The forced migration from Ukraine after the full scale Russian invasion: dynamics and decision making drivers

Population migration has always been a noticeable phenomenon in contemporary Ukraine. Initially, it was of a predominantly voluntary nature, but the war has changed the nature of Ukrainian migration dramatically. Unprovoked Russian aggression in Ukraine started on February 2014 (Верховна Рада України 2015). International scholars frame this aggression as the ‘hybrid war’ since it extends beyond the traditional military domain (Hoffman 2007, 2022; Rasz 2015; Сегеда and Шевчук 2019; Clark 2020; Кундеус 2020). This aggression resulted in the occupation of Crimea and parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. Although international actors condemned it (United Nations Digital Library 2014), the Russian aggression made many Ukrainians become forced migrants. The following full-scale invasion that started on 24 February 2022 has multiplied their numbers.

Defining an individual as a forced or a voluntary migrant is a problematic task despite the fact that people try to avoid obvious hazards by fleeing abroad due to war: the risk of death, violence, forced deportation, etc. (Bivand Erdal and Oeppen 2018; Castles et al. 2014; Fussell 2012). Crawley and Skleparis use a term ‘categorical fetishism’ to describe the strict distinction between forced and voluntary migration, arguing that the dominant categories fail to capture adequately the complex relationship between political, social and economic drivers of migration (Crawley and Skleparis 2018). The analyses of the migrational behavior of the Ukrainian population after the full-scale Russian invasion could provide valuable insights into understanding the nature of displacement processes and informing policy development in this area. The term ‘forced migrants’ in this article covers both refugees from Ukraine and internally displaced persons within the country. With regard to refugees, I define them as individuals who were living in Ukraine before the Russian invasion and left the country due to the war. Following the guiding principles of the UN's definition on internal displacement, I define internally displaced persons as those who have been forced to flee or leave their places of habitual residence in order to avoid the effects of the Russian invasion, but have not crossed an internationally recognized Ukrainian state border.

The aim of this essay is to trace the dynamics of forced migration in Ukraine after the full-scale invasion and reveal the main drivers of population (im)mobility decisions in order to contribute to the existing literature in the field.

In this essay, I refer to the secondary analysis of multiple data sources from the Boarder Guard Service of Ukraine to the surveys carried out by international and local agencies (UNCHCR, IOM, CEDOS, Gradus). Forced displacement is a decision that is taken very quickly following a sudden shock (Verme and Schuettler 2021). To conceptualize the empirical data about the relocation decisions under the war conditions I rely on capability approach (Sen 1993) and the aspiration-capability framework (De Haas 2021). The data have limitations. Both the CEDOS and Gradus studies do not reflect the socio-demographic characteristics of the entire population of Ukraine. The Gradus study does not cover the inhabitants of rural areas and small towns. In the CEDOS survey, there is a significant overrepresentation of female respondents. The method of online data collection in both cases implies the exclusion of people who do not use the Internet. In the State Border Guard Service data, information about border crossings out of Ukraine during 24–26 February 2022, and border crossings into the country during 24–28 February is missing. However, these sources still provide decent data and are the best examples of available information about population migration after the full-scale invasion.

The origin of Ukraine's forced migration took place in early 2014. On 19–20 February 2014, Russia had occupied several objects of oil and gas production within the continental shelf of Ukraine and the Ukraine's Autonomous Republic of Crimea. The occupation of the certain territories of Donetska and Luhanska regions had started on 7 April 2014 (Верховна Рада України 2022). A full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 provoked a second wave of displacement (Mykhnenko et al. 2022) which was considerably more massive compared to the initial flows. According to UNHCR, 8.2 mln of refugees from Ukraine had been recorded across Europe as of 9 May 2022. The number of reported border crossings from Ukraine on the same date was 21.5 mln. The war did not stop the reverse flow of people. During 28 February–9 May, 12.7 mln border crossings to Ukraine have been recorded (The operational data portal of the UNHCR 2022).

The border crossing legislation under the war conditions is different for Ukrainian men and women. The female population is free to leave the country without any restrictions, whereas the majority of males aged between 18 and 60 are not allowed to go abroad according to the law ‘On Mobilization Training and Mobilization’. There are a few exceptions for single fathers, men who have three or more children under the age of 18, or a child with a disability, etc. These restrictions impact the gender composition of Ukrainian refugees in receiving countries, where a tiny proportion of men is usually detected by studies. For example, among the 1.1 mln of Ukrainians who received a state ID number in Poland (PESEL), 94% were women and children (UNHCR 2022b). Among the 34.1 thousand of Ukrainian refugees interviewed between May and September 2022 by trained enumerators from UNHCR and partners, 86% were female (UNHCR, 2022a).

The data of the State border guard service of Ukraine show that during the full-scale war the characteristics of population movements through the western part of the Ukrainian border have changed several times. Right after the invasion intensive population outflow took place. During 27 February until the end of March 2022, almost 2.3 mln of the border crossings out of Ukraine has been registered (Table 1). The invasion did not stop the inflow completely, nevertheless it was noticeably smaller at this period. On average almost 70 thousand cases of border crossing per day has been registered to leave the country. Movements in the opposite direction occurred almost 4 times less often. This has resulted in a huge negative net migration¹ – (−1.7 mln) in only 33 days. The higher outflow compared to inflow was observed also in April, with a smaller intensity then before though.

