are no limitations to such engagement. In BiH, where national minority groups are small and fragmented, but also constitutionally limited, the social capital perspective is more nuanced. In short, for such groups, associational networks, in a form of ‘constructive engagement’ (Nagle 2018), provide primary channels for organized and influential political activity.

The second perspective, which leans closely on to the social capital argument, is the influence of socio-economic status of group members. The perception is multi-dimensional and as such, it includes age, gender, educational levels, profession, income and religious preferences. Alternatively, scholars⁷ propose the individual resources model, which is driven by the notion that individual skills and resources such as knowledge, but also money, time and levels of individual's self-confidence can impact political participation, as these factors allow people ‘to meet the economic and psychological costs of political participation’ (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).

The transformative paradigm within which this research is posited leads to the reframing of the existing understanding of national minority political participation. This, in turn, calls for corresponding methodological decisions, which also need to be reframed. Additionally, Mertens (2007) claims that there must be a ‘conscious awareness of the benefits of involving community members in data collection decisions with a depth of understanding of the cultural issues involved, the building of trust to obtain valid data, the modifications that may be necessary to collect valid data from various groups, and the need to tie the data collected to social action’ (Mertens 2007: 220). Rooted in the epistemological assumption of the transformative-emancipatory paradigm, the cyclical method of research lies in the hands of the researched community and it allows for their participation at all times. In alignment with the said paradigm, the relations here were established by in-depth interviews and focus groups. Considering that this paradigm is ‘characterized by the intentional collaboration with minority and marginalized groups or those whose voice is not typically heard in particular issues’ (Shannon-Baker 2016: 326), the context within which transformative-emancipation is employed is precisely the one where there is a need for a framework that entails work towards social justice with marginalized groups (Mertens 2007). The importance of the transformative-emancipatory paradigm lies in the fact that it has allowed me to engage directly with the researched groups in the context of an unequal political right of the access to political participation of national minority groups in BiH, a matter that relates to an unequal political power relation between the constituents and the ‘Others’.

It sought to describe and understand the situation in its context – how two specific national minority groups describe and define political participation, against which background do they understand it, what drives their need or its lack thereof to participate in different political forms and how do they relate it to their minority status and the post-Dayton political context. Jews and Poles from BiH are subjects of this study due to their autochthone position, their current presence in politics and size. Jews and Poles are small groups,⁸ but still larger compared to other minorities (apart from Roma and Albanians). Equally important, both have displayed high levels of political participation during different parts of pre-Yugoslav and Yugoslav history. From a methodological perspective, the choice of BiH is adequate for two reasons: the country does not grant constitutional recognition to its national minorities, and secondly, members of national minorities have restricted rights to political participation.

In contrast to this, membership in minority associations and various types of communication with politicians were discussed through focus groups and interviews in order to generate answers on what are the trigger factors for such political engagement and how do these groups envision political participation in the minority context. I conducted seven focus groups, each of which consisted of 8–10 respondents and lasted anywhere from 1 to 2.5 h.⁹ Participants from the two groups were not mixed.¹⁰ Within groups, they were selected according to age. Consequently, there were three age groups, 18–30, 31–50 and 50 + . All participants were approached through their ethnic associations. Discussions took place during traditional gatherings or times during which associations were visited by a high number of members (women's or youth club meetings, Sunday school). All focus groups, including the gathering of participants and data collection, took place between June and September 2019.

I also conducted 11 semi-structured interviews. Interviewees were selected on the basis of purposive sampling (Patton 2002) according to a specific set of political, ethnic and geographical criteria. All interviewees were highly politically engaged individuals, influential representatives of their minority group or active association members. I define ‘highly politically engaged individuals’ as political party members or leaders of their associations, as well as minority representatives in the minority consultative body of the Parliament of BiH. Six were from Jewish (Sarajevo and Tuzla) and five were from Polish associations (Gradiška and Banja Luka). All interviews with Jewish representatives were conducted face-to-face. Interviews occurred in participants’ offices or public places. The five interviews that I conducted with Polish participants were conducted over the phone. All interviews lasted between 1.5–2 h and all were conducted in local languages. The profile of cited participants is presented in Table 1.¹¹

Once each transcript was completed, I returned to it to understand how respondent(s) understood their political participation and how they discussed their motivations. I employed thematic analysis (open and axial coding, Babbie 1998). The coding process was divided into three steps – open coding of data to identify the elements and formations of concepts that emerged; axial coding – to establish associations between those codes; selective coding – used to confirm the emerging relationships from the first two stages. This led to the formation of five themes which discovered the motives for each group's political participation separately. The first three relate to Jews, while the last two are common to Poles. A significant overlap is noted between motivations for both groups:

Jews: (a) dissatisfaction with social (discrimination) and economic issues; (b) dissatisfaction with the work of government when it comes to minority-specific problems¹² and(c) lack of political trust in the system;

Poles: (a) personal dissatisfaction with the current social and economic system and (b) dissatisfaction with the minority statuses in BiH;

In the section below, I employ direct quotes in order to illustrate the personal motivations of participants.

