Symbolic boundary work among Syrian refugees: perceived stigmas, responses, and cultural repertoires Open Access

Although the Turkish public initially welcomed Syrian refugees, signs of hardening boundaries have emerged over time. This study, based on in-depth interviews with Syrian refugees in Istanbul, examines both their perceptions of symbolic boundaries drawn against them by the majority Turkish society and their responses. The Syrian refugees in this study perceive three main stigmas: “uncultured,” “traitor,” and “freeloader.” They respond to these stigmas situationally by assuming individual responsibility, managing their self-presentation, and sometimes choosing not to respond. They also engage in discursive boundary drawing, emphasizing a strong work ethic as a defining characteristic of their group compared to Turkish workers. I argue that the historical cultural repertoire of anti-Arabism inherent in the conception of Turkish nationhood feeds these stigmas, especially in the context of the current economic crisis and political polarization. Meanwhile, the precarious position and fragile status of Syrian refugees constrain their situational responses. Their moral boundary work helps them reassert their dignity and legitimize their presence, but it also hinders potential solidarity with Turkish workers against a governing strategy that systematically exploits both groups.

Scholarship on both symbolic boundaries and responses to stigmatization continually reveals salient boundaries against Muslim immigrant groups and their variations in counterstigma strategies in several countries. Research on symbolic boundaries has documented the increasing portrayal of Muslims as culturally inferior, obstacles to progressivism and secularism, and associated with terrorism (Alba, 2005; Hellwig and Sinno, 2017; Bleich and van der Veen, 2021). Studies on responses to stigmatization have illustrated how Muslims creatively respond to these boundaries in various situational and discursive ways, adapting to different contextual dynamics to claim equality and reassert their self-worth (Lamont and Mizrachi, 2012; Lamont et al., 2016; Witte, 2018; Yurdakul and Altay, 2023; Dazey, 2021). While these studies reveal variations in boundaries and responses, certain limitations are evident. They focus predominantly on boundaries against Muslim immigrants in Western countries from the majority society's perspective. Although the literature on responses to stigma naturally centers on the perspective of the stigmatized, it also focuses primarily on immigrants and minorities in Western contexts.

This narrow focus leads to several limitations. First, it causes researchers to concentrate excessively on religious difference as the most prominent boundary, potentially overlooking other important dimensions of boundary work and responses. It is essential to avoid unquestioningly viewing religious distinctions as the primary defining boundaries in migration processes, as discussed by Carling, Erdal, and Ezzati (2014) in their examination of ethnonational distinctions in migration research. Boundary-making dynamics and processes are not uniform; they can occur between vastly different groups and between groups sharing common aspects, such as religion. Second, this excessive focus on established immigrants and minorities may cause researchers to overlook potential boundaries against, and responses from, forced migrants, such as refugees. Unlike immigrants, refugees face sudden loss of status, bitter downward mobility, and fragile legal status. Çelik (2021) provides theoretical insights, and Çelik (2023) offers empirical findings on the differences between immigrants and refugees that shape their adaptation processes differently. Additionally, Vandevoordt and Verschraegen (2019) provide empirical evidence on how forced migrants experience symbolic boundaries in distinct ways. Third, the focus of symbolic boundary scholarship on the majority society is inadequate for understanding the effects of boundaries on people's lives. As Simonsen (2018) observes, the majority society often takes boundaries for granted and does not experience them as decisively shaping their lives.

Against this background, I argue that this study, by focusing on Syrian refugees’ perceptions of symbolic boundaries in Turkey and their responses, with attention to cultural repertoires, institutional regulations, and contemporary factors that enable and constrain them, can significantly contribute to the integration of boundary-work and stigma-response scholarship. Specifically, I anticipate that, first, the shared religion between refugees and the majority society in a non-Western context will reveal boundaries that extend beyond religious differences. Second, the study illuminates the situational and discursive responses by refugees, informed by specific cultural repertoires, conditions, and legal statuses, which differ from those of established immigrants and minorities.

In the following sections, I introduce theoretical notions on symbolic boundaries and responses to stigmatization to elucidate the dynamics affecting Syrian refugees and their counterstigma responses. Next, I provide an overview of the context of Syrian refugees in Turkey, focusing on cultural repertoires, institutional regulations, and economic and political conditions. I then analyze respondents’ perceptions of symbolic boundaries drawn by the host society and their responses, identifying three situational strategies and one moral discursive strategy. Finally, I argue that the anti-Arab aspect of Turkish nationhood, activated by current economic and political dynamics, contributes to these boundaries, while refugees’ precarious labor market positions and fragile statuses shape their responses.

