THE MISSING EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE AND THE ABSENCE OF IMAGINED EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP: Democratic deficit as a function of a common European media deficit

In this article, I explore some of the theoretical and normative bases for an alternative relation between polity and communication at the level of the European Union (EU). I start by elaborating on prior empirical research findings, according to which general European affairs are treated in an erratic, segmentalized, diverging and undermining fashion by the media. I focus, therefore, on the crucial problem arising from the absence of a communication system that shares an analogous scope and focus with the EU. I interrogate the reasons why such a mediatic arena is missing and discuss the possible obstacles to the creation of such a system. By scrutinizing concrete facets of this incongruent condition and the prevalent shortcomings of political communication, I try to explain why this has occurred and identify its negative implications.

I argue that there is a crucial and pressing need for a common European electronic public domain in order to communicate common EU affairs in a unitary and universally accessible fashion, primarily to enable a continuation of the conditions necessary for democratic politics. Consequently, the fact that decision-making in Brussels is under-mediatized or systematically filtered through the lens of nation, results in misinformation and the disorientation of citizens about crucial instances of power brokering. I hold that European political communication is in deficit and this leads to de-politicization. Irrespective of pro- or anti-EU stances, what takes place in Brussels cannot be ignored. Ignorance about our European public affairs, the waning commitment to EU citizenship and the absence of an imagined common European identity result precisely from the perpetuated lack of a Europeanpublic sphere.

Liberal democracies developed as political entities intrinsically linked to a free press and related media systems and were also distinguished by their evolution into nation states. Over the last 50 years, a complex supra-national political structure has developed in Europe, which both unites and supersedes the constituent nation states. Most EU institutions have already acquired pan-European scope and validity. Yet, the key political institutions of communications media remain nationally entrenched and oriented. Thus, the EU as a political structure lacks a corresponding communication system. The idea of European citizenship, first proclaimed in the revision of the founding treaties of Maastricht¹ in 1992, and the corresponding ideology of Europeanism, are thus absent in existing symbolic and discursive domains. At best, such notions are submerged into a collateral identity next to feelings of national identity and citizenship. In principle all EU citizens enjoy rights to information and communication. But how can these be realized within the larger Euro-political domain? How, and most importantly, in exactly what commonly visible public domain or shared space are we to exercise our active and passive information rights? Currently, are such rights of no practically significant value? Such questions persist and become more acute when considering the nature and complexity of the policy process in Brussels that are remote from most ordinary citizens living in distant regions. Severe dysfunctions are manifest in the primary level of passive information rights, such as low visibility of even key EU issues. The problems in exercising the superior category of active information rights, which are linked to political participation, are far more severe.

Currently, the Internet is the only common platform to accommodate such needs. However, the Internet, by its very technical peculiarity, lacks the politically indispensable centralized visibility, unless it operates in synergy with television. As such, the Internet is not in itself suitable for a common and universally shared publicness and visibility (Kaitatzi-Whitlock 2003). To date, the Internet is accessed by less than half of Europeans and its demographic spread is constrained in a number of ways. Moreover, the range and frequency of its uses are often quite limited. In contrast, television is still the most pervasive and accessible mass medium. Television, under different premises, could be an instrument for certain functions of direct democracy (Bourdieu 1997: 8). Indeed, through digital interactivity, and under certain preconditions, television could emerge as a broadly participatory medium (Kaitatzi-Whitlock 2004a). Hence, interactive television is the optimal medium for individuals and groups to make themselves heard, but also to achieve visibility and thereby to bridge geographical and socio-cultural gaps in Europe.