Jews in BiH have a significant history of formal political engagement through ethnic associations. Considering the absence of a kin-state through most of Jews’ presence in BiH¹³, no outside pressure motivated their engagement in politics. Since formal political participation implies individual motives to undertake political actions, citizens respond to political events in ways that lead them to achieve their own goals. This, in turn, infers that political actions are temporary, individualized and sporadic and that trigger factors behind such political engagement may differ within a social unit (i.e. national minority community). In consociational contexts, such temporary actions reveal the need of ‘Others’ to position themselves with respect to power-sharing arrangements (Agarin et al. 2018), but also demarcates their ability to participate in ‘active resistance’ (Nagle 2018) so as to ease the consequences of the power-sharing mechanism.

In line with the above, this research revealed three main themes observable as political participation triggers among Jews in BiH: dissatisfaction with socio-economic issues, dissatisfaction with the government when it comes to Jewish problems and low political trust. All three triggers are prompted by political issues, but this research also exposed that such trends fluctuate among different generations of participants.

Following one of three trends, Jewish conventional political engagement is linked to individual action (communication) that initially occurs under the auspices of Jewish ethnic associations (Fennema and Tillie 1999). Members of ‘Jewish community’¹⁴ across BiH engage in communication, but solely in instances in which they believe are either threatening to their group or concern their well-being. Hence, the problems they react to are ‘group-specific’. Jews communicate with political authorities mainly due to socio-economic issues which press their own people. An active male member of the Jewish community in Tuzla (57) speaks about this:

A male participant from Sarajevo (60) makes a convergent claim: Despite the fact that Jews are termed ‘Others’, it is not this feeling of ‘otherness’ that serves as their main driver of political engagement. Instead, they are concerned with everyday community problems, which are mirrored in issues such as financial help to families and student scholarships. Apart from the economic issues which, as the respondents claim, overwhelm all citizens and not just Jews, a large number of respondents also discussed their lack of optimism when it comes to the future of Bosnian politics, especially the political system. Likewise, after more than two decades of slow economic development of the country, many are also sceptical about economic prospects. Thus, this group of participants is motivated by factors that concern their political status and economic situation, but also that of other citizens (Verba 1995).

The constitutional categorization of Jews as ‘Others’ is the most cited social motivation for Jewish political engagement. A female participant from Banja Luka (81) says:

Another female participant from Banja Luka (66) adds: ‘Yes, we are like a sub-category of something bigger … like something or somebody is above us and we do as they do because we are ‘a sub’. And this keeps us stuck in place … ’ What is interesting here is that the respondents were mainly in their late fifties or sixties, all of whom actively participate in most activities of the Jewish association in their city. However, they do not affiliate with a political party.

In this constellation, a distinct group that demonstrated interesting reasons for political participation consisted of individuals between 18 and 30 years old. Generally, they engage in higher political activities.¹⁶ Although small in number,¹⁷ 10 of them claim to have engaged in politics outside of Jewish associations. Overall, it can be said that this group favours participation outside the ‘home-base’. All claim that they participate in politics because they do not trust the political system, while 10 say that they are unhappy with the economic progress of the country. A statement given by a Jewish male from Sarajevo (19) illustrates this:

