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Sebastian Oberthür
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Global Environmental Politics (2013) 13 (3): 100–118.
Published: 01 August 2013
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This article explores the impact of the Nagoya Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity on the complex of international institutions involved in the governance of access to, and benefit sharing from, genetic resources. Conceptually, we develop an interplay management perspective that focuses on the governance of institutional complexes and their internal division of labor by means of collective decisions within the elemental institutions. We seek to understand interplay management with reference to constellations of actors' interests and power, as well as institutional factors (commitments, inter-institutional consistency). We argue that the strength of status-quo forces led to the Nagoya Protocol consolidating and clarifying (rather than changing) the existing interinstitutional division of labor. The analysis demonstrates the difficulty of changing existing inter-institutional balances, yet suggests that a consolidation of an inter-institutional equilibrium can induce important new, pathdependent developments in fragmented governance architectures.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Global Environmental Politics (2006) 6 (2): 1–31.
Published: 01 May 2006
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The competitive quest of the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO for authority to regulate international trade in genetically modified organisms (GMOs) exemplifies a typical interaction between international institutions with diverging objectives. This article first develops a conceptual framework for the analysis of institutional interaction that emphasizes disaggregation of complex interaction situations into separate cases of clearly directed inter-institutional influence. These cases can follow different causal mechanisms. Second, applying this framework to the interaction between the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO reveals that existing commitments have driven parties toward a step-wise delimitation of the institutions' jurisdictions. Although the WTO acquired a firstmover advantage by structuring the regulatory field, the Cartagena Protocol showed surprising strength in exploiting the remaining room for maneuver. The structure of international governance thus steers institutions with differing objectives toward a jurisdictional balance that, while reflecting existing power relations, limits the potential for conflict and frames available policy choices.