The implicit assumption here is that there are considerable numbers of Europeans interested in developing such transfrontier exchanges and ties through the creation of a transnational civil society and who lack the requisite structures to implicate themselves in European politics.² Therefore, since the operation of a pan-European transnational television channel could encompass such needs, the question is why one does not exist. The synergy between television and new media, notably the Internet, can regenerate television's role, transforming it into an electronic public sphere, a politically valuable common deliberative space. A live electronic forum such as this could also function inter alia as a means for facilitating actual horizontal communication.³

Many democracy theorists have been preoccupied with the complexities of inadequate, biased or default political communication. Dahl (2000), Keane (1991), and Dahlgren and Sparks (1991), locate the objective of democratic regeneration in rectified political communication. Jürgen Habermas (1989) succinctly set out the immanent liberal democratic tenets by which we can establish and assess the role of a ‘public sphere’ and its agencies. It must above all be accessible to all citizens for dialogue and interactive participation. Crystallizing the Habermasian thesis, MacNair (1995): 21) identifies five core functions of political communication in democracies. To (1) inform citizens of what is happening; (2) foster an understanding of the significance of information communicated; (3) monitor and scrutinize the role of governments and of individuals in public office (watch-dog function); (4) provide a platform for public political discourse facilitating the formation of ‘public opinion’ and of political will; and (5) provide a forum for the advocacy of diverse, even antithetical, political views. It is worth remarking that the first three functions pertain solely to the professional journalistic role, whereas the latter two functions, which normally belong to the superior category of interactive communication, pertain to broader civic communication roles and agency. An accomplishment of these roles allows the media to approximate an optimal ‘public sphere’ that is a prerequisite for democracy.

A modern pan-European televised public space should pursue two different functions: first, to disseminate political information of a broad scope (passive information rights), and second, to accommodate participation in the exchange of citizens’ opinions and messages in public deliberation and dialogue (active communication rights). Such a forum could prepare the ground for solidarity and the transcendence of feelings of alienation or suspicion amongst Europeans, thus building a real sense of community. The questions that arise concern the real options available to EU citizens, first, to receive, impart and share information, and, second, to participate in trans-national, broad forums beyond frontiers. Today, none of these fundamental political communication functions is ascertained in Europe.

Fifty years since its inception, the project of European unification is at a crucial turning point: perhaps even at an extremely precarious moment in its history. Umberto Eco argues that the EU ‘will either become European or it will disintegrate.’ (Eco 2003: 16–17) Indeed, in view of recent crises (over the Iraq war or the rejection of the constitutional convention) he could not be more accurate in his assessment that the EU is currently ‘between renaissance and decline’. Fernando Sabater concurs that ‘European states are today less united than ever’ (Sabater 2003: 18–19).⁴ Studying the bi-polar tension between the nation-state, on the one hand, and the EU, on the other, Habermas (2003): 99) on his part, argues that it is only the symbolic construction of ‘people’ that ‘transformed the modern state into a national state’. Hence, just as national unification processes of the nineteenth century formed nation-states, today corresponding symbolic constructs can procure a unitary Europe, a continental union with cohesion and a common political – cultural identity.

In his ‘Post-national Constellation’ (2003): 139–42, first published in 1998), Habermas argues that such a project is feasible under certain conditions. In his view the present challenge facing the EU amounts to two major priorities: first, to impose re-distributional obligations on (stronger) market forces, and second, to generate a new collective identity beyond frontiers or the limits of nationhood.⁵ Today, both of these Habermasian conditions are failing. The first due to the unbridled and globally operating market forces and the second, which is related to the lack of a common communication space, due to real or perceived nationalist sensibilities.

However, a ‘Europe-wide public sphere’ is anticipated by Habermas (2001): 16) and by other democracy theorists. One of the fundamental problems involved here is: how should this be created and fashioned? Methodologically, Habermas considers that existing, nationally entrenched media can develop a sort of inter-penetration and a flow of exchanging of views on common topical issues. However, existing national media have not taken such initiatives of their own free will. Indeed, the contrary applies. Investigations on supplied contents by both national and transnational channels demonstrate the dire fact that European politics is not communicated to EU citizens. Indeed, it is confirmed that Europolitics is already a renowned ‘quantité négligeable’. In view of this harsh reality and contrary to Habermas’ conception, I propose that an autonomous, supranational,pan-European channel is both badly needed and feasible given due financial safeguards and political responsibility by EU institutions.

