In 1991, in meetings constructing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the small island state of Vanuatu introduced a proposal requiring wealthy countries to pay for damages related to sea level rise. More than thirty years later, countries finally agreed to establish a financing mechanism for loss and damage associated with climate change. Scholars have observed the slow progress on loss and damage finance, but what tactics did countries use to obstruct negotiations? We answer this question using data from primary and secondary sources, observations at negotiations, and key informant interviews. Our analysis details four periods of obstruction and outlines a typology of fourteen tactics countries have used to delay progress. These tactics limited the issue’s scope, reduced transparency, manipulated language, and advanced nontransformative solutions. These findings contribute to the study of obstructionism in climate governance and can help loss and damage advocates better anticipate and respond to obstruction.

We develop and apply a new theoretical framework for assessing the transformative capability of transparency in environmental governance. Our framework suggests that as norms related to transparency are recognized and translated into accountability mechanisms, and as these mechanisms are complied with, effects cascade and substantially influence the ability of transparency to transform relationships of inequality. Utilizing the case of climate finance in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, we find that while a variety of norms underpinning transparency are recognized within the governance architecture, their translation into accountability mechanisms has been weak, and information disclosed by countries is often opaque. This suggests that a focus on enhanced transparency is unlikely to be sufficient for realizing a climate regime that is adequate and equitable. Moreover, transparency should be seen as a terrain of political conflict over the conditions of inequality, employed differently by various coalitions to benefit their respective interests.

This paper examines the climate rhetoric and climate action of the Obama administration in its first term. It first traces the trajectory of the term “climate change” as used in 1,908 speeches by administration officials from January 2008 to December 2011; after an apex in 2009, the phrase nearly disappeared. Second, the article details the history of US international climate funding since 2009. In the Obama administration's first budget alone (Fiscal Year 2010), dedicated climate change foreign assistance increased from $321 million to $1.008 billion. Using anonymous administration sources, “fast start finance” reports, and the Congressional Research Service, the paper details the numbers and behind-the-scenes details of President Obama's apparent determination to prioritize climate finance despite powerful congressional opposition. Although these seemingly contradictory trends in rhetoric and finance can be seen as cohering in a highly strategic, energy-focused “two-level game” by the administration, the program's longevity is endangered.

Finance for developing countries to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change now tops the international climate negotiation agenda. In this article, we first assess how adaptation finance came to the top of the agenda. Second, drawing upon Amartya Sen's (2010) “realization-focused comparison” theory of justice, we develop a definition of adaptation finance justice based upon the texts of the 1992 UNFCCC and its subsidiary bodies. From this perspective, we assess three main points of contention between countries on both sides of the North-South divide: The Gap in raising the funds, The Wedge in their distribution, and The Dodge in how they are governed. Overall, we argue that while some ambiguity exists, the decisions of the UNFCCC provide a strong basis for a justice-oriented approach to adaptation finance. However, in practice, adaptation finance has reflected developed country interests far more than the principles of justice adopted by Parties.

International environmental accords have become important mechanisms by which nations make promises to administer natural resources and manage the global environment. Previous studies, relying mainly on single cases or small- n data sets, have shed light on the proximate political causes of participation in these agreements. However, no study has yet systematically explained the deeper social determinants of why nations sign, ignore or resist environmental treaties. We offer a theoretically-sequenced model that exploits complementarities between rational choice institutionalism and world-systems theory. Key variables posited by realists and constructivists are also examined, using a new environmental treaty participation index based on ratifications of 22 major environmental agreements by 192 nations. Cross-sectional OLS regression and path analysis strongly supports the institutionalist claim that credibility—the willingness and ability to honor one's international environmental commit-ments—“matters.” But these measures also lend considerable support to the world-systems hypothesis that state credibility is strongly influenced by a legacy of colonial incorporation into the world economy. Narrow export base—our proxy for disadvantaged position in the world-economy—directly and indirectly (through institutions and civil society strength) explains nearly six-tenths of national propensity to sign environmental treaties. A nation's natural capital, its ecological vulnerability, and international environmental NGO memberships had no explanatory power in the path analysis. Our results indicate that new theoretical, methodological and policy approaches are needed to address structural barriers to international cooperation.