ABSTRACT
This paper examines Russian social science in the state of Russia's war in Ukraine. Post-socialist coloniality of Russian scholars eventually led to the desire to contest the scientific hegemony of the West and to have a unique local sociology, mostly inspired by political context. These ideas became part of the political agenda and Putin constantly claims that Russia is a leader of the anti-colonial world. His claims are accompanied by the desire to epistemicide everything western both in the structure of knowledge and at the institutional level. It nominally interrelates with international discussions about the possible emergence of unique local sociologies outside Western hegemony. Political will and its nominal ‘decolonial’ perspective bring Russian science closer to isolationism, using arguments paradoxically similar to decolonial narratives. The necessity to ‘decolonize’ science and education from Western-centric structures became part of the political and scientific agenda. Being a subaltern empire Russia finds itself in a state of war, which creates two problems for Russian social science: decolonial isolationism, meaning the disguise of epistemicide of western models of knowledge production as decolonial liberation and tuzemnaya nauka, a general rejection of scientific standards of the outer world with an attempt to prove the local agenda's superiority.
Introduction
Sociology is a western-centric science and this statement is getting less and less debatable (e.g. Rodríguez et al2010). Being institutionalized in the specific colonial context of the European powers of the nineteenth century, sociology tended to ignore the impact of scholars from other parts of the world, especially the global South.
This state of affairs became a focus of several studies, which present researchers and concepts from the southern perspective (Alatas and Sinha 2017; Connell 2007; de Souza Santos 2015), which deal with indigenous and local sociologies (Akiwowo 1999; Alatas 2006), (post)colonial (Bhambra 2014; Go 2020; Mignolo 2012; Mignolo and Tlostanova 2006; Steinmetz 2017) and decolonial issues in social science (Bhambra and Holmwood 2021; Meghji 2021) and global production of knowledge (Collyer 2014; Connell et al2017). Southern epistemologies took a significant place in the discussion on the re-configuration of power in sociology towards bigger epistemic justice (e.g. Anderson 2012).
Apparently, no one would ever think about Russia as a South. Since the Brandt line was introduced neither economically nor geographically has Russia been marked as a South (Brandt et al1980). Nevertheless, for example, Burawoy claims the dominance of the global North over the global South, mentioning not only classical examples of the latter (China, India, Brazil, etc.) but also Russia (Burawoy 2008).
North/South demarcation is not strict and could be transformed (see Australian case in Connell 2007). Australia is a South, because of colonial mechanisms described by Connell. There is also the epistemological South, which may not coincide with the Brandt line (de Souza Santos 2015). Although it does not fit the Russian case perfectly, it just demonstrates that the South is a liquid concept. Southerners try to epistemologically demolish the monolith of northern (western) unified social science, claiming that there is more than one universal sociology.
During the last decades, the discussion on bigger pluralism and alternative non-western sociological discourse has emerged rapidly (Albrow and King 1990; Alatas 2014; Burawoy 2011; Connell 1997, 2007; Meghji 2021; Oommen 1995). Also, criticism of such an idea was developed (Collins 1997; Sztompka 2011). The history of the debates is localized in the time when Russian society came through significant changes and reforms in economics and politics.
A very specific tradition of considering Russia as a subaltern empire took a significant place, mostly in the field of international relations (Morozov 2013; 2015), but also partially in social sciences (Tlostanova 2008). This gaze deals with the very concrete paradox between the criticism of Eurocentrism and nominal counter-hegemonic anti-western narratives in Russian politics, which eventually reaches social science. For example, Morozov explicitly outlined the possible usage of this notion. The subaltern empire, being placed between imperial and postcolonial logics, ‘creates a productive tension within the postcolonial paradigm’ (Morozov 2015: 4).
Simultaneously, Russian social science became a focus of several research in both Russian (Sokolov 2009; Sokolov and Titaev 2013; Batygin and Deviatko 1994; Doktorov, 2014; Gorshkov 2018) and English (Filippov 1993; Titarenko & Zdravomyslova 2017; Sokolov 2019; Sorokin 2015). Foreign colleagues also analysed the sociology in the Russian empire (Hecker 1916), in the Soviet Union (e.g. Greenfeld 1988), and contemporary Russia (e.g. Himmelstrand 2000).
Inevitably, the ideas of unique non-western agenda eventually emerged in the state of sociology in Russia. Supporters of this idea want to contest the hegemony of the West in social science and advocate the uniqueness of the local context, which cannot be described in terms of Western sociology. Among them became popular theoretical positions, which are close to indigenous sociology, the epistemologies of the South and anti-Western narratives in social sciences. Although they paradoxically never referred to these concepts and understand them in rather twisted politically inspired terms, the claims to pay more attention to the local agenda, values, and problems with unique Russian optics took a significant place in the debates (e.g. Osipov 2004; Dugin 2011; Kirdina 2011; Dobrenkov 2009, 2011).
Such counter-hegemonic debates in the leading sociological journals across the globe were visible on the international stage and were in English. There are a lot of national/local traditions and the majority of them are erased for non-members of these communities due to the language issue. Russian debates are also hidden, but important in the current political situation – Russia's war in Ukraine has changed society and science. Claims to pay closer attention to the unique state of Russian social science were present even before, but after the 24th of February reached an unprecedented level of dominance, inspired mostly by political agenda from above.
With the beginning of the war, the institutional context was severely affected by ‘decolonization’ of scientific and educational models of knowledge production from Western influence. This state of affairs was widely supported by constant claims of Vladimir Putin to contest the hegemony of the West, by his ‘anti-colonial’ speeches and has been legitimized by the government (e.g. September 30; October 27, Kremlin 2022). The necessity to participate in the Bologna Process, the presence of certain programs (e.g. liberal arts) and their content, Western foundations, systems of quality assurance of publication activity, and agreements with foreign institutions were questioned as the dominance of the West. The justifications toward everything locally invented took a significant place in the narratives of the fight with everything Western.
Russian scholars do not refer to the southern epistemologies, indigenous sociologies, or the anti-colonial claims of the sociologist of the global South, but paradoxically repeat similar strategies in their arguments. Moreover, the active part of the initial discussion coincides in time with the publication of the main research in this field (e.g. Connell's Southern Theory 2007). It seems that the dispute is linked to the international logic of the discussion, meaning the epistemological division of North/South – at least in a part of the importance of the local sociological practices and paying more attention to the non-western world. Even though it does not refer anymore to the Brandt line (economics), politics, or geography, it still influences the discussion. North and South reflect the position between universalism for one/many worlds and particularism accordingly.