What is significant is that this young group of respondents did not differentiate between ‘Jewish vs. Bosnian issues’ – the trigger for their political participation lies in the dissatisfaction with the lack of trust in the political system (Verba 1995; Putnam 2000). In fact, only two of them engaged because they wanted to solve issues that were only relevant to the Jewish community. A young female from Tuzla (24) said she joined a political party in an attempt to make this country a better place for everyone and not just Jews: When compared to the first group, the young can be termed highly active. The reasons for engagement also differ – while older generations are inward oriented¹⁸, the younger cohort reacts to political instability and is generally driven by low levels of trust in the system. This drives their attempt to influence such issues through political party membership.¹⁹ Such trends could be explained by the fact that all participants from this group claim that they strive in hopes for a better future and firmly believe that active political engagement can make an impact. A focus group female respondent from Banja Luka (26) summarizes this: Hence, it is obvious why formal political participation of Jews BiH occurs – it is a by-product of two social factors – constitutional discrimination and general dissatisfaction with country's ethno-national politics. It cannot be argued that there is a specific wave of mobilization, as it might be the case with long-standing democracies, but that we are rather looking into varying motives for participation among different cohorts of participants. In such a constellation, paths of participation take the form of both citizen communication with authorities and more direct channels, such as political party membership, but certainly go beyond mere electoral practices. This indicates a strong need to navigate the EAI dilemma (Agarin et al. 2018), but also implies a strong ‘active resistance’ (Nagle 2018) which occurs as a response to limitations induced by the existing power-sharing mechanism. A strong association with ethnic associations across the country furthers their political engagement (Fennema and Tillie 1999). Since Jews in BiH are a small minority, a positive trend remains in the fact that they are aware that channels of political influence exist and that they are able to clearly define them. Alternatively, Jewish political participation surpasses their minority position and ‘otherness’, as they engage for reasons that are ‘Jewish’, but also ‘Bosnian’. ²⁰Hence, they are not a politically marginalized minority group, as it might appear from their constitutional status. This confirms Stojanović's (2018) argument that ‘the real extent of the political of the political discrimination suffered by Others is very limited’ (350). Instead, they are closely integrated into a society about which they care; they aim to influence the political processes for the whole country and not just their group. They are not ‘inward-participants’, but are pressed by local problems, a finding which confirms the claims of Riesman and Glazer (1965) that unstable and repressive societies with great political dissatisfaction only drive political participation forward.

In an attempt to conceptualize and frame a debate on formal political participation of Poles within broader post-Dayton reality in BiH, several conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, Poles represent a very active community. Despite a strong connection with their kin-state, their political participation is not at least influenced by events in their distant homeland, but is rather tied to BiH. Data gathered from interviews and focus groups indicates that it is more the individuals, albeit his/her close ties with the community, that influence the political processes. Hence, the nature of political engagement actions of Poles is individualized, non-permanent reaction to current socio-economic circumstances (Nagle 2018). This means that Poles do not have a continuum in political participation, but rather that their involvement depends on the time and space in which problems concerning their own group become actualized. Thus, it can be claimed that formal political participation of Poles in BiH is sporadic.

However, the ‘why’ behind this group's political activism cannot be generalized on the group level, as it is the individual that decides. The results of this work reveal two observable triggers for political participation among Poles: dissatisfaction with the current social and economic issues, with the social aspect (dissatisfaction with the minority status)being particularly noticeable.

Unlike Jewish formal political participation which often occurs under the auspices of ethnic associations, this trend was not observable among members of the Polish community. However, triggers generally follow a similar trend. Poles choose to participate outside of their ethnic associations, or better, they do not perceive ethnic associations as the primary channel of participation. Thus, the findings from Fennema and Tillie (1999) do not stand for Poles.

The first discernible trend among Poles who were both members and non-members of Polish ethnic associations reveal that they prefer to get involved in politics for personal reasons,²¹ meaning that they are motivated by factors that transcend group issues. A male participant from a village near Prijedor (34), explains:

A female focus group participant (44) from Banja Luka, adds: Yet, just like in the case of Jews, a second group among Polish respondents that emerged and that should not be disregarded comprised of individuals between 18 and 30 years of age. Nevertheless, unlike Jewish respondents of this age, they do not seem to engage in political parties. This group was not significantly small as it had 22 participants. However, only 8 of them stated that they have or would engage in political acts such as party membership. Two participants from Prnjavor, both aged 19, explain their views: Their view explains the trends observed among the first group, but also generally reflects youth apathy towards political engagement observed in post-Cold War CEE states.²³

Related to the first trigger, a few interesting conclusions emerge also from focus group discussions on national minority status in BiH. A female participant from Gradiška (36) summarizes her observation:

Eleven other respondents from all focus groups offered similar answers. All of them realize that Poles are a small minority, which means that the influence they assert on the decision-making processes is minimal. This confirms the claim made Agarin et al. (2018) that the system in place shapes participation. More importantly, however, is the fact that Polish participants view themselves as members of a wider group (‘Others’) hence their motivation to participate is highly influenced by ‘discriminatory constitutional provisions’, ‘socio-economic status of second-class citizens’ and ‘generally bad social, political and economic standing of all national minorities in BiH’.²⁴ Thus, their need is motivated by the enshrined EAI model (Agarin et al. 2018; Agarin and McCulloch 2018). Interestingly, only one reason cited by Polish participants is strictly tied to the group. A male participant from Prijedor (46) explains: Another female participant (61), also from Prijedor adds shortly: These views suggest that most Poles from BiH realize that the advancement of all minorities’ rights is essential also for Polish political empowerment. However, there are individuals who do not always recognize the opportunity that general advancement of minority political rights may benefit their group. These views were isolated and mentioned exclusively by less educated and highly religious participants who reside in rural areas.