Cultural processes involve various forms of identification that necessitate symbolic segmentation into “us” and “them,” achieved through boundary drawing. Symbolic boundaries are the conceptual distinctions individuals use to categorize objects, practices, and people, generating feelings of similarity and difference to establish group membership (Lamont and Molnár, 2002). These symbolic boundaries inform social boundaries, meaning that moral judgments shape our understanding of the lines between groups based on the resources, networks, and spaces they access. For instance, judgments may deem certain groups as undeserving because they are perceived as lazy, vulgar, or phony (Lamont, 2023).

Individuals draw boundaries and stigmatize others by assigning them low status, thereby challenging their dignity, honor, or sense of self (Lamont et al., 2016). Crucially, boundary drawing is a fluid and ongoing process, influenced by complex interactions of historical cultural repertoires, legal regulations, and contemporary factors. Cultural repertoires—the tools individuals use to make sense of their reality—can manifest as national myths and ideologies. For example, the American Dream or melting pot in the United States, Zionism in Israel, and racial democracy in Brazil all shape boundary-drawing, stigmatization, and destigmatization processes (Lamont et al., 2016).

The observed stigmatizations and discriminations lead to the perception of symbolic boundaries and trigger the development of situational and/or discursive destigmatization responses by stigmatized groups.¹ However, different stigmatized groups respond to harmful boundaries in varied ways. Studies have shown that stigmatized individuals, depending on their resources and contextual factors, can draw, blur, shift, expand, or contract these boundaries around, for instance, social class and ethnicity (Yurdakul and Altay, 2023), class and race (Lamont, 2000), and gender and religion (Yurdakul and Korteweg, 2021).

Situational responses are immediate reactions to stigma in specific contexts and may encompass strategies like confronting, avoiding, and self-management (Lamont et al., 2016). These responses are crucial for understanding how contextual elements and power dynamics in concrete situations shape variations of destigmatization strategies. Discursive responses involve boundary work, prima-rily in moral and cultural spheres, where stigmatized groups engage against other groups to gain recognition, claim equality, or reassert self-worth (Witte, 2018).

Empirical studies on symbolic boundaries and destigmatization concerning Muslim groups have consistently found that Muslim immigrants face significant boundaries in Western countries. Bleich and van der Veen (2021) analyzed media coverage of Muslims in the United States, England, and Canada, revealing more negative portrayals compared to other groups, including Catholics, Jews, Hindus, African Americans, Latinos, Mormons, and atheists. Hellwig and Sinno (2017) found that in Britain, economic concerns negatively affect views on Eastern Europeans, while security fears and cultural threats negatively impact attitudes toward Muslim immigrants. Alba (2005) studied boundaries and belonging among second-generation Mexicans in the United States, North Africans in France, and Turks in Germany, arguing that belonging is easier in contexts with blurred boundaries, such as for Mexicans in the United States, and harder where boundaries are bright, as for Muslim groups in Europe. Simonsen (2018) illustrated the complex nature of boundary and belonging, showing that second-generation Middle Eastern immigrants in Denmark perceive strong boundaries but still feel at home in Denmark.

Regarding responses to stigmatization, Witte (2018) found that Turkish residents in Germany confront, deemphasize, ignore, and avoid ethnic and religious stigmas situationally, while discursively employing strategies of boundary making and blurring. Yurdakul and Altay (2023) discovered that Turkish mothers in Germany countered stigmas by emphasizing class status over ethnicity and religion. Ellefsen and Sandberg (2022) studied young Muslims in Norway, identifying responses such as talking back, entering dialogue, living the example, and denying significance, which they conceptualize as a repertoire of everyday resistance. Vandevoordt and Verschraegen (2019) found that Syrian refugees in Belgium emphasized moral worthiness and a strong work ethic to negotiate status, distancing themselves from uneducated refugees.

Building on this literature, and aiming to extend it, this study explores Syrian refugees’ perceptions of symbolic boundaries and their responses within a non-Western context where they share a religion with the majority society.

Turkey hosts approximately 3.2 million registered Syrians (Presidency of Migration Management [PMM], 2024). However, owing to its geographical limitation policy, the country does not grant refugee status to non-Europeans. Instead, Turkey enacted the 2013 Law on Foreigners and International Protection and the Temporary Protection Regulation in 2014, ensuring Syrians’ temporary stay and access to basic rights, such as health care, education, and the labor market, under Temporary Protection Status (TPS) (PMM, 2013). While President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has often cited moral values of hospitality and religious brotherhood concerning the stay of Syrians in Turkey, Turkish society has increasingly displayed signs of hardening boundaries with Syrians over time. The Annual Syrian Barometers, initiated in 2017, consistently report a rising tide of anti-Syrian and anti-Arab sentiments among the Turkish public (Erdoğan, 2020). Syrians are widely viewed in Turkish society as culturally incompatible with Turkish values, lacking secular and modern ideals, and potentially transforming Turkey into a Middle Eastern country (Morgül, Savaşkan and Mutlu, 2021).