Russia as the subaltern empire i.e. ‘a space which is both imperial and postcolonial’ gradually falls into decolonial isolationism from above and tuzemnaya nauka below (Morozov 2015: 8). Instead of actual decolonization a state of decolonial isolationism emerged, using forced and brutal epistemicide of the existing patterns of knowledge production and well-established structures, which were essential for the social science, it falls into the same path it is supposed to oppose. Another problem comes from below – the so-called tuzemnaya nauka is about to take dominance in Russia, meaning the constant rejection to orient to the outer-world with the attempt to prove the uniqueness of the local context.
This paper starts with providing a lengthy and extensive context, including the proper demarcation of the concepts of indigenous and national sociologies. It continues with a brief history of the westernization of Russian social science and acknowledgment from the West. A certain place in this paper is devoted to the discourse on localism, describing gradual and constant disappointment in the Western models of science and education administration, supported with the discourse on localism. Another part will deal with the ‘anti-colonial’ claims of Vladimir Putin and epistemicide of the Western models of knowledge production. Using this context, the final part will closely work with the ideas of the most recent state of decolonial isolationism and tuzemnaya nauka as well as provide the final argument of the paper (see Conclusion)
The aims of the article are: (1) to define the key differences between national (sociology in Russia) and indigenous (Russian sociology) sociologies; (2) to outline the milestones of the westernization of Russian social science; (3) to describe the gradual disappointment in the West and identify the justification of the discourse on localism; (4) to demonstrate the attempts to epistemicide everything western. Each aim corresponds to one specific section in the text. All these steps will help to (5) define the key similarities and significant differences in ‘decolonization’ of Russian social science with the actual decolonial narratives of the southern epistemology as well as possible consequences for Russian social science.
Correlation between the concepts of indigenous and national sociology: Russian sociology or sociology in Russia?1
The role of national and indigenous sociologies is crucial for this paper. The issue of how these terms relate to each other is often blurred since participants of the discussion on the international level tend to accuse their ideological opponents and ignore some key points that need to be addressed (Kislenko 2021). Nevertheless, some scholars researched the notion of national sociology (Genov 1989; Turner 1990, 2006) and analyzed the indigenous sociology (Akiwowo 1999; Adesina 2002; Alatas 2006). Despite that the intersection rarely happens (though – Quah 1993), one of the most famous examples is the debate between Burawoy (2011) and Sztompka (2011) on the prospects of multiple sociologies in the world. Their arguments will be useful to define what ‘sociology in Russia’ and ‘Russian sociology’ for this paper are.
Before starting the consideration of this issue, it should be indicated why sociology can even exist in the plural form: ‘the question of whether there is Spanish physics, Polish chemistry or Danish astronomy does not make sense, but why then we are talking about the sociology of that or another country?’ (Sztompka 2009: 21). In its simplest form, the answer lies in the fact that sociology is a multi-paradigm science and exists in a state of theoretical and methodological pluralism (ibid). Nevertheless, sociologists, conducting research even in unique contexts, inevitably follow the generally accepted universal sociological standards. Such a local context often can be limited by the borders of the national state and then it is possible to discuss the sociology of the particular country.
Such a state of affairs exists because some phenomena can occur only in a particular place i.e. caste system in India or traditional oral poetry in Nigeria. Unique explanations can lie exclusively in the field of history, culture, norms, and values of the country. Sztompka uses the expression ‘pluralistic mosaic of sociology’, which characterizes well the role of national sociologies (Sztompka 2009). Together, they create the general picture in a ‘frame’ of universal principles of social science.
The concept of national sociology is indeed closely related to indigenous sociology. For this reason, a procedure should be made to distinguish these concepts, identifying the main features, which demarcate them from each other. It is worth mentioning that the history of the concept of ‘national sociology’ is wider than ‘indigenous sociology’. If at the dawn of institutionalization, it was French or German sociology, then indigenous sociology is a product of the late twentieth century and is different from the first concept.
Surprisingly, the most accurate description of indigenous sociology was given by the ideological opponent of such an idea – Sztompka (2011: 392):
indigenous may mean many things: first, everything non-Western (neither European nor American); second, limited to one civilization; third, limited to one region; fourth, limited to one nation-state – this currently is the most common framework within which social life is lived.
It is the latter interpretation that is associated with the ‘national’ factor of indigenous sociology.
One of the main differences is that national sociology tends to be linked with the state, while indigenous sociology may not have such a connection. It mostly refers to the importance of the local traditions and the cultural aspects of a particular location and is less oriented toward the state. As soon as Akiwowo (1986, 1999) started to work with the term, he indicated the possibility of building sociology based on myths in the oral tradition of the Yoruba people. This linkage had another dimension – the word ‘sociology’ is not just added to any country but became a fundamentally new local sociology that would be different from the ‘standard’ version, inspired by Western Enlightenment. It also would have a basis, which came, for example, from the views of Yoruba.
Unlike national sociology, which contains the entire set of processes within the sociology of a state, indigenous sociology claims a larger role. It desires not to be a simple part of generalized sociological knowledge but argues the emergence of the prospect of multiple sociologies, which makes it different from national sociology in this regard. Indigenous sociology is another higher level of particularism/relativism. Sztompka (2011) identifies national, regional, and civilizational levels – the higher the level, the bigger the claim to the special status of such sociology. Here, it gets closer to the idea of tuzemnaya nauka in the sense of claiming a bigger role without proper reference to the outside world and even one of the possible translations of this term is ‘indigenous sociology’, but does not fully coincide with the notion analyzed in this section.
The language is also an important point in the discussion. It becomes a way to ‘nationalize’ sociology, to make it more connected to the boundaries of sociologists, who speak the same language. Such a procedure is often based on the translation of generally accepted sociological concepts into one or another language. However, there is another way: the use of local concepts to denote any phenomena, although usually, it is possible to find a linguistic equivalent in English. There are two positions on the issue. The first is connected with the support of local concepts, and the second one concerns established international terms. Both these points of view are represented in any national sociological community: ‘the distribution of supporters of one and the other position partially correlates with the level of knowledge of foreign languages’2 (Zdravomyslov 2008: 10).
Indeed, it is much easier to turn to a self-invented term, when the level of distribution of various languages within the scientific community is low. Then, there is the misunderstanding of the application of universal concepts to the reality of society, limited by the borders of the state. Nevertheless, it seems that it does not play a primary role in the matter. Much more important is the element that can be described as ‘confidence in exclusiveness’. Such confidence, which is seen in politics, economics and education will inevitably reach science.