Generally, the above results demonstrate that Poles are more oriented towards the well-being of the regions and territories in which they live and the advancement of general national minority rights, than simply just ‘Polish issues’. A female participant from Gradiška (37), who claims to be highly politically active, explains:

Although Poles are constitutionally marginalized, their principal reasons for activism do not relate to political isolation or discrimination, but rather issues of social and economic nature. Lastly, it should be noted that Polish participants mainly fell into the age group from 31 to 45 and 50 to 70, not all of whom were active members of Polish ethnic associations in their cities. Several participants were also members of political parties and different social organizations.

Hence, it can be concluded that the trends in formal political participation of Poles in present-day BiH obviously do not follow a specific pattern, but occur as products of different socio-political economic and personal reasons, which are not only tied to minority marginalization and inequalities resulting from discriminating constitutional provisions but also group-specific reasons and individual motivations. Just as it was the case with Jews, the findings of Riesman and Glazer (1965), Verba (1995), Agarin et al. (2018) and Agarin and McCulloch (2018) are also confirmed through the case study of Poles. The findings of Fennema and Tillie (1999) appear less relevant for them. Bosnian Poles choose to observe politics as an act that goes beyond voting or discussion and realize that there are more direct ways of influencing the majority-led political system, despite the fact that channels for such engagement are stringently confined and inadequate. Thus, it can be concluded that Poles are not an isolated small minority that acts in a vacuum of its own citizen-led groups and associations, but an increasingly important political actor that originates from the national minority-realm in a majority-dominated state.

This article aimed to identify the main reasons for the conventional political participation of small and constitutionally marginalized minorities. The article is posited against the EAI dilemma in power-sharing consociational regimes and political participation background which goes in favour of social-capital argument and socio-economic status of group members. The findings suggest that there are essential differences in the patterns of political participation of Jews and Poles from BiH, while the type of participants variable is similar for both groups. In particular, there is a cross-generational absence of significant involvement in political acts that are considered high active.

The results showed that older generations of Jews and Poles exhibit completely different behaviours. Conversely, older members of the Jewish community from BiH are predominantly active members of Jewish associations, meaning that they participate in the events, but more importantly use the associations as a channel to further their political, social and economic goals. Findings reveal that older Jews prefer to engage in politics for group reasons, whereby issues that pertain to the group (Jews) transcend individual interests. The reasons for their political participation are great dissatisfaction with their current political, social and economic standing. On the other hand, older generations of Poles present a completely different picture. They are not active members of Polish associations and are motivated by factors that transcend group interests. The research has shown that Poles engage in politics for two different reasons – dissatisfaction with the current social and economic issues and the disadvantages deriving out of their minority status in BiH.

This work also examined the trends present among Jewish and Polish youth. Young Jews, if they choose to engage in politics, do so outside Jewish ethnic associations. Unlike the older generations, they do not see ethnic associations as channels for furthering their or their group's political, social and/or economic goals. This group of respondents represented the highly active group. Quite strikingly, younger Poles were low active political participants, but, unlike younger Jews, they were very active in their ethnic organizations. They were among the least educated participants who prefer to be active within Polish associations. The findings further reveal that the principal reasons for the absence of highly active forms of political participation among these groups rest in the alienation from the political system and the ability to induce change, which, again stems from the constitutional limits. More generally, the hope is that the empirical analysis of political participation trends among Jews and Poles from BiH may serve as a basis for future studies which engage in research on how ‘Others’ circumnavigate the EAI dilemma (i.e. in which ways and why). On the normative side, this work may serve to further advance the research on conceptualization of ‘Others’ in ethnically divided and consociational regimes in ways that call for the examination of triggers for political participation, and not just representation which appears difficult to achieve.

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Maja Savić-Bojanić is an Assistant Professor and currently also the Head of Department of Political Science & International Relations at the Sarajevo School of Science and Technology. She also holds the position of an honorary associate professor at the University of Exeter (UK) where she teaches within the Applied Security Strategy Programme. She is a recipient of numerous grants, projects and awards both at her home university and abroad. Her research interests lie in the area of national minority rights, ranging from political participation to cultural recognition, with a focus on small groups from Bosnia and Herzegovina. She has studied minority groups in post-communist states, but also focuses on issues of ethnic identity, Yugoslav cultures and Yugoslav identity and migration. She has published in peer reviewed journals, as well as books, studies and conference proceedings.