The worst case scenario of the full-scale Russian invasion has fortunately not taken place. Ukraine was able to protect the capital at the beginning of the war and free part of the occupied territories later. Under such conditions, the outflow of the population abroad decreased while the returning processes of the displaced persons occurred. During May–September 2022, the net migration rate was positive with average daily border crossings out of Ukraine ranging from 34 to 41 thousand. The highest average daily inflow (45.1 thousand) during this period was reported in August, the smallest (38 thousand) in May.

In the middle of the autumn 2022, Russia initiated a large-scale missile attack campaign against Ukraine, primarily targeting energy infrastructure but also inflicting damage on other civilian objects across the country, causing people's injuries and deaths. The first massive infrastructure attack occurred on 10 October 2022 and more than a dozen attacks have been launched till the beginning of Spring 2023. These attacks have disrupted power and water supplies for millions of people. This brutal tactic has triggered a significant shift in population movements along the western part of the Ukrainian border. The third phase, which can be referred to as ‘the cold season outflow’ has begun. During October 2022–February 2023, the number of crossing borders out of the country increased and the number of crossings into Ukraine decreased. It started with a moderate outflow and escalated to substantial levels of migration loss during the final two month of winter. Particularly noteworthy is the fact that, in December, the rates of both arrivals and departures nearly balanced each other. This phenomenon can be ascribed to a notable surge in arrivals, most likely attributable to the temporary homecoming of numerous refugees to celebrate Christmas and New Year with their families in Ukraine.

The Ukrainian power system, just like the entire country, managed to withstand throughout thе extremely harsh winter of 2022–2023. The data from the State Border Guard Service indicate that in March 2023 the number of arrivals to Ukraine once again exceeded departures. In April, this disparity became even more pronounced, most likely due to refugees returning home to celebrate Easter. At the beginning of May, visitors began to return to their countries of residence, resulting in a negative net migration. Additionally, the high holiday season starts in May, further increasing the outflow through the western border. Thus, the second spring after the onset of the full-scale invasion is characterized by the fluctuation of migration processes. At the end of April 2023 after a hiatus of nearly two months, Russians resumed actively launching massive missile strikes on civilian targets in Ukraine. The future evolution of the migration flows to/from Ukraine is hard to forecast precisely because of the inability to predict the scales of future missile attacks, possible infrastructure distractions and other factors.

To leave the country in a time of war or at least to move away from the hostilities looks to be a reasonable choice. However, the majority of the population stays despite the obvious danger. Empirical data show that the bigger part of the Ukrainians remained at their permanent place of residence. In the twelfth wave of the Gradus survey it was reported by 62% of respondents, the previous waves provided similar results. 37% of the audience changed their place of residence. Among them, 17% have already returned home as of the end of autumn 2022. It was mostly the residents of Kyiv and the North (Gradus 2022). The scales of internal displacement were much larger than the forced migration abroad. Only 19% of all relocation cases have been connected with crossing the Ukrainian border (Gradus 2022). Migration can mitigate war-related risks for the population but it is not an option for many people. The UN reported that around 12 mln people in Ukraine were unable to flee from the territories near the front line due to a dangerous road, destroyed transport infrastructure or lack of information about where to find safe housing.

When coping with the initial shock and other aspects of emotional burden induced by the Russian aggression, Ukrainians simultaneously had to arrange many practical things. The survey conducted during the first days of the full-scale invasion reports that the relocation associated decisions were the most important decisions mentioned by the respondents at that time period² (Bobrova et al. 2022). Тhe most significant division of the possible scenarios for people's further activity emerged via solving the dichotomy: ‘to stay where they were or to move somewhere else’. The latter option included moving to another part of Ukraine, migrating abroad, going into the home of relatives or friends. The respondents also actively mentioned the moving decisions which targeted other people, for example, evacuating children, relatives or people close to them.

Contemporary scholarship of migration often ignores the immobility analysis (Shewel 2020). Nevertheless, in reality people often stay in very dangerous locations despite the war. There are many reasons for that. Sometimes people do not have resources to move but sometimes they do not have motivation to do so. Scholarship should frame an option to stay as equally significant outcome variable, similar to a decision to migrate (De Haas 2021). The CEDOS study reports that the vast majority of their respondents had to decide whether to leave or stay at their permanent place after the start of the Russian invasion. This was a difficult decision for many of them (Bobrova et al. 2022). These data support the idea of combining mobility and immobility prospects into the single construction withing personal migration decision making. The fact that a choice between the option to stay or to go was a hard one to make shows that fleeing is not a self-evident decision for everyone. Of course, there are extreme war situations which leave no space for the reflections about what way of actions to choose. As, for instance, in cases of massive forced deportations of the Ukrainian civilians to Russia that where frequently reported after the full scale Russian invasion (Amnesty International 2022; European Parliament Delegations 2022). Whereas in the situation of ‘comparatively moderate insecurity’ people might choose the option which looks better for them.