Another significant detail is the fact of recognition of the ideas laid in the field of national/indigenous sociology. They have to be accepted ‘by the world professional community, otherwise, the fate of an unrecognized author's invention awaits such an idea’ (Yadov 2008: 20). However, this point misses the other side of this process. The recognition of indigenous sociologies is discussed by scientists who are inevitably closely related to the sociology of the global North. Since they are at the zero point, where the recognition of their universal sociology is not required, it creates an unequal distribution of power within this discussion (Kislenko 2021).
When the recognition procedure is implemented by one side, which is involved in the confrontation, the issue of the objectivity of such verdicts is especially important (ibid). Indeed, most critics agree that recognition cannot be made by an ideological opponent. In this regard, there is only one way – the recognition of their own sociology by the sociologists of a particular country/territory/culture, which does not give it full and shared legitimacy, but gives a chance to reproduce certain practices.
Here, it is necessary to turn to the distinction between ‘sociology in Russia’ and ‘Russian sociology’. In sociological discourse, which is not based on the discussion of the issue, the use of these phrases is synonymous. It becomes clear if we keep in mind that the first corresponds to the idea of national sociology and the second one is more suitable for the definition of indigenous sociology. Nevertheless, there is no longer any difference in use and both of them are somehow valid.
Using the arguments of Burawoy and Sztompka, let us define the restrictions imposed on this research in order to avoid the problems, which could emerge if this note will not be introduced. Debating on the prospect of the sociology of the imaginary Kingdom of Lailonia, they agree that sociology in such a country could mean: (1) The sociology of the kingdom taught at the universities and the academic community itself; (2) Sociology in Lailonian language; (3) Sociology of natives of the kingdom; (4) Sociology of Lailonia; (5) Sociology with the Lailonian agenda (Sztompka 2011; Burawoy 2011).
All of them are correct to a certain extent, but the majority of them cannot be used for the aims of this paper. For example, the language criteria include rather a colonial assumption that the Russian language is in use in other countries (or might be theoretically not in use in Republics of the Federation). Others are simply not useful for the discussions on localism since do not help to outline the criteria for the minimal element for analysis.
In order to avoid these problems, not to produce the colonial logic and still refer to the localist case of this research, this paper will work with ideas, which emerged among scholars based at the scientific institutions in Russia in internationally recognized borders as stated in the Constitution in 1993. Another criterion is Russian language of the publication since together with the previous condition it cuts the colonial assumption and allows not considering foreigners, who worked in Russia since the focus is the discourse on localism. Once again, all of the points discussed by Sztompka and Burawoy are valid. The restriction is introduced due to the specific aims of this exact article.
These criteria also fit the idea that the recognition of national sociology is usually easier accepted than the indigenous one. As it was clarified earlier, national sociology is connected with the state and usually does not claim much exclusivity. In the context of this research, this connection is a crucial prerequisite for the analysis. In addition, the state automatically has some legitimacy since it has already been officially recognized by the international community and it is partially transferred to sociology. It is much easier to recognize the existence of sociology and all its sociological processes in one particular country than to accept the recognition of its uniqueness. It is also false to assume that such sociology can claim a large alternative role, as it happens with indigenous sociology, especially in the global South. Nevertheless, it is known that the global South in sociology could be an epistemological term.
Therefore, let us focus on Russian social science in the state of war and beyond.
Westernization of Russian social science and the recognition from the west
Russian sociological tradition has a huge history and was the subject of several research (Titarenko and Zdravomyslova 2017; Batygin and Deviatko 1994; Sokolov 2019). It is well-known that the first sociological activity in the Russian empire started in the 1860–70s (Hecker 1916). During the end of the 19th and the beginning of the twentieth century, scholars actively participated in the development of sociology in the country. They were also visible on the international stage and widely involved in the activity of the International Institute of Sociology, established by Rene Worms in 1893. Sociological tradition at that time was identified with the names of Lavrov, Kovalevskii, and Kareev: a huge influence had the so-called school of subjectivity (ibid).
Due to the consequences of the October revolution, some thinkers were forced to leave Russia. Sociology as a science became erased and in a rather transformed form later become part of the Marxist-Leninist ideology: ‘with the eclipse of Stalinism and the political thaw that followed in its wake, sociology took on a precarious existence as an ideological instrument of the party-state’ (Burawoy 2016: 953).
The idea of unique Soviet sociology based on Marxist-oriented standpoints, rejecting Western bourgeois sociology was common sense for the majority of sociologists, at least it was officially declared. Some scholars eventually even considered this fact as crucial for forthcoming changes: ‘the uniqueness of Soviet sociology lies primarily in the fact that being involved in the reproduction of basic ideological and political values of Soviet society, it became an important factor in its reshaping and, finally, revolutionary transformation’ (cited by Sorokin 2015; Yadov and Grathoff 1994).
Despite the ideological issues, the rapid social transformation of Perestroika period allowed to open two faculties of sociology – in Moscow and St. Petersburg in 1989. Two years later, the Soviet Union collapsed and it was a crucial point not only for Russia and its social science but also for the understanding of the North–South dichotomy.
Being introduced in 1980, so-called Brandt Line divided the world based on the economic distinction between ‘the “northern”, rich, exploiting nations and “southern”, poor, exploited nations’ and started to contest the old political division on first (capitalist)-second (socialist)-third (non-alignment movement) worlds (Tomlinson 2003). The collapse of the Soviet Bloc left the third world alone in front of the neoliberal machine of the first world. The metaphor ‘the West and the Rest’, coined by Hall (1992), became the most accurate description of the world at the beginning of 1990 – the end of history (Fukuyama 2006).
At the same time, the post-socialist coloniality emerged. Tlostanova pointed out that while coloniality is a condition, where the post-socialist cannot speak, then decoloniality is the ‘option, consciously chosen as a political, ethical, and epistemic positionality and an entry point into agency’ (Tlostanova 2014, 2019: 165). The distinction between option and condition is still applicable to the Russian context and political will should (will) play a significant role in this process (see the section on ‘anti-colonial’ crusade of Vladimir Putin). Morozov (2015: 4) stated that ‘Russia's postcommunist transition has been a subaltern experience’ and the state of the post-socialist coloniality was also accompanied by the presence of the so-called subaltern empire. As he claims: ‘having own colonial periphery does not prevent a country from simultaneously being incorporated in the hegemonic order as a subaltern who retains its sovereignty and thus is not colonised in the formal sense’ (ibid: 4). This tension between postcoloniality and the state of the subaltern empire problematizes a positioning of Russia and its social science in the dichotomy of the North–South.