Gezik (2022) analyzed media representations of Syrians in major newspapers from January 2016 to July 2017, revealing that news articles often reinforced divisions between Turks and Syrians. Syrians were portrayed as welfare recipients, as demographic threats due to high birthrates, and as criminals or ignorant individuals. Dağdeviren (2022) interviewed Syrians about their media portrayal and found that they felt offended by the negative image depicting them as troublemakers and ignorant individuals. They believed that news, images, and stories were carefully selected and exaggerated to shape negative public opinion against them. Erdogan-Ozturk and Işık-Guler (2020) investigated anti-Syrian sentiments on Twitter, focusing on the hashtag #idontwantsyriansinmycountry. They discovered an alarming rate of anti-Arab and antirefugee sentiment and growing racism toward Syrian refugees in the Turkish context, with online users depicting them as threats, invaders, criminals, and potential dangers to construct a collective nationalist identity.

What cultural repertoires and background conditions potentially inform symbolic boundaries against Syrians in Turkey? Siviş (2023) asserts that Turkish citizens use national history and militarized masculinity to establish boundaries against Syrian refugees. Despite sharing a religion with Turks, Syrians are branded as “Arabs” and viewed as culturally incompatible with Turkish national identity. They are criticized for not defending their country and relocating to Turkey instead, and their use of Arabic further challenges Turkish unity around language and flag. These symbolic boundaries, contrasting the proud, heroic Turks with Syrians who did not defend their own country, reinforce a masculine conception of Turkish nationhood and citizenship. Güney (2022) echoes these findings in her research in Bolu, a conservative and nationalistic city with a relatively small number of refugees. She suggests that Bolu residents view Syrians as unworthy of Turkish citizenship, seeing them as traitors to both the Ottomans and their own nation—and as potentially disloyal to Turkey. The notion of nationhood and ethnicity, built around superiority and heroism, leads to the alienation of refugees. These two studies effectively underscore the significance of the conception of nationhood in delineating boundaries against Syrians. However, I contend that anti-Syrian sentiments are intricately linked to a robust anti-Arab repertoire in Turkey, a phenomenon with deeper historical roots than they suggest.

Anti-Arab sentiments trace back to centuries of interactions during the Ottoman Empire, as documented by Büke Okyar (2023), where two primary stereotypes emerged: the “white Arab,” representing Middle Eastern traders, often viewed as calculating and unreliable, and the “black Arab,” referring to servants who ended up in the capital via the Ottoman slavery system from North Africa and sub-Saharan territories, portrayed as loyal but “simple-minded.” In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire faced increased conflict with Western colonial powers, leading to a surge in cultural exchange and European fascination with the East (Said, 2003). However, by the early 20th century, European perceptions had shifted, viewing Ottomans as clumsy and uncivilized owing to military losses and oppressive rule (Büke Okyar, 2023). Influenced by European nationalist movements, young Ottoman intellectuals began projecting Orientalist ideas onto their Arab provinces, portraying them as uncivilized savages and believing that civilization should start from these regions (Deringil, 2003; Büke Okyar, 2023).

During the Tanzimat, a series of reforms initiated in 1839, Arabs were seen as subjects to be united under modern Ottoman patriotism against Western colonial powers, yet also as backward Bedouins living in the desert (Hanioğlu, 1991). This dual view, despite the shared religion, led to a sense of moral superiority among Ottomans, resulting in moral distance from Arabs and the creation of narratives that portrayed Arabs as nonnational scapegoats for the empire's troubles (Deringil, 2003). The Arab Revolt of 1916, backed by the British army in 1918 and motivated by pan-Arab nationalism, caught the Ottomans off guard and reinforced existing Turkish stereotypes about Arabs (Makdisi, 2002). Crucially, as Kaya (2017) noted, pan-Arab nationalism emerged mainly as a reaction to the pan-Turkist ideology of the Ottoman elite, who had gained prominence and popularity among Turkish nationalists in the late 19th century. The loss of former Ottoman Arab provinces to Western colonial powers and their subsequent suffering under foreign rule further solidified the image of Arabs in the public consciousness as treacherous, lacking honor and decency, and unable to resist European expansion (Büke Okyar, 2023).

