ABSTRACT The classic gap between lower and higher social classes in their likelihood to vote for radical left parties (RLPs) persists to this day. Prior studies showed that economic and political grievances predict support for the radical left, but they largely neglected to address whether the working class is more likely to vote for RLPs because they are economically and politically dissatisfied. This study, therefore, examines the explanatory role of economic and political grievances. It also examines whether the class cleavage in RLP support depends on a country's economic performance in terms of wealth, unemployment and income inequality. European Social Survey data on 19 countries between 2002 and 2018 are analysed using three-level logistic regression models. The results replicate that people in lower social classes are more likely to vote for RLPs than those in higher ones. They do so because they are more dissatisfied with the economy, democracy and, particularly, income inequality. Against expectations, class voting for the radical left is not conditional on macroeconomic performance. Yet, RLPs turn out to be more electorally successful as a result of economic and political grievances in times of economic prosperity, suggesting that feelings of relative deprivation spur radical left voting.

ABSTRACT Testing propositions from ethnic competition theory, we examine contextual and individual determinants of support for restrictive immigration policies in 26 European Union member states between 2002 and 2013, a period characterized by enduring economic downturn. We hypothesize that natives in vulnerable economic positions, similar to many migrants, are more restrictive toward immigration, because they perceive more economic strain and more ethnic threat. We expect that natives are more restrictive in times of economic decline – when national unemployment rates and debts increase – especially those who hold similar economic positions as many migrants. We enriched European Social Survey data (2002–2013, containing more than 210,000 respondents) with cross-national data on the economic situation. We indeed find that support for immigration restrictiveness is higher among natives in more vulnerable socio-economic positions. They perceive more economic strain, which is directly related to restrictiveness. But economic strain also increases perceptions of ethnic threat, which is strongly related to restrictiveness. We do, however, not find strong empirical evidence that economic decline more strongly affects support for restrictive immigration policies among vulnerable economic groups. Stronger changes in national debts induce more restrictiveness among the full population, but especially among those who perceive more economic strain and more ethnic threat.

ABSTRACT This article investigates to what extent nationalist and anti-out-group drives contribute to the explanation of political euro-scepticism, in addition to economic and political drives. The authors disentangle individual-level, regional-level and country-level effects by using the European Social Survey, covering 21 European countries ( n =34,160), which is enriched with region and country characteristics. Perceived threat from immigrants as well as political distrust increase political euro-scepticism, explaining low levels of euro-scepticism among higher educated people, higher income categories and socio-cultural specialists. At the contextual level, the authors find that scepticism increases with the distance to Brussels. Moreover, it is found that in countries where television broadcasts are dubbed, euro-scepticism is lower than in countries using subtitles. The authors find small effects from intra-EU trade and number of foreign tourists. In particular, differences between countries in political euro-scepticism are explained by duration of EU membership.