Despite the fact that Russia attacking the entire Ukraine the security situation is not unified on the national level. Some territories are more affected than others and the situation is constantly changing. It is quite obvious that distance to hostilities impacts the persons feeling of safety. However it is also influenced by the effective work of utility systems, the availability of resources required to meet basic needs, the state of the bomb shelter (Bobrova et al. 2022). After the beginning of the massive missile attacks in autumn 2022 the perceived safety of the Ukrainian population decreased, especially among the residents of the West and Kyiv where the percentage of respondents who mostly felt safe decreased by 10 and 8 percentage points within only a few weeks (Gradus 2022). The lowest levels of perceived safety were revealed on the South and East of the country. However, the regional difference within Ukraine in this domain is rather small compared to the situation reported by Ukrainians relocated abroad. 46% of them felt safe most of the time whereas the same percentage among stayers was almost twice smaller (Table 2). Ukrainian refugees feel insecure even when they are abroad because their physical departure does not mean they have left the semantic field of war. It is not easy to overcome the traumas resulting from the Russian invasion. Additionally, the majority have relatives and friends left behind, abandoned properties, and simply want to keep the place they call home, even if they decide to remain in the countries that have provided them with shelter.

Sen (1993, 2010) suggests that scholars should distinguish between what people actually end up doing and what they were able to do. The issue of opportunities arises here. The empirical evidences show the significant inequality of migration opportunities of the Ukrainian population after the full-scale invasion. Their mobility decisions were shaped not only by the mere desire to escape the danger but also by the available opportunities to flee. Thus, the respondents of the CEDOS study often explained their departure-related decisions by the accessibility of the financial resources, transport for departure, housing, possibility to work, availability of connections into the safe(r) localities, the state of health (physical and psychological) (Bobrova et al. 2022).

The quantitative data confirm the idea about the divergence between the wishes and opportunities to relocate due to war among the Ukrainian population. Almost two-thirds (62%) of the surveyed population reported they would rather stay at current location in case of aggravation of war events (Table 3). At the same time, almost half (49%) were not able to relocate anywhere. There was also a difference between the shares of the respondents who have the possibilities to relocate (withing Ukraine or abroad) and those who would rather do it. There were more people with possibilities to leave the current places compared to those who are willing to do so.

Migration management requires sorting migrants into the forced or voluntary bureaucratic categories (Bakewell 2021). At the same time, the reality is more nuanced. The migration process can be prolonged in time. Although the first choice to migrate might be voluntarily (or involuntarily), the consequence choices might be different (Olsaretti 1998). For example, migrants could be forced to leave but then make voluntary choices about the direction of travel. Available opportunities matter (Olsaretti 1998), and the perception of such alternatives is shaped by a person's beliefs and access to information (Colburn 2008). Ukrainian migrants acted under a lot of uncertainty and information warfare. Thus, one can assume that many Ukrainian migrants made their primary decisions to leave the country as principally forced, however their later decisions were more voluntary. More studies are needed to address these nuanced dynamics.

Forced migration is a crucial population response to armed conflicts, as evidenced by numerous conflicts around the world including the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian war. The western part of the Ukrainian border has experienced several shifts in migration patterns after the full scale invasion. An intensive outflow occurred from the end of February to April 2022, followed by the initial return and stabilization of cross-border movements from May to September 2022. The cold season outflow took place from October 2022 to February 2023. The Spring 2023 has introduced the fluctuation of migration processes. However, it is probable that over the next months the post winter trend will become evident.

The traditional approach in migration literature assumes that during relatively stable peaceful times sedentary life is the norm and migration is a deviation. In the context of war, the literature often presents a contrasting perspective. However, staying immobile is just as normal as moving away from danger. While forced migration is an important response to armed conflicts, particular groups of people remain immobile. Hence, there is a variety of population categories based on their (im)mobility status and motivation for choosing to leave or stay during the war. The general policy line in tackling the issue of forced migration in Ukraine is to provide support for those who left their habitual places or to arrange evacuation. However, the stayers also need governmental support with a reasonable distinction between those remaining in relatively safe localities and the immobile population from places of high danger.

Numerous studies have already acknowledged the rich social and economic potential of forced migrants, both actual and returned (Kone et al. 2021; Fransen et al. 2017). In the post-war restoration discussion, which has already been initiated by the Ukrainian government, the issue of displaced persons return is also emphasized (Ukraine Recovery Conference 2022). However, the discussion has not addressed the potential contribution of stayers to the post-war economy. A more comprehensive approach to forced migration in Ukraine is needed, one that recognizes the value of the immobile population and addresses the challenges they face. Recognizing this need opens up new possibilities for future research and policy that integrates both mobility and immobility into a cohesive framework.

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Iryna Maidanik is a senior research fellow in the migration studies department of the Ptoukha Institute for Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Science of Ukraine. She holds a PhD degree in Sociology. She has around 70 publications, among them – two personal books.