The literature shows that one-, two-, and three-dimensional bin packing and knapsack packing are difficult problems in operational research. Many techniques, including exact, heuristic, and metaheuristic approaches, have been investigated to solve these problems and it is often not clear which method to use when presented with a new instance. This paper presents an approach which is motivated by the goal of building computer systems which can design heuristic methods. The overall aim is to explore the possibilities for automating the heuristic design process. We present a genetic programming system to automatically generate a good quality heuristic for each instance. It is not necessary to change the methodology depending on the problem type (one-, two-, or three-dimensional knapsack and bin packing problems), and it therefore has a level of generality unmatched by other systems in the literature. We carry out an extensive suite of experiments and compare with the best human designed heuristics in the literature. Note that our heuristic design methodology uses the same parameters for all the experiments. The contribution of this paper is to present a more general packing methodology than those currently available, and to show that, by using this methodology, it is possible for a computer system to design heuristics which are competitive with the human designed heuristics from the literature. This represents the first packing algorithm in the literature able to claim human competitive results in such a wide variety of packing domains.

In recent iterated prisoner's dilemma tournaments, the most successful strategies were those that had identification mechanisms. By playing a predetermined sequence of moves and learning from their opponents' responses, these strategies managed to identify their opponents. We believe that these identification mechanisms may be very useful in evolutionary games. In this paper one such strategy, which we call collective strategy, is analyzed. Collective strategies apply a simple but efficient identification mechanism (that just distinguishes themselves from other strategies), and this mechanism allows them to only cooperate with their group members and defect against any others. In this way, collective strategies are able to maintain a stable population in evolutionary iterated prisoner's dilemma. By means of an invasion barrier, this strategy is compared with other strategies in evolutionary dynamics in order to demonstrate its evolutionary features. We also find that this collective behavior assists the evolution of cooperation in specific evolutionary environments.