The international relations literature often assumes that negotiators in global regimes are actively seeking a collective agreement to the problem on the table. There are cases, however, where a delegation may instead be “striving for no,” that is, participating with the aim of obstructing a deal. This article explores the challenges surrounding such cases of “obstructionism,” using the example of Saudi Arabia in the climate change regime. It examines the evidence for diagnosing Saudi Arabia as an obstructionist in that regime, the delegation's negotiating tactics, strategies for addressing obstructionism, and finally the repercussions for both the climate change regime, and Saudi Arabia itself. In conclusion, the article considers whether Saudi Arabia may be moving beyond obstruction.

There is growing recognition in the literature of the important roles played by Chairpersons and secretariats in global environmental negotiations. Less frequently recognized, however, is the interdependence of those roles. Using the example of the climate change negotiations, this paper argues that Chairpersons and the secretariat are locked into a mutually-dependent relationship. Whereas the Chairperson has the political authority needed to exert leadership in the negotiations, the secretariat possesses intellectual resources that can maximize the effectiveness of that leadership. The secretariat's input to the negotiations, however, must be shielded by a “veil of legitimacy,” whereby the Chairperson takes responsibility for that input. The paper explores how Chairpersons and the secretariat work together, along with the dysfunctionalities that can emerge in this very personal relationship. In doing so, the paper expands our understanding of exactly how these two actors exert influence in global environmental negotiations.

Promoting learning among participants is a key function commonly attributed to international regimes. Such learning, however, cannot always be guaranteed, and regimes may sometimes descend into ossification. In contrast to a learning regime, an ossifying regime is one that is unable to process new information, facilitate the free-flow of new ideas, or foster understanding and trust among negotiators. Evidence from the recent history of the climate change regime suggests it is suffering from ossification. Dragging forces contributing to this include the institutionalization of the “north/south divide,” complexity of the process, fragile conditions for effective communication, onerous decision—making rules, activities of obstructionists, absence of the US, and weak implementation. Pockets of learning on climate change are, however, still active, especially outside the regime itself. To reinvigorate the negotiations, meaningful progress is needed on domestic and regional implementation, including ensuring the success of the Protocol's market mechanisms.