It is worth mentioning that later the idea of the global East emerged for the description of the parts of the world outside the North–South dichotomy. Nevertheless, Global East has some similarities with the southern perspective such as absence of the eastern voices in global agenda, claiming a huge diversity at the East and even finding itself outside western knowledge architecture (Muller 2020). Moreover, currently, there is no explicit Eastern epistemology behind this concept, which can be applied to social science as it happens with the epistemologies of the South. Several steps could be made in order to develop Eastern epistemology, even though some modest attempts already exist (e.g. Gill 2006).
Muller (2020) perfectly summarizes the transformations:
with the evaporation of the communist Other, the ideological East–West division evaporated too. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Second World categorization became less useful. < … > The time was ripe for a new, simplifying categorization. The First World became the North and the Third World became the South. (cited by Muller 2020: 2; Reuveny and Thompson 2007)
Such a transformation eventually led to the appearance of so-called ‘poor science’ after the fall of the USSR. Such a notion means ‘a science that exists due to the desire of scientists to earn money for a piece of bread’, which ‘inevitably suffers from a permanent deficit of attention and its extremely ineffective distribution’ (Sokolov 2009). As Muller stated,
many left academia and their countries in order to survive and those who stayed had to (sometimes still have to) work side jobs to make money, especially in those disciplines like the humanities and social sciences whose work was thought to be of little practical value. (Muller 2020: 742-743)
This state of affairs brought a lot of scholars to the state of tuzemnaya nauka. Being rather isolated from the shared world standards of scientific activity and the necessity to prove that local science still has some dignity led to the various mutations of the patterns of knowledge production, including widespread rejection to somehow orientate towards the outer world.
The pluralistic state of sociology of the 1990s was the dominant paradigm for quite a long time, but the country has left democratic changes based on western models and rapidly turned into a new paradigm. Sociology found itself in an undefined position, it is recognized neither by the state nor society (Zdravomyslova 2008: 410). There was no demand for sociology in Russian society, although there were (and still) a lot of sociological problems (ibid):
‘Our social science has gone through an inglorious decade. Intellectuals changed their usual opposition (at best) in relation to the old regime, to (pretending to be science) ideological support of the new order, and it came to their minds only when this order did not need such a thing from them’ (cited by Kislenko 2022; Filippov, 2008: 85); ‘it will be useful to determine the institutional place of Russian sociology. As a science, as pure research, it has died and has no chance of being reborn (author's italics) < … > (ibid: 86).
One of the biggest foundations, which came to Russia back then was the Soros Foundation, which is today in Russia unfairly accused of financing dishonest, biased research that undermines the foundations of the Russian state. Although the official name of the structure was the Open Society Institute, the name of the American entrepreneur became incredibly famous synonym for ‘anti-Russian’ activity.
Another significant organization was the MacArthur Foundation, which set as its goal the ‘support for independent research and creative approaches to solving social problems’ (TASS 2015). By 2015, the foundation has spent more than $173 million to ‘support higher education and human rights in Russia < … >’ (Deutche Welle 2015). Both of these structures, have never been funded by the US government, but were included in the patriotic stop-list in 2015 and stopped working in Russia due to the suspect in such a collaboration.
Direct funding from the US federal budget organized by the State Department is provided within the Fulbright program, often seen as an American tool of political soft power. The website of the US Embassy in Russia describes the program as ‘an opportunity to increase mutual understanding between the United States of America and the peoples of other countries’ (US Embassy 2022). The variety of Fulbright programs offers to receive a degree or to attend an internship at one of the American universities with full financial support.
A significant place in the field of social sciences was taken by a variety of German foundations (e.g. Heinrich-Böll, Friedrich-Naumann, Friedrich-Ebert Foundations, etc.), which financed not only the research but also organized social events, public debates, political talks, summer schools. They became the think tanks that attracted talented students and scholars in order to jointly analyze the social reality and ongoing societal transformations.
These are just some examples of the Western foundations, which were considered by the Russian state as promoting foreign influence later on. Nevertheless, the Westernization of education and science took a significant place in the debates on the implementation of the basic principles of such activities.
Turning away from the Soviet past, Russia adopted several basic legal documents which included the country in the Western system of education and science. Russia initially signed Lisbon Principles and later became the full member of Bologna process in 2003, which brought the country closer to the unification of education according to Western patterns (EHEA 2022). It eventually led to the emergence of the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) in 2010. Among other things it allowed Russia to use the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS), Qualifications Frameworks in the European Higher Education Area (QF-EHEA), the Diploma Supplement (DS), the European Standards, Guidelines for Quality Assurance of Higher Education (ESG), etc. (ibid). All in all, it helped to make the process of degree recognition simpler and more transparent. Bologna system was introduced and the denial of the soviet design of education with 5 years of study was gradually transformed into a worldwide accepted system bachelor-master.
Nevertheless, one of the first master-level systems was introduced at HSE University (which is focused mostly on economics and social sciences) already at the beginning of the 1990s even before Russia entered the Bologna process. The significant milestones for sociology in Russia became the foundation of two private universities with a specific focus on social sciences – European University at St. Petersburg (1994) and Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences (1995). Initially, they were exclusively postgraduate universities, which adopted western models of science and education administration. MSSES is accredited by the University of Manchester and even has a right to issue UK diplomas at the master's level. The foundation of the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Sciences at St. Petersburg State University (1999) allowed to introduce the system of Liberal Arts programs – almost a symbol of Western education in the field of the humanities and social sciences.
It is important that it was not just a one-sided process. The acceptance and the recognition of newly established western nature of Russian social science were widely spread in the West. It was seen not only in routine collaboration between scholars but also in the most possible formal way. The desire to be included in all the famous Western university rankings emerged among people, who influence the policy in the field of education. This way of acknowledgement from western colleagues became increasingly popular among Russian administrators of education and science. For example, the whole program financed by the state was introduced in order to reach a wider representation of Russian universities in rankings. The Russian Academic Excellence Project (5–100 program) was launched in 2013 and put aim to have five Russian universities in top-100 among at least one of the major rankings (e.g. QS and THE).
Despite that five Russian universities were not included in top-100 at the end of the program, Russian social science obtained significant recognition in this field. For example, according to QS World Rankings by Subject (Sociology) 2021 and 2022, 3 and 4 universities were included in top 250 respectively. It also includes HSE University, which occupied the 50th position in 2021 and 72nd position in 2022 – enormous recognition from the Western colleagues.
Moreover, a lot of Russian journals in the field of social science started to be included in the scientific systems of indexation such as Scopus and Web of Science. The latter even introduced the Russian Scientific Citation Index (RSCI), the list of the most respected journals from Russia. The quality assurance of the scientific activity and additional renumeration for scientific work started to be based on the list of journals included in such systems. The general orientation towards western models of administration and knowledge production became deeply incorporated in the very essence of the science and education. The desire to accept such models as the primary way of structuring of the science and education led not only to the actual use of these approaches but also to widespread acceptance of these processes as the positive transformation of Russian educational/scientific space by Western colleagues.