Research projects conducted in all EU countries have now gathered substantial evidence that proves that, to date, national media either sideline EU political affairs or misconstrue them severely. This condition is comprehensive and takes the form of: (a) the minimal visibility of general EU political issues; (b) coverage of even these minimally selected issues with gross national bias, and (c) coverage of isolated events of high-politics, preferably personalized, or ‘ethno-controversial’ issues or non-political items. To these we must also consider overtly negative reporting and condescending and/or ironic overtones in editorials, all of which add up to practices that drastically contribute to Euro-scepticism and of Euro-phobia.

Minimal visibility of current EU political issues signifies that even though available political matter may be crucial and large in quantity and scope, the portion of issues that reach the media agenda never, or extremely rarely, exceeds the level of 1–5 per cent of the overall output in any single medium (Media Tenor 2005c).⁶ Euro-political issues are filtered out completely or coverage is severely limited by national media gatekeepers. Not surprisingly, ‘in Germany, Belgium, France, Greece, Great Britain, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Lithuania, sports were more important than the EU’ (Media Tenor 2005b).

One of the most comprehensive single surveys that investigates media coverage of a EU issue, notably that about the European election of 2004, was conducted by Media Tenor (2005b).⁷ Moreover, countries such as Germany, Greece, Denmark, France, The Netherlands, the UK, Sweden, Switzerland and others figure in several recent studies, which involve single case studies or comparative synchronical or longitudinal surveys. Such investigations interrogate the extent, the type and the quality of covering EU political affairs by the media, either in specific historical conjunctures, e.g., the adoption of the Euro-currency, the accession of the ten new member states or the last Euro-elections of 2004. The common finding of all these studies is that the coverage of Europolitics is minimal and negative.

On the basis of a comparative study of the press coverage on the introduction of the Euro currency, in Germany, France, the UK, The Netherlands and Switzerland, Ludes (2004): 216–17) demonstrates the failure of national media to cover this historic European-wide policy choice adequately. Similar instances of failure are found in coverage of other events and aspects especially by longitudinal, comparative studies by Media Tenor, but also by several more recent studies.⁸

Overall, it emerges that for national media the EU per se and its policies do not constitute a newsworthy topic. In this light, even the spectacular rejection of the draft constitution for the EU by the people in The Netherlands and in France, which ‘could have triggered a debate about the direction Europe should head for in the future’ failed patently to draw media attention. On the contrary, ‘the visibility of European politics has decreased notably in the summer of 2005 – and not only in pre-election Germany’ (Media Tenor 2005c). Indeed, after the dismissive results of the referenda ‘TV coverage of EU politics in Germany and the UK dropped to a level below a share of 1% of all news stories’ (Media Tenor 2005c). Apart from the media themselves, this ‘standstill of discussion reflects rather unfavourably on leading European politicians, who are probably inclined to sit out the crisis’ (Media Tenor 2005c).

However, effacing Europolitics in news media is not the sole aberration. Additionally, there is the corrosive factor of bias. There exist several aspects to biased coverage. Most usual instances, in this respect, concern overly negative/positive rather than factual, precise, fair or ‘objective’ reporting. Another manifestation is the systematic disregard of the European common interest and the framing of news items uniquely from national perspectives (Neverla 2006). Thus, the preferred prism usually sets ‘us’ against ‘them’, i.e., all other nationals of the EU. Such bias in coverage generates, inevitably, a ‘naturally’ partisan approach, but it cannot be accepted by critics assessing Europolitics on the basis of the common European interest⁹.

Besides, prevalent editorial tactics prioritize personality-centred stories or material amenable to dramatic visualization. The occupation of media time/space accentuates the marginalization or rejection of the more intricate aspects of political matter and conflict. So, as a rule, while issues originate or link directly with supranational policymaking, media coverage presents them as national in character. This deforms reality and the actual nature of politics and of the policy process. Minimal coverage combined with negative coverage in terms of quality epitomizes the worst possible scenario for the communication of Europolitics to EU citizens.

