There is a long and continuing debate in the literature on corporate political power about whether businesses that advocate public-interest regulation do so for strategic political reasons or because they anticipate economic gains. Previous research on Big Oil’s strategies in climate politics has largely converged on the first view, arguing that global majors feign support for moderate carbon pricing largely to prevent the adoption of more drastic and costly policies. In contrast, this article argues that Big Oil’s growing stake in natural gas expansion is its economic motive for supporting favorably designed carbon pricing. The article finds that policy, technology, and energy market changes have paved the way for a shift toward natural gas and that a moderate carbon price, by triggering coal-to-gas switching, supports the realization of a gray transition in which “Big Gas” can expand its market share at the expense of coal and become a major bridge fuel next to renewables. Our findings underscore the importance of studying the competitive rivalry that underpins evolving industry demands for climate policy and regulation.

This article examines the roles of international policy diffusion and domestic politics in shaping the design of an emissions trading system (ETS) in Kazakhstan. We find that although the overall framework for the Kazakh ETS and many of its design elements are based on the EU ETS, domestic political factors were central mediating variables in the diffusion process. The system was initiated at the highest levels within the government, but the fast-tracked nature of the implementation process did not provide sufficient notification to the donor community to mobilize much-needed technical support until the pilot phase had been completed. Implementation of a fully operational system was postponed until 2018 due to industry mobilization against the system and unresolved legal and technical issues. The findings indicate that the longer-term outcome of a diffusion process can be policy divergence, not convergence, as domestic interest groups influence policy and as governments learn from their own implementation experiences.

The rise of transnational nonstate certification programs has contributed to complex accountability relations surrounding efforts to hold companies accountable for their environmental and social impacts. Using the analytical lenses of internal and external accountability, we examine the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC)—a fisheries certification program—to assess how its decisions about goals, engagement of stakeholders, and accountability mechanisms have affected the controversies facing the program and how it has sought to address them. We reveal a misalignment between environmental groups and the MSC. Both seek to advance sustainable fisheries, and the market campaigns of environmental groups have supported certification. However, the MSC has provided these groups limited influence over its governance; it has responded to external demands for accountability by focusing on internal accountability, and reforming its assessment and objection procedures. Environmental groups have responded by working to decouple their campaigns from supporting the MSC. Tracing the consequences of this misalignment therefore highlights the need to assess rival processes such as market and information campaigns to understand attempts to hold nonstate certification programs to account.

Nonstate certification programs have formed in the past 20 years to address social and environmental problems associated with production practices in several economic sectors. These programs embody the idea that information disclosure can be a tool for NGOs, investors, governments, and consumers to support high performers and hence, advocates hope, place upward pressure on sector-wide practices. Many unanswered questions remain, however, about information disclosure's practices and outcomes. We compare the use of procedural and outcome transparency in the rule-making and auditing processes of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) and Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). We highlight key differences in how transparency relates to accountability and legitimacy of the programs. The MSC uses transparency and stakeholder consultation instrumentally, whereas the FSC treats them as ends unto themselves. This underscores the importance of considering transparency alongside other governance aspects, such as who the eligible stakeholders are and who gets decision-making power.

This article explores the influence of scientific knowledge in rule-making processes to enhance environmental protection in Swedish and Norwegian forestry. It examines the mapping and protection of small reserves; the development of plans for protection of large reserves; and rule-setting in voluntary forest certification schemes. The analysis shows that Sweden has enacted more stringent environmental protection policies on all measures examined. Whereas variation in the state of knowledge about environmental protection needs does not explain these differences, variation in the access to the science-policy dialogue and in the distribution of costs and benefits in the forestry sector does help explain the differences in the stringency of Norwegian and Swedish forest policy. I conclude that the influence of knowledge depends on the process by which it is created. Although scientific information usually has little influence when strong economic counter-forces are involved in the decision-making process, this problem can be ameliorated by facilitating processes of coproduction of knowledge among scientific experts, practitioners, and decision-makers.

While most scholars agree that NGOs make a difference in global environmental politics, there has been little systematic work that looks at the actual influence NGOs have on policy outcomes. This paper looks to shed some new light on the question of NGO effectiveness through an evaluation of the role played by NGOs in climate negotiations. We begin with a brief sketch of different kinds of green NGOs, along with a review of the sorts of strategies and resources they employ. Next, we look to gauge the influence that NGOs have had on recent rounds of negotiations to do with compliance, flexibility mechanisms, and appropriate crediting rules for sinks. Our analysis is based on detailed interviews with members of some of the most prominent environmental NGOs involved in climate work. Finally, we suggest, based on our findings, some means by which NGOs may look to extend their influence in the development of the climate regime. Our analysis points to the crucial need for further “insider” capacity—that is, NGOs are likely to have the most far-reaching influence on future climate negotiations if they foster ways to work closely and collaboratively with key negotiators and governments.

This article investigates whether forest certification (eco-labeling) is likely to rectify certain omissions in the current global forest regime. Following an examination of the achievements and shortcomings of the forest regime to date, I argue that gaps could be filled by including a broad range of stakeholders in certification standards development; promoting strong environmental and social performance standards in forestry; providing effective control mechanisms; securing producer participation; and penetrating markets. Although the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was considered initially to have the greatest potential to fill these gaps, the emergence and widespread proliferation of industry-dominated schemes have marginalized the FSC in many countries. The study shows that while forest certification would probably promote more sustainable forestry in the temperate and boreal zones than it would in the tropical zone, the ability of this tool to actually do so remains to be seen.