In global environmental cooperation, legally binding agreements remain a customary way for states to set common goals and standards. This article analyzes the Minamata Convention on Mercury by addressing three questions: First, how did linkages to earlier agreements shape the negotiations? Second, what were the main legal and political issues during the negotiations? Third, what are the major issues moving forward with treaty implementation and mercury abatement? The analysis shows that the decision to start treaty negotiations was influenced by related policy developments on hazardous chemicals as well as differences in national interests. Five sets of issues dominated the negotiations: 1) supply and trade, 2) products and processes, 3) emissions and releases, 4) artisanal and small-scale gold mining, and 5) resources and compliance. The article concludes that future mercury abatement hinges on the parties' ability to move beyond the initial mandates, as the convention may affect decisions by a wide range of public, private, and civil society actors.

As global environmental governance evolves, the parties to the 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal and to the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants have established regional centers working on capacity building and technology transfer. This article empirically explores the following questions: Why did the parties to the Basel and Stockholm Conventions establish these regional centers? What roles do the regional centers play in treaty implementation and multilevel governance? The article argues that the parties have set up regional centers in response to three partially overlapping sets of developing- and industrialized-country interests: expanding regional cooperation (both developing and industrialized countries); attracting more resources for treaty implementation (mainly developing countries); and supporting implementation projects across smaller groups of countries (mainly industrialized countries). This article finds that the regional centers collectively operate in three broad areas important to treaty implementation: raising awareness, strengthening administrative ability, and diffusing scientific and technical assistance and information. However, the ability of the regional centers to function effectively depends on access to greater resources and stronger political support. There may also be benefits to expanding regional center mandates into areas of monitoring and compliance to improve multilevel governance. Furthermore, the regional level should be given more consideration in the study of global environmental politics.

The European Union (EU) has greatly expanded its environmental legislation over the past two decades. This article analyzes the recent development of the REACH (Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals) regulation. It uses a process-tracing technique to explore the question of how REACH was created despite signifıcant resistance from influential and well-organized industry interests and misgivings from leading European politicians and policy-makers. Examining developing coalition politics within the EU, it is argued that a relatively small coalition of green actors from EU organizations, member states, and environmental and public health advocacy groups succeeded in ensuring the development and adoption of REACH largely because the coalition included influential members from all major EU policy-making centers (the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament). In addition, it is argued that the implementation of REACH can have important ramiıcations for international chemical politics and policy-making outside the EU.

The growing literature about linkages between international institutions remains littered with proposed taxonomies. Most of these taxonomies are conceptual, rather than empirically driven, remaining too vague to offer guidance for empirical research regarding linkages as possible avenues of influence across international institutions. This article argues that institutional linkages are potential causal pathways by which policy making and implementation are influenced. It supplements concepts of structural governance linkages, which are common in the existing literature, with attention to agent-oriented actor linkages. The article offers a typology of governance and actor linkages that can be operationalized in empirical research. It discusses governance and actor linkages between policy making within the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and the European Union. The paper argues that research on international environmental cooperation would benefit from greater empirical attention to linkages in a context of a multitude of connected governance and actor linkages.