The image of EU public affairs in national media is a sparse, bleak and negative one. But how does this image translate across transnationally operating media? Over the last 20 years, a host of transnational audiovisual channels have sprung up to occupy the space opened up by new satellite and digital technologies. Today more than one hundred transnational channels operate in Europe that vary in a number of ways: transnational scope, language, type of programming output, type of ownership (private versus public) and indirect or direct commodification (advertising vs. subscription channels). Among ‘the transnational channels that are pan-European in scope, 17 are particularly prominent’ (Chalaby 2001: 186) as they have a strong distribution in at least five EU countries and an expansive strategy. Among them figure Arte, BBC Prime, BBC World, Bloomberg, Fox kids, MTV, Eurosport, Cartoon Network, TV5, CNN International, Sky News and Euronews. These channels transmit to about 24 territories and are received by about 40 million households. The great majority of them are commercial and monothematic (music, film, sport). Significantly though, over 80 per cent of them hold a license from the UK Ofcom authority (ibid), a fact that cannot hide a ‘colonial’ type of structure in the control of communications within the EU.

To assess the nature and the extent of transnationality and to classify differences of degree between channels, a range of criteria may be applied: (a) the range in territory of transmission and geo-political or geo-linguistic scope; (b) the type of ownership and management; (c) the language of content, i.e., lingua franca, local languages or both; (d) the profile and strategy (business or public service strategy); and (e) programming and the type of content, notably whether or not this comprises current public affairs and political communication more broadly, which is the specific prerequisite at issue here. In this respect, practices of internal pluralism, pluralism in sources and of reflecting observed civic needs across Europe are also of central concern.

On the basis of these criteria we can single out only two channels that demonstrate a relatively advanced transnationality: Arte and Euronews. Both channels meet most of these criteria, though in varying degrees. Of the two, Euronews is by far the most advanced in terms of transnationality, as it broadcasts in five languages simultaneously (Purvis 1999: 36), across 16 countries, and most importantly content-wise, it is a channel committed to news and current affairs programming from a non-national perspective. Moreover, Euronews, is multi-nationally owned; originally launched by eleven members of the European Broadcasting Union and later joined by another eight members (Machill 1998; Purvis 1999: 36). In spite of its pertinence in terms of output programming and its advanced degree of transnationality, Euronews is still far from being a channel that fulfils the necessary criteria of a fully transnational or pan-European channel committed to European citizens. To start with, Euronews does not actually reach (nor intends to) all Europeans. In its promotion profile it underscores that its focus is on ‘high-income earners and businessmen’, and more specifically, that it targets the top 20 per cent of households¹⁰ by income, in 16 countries. Their news content is shaped accordingly. Menus are determined and centered on business and global news, comprising only snapshots of high-Europolitics. Effectively, as this amounts to an elitist strategy, Euronews cannot quite yet claim credentials of constituting a vehicle for European political communication. This strategy is dictated by its competition with channels such as CNN. Nevertheless, Euronews, which was established with EU financial support, prides itself as holding the position of ‘Europe's own news channel, providing world news from a European perspective’ (Purvis 1999: 37). Such ‘Euro-patriotism’ does not, however, correspond with lack of broadcast content of political communication about Europe addressed to all EU citizens. So, in the incumbent national and transnational media none of the democratic requirements for an adequate political communication are obtained.

Whenever the problem of inadequate coverage of EU affairs is raised, media owners and news editors tend to claim that such issues are sidelined because the public does not care about them (see Stangos 2004; Panagiotarea 2006). In other words, viewers, listeners and readers do not create demand for such issues. But the acute question is: can any political entity condition its visibility and its transparency on whether it sells according to commercial criteria? Conversely, civil society members are naturally disinterested about entities they do not know enough about.

What results from a virtual starvation of news on Europolitics is a relative or absolute lack of awareness and, in time, opaque ignorance. According to a Eurobarometer survey of 2003, when EU citizens were asked whether they consider themselves informed about political decision-making and the institutions of the EU, 71 per cent, answered ‘little or not at all informed’ and 25 per cent ‘adequately informed’. The equivalent Eurobarometer figures back in 1973 were 63 and 25 per cent, respectively (Peel 2004: 13). So, how can it be justified that, despite the recent explosion in media and the information cornucopia, today, more Europeans experience a lack of political information? This condition of growing ignorance signals the veritably ‘vicious circle’ of the democratic deficit. But, rather than breaking the vicious circle by introducing full, implementable ‘communication rights’ and improving the conditions for accessing information, in fact, the opposite occurs. While gatekeepers of commercial television channels keep EU coverage down to a minimum following commercial profit-maximizing strategies, EU policy-makers watch on inertly. Media entrepreneurs opt for lowest common denominator programming while public debate programmes on more intricate political issues are under extinction (Kaitatzi-Whitlock 2004b). This is a flabbergasting paradox, as since 1989, the post-TWF era,¹¹ we have ostensibly acquired a common European Audiovisual Space (EAS). The plain reality is that only media barons and market entrepreneurs have acquired it.