After the foundation of Turkey in 1923, Turkish republican elites aimed to strengthen Turkish identity by marginalizing the Arab world through nationalist and modernization efforts. They downplayed shared Islamic ties, emphasized ethnic differences, and promoted the idea of ancient links between Turkishness and the West. This depiction portrayed Turks as “dynamic” and “progressive” Westerners, in contrast with the “stagnant” and “backward” Easterners, painting Arabs as uncivilized and disloyal nomads (Ergin, 2018).

In addition to historical cultural repertoires, contemporary economic crises and political divisions are crucial factors influencing boundaries with Syrians. Turkey faces severe economic challenges, including high inflation, rapid currency depreciation, growing wealth disparities, and political polarization. The Turkish lira has significantly depreciated against major currencies, such as the US dollar and euro, going from 1.9 in 2013 to 32.20 per US dollar by May 2024, notably synchronizing with the increasing number of refugees in Turkey over time.

The currency devaluation and high inflation are eroding incomes and savings. Consumer price inflation has been significant, rising from 8.17% in 2013 to 17.90% in 2018, and reached 80.21% in 2022 (Turkish Republic Central Bank, 2023). Independent institutions report even higher inflation rates, with estimates reaching 128.05% in 2023 (ENAG, 2023). These trends exacerbate societal inequalities, with the wealthiest 20% experiencing an increase in gross household income while other social classes have seen a decrease. This has led to a shift in the Gini coefficient toward 1, signifying a more unequal income distribution (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2023).

Growing economic inequalities worsen political polarization. A 2020 nationwide representative survey revealed significant emotional political polarization in the country, characterized by social distance, moral superiority, and political intolerance among supporters of different political parties. The survey also highlighted a strong connection between political party preferences and personal identities (Turkuazlab, 2022). As people increasingly inhabit political and cultural echo chambers, socializing primarily with like-minded individuals, political party affiliation—particularly in the form of being pro- or anti-Erdoğan—significantly shapes people's stances on various issues. Opposition party supporters often view Syrians as natural allies of the conservative Erdoğan regime (Erdoğan, 2020). The ambiguity surrounding the number of Syrians granted Turkish citizenship and their potential voting influence in head-to-head election results further reinforce negative perceptions toward Syrians and Arabs. The May 2023 presidential election went to the second round with a slim 0.48% margin, and Erdoğan narrowly won in the second round with 52.18% to 48.82% (Official Gazette, 2023).

The aforementioned historical cultural repertoire of anti-Arabism from the late Ottoman and early republican periods, combined with current economic and political factors, and the fragile status of refugees have shaped the urban milieu in which Syrian refugees, studied in this article, perceive symbolic boundaries drawn against them and respond to them.

This study rests on 15 in-person, in-depth interviews with Syrians holding TPS in Istanbul in 2019. Istanbul, hosting 530,774 Syrian refugees, corresponding to 3.28% of the city's residents (PPM, 2024), attracts high numbers of refugees and immigrants because of its economic, cultural, and social characteristics. This makes Istanbul the best setting to capture stigmatizations and responses. The study focused on Sunni Muslim Arab Syrians to ensure a homogeneous group and to better understand their perceptions of boundaries drawn against them, as well as their responses.²

I initially contacted interviewees through personal and institutional connections, then used a snowball technique to access more participants. The initial interviewees vouched for my credibility, leading to more openness from subsequent participants. I presented myself as a researcher studying Syrian–Turkish societal relationships and conducted interviews in Turkish and English, while my research assistant, a female nongovernmental organization (NGO) worker, conducted interviews in Arabic. We used a semistructured, in-depth interview approach because its flexible structure allowed for posing additional, probing questions (Berg, 2004), making it the best method to comprehend how individuals make sense of the reality around them (Weiss, 1995). We asked questions about respondents’ arrival in the country, social networks, daily routines, interactions with Turkish society, perceptions of the majority population, and responses to these perceptions.

My ethnicity, biography, and linguistic differences from the interviewees occasionally led to initial hesitation in some interviews when discussing how the majority society perceived them. However, as the interviews progressed, participants became more open and detailed about their experiences. Nonetheless, there were instances when the “insider–outsider divide” (Carling, Erdal and Ezzati, 2014) was evident, and I felt somewhat unwelcome, particularly during the pilot interviews with female participants conducted in Arabic in my presence. The brevity of the responses and the short duration of the interviews were understandable in this context. As a researcher from the majority society, with a Turkish name and ethnicity, and being male, my presence may have made participants cautious. Moreover, the information they shared, if exposed, could tighten the authorities’ control over them, threaten their livelihoods, and potentially lead to deportation (Carling, Erdal and Ezzati, 2014). To mitigate these risks, I collaborated with my research assistant, a Syrian female refugee, to conduct these interviews independently. This approach resulted in more extended and informative interviews. This aligns with Herwartz-Emden and Westphal's (2000) argument that having an interviewer who is ethnically, culturally, and, in our case, gender-wise similar can create an intimate atmosphere. Such an environment facilitates communication on sensitive topics like racism and discrimination, a phenomenon known as the culture effect.

