Design Trade-Offs Under Power Asymmetry: COPs and Flexibility Clauses | Citedby Results | Global Environmental Politics | MIT Press

Skip to Main Content

Skip Nav Destination

Design Trade-Offs Under Power Asymmetry: COPs and Flexibility Clauses

Global Environmental Politics (2022) 22 (1): 19–43.

This article has been cited by the following articles in journals that are participating in Crossref Cited-by Linking.

The survival of the weakest: the echo of the Rio Summit principles in environmental treaties

Jean-Frédéric Morin
Jen Allan
Sikina Jinnah

Environmental Politics (2024) 33 (3): 486.

The latent net effectiveness of institutional complexes: a heuristic model

Ashok Vardhan Adipudi
Rakhyun E. Kim

Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences (2024) 382 (2270)

A springboard or a safeguard? The repercussions of affinity on environmental treaties’ adaptability

Noémie Laurens

Earth System Governance (2024) 21: 100215.

Checking for Updates: Ratification, Design, and Institutional Adaptation

Noémie Laurens
James Hollway
Jean-Frédéric Morin

International Studies Quarterly (2023) 67 (3)

Toward a Super-COP? Timing, Temporality, and Rethinking World Climate Governance

Michael W. Manulak

Global Environmental Politics (2023) 23 (1): 3.

The treaty management organization established under the UNFCCC and the Paris Agreement: an international actor in its own right?

Thomas Gehring
Linda Spielmann

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics (2023) 23 (3): 235.