Considering all the described transformations, it is possible to accept that Russian science and education was indeed deeply (euro)westernized. Nevertheless, several other significant problems emerged:
Russia did Europeanise during the previous two decades (and in some respects continues to do that), but the advent of its European identity has been permanently deferred by the imperial legacy. This dialectic of the subaltern and the imperial produced ontological insecurity, resulting from a failure to maintain a consistent self-concept as a European nation. Ontological insecurity generated resentment, which eventually transformed into the antagonisation of the West. (Morozov 2015: 104)
The disappointment in the west and discourse on localism
While these changes were implemented, they were also accompanied by huge local criticism. The claims that the domination of the West will ‘kill’ the local diversity and Russian language as the language of publication became popular. The criticism of the West, which was considered as trying to establish the neoliberal rules of ‘the scientific game’ and as dictating what science is and what everyone has to do, was widespread in the academic community. Scholars struggled to learn how to become effective scientists and how to craft reports with publications in Scopus and Web of Science: ‘academics found themselves in a situation where the idea of what makes a good scholar had changed radically’ (Muller 2020: 742).
These changes also highlighted the deepest division in Russian social science. The state of sociology in Russia in a sense of outer-inner orientation could be described as follows:
in the Russian social sciences, the dividing line between those who believe that reading Western books is more important than Russian ones, and those who are convinced of the opposite, runs more or less along the line separating Bolotnaia Square from Poklonnaia Gora.3 (cited by Kislenko 2022; Sokolov and Titaev 2013: 250–251)
This definition written in 2013 becomes more accurate if we move closer to 2022 on the timeline. Such a rather simplified description after the 24th of February is probably the most correct way to identify supporters of these positions since the political component now is more important than probably ever.
The gradual disappointment in the West was constantly growing even before the war and full-scale propaganda. At the same time, some authors noticed the world trend for the indigenization of sociological practices and were rather critical:
‘If we want sociology, then descriptions must be made according to certain patterns. And since there is no theoretical sociology other than the so-called western sociology (author's italics), the emergence of theoretical sociology as a science, wherever it occurs, implies a constant orientation toward the ‘western model’ (cited by Kislenko 2022; Filippov 2008: 87).
Similarly, Yadov (2008) criticizes the dominance of locally invented sociologies and draws an extremely interesting example from his own experience, where he described his dialogue with his colleague from Kenya:
‘My students undertook a content analysis of the parliamentary sessions to understand the positions of the deputies. Complete failure! The deputy's speech on the verbal record leaves no doubt that such a parliamentarian supports the law, but he and his fraction voted against it. Do you know why? Because in our culture, the speaker's facial expressions are more important. By his facial expressions and gestures, his colleagues understood that he strongly disagreed with the draft law’. Kenyan colleague concluded: we need our own Kenyan sociology. Yadov answered: ‘it was necessary to use not a positivist approach, but a phenomenological one < … > Why is it necessary to invent a special Kenyan approach?’ (cited by Kislenko 2022; Yadov 2008: 19).
Nevertheless, it does not become a dominant trend in the debates on indigenization or uniqueness. Some scholars not directly referring to these disputes used this approach to question the western-centric paradigm of the sociological mainstream in favour of local means of knowledge production. It was claimed that Russia had an intellectual chance to be presented in international space properly since at international sociological events, ‘Russia was often considered as a “student” when advanced Western colleagues taught us’ (Kirdina 2011: 8). Authors connect the fact of the political and economic weakness and the interest in Russian sociology, meaning that ‘independent’ in the decision-making process Russia is not interested to be taught by someone (ibid). As for the relationship between the inner and outer worlds, the common feeling is resentment in communication with the foreign audience: ‘everything that we wanted to know about your country, we learned from our own colleagues, who worked in Russia, or from numerous publications in journals like Post-Communist Studies’ (Yanitsky 2011: 20). It perfectly corresponds to the idea that Russia is a part of the (Euro)Western world: ‘for the Russians (at least at the period of time when these statements were announced – author's note), Europe is the centre of the world, and their identities and practices are situated within the European normative order < … >; but ended up at the periphery of this world in the state of ‘hierarchical inequality’, which manifests itself ‘at all levels of production and exchange – both material and symbolic’ (cited by Morozov 2015: 16; Prozorov 2009),
These are just a few symptomatic statements, which show that the desire to be equal or at least visible in world science eventually turns to so far soft claims of the uniqueness of Russian social science. It is also accompanied by the political dimension of social life. When all the political mechanisms started to turn towards the denial of everything Western, some sociologists provided these changes with suitable explanations. The idea of unique Russian sociology is linked with political dimension almost during the whole existence of the debates.
Adherents of unique Russian sociology work with similar arguments of local knowledge. Nevertheless, as indigenous (still not referring to the debates, but paradoxically repeating similar arguments), they mostly consider the ideas of conservative philosophers of the past and the values of power relations and ideology.
For example, Osipov has argued that ‘the Russian state has devalorized sociology and this is one of the reasons for the ongoing societal crisis in Russia: ‘if scholarly knowledge is not integrated into the system of power relations, it means that power holders govern on the basis of social mythologies’ (cited by: Zdravomyslova 2008: 410; Osipov 2004: 13). These scholars talk about possible equality between world sociological science and Russian sociology, considering special interests and impact of the latter (e.g. Kravchenko 2007; Toschenko 2009; Romanavsky 2019). According to them, it is crucial to provide the inner audience with a proper explanation of the local practices since the majority of the sociological literature is foreign and does not consider the Russian context properly. There were also modest claims to export Russian ideas to the West in order to familiarize the international audience with the Russian context (Kravchenko 2007).
A similar critical reflection emerged already after the war. In October 2022, the Kharchevskie Chteniya took place at the Russian Academy of Sciences. Certainly, the topics on the domination of the West and general unequal distribution of power in knowledge production were present among other themes: bipolar coalitions, new geopolitical challenges, the transitional state of Russian society and especially the sovereignty of national sociology (RAS 2022). These reports demonstrate that at least some part of the Russian sociological community indeed wants to question the universality of sociological knowledge.
Once again, these concerns as well as the political aspect of the arguments on the necessity to justify the uniqueness and importance of local agenda were also present before 2022. A pure example of such an approach is Alexander Dugin, one of the main ideologists of the Kremlin's politics according to some Western experts. This statement is rather debatable, but with the beginning of the war, Dugin indeed became one of the most prominent supporters of the state.
