This article examines developments in the renewable electricity sector in Brazil and China since 2000. The two countries share many interests with respect to solar and wind power, but institutional differences in state–business relations led to different outcomes. In China, in a context of corporatist state–business relations, state interventions were more far-reaching, with the state coordinating with state-owned banks, offering large financial and investment incentives to state-owned or state-connected enterprises. By contrast, in Brazil’s public–private partnerships, state support to promote renewable energies was shaped by a stronger preference for competitive auctions and stricter financing rules. The differences in state–business relations help explain the observed developmental trajectories in wind and solar power.

As South-South trade gains new weight in global exchange patterns, will environmental protection be enhanced or endangered? Environmental economists are generally optimistic that trade will lead to greater environmental protection, but see less chance of that in South-South trade; political economists make opposite arguments on both points. This article shows that South-South trade is dominated by a small set of fourteen countries, with most Southern countries continuing to be natural resource providers. Case studies of Brazil's trade with China and with its South American neighbors reveal a policy framework that supports both of the opposed arguments: Southern countries can and do consider the environmental impacts of their production and trade, but strong counter-forces limit that effect.

This article focuses on one common transnational NGO strategy, the boomerang strategy. In this strategy, Southern NGOs seek international allies to help them pressure their states from outside. The article uses a case study of a transnational mobilization against a water superhighway or “Hidrovia” in the La Plata River basin in South America to develop arguments about the long term impacts of throws of the boomerang. I argue that what happens after the boomerang depends on two related factors: the extent to which the target state(s) have accepted the international norms at stake and the presence or absence of a specific set of domestic capacities in the target state(s). Because Brazil has higher levels of national environmental legal capacity and greater acceptance of international environmental norms than its neighbors, environmentalists were able to block the Hidrovia there after the successful collective pressure, while Argentine environmentalists were not.