For the fieldwork, ethical approval was obtained from the university's research ethics board. Prior to the interviews, participants were informed about the study's purpose and data protection procedures. At the start of each interview, verbal consent was obtained, avoiding written consent to address concerns about affecting refugees’ status and stay. The profiles of both highly and less educated respondents showed similar income and occupation shifts due to bitter downward mobility. For example, former dentists and teachers were now engaged in low-skilled jobs as menial laborers, bellhops, or hotel security guards. Interviews with highly educated participants were longer, lasting 60–120 minutes, while those with less educated participants lasted 40–60 minutes. Highly educated participants shared more detailed descriptions about discrimination and life history, while less educated participants gave shorter, yet emotionally charged responses, particularly regarding financial struggles and discrimination.

The interviews focused on participants’ experiences with discrimination and exclusion and their responses to stigmatization. They were voice-recorded, translated, transcribed, and manually coded using grounded theory. In grounded theory, there is a debate on the role of prior literature: Corbin and Strauss (1990) argue that preexisting theory informs data interpretation, while Glaser (1992) believes that theory should emerge from the data. Charmaz (2006) introduces a constructivist approach, advocating for an abductive method that uses general frameworks to inform fieldwork and revisits them to refine existing knowledge.

In analyzing the first part of the interviews on symbolic boundaries, I derived categories directly from participants’ narratives without relying on predefined theoretical frameworks. Examples of these categories include “traitor,” “freeloader,” and “uncultured.” In the second section, focusing on responses to stigma, I used an abductive approach within grounded theory, incorporating existing classifications related to stigma responses where applicable (Lamont et al., 2016). These classifications include confronting, assuming individual responsibility, managing the self, and not responding. This method identifies commonalities and differences in responses among diverse groups across countries, facilitating the comparison of relational taxonomies (Witte, 2018; Piwoni, 2023).

The interviewees did not spontaneously mention discrimination and stigmatization when discussing their experiences in Turkey. Instead, they highlighted the role of common religion, vibrant life, and economic opportunities as reasons for staying in Istanbul and Turkey. Both male and female interviewees emphasized the uniqueness of Istanbul and drew parallels between the religious values, social lives, and architectural landscapes of Istanbul and major Syrian cities like Damascus and Aleppo. They saw this parallelism as advantageous, especially in terms of maintaining cultural continuity, particularly in child-rearing.

However, when asked about Turkish society's perceptions of Syrians and their experiences with discrimination, interviewees highlighted widespread prejudice, stigmatization, and mistreatment. They noted unequal treatment, humiliation, and discrimination in areas like housing, health care, education, and the labor market. While they avoided generalizing their experiences to all Turkish citizens and cited positive examples, they reported common stigmas faced by Syrians in Turkey. These include being labeled as “uncultured,” “freeloaders,” and “traitors.” For example, Nada, a civil engineer working in a humanitarian association, noted that a prevalent stigma in Turkish society is the belief that Syrians receive more public assistance than Turks:

Nada's observation about Syrians being perceived as freeloaders, implying that Syrians take advantage of public resources like welfare and rely on Turkey's generosity, aligns with a significant study in which 36% of respondents did not view Syrians as war victims and 78% believed the government treats Syrians better than Turkish citizens (Şar and Kuru, 2020). This stigma seems to be mediated through a cultural repertoire that portrays Arabs as “stagnant” and “lazy,” a depiction originating from the early Turkish republican period. President Erdoğan's statements about the generous spending of the Turkish state on Syrians (Presidency of Republic of Türkiye, 2017) further reinforced this perception. While Erdoğan likely made these statements to secure more funding from the European Union and international organizations, they contributed to the stigmatization of Arabs as “welfare sponges” in Turkey. This boundary drawing gained further traction during the COVID-19 pandemic, fueled by the ambiguity and lack of transparency regarding refugee assistance, leading to rumors and public resentment among low-socioeconomic-status Turkish citizens (Erdoğan, 2020).

Interviewees frequently highlighted the stigmatization of Syrians as freeloaders. Assaad emphasized the challenging living conditions faced by Syrians and criticized the unjust freeloader stigma, especially given their long working hours and low wages. He noted that Syrians are stigmatized in various additional ways, sharing his own experience in a hospital:

Assaad went on speaking, citing similar experiences in public spaces: The doctor's portrayal of Syrians as traitors and freeloaders suggests they are not defending their country but seeking a “better” life in Turkey. This perception, along with public incidents experienced by the interviewees, documents a strong boundary drawn against Syrians, branding them as traitors. It also reveals the limitations imposed on Syrians in public spaces in the minds of the majority. As “traitors,” Syrians are not permitted to smile, laugh, or claim their space and rights. This stigmatization severely restricts their social interactions and access to resources, reinforcing their marginalized status.