For us, it is important that he wrote the book Sociology of Russian Society: Russia between Chaos and Logos. He writes: ‘not one sociology, but plural sociologies, each of which would describe and interpret the societies under study in terms of those values and paradigms that constitute the essence of this, and not some other society’ (Dugin 2011: 4). This book is an attempt to analyze the sociology of Russian society. He uses Russian (russkogo – everywhere further only in this context) as ethnicity, not as a nationality (rossijskogo), which is symptomatic and brings us back to the distinction between indigenous and national sociology. Dugin continues:
speaking of the sociology of Russian society, we mean Russian sociology. It means that we consider Russian society as an independent civilizational paradigm, different from the Western European and American, on the one hand, but also from the Asian, Eastern, on the other one. (ibid: 4)
Being a radically right-wing theorist, Dugin paradoxically works with similar arguments on the diversity of sociological knowledge. He criticizes the ‘universal sociology’, which in his opinion equals the sociology of European and American society in the same manner as a sociology of Russian society. The multi-paradigm state of sociology is undeniable in his approach. Dugin (2011: 6) also mentions that those who will not agree with the western paradigm
have all the chances ended up as the ‘outcasts’, being labelled as the ‘axis of evil’ and to become the object of the same apartheid, segregation and discrimination that the West practiced openly in the very recent period of its colonial history.
He also claimed the necessity to have wider diversity and to contest the Western hegemony. This is similar to what Vladimir Putin claimed in his speeches on ‘anti-colonialism’ (see the section below).
His book consisted of 68 (sic!) chapters and among other things deals with the following: Russian gender, Russian family, Russians and the state (religion), and sociology of Russian time and space. In the majority of them, he tries to pose the uniqueness of Russian society, meaning that any terms and principles of the European and American (simply – Western) societies and their sociologies are not applicable to the Russian context. This is paradoxically close to the ideas that are associated with decolonial discourse and the desire of the global South to work on its own agenda. Nevertheless, Dugin uses this move in order to reflect the uniqueness of local context based on ideological and political reasoning, including questioning the current world political order.
Another supporter of a similar approach – Dobrenkov (2009, 2011) was a dean of the faculty of sociology at Moscow State University at that period of time. He became well-known to the general public at the end of the 2000s thanks to the scandal that took place within the walls of his faculty of sociology. The generally low level of teaching, corruption at the faculty, and plagiarism in his works provoked protests among students.
His aspiration was aimed to focus the Russian sociology on the traditional values of Russian society, which are specific to exact unique community, according to his interpretation. Namely, orthodox ethics and patriotic values mixed with loyalty to the political regime in the country. Such an approach often refers to Russian philosophy and its values, even though such references are criticized: ‘of course, now there can be no orientation towards Russian sociology as a theoretical position. An orientation in sociology towards Russian philosophy would be even less consistent < … >’ (Filippov 2008: 95).
Dobrenkov (2009) also refers to an old idea proposed by Uvarov, Minister of National Education of the Russian Empire. It is concentrated on the trinity of the united components: orthodoxy (pravoslavie), autocracy (samoderzhavie), and nationality (narodnost’). It suits the idea of sociology as a pure ideological enterprise, serving for political aspirations of the current regime. He believes that Uvarov's idea ‘looked into the innermost depths of the social life of Russia, into the secrets of its existence’, and was not properly understood, not only by contemporaries but also by subsequent generations (ibid: 110). Briefly, his aspirations could be described as follows:
The orientation of our people towards religious collectivist spirituality (orthodoxy), strong and authoritative power (autocracy), social responsibility and paternalism (nationality), is not a situational ideological imperative of the first half of the nineteenth century, but an ingeniously guessed fundamental principle of Russian public life, Russian mentality, Russian civilization. (ibid: 110)
He also stated ‘the necessity of a strong Russian state, the formation of a single national ideology or a system of the highest values of society’, adding that ‘Russia, now more than ever, needs its own ideology’ (ibid: 114-115).
These examples nominally bring us closer to the tuzemnaya nauka once again. In the sense of sociological theorization its key task ‘is to prove its equality with what is happening in the rest of the world, and more often – superiority’ and the statements presented above fit this definition well (Sokolov and Titaev 2013: 259). This is an accurate description from 2013 that became even more correct, being accompanied by the powerful support of the state.
It is necessary to mention that these radical ideas are not dominant among the majority of Russian sociologists and sometimes are considered as rather a doubtful enterprise. These scholars have rather a specific reputation as people, who advocate the political ambitions of the current political regime. Moreover, these ideas are rather marginal even inside Russia and do not possess a significant influence, but paradoxically they became a part of official political discourse recently. Similar ideas are what Vladimir Putin constantly claims in his ‘anti-colonial’ speeches after the 24th of February.
‘Anti-colonial’ Crusade of Vladimir Putin as the epistemicide of western means of knowledge production
Many of the theorists of the African anti-colonial movement of the twentieth century were politicians. Some of them changed academic activity in favor of political ambitions or vice versa. For example, the first leader of independent Ghana – Kwame Nkrumah was a specialist in the field of neo-colonialism. Léopold Sédar Senghor – a poet and negritude theorist, was the first president of independent Senegal.
The political career also attracted anti-colonial authors outside the African continent. Fernando Cardoso is a rather unique case of a sociologist-president. He is a famous sociologist in the field of the theories of dependent development as well as the twice-elected president of Brazil. Another negritude theorist, a native of Martinique – Aimé Cesar, despite the fact that he actively criticized the metropole was the representative of this overseas department of France in its parliament. One more famous representative of Martinique – Franz Fanon, has never been a politician, but actively participated in the anti-colonial struggle during the war in Algeria. The Guyanese Marxist and pan-Africanist – Walter Rodney, taught for a long time in Tanzania and Jamaica. His ideas provoked the government of the latter to declare him persona non grata, which led to political protests. Therefore, the pattern, when a scientist/activist from a colonial country supports the anti-colonial discourse not only academically, but also politically is well-known.
Vladimir Putin hardly imagines himself continuing the discourse of Kwame Nkrumah or Franz Fanon. Although he has nominal similarities with both: a presence of political power and participation in the war. In September 2022, in his speech on the annexation of legal Ukrainian territories, Vladimir Putin claimed.
‘It is worth reminding the West that it began its colonial policy back in the Middle Ages, followed by the worldwide slave trade, the genocide of Indian tribes in America, the plunder of India and Africa, the wars of England and France against China’ < … >; ‘we are proud that in the twentieth century our country led the anti-colonial movement, which opened up opportunities for many peoples around the world to make progress, reduce poverty and inequality, and defeat hunger and disease’ (September, 30; Kremlin 2022).
