International climate negotiations reached a turning point in 2009. The fifteenth Conference of the Parties (COP15) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was anticipated as a pivotal event in the global response to climate change.1 The negotiations, however, failed to meet the self-imposed objective of reaching agreement on a replacement to the Kyoto Protocol. Instead of a new, binding international agreement, the negotiations produced the Copenhagen Consensus, a voluntary, country-driven approach based on the accretion of voluntary national mitigation and financial commitments.2 As the primary state-oriented pathway towards global climate governance,3 the Copenhagen Consensus may offer a means of sidestepping the international collective action problem. In so doing, though, this new country-driven approach simply shifts the burden of producing collective action to the domestic arena. The key question, therefore, is whether states are...
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May 01 2015
An Uneasy Equilibrium: The Coordination of Climate Governance in Federated Systems
David J. Gordon
Online Issn: 1536-0091
Print Issn: 1526-3800
© 2015 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Global Environmental Politics (2015) 15 (2): 121–141.
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David J. Gordon; An Uneasy Equilibrium: The Coordination of Climate Governance in Federated Systems. Global Environmental Politics 2015; 15 (2): 121–141. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/GLEP_a_00301
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