These findings closely align with the boundaries of “disloyalty” and “fecklessness” identified by Siviş (2023) in the narratives of Turkish citizens, shaped by a uniform, masculine, and proud national identity. I further argue that these stigmatizations are also influenced by a cultural repertoire that historically portrays Arabs as passive, tribal Bedouins incapable of forming national unity, in stark contrast to Turks (Deringil, 2003). This historical construction of passiveness also indirectly fuels the stigmatization of Arabs as freeloaders benefiting from Turkey's welfare state. The following quote from Mahmood, who studied until the seventh grade, exemplifies this deep-seated, historical anti-Arab sentiment:

The enduring stereotype of Syrians as uncultured, uncivilized desert dwellers reflects the lasting influence of historical ideological constructions portraying Arabs as primitive Bedouins living in barren wastelands, particularly evident during the late Ottoman period's Orientalization of Arabs.

Relatedly, Makram, an English teacher who taught in Damascus and later worked in a private school in Istanbul, expressed frustration with the numerous degrading stigmas about Syrians:

Like Makram, Syrians perceive stigmas of being uncivilized and dependent on the welfare state from almost all segments of Turkish society. These depictions are versions of uncultured and freeloader boundary drawing mediated by cultural repertoires about Arabs in the late Ottoman and early republican periods. However, in response, the interviewees in this study actively engaged in counterstigma responses and boundary-making strategies to achieve recognition.

The respondents in this study have developed three situational responses: managing the self, assuming individual responsibility, and not responding. Confrontation, in the forms of “teaching the ignorant” and “striking back,” is a highly common response to symbolic exclusion among various immigrant groups and minorities, often drawing on available repertoires. For example, Kurds in Turkey rely on Kurdish political repertoires (Turgut and Çelik, 2022), Turks in Germany are motivated by their religious belief in the equality of all human beings and an interest in reciprocal recognition between minority and mainstream members (Witte, 2018), and African Americans in the United States draw on strong cultural repertoires like the American Dream and the civil rights movement (Fleming, Lamont and Welburn, 2012). However, significantly, my respondents did not confront stigmatizers at all owing to feelings of powerlessness or fear of significant losses because of their precarious positions in the informal labor market and their fragile legal status.

In addition, interestingly, in contrast to other studies that find varying levels of confrontational responses among middle-class and lower-class individuals—for example, more confrontational (Lamont et al., 2016) and less confrontational (Lacy, 2004) responses among African Americans—there were no variations in responses between low- and highly skilled interviewees in my study. This uniformity is likely due to the equally resource-poor conditions experienced by both groups, stemming from the bitter downward mobility and status loss associated with refugee status.

As stated, some respondents assumed individual responsibility in addressing stigma and discrimination. Assuming individual responsibility involves accepting stigma at the general level but attempting to prove that the individual does not carry the negative characteristics of the group. This implies that stigma is not a structural issue but that the individual has the power to manage and prevent the stigmatization process (Turgut and Çelik, 2022). For instance, Fida noted that Syrians themselves often perpetuate the negative image of their community in the host society:

Fida justifies the attacks on Syrians’ worth because of their own actions, while reserving moral room for herself as different from many Syrian women doing immoral things. In doing so, she accepts the stigma as accurate, justifies the perpetrators of the stigma, and puts the responsibility on Syrians to control the stigmatization process. She spoke about how she feels and reacts to stigmatization and discrimination:

This exchange is highly informative in several ways. First, Fida describes the group as resourceless and fragile, indicating the absence of strong repertoires in refugee conditions that facilitate confrontation. Second, she advises a “strategic silence” informed by extreme precarity as part of the “managing the self” strategy (Lamont et al., 2016). This approach, supposedly, allows Syrians to access certain resources and avoid confirming stereotypes of Syrians as impulsive and furious—likely a subset of uncultured Arab stereotypes. In managing the self, respondents acknowledge the occurrence of stigmatization but carefully weigh potential responses, ultimately deciding against direct confrontation because of the high costs involved. Their deliberate efforts aim to avoid confirming stereotypes about Arabs, losing jobs, or being deported and to maintain access to resources.