The idea to focus on local problems using means of local languages and self-invented terms, against the domination of the English language and western designs of the research is rather widespread in southern and decolonial epistemologies. A similar approach could be projected to social science based on the idea of unique (traditional) values of society. In general, this discourse refers to the decolonization of science/university/education. This is a counter-hegemonic idea, which in the majority of cases fights with the Western-centrism of these structures. It also sometimes refers to the anti-imperial nature of such aspirations. It happens when, once again, the countries of the global South are involved in the discussion, but what if such a project arises from the heart of the (subaltern) empire?
Since Putin considers himself a leader of the anti-colonial movement, he claims: ‘today, we are fighting so that it would never occur to anyone that Russia, our people, our language, or our culture can be erased from history’ (September 30; Kremlin 2022). Almost a month later, he continues with even stronger statement on diversity: ‘standardisation, financial and technological monopoly, the erasure of all differences is what underlies the Western model of globalisation, which is neocolonial in nature’ (October 27; Kremlin 2022). Putin also referred to the Nobel Prize Winner in Literature – Solzhenitsyn, using his expression on ‘a continuous blindness of superiority’ of the West (1978), ‘which is openly racist and neo-colonial’ and ‘has acquired especially distorted forms, in particular, after the emergence of the so-called unipolar world’ (ibid). These statements intend to ‘construct a space almost like postcolonial one < … >, but postcolonial intuition therefore would not hesitate to dismiss the Kremlin's statements as cynically abusing the ethics of hybridity’ (Morozov 2015: 28).
Historical revisionism has been accompanying the Russian president for many years. This is one of the reasons why the war started and why a lot of organizations, which deal with the past were recognised as foreign agents, including one of the Nobel Prize for Peace Winner 2022 – The Memorial. The main result of such a policy became sanctions, which were imposed on Russia and dramatically influenced society. Putin probably underestimated the destructive consequences for the Russian economy, society, and what is especially important for this article – for social science and education. The erosion of everything Western happens rapidly with the direct participation of the state.
Such a state of affairs perfectly corresponds to the idea of de Souza Santos (2015) – the epistemicide – the destruction of existing knowledge. He uses this notion in a different context and it would be incorrect not to mention that this is mostly applicable to colonized states. Nevertheless, since this article deals with the twisted understanding of the anti-colonial ideas, it is possible to transfer it to the Russian case. De Souza Santos writes that such the destruction of knowledge cannot happen without the consequences and it leads to the ‘destruction of the social practices and the disqualification of the social agents that operate according to such knowledges’ (ibid: 153). Such ‘the murder of the knowledge’ happens in Russia, but not with the help of the ‘hegemonic Eurocentric modernity’, which is usually involved in the production of the epistemicide, but by own isolationist will (ibid: 92).
In order to demonstrate the process of this epistemic destruction, it is worth mentioning what the Russian government has made in order to ‘decolonize’ Russian social science. During the most reactive months of 2022, several foundations were closed, moved outside of the country or recognized as undesired organizations. There are the most significant ones, which financed different projects in the field of social sciences: Oxford Russia Fund, Institute of International Education, and German organizations i.e. Heinrich-Böll, Friedrich-Naumann, Friedrich-Ebert Foundations, etc. This list could be prolonged.
Certainly, the story is not complete without mentioning other events. Most Western-oriented institutions were under attack for several years even before the 24th of February. European University at Saint Petersburg and Moscow School for Social Economic Sciences – the most respectful private universities, specializing in the field of social sciences – had problems with accreditation from the state. The Rector of the latter was arrested. The rector of the university, which was affiliated with MSSES – Russian Presidential Academy (RANEPA) was also accused of economic crimes. Several years ago, the elections of the rectors were abolished. The president received a right to appoint the rectors of two most-known universities outside the country – Lomonosov Moscow and St. Petersburg State Universities.
The institutional context indeed influenced this isolationist ‘decolonization’ much. The programs of the Liberal Arts have repeatedly been the object of close attention of the Russian Prosecutor's Office. For example, such a program at RANEPA was recognized as violating not only the Constitution and the National Security Strategy (sic!), but also implementing activities aimed at ‘destroying the traditional values of Russian society and distorting the history’ (TASS 2022). This program eventually was forced to change the name and the content itself, bringing it further away from the standards of Liberal Arts programs.
At St. Petersburg University at the Faculty of Liberal Arts and Sciences, the administration was forced to refuse to cooperate with Bard College (United States) due to the recognition of the latter as an undesirable organization. Later in 2022, this structure was completely destroyed. Earlier, the Coordinating Council of Non-Commercial Organizations sent a statement to the Prosecutor's Office in order to check suspicious affiliation of the faculty ‘with the foreign NGOs controlled by George Soros and conducting destructive activities in Russia’ (Radio Liberty 2021). The majority of the above-mentioned events happened even before the war, but the full-scale tragedy for Russian social science and education happened in February 2022.
For example, the supporters of unique practices have been promoting the idea to deny the Bologna System for years. Minister of Education and Science Sergei Falkov said: ‘the future belongs to our own unique education system, which should be based on the interests of the national economics < … >’ (Kommersant 2022). The Deputy Chairman of the State Duma, Pyotr Tolstoy agreed: ‘it is time to abandon the Bologna system and return to the traditional Russian system of education’ < … > (ibid). It is worth mentioning that no one knows whether these claims will be actually implemented in reality, but they illustrate the symptoms of the ‘decolonization’. Nevertheless, Russian membership was suspended in April of 2022 by other members of the Bologna Process.
In the literature that seeks to demolish the neo-colonial structures of Western academia special attention is paid to the dictate of publishing houses (e.g. Springer, Taylor, and Francis). Wide-known fact that they publish articles without any compensation to the authors and sell access to their resources. Sometimes scientific systems of indexation fall under similar statements. Recently, the Ministry of Education and Science introduced a moratorium on the requirements to publish in journals indexed in the international databases Scopus and Web of Science. The latter formerly cut Russian institutions from their libraries.
Apparently, in the future, these systems will indeed have less importance, although for years the policy was different. It means that during the quality assurance of scientific activity in Russia the traditional means of the Western academy will no longer work. Most likely the evaluation will be based on the recently adopted so-called White List of journals, which includes journals approved by the Ministry of Education and Science. This list apparently will include journals from Scopus, Web of Science and also from the so-called core of the Russian Science Citation Index on this platform (RSCI). The authority to correct this list will be in hands of the state.
