There is a long and continuing debate in the literature on corporate political power about whether businesses that advocate public-interest regulation do so for strategic political reasons or because they anticipate economic gains. Previous research on Big Oil’s strategies in climate politics has largely converged on the first view, arguing that global majors feign support for moderate carbon pricing largely to prevent the adoption of more drastic and costly policies. In contrast, this article argues that Big Oil’s growing stake in natural gas expansion is its economic motive for supporting favorably designed carbon pricing. The article finds that policy, technology, and energy market changes have paved the way for a shift toward natural gas and that a moderate carbon price, by triggering coal-to-gas switching, supports the realization of a gray transition in which “Big Gas” can expand its market share at the expense of coal and become a major bridge fuel next to renewables. Our findings underscore the importance of studying the competitive rivalry that underpins evolving industry demands for climate policy and regulation.

The European Commission has played a crucial role in promoting ambitious EU climate targets and policies that boost the credibility of EU leadership-by-example efforts internationally. The approach has gradually shifted from leadership toward more strategic behavior that reflects the preferences of the member states. Reduced uncertainty concerning member-state preferences and solutions accounts for much of the change in leadership. Uncertainty has decreased as climate policies have become more mature and member states have gained experience from implementing them. Asymmetries in member-state preferences, decision-making procedures, and impatience caused by the international context are all important conditions for the European Commission’s leadership. These observations lend support to apparently contradictory theories that have seen EU climate policy as propelled either by autonomous supranational institutions or by increasingly ambitious member states.

Strong rhetorical differences between the European Union and the United States on climate matters have been evident for almost two decades. Since the mid-2000s, such differences are becoming visible in their respective climate policies as well. We propose three explanations for differences in climate policy outcomes in the EU and the US. First, the agenda-setting privileges of their policy-makers are significantly different, influencing how agenda setters shape policies and link issues, such as energy and climate policy. Second, while issue linkage has helped overcome distributional obstacles in the EU, it has led to more complexity and greater policy obstacles in the US. Finally, legislative rules, procedures, and norms have constrained the coalition-building efforts of lawmakers in the two systems in different ways, affecting negotiation processes and outcomes. Such differences in agenda-setting privileges, potential for issue linkages, and legislative procedures in the EU and the US have left them wide apart in international climate negotiations.

This article explains why the significant changes in the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) for the 2013–2020 phase were adopted in 2008. The combination of a more stringent EU-wide cap, allocation of emission allowances for payment, and limits on imports of credits from third countries have strengthened the system for the post-2012 period. This will promote reduction in greenhouse gases compared to the old system. The main reasons for these changes are, first, changes in the positions of the member states due to unsatisfactory experience with performance of the EU ETS so far. Second, a “package approach” where the EU ETS reform was integrated into wider energy and climate policy facilitated agreement on the changes. Third, changes in the position of nonstate actors and a desire to affect the international climate negotiations contributed to the reform.

The EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the cornerstone of EU climate policy, a grand policy experiment, as the first and largest international emissions trading system in the world. In this article, we seek to provide a broad overview of the initiation, decision-making and implementation of the EU ETS so far. We explore why the EU changed from a laggard to a leader in emissions trading, how it managed to establish the system rapidly, and the consequences to date, leading up to the 2008 proposal for a revised ET Directive for the post-2012 period. We apply three explanatory approaches, focusing on the roles of the EU member states, the EU institutions and the international climate regime, and conclude that all three approaches are needed to understand what happened, how and why. This also reveals that what happened in the early days of developing the system had significant consequences for the problems experienced in practice and the prospects ahead.

This article examines major oil companies in terms of climate strategies and their implementation. More specifıcally, it takes a critical look at Shell, BP, and ExxonMobil, and the relationship between rhetoric and action regarding investments in climate-friendly activities. Empirical evidence indicates a generally high degree of consistency between what these companies say and what they do, but interesting differences are also found: ExxonMobil has done somewhat more than its climate strategy formulations would suggest; Shell has done somewhat less; whereas BP's activities are mainly in line with its statements. Factors at three levels contribute to explaining these differences: (1) the company level, 2) the political framework conditions in the various regions where the companies operate, 3) international climate cooperation. The fındings and explanations, although restricted to the three oil companies with regard to climate change, provide insight into the relationship between corporate strategies and implementation more generally. They offer understanding and analytical categories for assessing how well and why such multinational entities put into practice stated objectives.

The article compares the interplay between soft law institutions and those based on hard law in international efforts to protect the North Sea, reduce transboundary air pollution, and discipline fisheries subsidies. Our cases confirm that ambitious norms are more easily achieved in soft law institutions than in legally binding ones, but not primarily because they bypass domestic ratification or fail to raise concerns for compliance costs. More important is the greater flexibility offered by soft law instruments with respect to participation and sectoral emphasis. Second, ambitious soft law regimes put political pressure on laggards in negotiations over binding rules, but this effect is contingent on factors such as political saliency and reasonably consensual risk and option assessment. Third, hard-law instruments are subject to more thorough negotiation and preparation which, unless substantive targets have been watered down, makes behavioral change and problem solving more likely. Finally, although most of the evidence presented here confirms the implementation edge conventionally ascribed to hard law institutions, the structures for intrusive verification and review that provide part of the explanation can also be created within soft law institutions.

The primary focus of most academic climate policy studies has been the robustness of climate science and the development of international negotiations and institutions, in which states, and sometimes societies, have been pinpointed as the key players. Systematic comparative studies of multinational and even global non-governmental actors have been in short supply. This research lacuna is particularly glaring since the position of a major non-state actor—the oil industry—may be crucial to the viability of the climate regime. This analysis shows that there are striking differences in the ways European-based and US-based oil companies have responded to the climate issue—here represented by the Royal Dutch/Shell Group and Exxon Mobil—and that one major source of explanation for this difference is found in the national political contexts of the companies' home-base countries. The importance of political context implies that the conditions for changing oil companies' climate strategies are likely to be located in the political context rather than in the companies themselves.