Besides, traditional media belong to an ‘ancien régime’ with different aims and habits. Media corporations often form part of systems of techno-national antagonisms. Due to tough competition for profitability, there is clearly no incentive to engage in objectives like the ones that concern us here. Deregulation, harsh commercialization and competition for audiences push channels to adopt such strategies. As a consequence, a common electronic public space is denied to citizens due to structural causes. In the circumstances, the potential for creating a common EAS for citizens, in the foreseeable future, is extremely slim. Nevertheless, it is only the transcending power of alternative and de-commodified pan-European media that could address the political communication and identity crisis that the EU currently faces.

Increasingly, the legislation that shapes our public and private lives originates in Brussels. However, despite the fact that EU decisions/legislation take precedence over national legislation, they are not adequately debated at the national level. Because policy measures that are transferred from Brussels to the member state level have already been agreed upon at the supra-state level, they are never examined or discussed as thoroughly as would happen for nationally developed policies. However, this décalage, particularly in combination with the fact that Europolitics is severely under-mediatized, creates a trap of power without responsibility; a ‘protective’ vacuum for the adoption of policies beyond political contention, and away from the scrutiny and the control of watchdogs. Political issues thus escape democratic contention or controversy.¹² Thus, such discrepancies between the two poles of EU/EC and nation-states lead, effectively, to a systemically produced de-politicization. The aberration consists in that power is brokered at just the level where the media refuses to shine its light. This trend annuls the watchdog role of the media, as set out in the third point of the Habermasian criteria (infra). Decision-making and the policy processes at EU level have already brought about remarkable changes to the lives of Europeans, but this cannot continue under such democratic and communication deficits.

The condition of being informed, indispensable though it is, is not sufficient per se. EU citizens need to express opinions and to be heard, i.e., to fulfill their active information/‘communication rights’. Although such needs and objectives are today technically achievable, they remain frustrated. Citizens both need and claim appropriate channels to participate in crucial debates (Baldi 2004; Cammaerts and Carpentier 2007). Without opportunities for participation, citizens will ‘naturally’ turn their backs upon a system that operates under false pretences, which excludes them and ignores their civic needs. The effect of this mediatic deficit is that citizens withdraw from politics. Depoliticization makes citizens ignorant, passive, divided, less demanding and easily duped, yet, it is reinforced by political and media elites.

The rationale that justifies such EU cultural policy hinges around the notion of cultural/ethnic diversity, notably in media policies. This reflects the obsession of member-states (MS) to control symbolic, media and cultural affairs. Diversity is a value per se, but in an entity that is seeking integration, it can be both exaggerated and falsely invoked. The greatest threat to cultural diversity emanates from commercialization and the import of US content.¹³ Besides, extreme emphasis on national diversity in the endo-European context may well become a trap, as we are no longer members of closed nation-states or bearers only of our idiosyncratic cultures. Denial of this fact through any type of nationalistic introversion is damaging. So, this obsession may have a boomerang effect on the European integration process because communities cannot arise out of a Babel of extreme diversities. In short, we need common understanding and a new ‘common’ sense. So, given the urgent need for common political fora for the European civil society, the discourse on diversity may, in fact, be undermining a process of community and identity building.

