Why do some international norms succeed, whereas others fail? We argue that norm campaigns are more likely to succeed when the actions they prescribe are framed as a solution to salient problems that potential adopters face, even if different from the problem that originally motivated norm entrepreneurs. For instance, the campaign to reduce environmentally harmful fossil fuel subsidies has been more effective when linked to fiscal stability, a common problem that policy makers face. Problem linkages can thus bolster the attractiveness of a proposed new norm and broaden the coalition of actors that support the norm. We probe the plausibility of this argument by studying two campaigns that aim to shift patterns of finance for fossil fuel production and consumption: subsidy reform and divestment. Subsidy reform encourages governments to reduce subsidies for products like gasoline; divestment encourages investors to sell or avoid equity stocks from fossil fuel industries. We look at the variation in the impact of these two campaigns over time and argue that they have achieved institutional acceptance and implementation chiefly when their advocates have been able to link environmental goals with other goals, usually economic ones.

In 2009, a group of member countries of the International Energy Agency (IEA) spearheaded the creation of a new international organization, the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), despite the fact that the IEA had been working on renewables for decades. Why would states create an overlapping organization, thus advancing the overall degree of fragmentation? Drawing on the work of Mansfield and Moravcsik, this article provides an explanation based on domestic preferences and institutional capture. Viewed thus, IRENA was part of an institutional hedging strategy instigated by domestic actors in Germany and allied states to counter the IEA's alleged normative bias toward the fossil and nuclear energy industries with a wider set of alternative energy options. The article suggests that, depending on the domestic preferences of a set of states capable to innovate, the transaction costs associated with institutional reform may surmount those of institutional creation.