This article considers the puzzle of Norway and Canada, two countries that have adopted ambitious Paris Agreement targets yet are also major fossil fuel exporters. To date, both countries have taken full advantage of the international convention that assigns responsibility only for emissions within a country’s borders. However, climate activists, First Nations, and green politicians increasingly have challenged fossil fuel production via campaigns centered on issues salient to voters in nonproducing regions: opposing new exploration licenses in Norway and pipelines in Canada. While supply-side campaigns have sometimes succeeded in ending expansion, neither country has seriously entertained restricting current production. We attribute these outcomes to continued public support for fossil fuel–driven prosperity; institutions that assign responsibility for production and climate to different government agencies; and the success of counternarratives that unilateral supply restrictions are futile, prosperity from petroleum exports will fund domestic clean-energy transitions, and gas exports advance global climate action.

In recent years, a new “supply-side” climate politics has emerged as activists have turned their attention from fossil fuel combustion to fossil fuel extraction and transport. This article investigates conditions for success of anti–fossil-fuel activism by comparing the fate of two proposed coal terminals on either side of the Canada–United States border. Both cases highlight that fossil fuel transport infrastructure is especially vulnerable to opposition as a result of concentrated costs and limited economic benefits in transit jurisdictions that did not produce the fossil fuels in question. Still, not all contexts are equally amenable to supply-side contestation. Institutional differences explain approval of a new coal port in Canada, while a similar US facility was rejected: a weaker environmental assessment regime and more limited opportunities for local government and Indigenous vetoes. However, the regulator’s subsequent withdrawal of the still-pending Canadian terminal’s permit five years later reveals that delay can be as good as victory for opponents when markets for fossil fuels decline.

This article theorizes about the implications for domestic climate politics of three distinct roles countries play in the global carbon supply chain: fossil fuel producer, manufacturer of carbon-intensive goods, and final consumer. Because international responsibility is assigned to territorial emissions, countries at either end of the global supply chain effectively evade environmental responsibility by shifting fossil fuel combustion to manufacturing countries. In so doing, they lessen the political challenges of reducing domestic emissions. Although exporters of carbon-intensive goods are reluctant to disadvantage local producers, importers can craft policies that both reduce territorial emissions and create local jobs. Ironically, fossil fuel exporters can emerge as leaders in reducing their own territorial emissions, a finding illustrated by case studies of British Columbia and Norway. The conclusion argues that shifting responsibility for carbon emissions to the point of either final consumption or fossil fuel extraction could facilitate an international climate agreement.

The authors use a comparative politics framework, examining electoral interests, policy-maker's own normative commitments, and domestic political institutions as factors influencing Annex 1 countries' decisions on Kyoto Protocol ratification and adoption of national policies to mitigate climate change. Economic costs and electoral interests matter a great deal, even when policy-makers are morally motivated to take action on climate change. Leaders' normative commitments may carry the day under centralized institutional conditions, but these commitments can be reversed when leaders change. Electoral systems, federalism, and executive-legislative institutional configurations all influence ratification decisions and subsequent policy adoption. Although institutional configurations may facilitate or hinder government action, high levels of voter concern can trump institutional obstacles. Governments' decisions to ratify, and the reduction targets they face upon ratification, do not necessarily determine their approach to carbon emissions abatement policies: for example, ratifying countries that accept demanding targets may fail to take significant action.

In 2001, President George W. Bush confirmed that the US would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. Despite the US' withdrawal, its neighbor Canada chose to ratify the Kyoto Protocol the following year. The divergence of these two highly integrated countries is surprising, since Canada and the US accepted comparable commitments in the 1997 Kyoto negotiations, and both could expect the costs of compliance to be significant given the greenhouse-gas intensive nature of their economies. The divergence cannot be explained by politicians' electoral incentives since Canadian and US politicians alike faced strong business opposition and a relatively inattentive public. A strong normative commitment to international cooperation to protect the global commons was necessary to overcome political opposition to ratification, but still not sufficient. In particular, while both Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and US President Bill Clinton supported ratification, only Chrétien had the institutional capacity to deliver on his values.