The mixed strategy of assuming individual responsibility and managing the self, as seen in Fida's case, arises from bitter experiences in precarious situations and from fragile legal statuses. For example, Fida recounted an instance when she confronted a stigmatizer at the municipality a long time earlier. However, even other Syrians present criticized her, saying, “Why are you mad and shouting when you are Syrian?” This highlights the collective dimension of these counterstigma responses and the situational constraints Syrians face in responding. They carefully consider potential scenarios before responding to stigmatization and discrimination, deliberating on their responses to manage the situation effectively because of their precarious position and concerns about legal status.

Managing the self was a common counterstigma strategy among respondents. Moussa, who speaks only Arabic and completed seventh grade, remarked that while many think Syrians are accessing many things for free, they are actually working more for less salary. He added that he has to do the same to survive:

Moussa is keenly aware of the “freeloader” stigma, which is fed by contemporary material conditions and the historical construction of Arabs as passive. To counter this, he actively exhibits competence and puts in extra effort. He does this to demonstrate that Syrians are hardworking and deserving of their earnings. Moussa manages himself internally to give a positive impression externally, acting against the common stereotype and avoiding being perceived as a freeloader Syrian.

Nada was once helping a family speak to a municipality project officer when a police officer recognized her as Syrian, she said, “most likely because of my headscarf's type and color.” He approached her with a sarcastic smile and reportedly said,

Although Nada was deeply disturbed by the implications of the “traitor” and “disloyal” stigmas in this interaction, which are fed by the notion of Turkish superiority over Arabs as part of the conception of Ottoman Orientalism and Turkish nationalism, she did not react. When asked about her justification for this response, she explained, Ilcan, Rygiel, and Baban (2018) argue that the precarity of Syrian refugees in Turkey ironically stems from the objectives of protecting refugees, describing it as an “ambiguous architecture of precarity” that limits their access to legal status, services, and mobility at both national and international levels. My findings suggest that, beyond these tangible uncertainties, unclear legal status and fear of deportation significantly influence how individuals respond to attacks on their dignity in public spaces. This ambiguity often leads stigmatized individuals to respond inwardly, avoiding direct confrontation with their aggressors. Nada's choice to remain unresponsive reflects her perception of the high risks involved owing to her fragile legal status, highlighting a strategy of self-management.

When asked about their silence in the face of stigma and their reluctance to demand their rights, Hanadi said, “We are facing a deportation risk.  .  .  . I think the most challenging thing is that we don't have rights here like we used to back home.” Karima added, “We simply can't do anything because we are incapable.  .  .  . We are nothing but strangers.” Galib expressed his disturbance over the subtle ways the “traitor” and “freeloader” stigmas appear in daily interactions and, like other respondents, stressed his precarious position in responding to these stigmas:

While TPS theoretically grants access to services, it does not ensure rights or a secure future, leading to unpredictable outcomes and a fear of deportation. Like others, Galib carefully considers incidents, calculating his responses as part of the strategy to manage himself.

However, some respondents choose to ignore and refrain from responding to stigmatization due to their extreme lack of hope for change in their situation, akin to the strategy of ignoring observed among Palestinian Arabs in Israel (Lamont et al., 2016; Lamont and Mizrachi, 2012). Unlike the “managing the self” strategy, which involves careful reflection on the best way to respond to a specific incident, not responding occurs when respondents believe it is pointless to respond. They feel a sense of resignation, thinking the situation is beyond their control and that they cannot effect any change (Lamont et al., 2016). Karima, a 31-year-old with a primary school diploma who arrived in Turkey with her husband and has worked in various low-paying jobs, described her sentiments about the impossibility of improved relations with Turkish citizens:

Karima is frustrated by the constant implications of disloyalty, untrustworthiness, and traitorousness. She feels exhausted and has little hope of change in the situation. According to her, “even if Syrians attempted to conform to Turkish preferences, some Turks would still not accept them.” This pessimistic view about the potential improvement of intergroup relations, shared by some other participants, stems from strong symbolic exclusion, a precarious position in the informal market, and institutional limitations on the status and rights of refugees in the country. These factors have led some respondents to believe that direct confrontation and strategic deliberation are unlikely to yield positive results, so they have opted not to respond.

Assaad's case illustrates the direct link between a lack of hope for positive change and the chosen response modality. As described in the earlier section, Assaad constantly encounters the host society's boundaries that stigmatize Syrians as traitors and freeloaders:

Assaad ignores stigmas and implies that he would have responded differently if conditions were different. This highlights how responses are influenced by situational constraints and enablers in existing conditions. The documented social, economic, and legal restrictions result in extreme hopelessness, leading respondents to choose not to respond to the thick boundaries drawn against them in the host society.