Currently, the ‘collaboration with the West’ is barely possible. It happens due to the decision of the foreign academic centres not to work with Russian universities that supported the war and the simultaneous rejection of possible collaboration by the Russian political agenda. Even though, it is still possible to work with so-called ‘friendly countries’ in South America, Asia, and Africa, the current configuration of power in science leaves Russian institutions outside the distribution of resources and academic influence in this regard.
Moreover, paradoxically the discourse of Vladimir Putin on ‘anti-colonialism’, contesting the ‘hegemony of the West’ and the ‘decolonial’ actions of the Russian state in a twisted manner indeed can theoretically interrelate with the counter-hegemonic ideas of the global South and narratives on ‘Diversity’, which faces ‘Unity’ in social science, but what is going to be established instead of the contested order?
Conclusion. decolonial isolationism and Tuzemnaya Nauka
Various intellectuals all across the globe have been dreaming of decolonizing the curriculum, the university, and science for decades. To be free of Western-centric means of knowledge production, of educational models, of neoliberal power of publishing houses. Vladimir Putin states the following:
the West is ready to cross every line to preserve the neo-colonial system which allows it to live off the world, to plunder it thanks to the domination of the dollar and technology, to collect an actual tribute from humanity, to extract its primary source of unearned prosperity, the rent paid to the hegemon. (September 30; Kremlin 2022)
His statements are sometimes indeed similar to counter-hegemonic and anti-colonial ideas, but only nominally: ‘the Kremlin's complaints about the discrimination Russia allegedly faces in the international arena are based on a vulgarising imitation of the universal democratic norm’ (Morozov 2015: 28). Using such ideas declaratively is nothing new in both academia and political realities and it will not necessarily lead to the implementation of these claims even partially. Also, it does not even prove that the speaker means the same analogies as mentioned in this article. Putin's example only demonstrates ‘the superb ability of established essentialist discourses to appropriate the legacies and language of the critical Western trends’ (cited by Morozov 2015; Waldstein 2010: 103).
Moreover, such a violent involuntary ‘decolonization’ of the academic sphere has little in common with the idea of decolonization of knowledge and with the liberation from the academic dependency of the West. Even in the wildest dreams of the southern theorists, they could not imagine that someone would have enough power outside of academic structures to try to implement the epistemicide of the Western means of knowledge production and administration of science.
Another question in this radical example is what will be established instead of what has been controlled by the dominance of the West. The decolonial perspective has been criticized for lacking a project, which will in the most radical understanding replaces the northern (Western) order of scientific activity. Outside academia, criticism is just criticism unless it suggests a specific plan of action to implement the project. Moreover, it is very difficult to actually implement it in reality politically and administratively, but it is indeed possible within the classroom, within the curriculum with the help of different epistemologies and efforts toward epistemic justice. This is exactly what the West tries to critically re-evaluate in order to make social science more inclusive. Despite that the Russian version also ‘feels’ the necessity to influence the curriculum, it happens mostly because the state wants to make education more patriotic and ideologically oriented. It seems that Russia is indeed gradually facing the problem of the absence of the project, which supposedly will replace all the above-mentioned epistemicided means of knowledge production and administration of science.
This epistemicide leads to the emergence of what this article offers to call decolonial isolationism rather than actual decolonization. This term could be described as follows. Let us imagine that we play a game – Snake, where it is necessary to collect dots on the screen. While someone implements decolonization, they collect these ‘decolonial’ points. According to the rules of the game, the snake will become bigger depending on how many dots it will collect. At some point, a successful player will have such a big snake that it will be difficult to control its moves on the screen. Eventually, it will bite its own tail and disappear, the game is over. The same happens with Russian social science with the help of the state: it bites its own tale and falls into decolonial isolationism. A good thing that the player can start from the very beginning.
This term means the nominal and declarative use of decolonial narratives with the simultaneous epistemicide of Western models of science and education without actual decolonial intention. In the Russian case, it is established from above and exists in the state of the institutional and theoretical emptiness of models designed to replace Western structures along with the rejection of the necessity to orient to the external scientific standards of knowledge production.
It brings us to another issue. Theoretical support of the discourse on localism also faces problems. From statements on the uniqueness of the local context, the importance of the national language of scientific publications and the special values that exist in certain territories is one step to what Sokolov and Titaev (2013) call – tuzemnaya nauka and to the denial of any necessity to orient to the scientific standards outside of the autonomous world. The current political context ‘creates a powerful attraction between tuzemnaya nauka and all forms of nationalism and political isolationism, and between provintsialnaya nauka (provincial science, author's note) and all forms of political cosmopolitanism < … >’ (ibid: 251).
As it was already mentioned in the text, the first term is characterized by extreme denial or rejection of the outer agenda with the attempt to prove the superiority of the local context. On the contrary, provintsialnaya nauka concentrates on copying and the implementation of practices from the outer world, looking at how they are doing research and how they are writing their articles in good peer-reviewed journals. Usually, it is good manner to go somewhere to the ISA World Congress, come back, and tell local audiences what topics are trending there (ibid, author's italics). The perfect summary of such a distinction is:
If the provintsialnaya nauka is a cargo airport that sends signals to real planes that do not hear these signals and never land at it, then tuzemnaya nauka is an airport that sends signals to imaginary planes and these planes regularly land on such an airfield. (ibid: 259)
The difference between the zones of tuzemnaya nauka is that the closest zone constantly proves to itself and to those who agree to listen, that their airport and planes are the same as the real ones, and the furthest zone successfully forgets that the real ones exist somewhere. (ibid: 259)
Paradoxically, the ‘decolonial’ campaign of the Russian state in the field of social science has not yet been fully successful. Epistemiciding the models that integrated Russian scientists into world science, the subaltern empire indeed cracked an almost monolithic wall of the Western structures incorporated into Russian social science. It was done from above at the level of organizations, structures, models, and agreements. From below the practices of the Western social science will still be implemented by those, who are always oriented toward these models. The southern scholars dreamt of the decolonization of the scientific structures for decades, Vladimir Putin turned Russian social science into decolonial isolationism in less than a year of Russia's war in Ukraine.
Footnotes
This part of the article is a re-written and re-shaped part of the author's dissertation (Kislenko 2022).
All the translations of the articles written in Russian are provided by the author of this article.
It refers to the places where supporters of two politically oriented camps gathered. Adherents of the unique Russian way chose Poklonaia Gora, protesters against the current political regime gathered on Bolotnaia Square in Moscow.
References
Ivan Kislenko holds a double PhD degree in sociology from HSE University (Moscow, Russia) and Ghent University (Ghent, Belgium). His research interests are global production of knowledge, southern theory, national and indigenous sociologies, sociological canon and history of the debates on the decolonization of sociology.
Author notes
Edited by Alexi Gugushvili