The multi-layered media deficit can be attributed to a number of sub-parameters. First, there is no single common network that provides political information about European affairs, in a unified fashion that is perceptible by citizens throughout the Union. Thus, the principle of universality is not applicable to any EU public affair, however important that might be. Second, there is no unitary elaboration of a minimum common European thematology (media agenda) that concerns all Europeans, irrespective of nationality. Most significant ‘European issues’ do not command adequate or appropriate media coverage. Third, national media do not care to reflect on or ‘reproduce’ news presented in the media of other member states. Due to increasing commodification and to phenomena such as infotainment, politics is either played down or metamorphosed. Hence, the low priority given to Europolitics, especially by commercial media, is not surprising. In particular, high-level EU politics is seen as ‘dull’, distant and unconnected to everyday life. Commercial channels, reliant upon advertisers, cannot risk covering news about the intricate and distant concerns of the EU. Consequently, individuals are deprived of the power they would accrue from this knowledge and ‘European citizenship’ tends to become a mere rhetorical invocation.

However, the media is not the only factor responsible for the accruing lack of transparency and knowledge. The institutions of the Union contribute directly to this failure. Due to labyrinthine, dispersed or occasionally even secretive policy processes at the Community level, the relevant information packages for addressing pan-European audiences are sparse. To mention just a few indicative instances: (a) the European Ombudsman, N. Diamantouros, was called on to intervene on a case of opaque practices in November 2004, in view of which he ordered that deliberations of the Council be made accessible to citizens, thereby implementing the ‘right to information’; (b) The Commission announced in 2004 that its regular calls for participation in funded programmes would be operated exclusively via the Internet (Manousaki 2004). This accentuates a problem of unhindered access to significant information, as studies on the Internet penetration indicate that this, potentially enabling, medium is used by less than half of Europeans, of which the vast majority is highly educated, young and male. According to Eurostat data of 2004, an average of 44 per cent of the population of the 25 member states were users of the Internet. The corresponding figure for the fifteen (older) member states was 47 per cent. If more than half of the EU population, aged between 16 and 74, are not networked (Eurostat 2004), the Commission is actively excluding more than half of Europeans from valuable information, which should be accessible by every citizen; (c) In January 2005, a pan-European Eurostat survey established that 95 per cent of European citizens attributed the enormous price rises of daily goods to the adoption of the Euro currency. Commission officials concealed this finding, which became known only after it leaked to the press (Eleftherotypia 14/01/2005). Thus, even without considering the effacing role of the media, European institutions seem to undermine transparency and comprehensive information about common affairs and opinion. This in its turn contributes to the renowned democratic deficit, constituted by accountability and legitimacy deficits (Habermas 2001: 14; Kaitatzi-Whitlock 2005).

The difficulty in creating and maintaining a common, pan-European channel has been blamed on the linguistic variation/fragmentation of Europe, which is indeed a serious barrier. But, if EU multilingualism can be overcome for parliamentary political discussions and decision-making, it can also be resolved for pan-European information channels. Euronews is a case in point. The lack of a pan-European channel is also blamed on difficulties associated with the development of a corpus of common interest issues to viewers from different nationalities. But to contend that there are not enough issues of interest to all Europeans is simply to negate the existence and the already enormous impact of the Union and its policies on the lives of citizens. It is an elitist view that considers the amounts of decisions taken in the Brussels as irrelevant to Europeans. So, the paradox consists in that state responsibility to provide political information to citizens is premised on market criteria, which is the best way to obliterate it. The underlying argument has always been that such information ‘is not in demand’. The case of common interest content for such a broad Union can be made, also, if we address citizens’ need for dialogue and expression of views on crucial issues. In other words, it is not only knowledge that matters, but also opinion. Besides, osmosis between Europeans may only occur in shared spaces for dialogue and ‘political will’ formation.

The phenomenon of disinterestedness is salient in a number of Eurostat statistical surveys. Participation in the EP election of June 2004 dropped dramatically. The corresponding level of absenteeism throughout the 25 EU member states was over 50 per cent for the first time in its history. Such levels of absenteeism in the core democratic institution of the EU highlight a deep political crisis and an ideological confusion. The clearest signals about the ongoing crisis came from the referenda in France and Holland in May 2005 in the rejection of the ‘elitist’ and ‘incomprehensible’ European constitutional convention.