In addition to situational responses, some respondents engaged in moral boundary work highlighting Syrians’ strong work ethic and diligence compared to Turkish workers, despite their awareness of bitter labor market exploitation. For instance, Muhammed, a 35-year-old with a sixth-grade education working in a shoe factory, recounted daily derogatory remarks from Turkish coworkers about leaving his country. He noted that while Turkish employers reluctantly hire Syrians, they value their willingness to work long hours for low pay and their devotion to work. For example, Muhammed expressed frustration, saying,

It's important to note that the respondents are well aware of the exploitation they face. Despite this, they carve out a space for their dignity and reaffirm their worth, which has been tarnished by their refugee status. This resonates with the findings of Vandevoordt and Verschraegen (2019) in Belgium, where male, low-educated Syrian refugees emphasized a stronger work ethic compared to immigrants and “lazy refugees” to assert their masculine worthiness. However, unlike respondents in their study, who compared themselves with immigrants and other refugees, Syrians in this study emphasize their work ethic compared to local Turkish workers. For example, 22-year-old Assaad, who attended school until the sixth grade, expressed frustration with working for Turkish people:

While opposing Muhammed's stance concerning the more positive treatment of Turkish workers by employers, Assaad also engages in moral boundary work that highlights the hardworking character of Syrian workers and derives dignity from it. As stated, such moral boundary work was common among male, relatively less educated respondents. However, it also appeared in the narratives of female respondents regarding their spouses’ working lives. For instance, Hanadi discussed her husband's work experience, explaining that he is a diligent worker with greater capacities than his Turkish coworkers and therefore is appreciated by his boss, who likes him very much:

These respondents affirm their dignity and decency by emphasizing a strong work ethic and diligence, framing these qualities in both masculine and moral terms. They do so within a new context where they face various forms of stigmatization and extreme precarious conditions.

This article examines Syrian refugees’ perceptions of symbolic boundaries and their responses. It aims to enrich the scholarship on symbolic boundaries, which focuses primarily and narrowly on boundaries against Muslim immigrants in Western countries from the perspective of the majority society, as well as responses to stigma scholarship that focuses on immigrants and minorities in these contexts.

The study showcases, first, that Syrian refugees perceive substantial symbolic exclusion in the form of stigma, such as being labeled “uncultured,” “freeloaders,” or “traitors.” Second, it reveals links between these stigmas and historical repertoires of anti-Arabism as part of the Turkish nationhood conception. This finding from the refugees’ perspective verifies Siviş’s (2023) and Güney's (2022) results from the majority society's perspective, thus complementing them by showcasing the salience of these symbolic exclusions and the enduring influence of historical cultural repertoires in the Turkish context.

Third, the study reveals refugees’ situational and discursive responses to stigma. They respond to stigma situationally by assuming individual responsibility, managing the self, and not responding at all, mainly due to their precarious position in the market and their fragile status. Additionally, they engage in discursive moral boundary work, emphasizing the diligent and hardworking character of Syrian workers compared to Turkish workers to reassert their worth in a masculine way—aligning with Vandevoordt and Verschraegen's (2019) findings on Syrian refugees in Belgium within the Turkish context.

These findings carry several theoretical implications. First, despite the presence of shared religion and values, especially evident in discussions about child-rearing and family life, common religion did not emerge as a significant factor shaping refugees’ responses to assert equality. I interpret this absence as a signal that the respondents, based on their accumulated experiences, perceive ethnic stigmatization as superseding shared religious identity. This discovery holds significance, revealing that while prevalent boundaries against Syrians in numerous Western contexts are typically linked to religion, in Turkey, ethnicity takes precedence.

Second, both situational responses and discursive moral boundary work by refugees are influenced by extreme precarity, sudden status loss with bitter downward mobility, and fragile status. These conditions differ from those of established migrants or minorities and suggest the necessity of investigating more cases of refugees and forced migrants in boundary-drawing and stigma-response scholarship.

Relatedly, finally, while this discursive moral boundary work operates to compensate for their sudden status loss, to negotiate their status, and to legitimize their worth and presence in the new context, it actually serves, similar to what Saraçoğlu and Bélanger (2021) observed concerning Syrian and Turkish relations, to legitimize a governance strategy that systematically exploits Syrian refugees in the labor market and hinders the formation of solidarity with Turkish workers.

I thank the anonymous reviewers and editors for their careful reading of my manuscript and for their many insightful comments and suggestions, which were pivotal in improving it.

AI tools (specifically, ChatGPT by OpenAI) were used solely for grammar checking and improving language clarity. All content and ideas are the original work of the author.

The qualitative data generated and analyzed in this study are not publicly available due to ethical considerations and privacy issues.

The author declares no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Koç University Committee on Human Research approved this research (approval 2017.104.IRB3.057).

Supplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1162/euso_a_00005.