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Mathieu Blondeel
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Publisher: Journals Gateway
Global Environmental Politics (2019) 19 (4): 63–84.
Published: 01 November 2019
Abstract
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Why do some international norms succeed, whereas others fail? We argue that norm campaigns are more likely to succeed when the actions they prescribe are framed as a solution to salient problems that potential adopters face, even if different from the problem that originally motivated norm entrepreneurs. For instance, the campaign to reduce environmentally harmful fossil fuel subsidies has been more effective when linked to fiscal stability, a common problem that policy makers face. Problem linkages can thus bolster the attractiveness of a proposed new norm and broaden the coalition of actors that support the norm. We probe the plausibility of this argument by studying two campaigns that aim to shift patterns of finance for fossil fuel production and consumption: subsidy reform and divestment. Subsidy reform encourages governments to reduce subsidies for products like gasoline; divestment encourages investors to sell or avoid equity stocks from fossil fuel industries. We look at the variation in the impact of these two campaigns over time and argue that they have achieved institutional acceptance and implementation chiefly when their advocates have been able to link environmental goals with other goals, usually economic ones.