The vector of all these factors reveals that the peculiar political structure of the EU lacks an indispensable commensurate media system, thereby drastically alienating its citizens and excluding them from direct involvement in Europolitics. Thus, we observe a demonstrable ignorance of EU affairs among EU citizens, even more so in older member states (Peel 2004: 13). Similarly, a growing disaffection is manifest and indeed, in many European countries more worrisome trends are under way. Euro-scepticism is on the ascendance, but even when this reflects legitimate concerns, biased and self-interested media manage to convert it into a threatening nationalism and anti-Europeanism (Trandafoiou 2006). So, in spite of a common European television policy, originating in the famous Television Without Frontiers Directive of 1989, today, there is no common European public sphere, nor any sense of a European identity. Twenty years ago when drafting the EP proposal for an initiation of a common audiovisual policy the relevant EP report argued that: Information ‘is perhaps the most decisive factor in European unification’. It held that ‘a European identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed’; a position very much in line with Habermas’ propositions (infra). Yet, it continued, mass media are ‘controlled at national level’ (Hahn Report 1983: 7).

The Hahn report and the associated resolution proposed the establishment of an ad hoc transborder pan-European television channel. This proposition was frustrated, although the idea of such a pan-European medium was revisited by the EP in the mid-1990s (Collins 1994; Kaitatzi-Whitlock 2005). Twenty-five years after the assertion of the Hahn report regarding ‘the national control of mass media information’ this situation remains perfectly in tact, but under a distinct guise. Significantly, the key distinction is that ‘national control’ does not derive from governments but from media barons. The key condition of the Hahn report has not been implemented, namely that: ‘A European identity will only develop if Europeans are adequately informed’. Today ‘information via the mass media’ is controlled strictly either by national or by global media barons and related self-interested actors. The EU, as a policy-agency, is voluntarily submerged.

The political communication deficit is a constitutive element of the democratic deficit, as political accountability is directly linked to transparency. The democratic deficit has far-reaching corrosive effects as it makes people suspicious; ‘The opacity of decision-making processes at the European level, and the lack of opportunity for any participation in them, cause mutual mistrust among citizens’ (Habermas 2001: 14–15). For decades, the democratic deficit and political accountability to electorates was considered one of the thorniest problems of the EC.¹⁴ Intrinsic to this media and democratic deficit are two market-led undercurrents that undermine the advance of the grand project of the Union. On the one hand, nationalist forces and, on the other hand, globalizing corporate trends sweeping over Europe.¹⁵ Such challenges and pressures stifle the process of the Union's political integration, which results in the creation of a politically unaccountable entity. The position against the political integration of the EU is not defensible, as it concurrently stifles its democratized future. Economically, the Union is an open system, however, open systems can hardly rise to the status of Communities or of firmly structured States. So, the identity crisis of the EU is also an outcome of its indecision to go for a strong and accountable European supra state that would fully inform and empower its electorates via a polity that would reinforce its democratic institutions and public policies. However, the Union is weak and losing in political legitimacy. The lack of common European public fora constitutes a deficient European political system. This deficit in fact reveals something more significant: that not only European citizens, but also their leaders suffer from a severe crisis of identity. There is a clear confusion between claims to belong to Europe and real political behaviour that is required to sustain it. So, European citizenship will remain a rhetorical referent, an ‘empty signifier’, devoid of any substance for the citizens of Europe.

Many thanks to two anonymous referees for their critical remarks on the proposed paper.

Sophia Kaitatzi-Whitlock is Assistant Professor at the Department of Journalism and Mass Communication of Aristotle University, Thessaloniki, Greece. She holds a PhD in communication from the University of Westminster, UK, and has published extensively on communications policies, political communication, the political economy of the media and European new media and technology policy. Her first book, The Domain of Information (Athens: Kritiki, 2003, in Greek), was followed by Europe's Political Communication Deficit (Bury St Edmunds: Arima, 2005). She has translated Steven Lukes’ Power – A Radical View, adding a comprehensive introduction entitled Subjugation and the Power of Ignorance (Athens: Savvalas, 2007). She is chair of the Political Communication Section of ECREA and member of the International Council of IAMCR. She was vice-chair (2001–2004) of the COST-A20 pan-European research programme on ‘The Impact of the Internet on Mass Media in Europe’. Her current research interests include democracy theory, power relations and the media.