The Global Environmental Governance (GEG) system has grown significantly since the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro. In this paper we analyze ten leading Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs), reviewing various quantitative indicators (related to time, resources and commitment) to chart their evolution and to measure the “negotiation burden” that the burgeoning GEG system is imposing on states and secretariats. We find that these representative MEAs have not only grown in size but also have become busier over time, although there are indications that as the GEG system “matures,” it may also be stabilizing. Among other things, we find that the reported budget for these ten MEA secretariats has grown nine-fold in sixteen years, from US$ 8.18 million in 1992 to US$ 75.83 million in 2007. Counting only the most important of meetings, and using the number of meeting days as an indicator of the “negotiation load,” we find that the negotiation load for the leading MEAs has stabilized, averaging around 115 meeting days per year. Decisions also seem to plateau at about 185 per year.

A de facto “system” of global environmental governance already exists. The de facto system of global environmental governance is neither neat nor simple; it works in a rather messy, non-linear, non-hierarchical, and intertwined fashion. However it is a system that has proved to be resilient as well as prolific. This paper argues that although there is no real reason to make the system less messy, it can be made more effective by taking a number of steps that would (a) support the positive trends already apparent in the emergent system (b) strengthen the system as it evolves, and (c) articulate a clear vision for the eventual system that we wish to move towards.

This paper seeks to understand how the collective South, as institutionally represented by the Group of 77 (G77), manages its unity as a negotiating collective despite its many internal differences and in the face of external pressures. Negotiations leading to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD) are used as an empirical case study. This is a particularly interesting case because a) it was manifestly South-driven, b) it saw uncommonly intense South-South bargaining within the context of a global environmental negotiation, and c) it also saw intense North-South differences. In focusing on how the G77 managed its internal (South-South) as well as external (South-North) negotiations, the paper uses a negotiation analytical framework to derive generalizable lessons about the collective negotiating behavior of the developing countries' caucus in global environmental politics.