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Thomas Gehring
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Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Global Environmental Politics (2008) 8 (2): 123–148.
Published: 01 May 2008
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The legitimacy and effectiveness of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) depends on problem-adequate listing decisions. Decisions are frequently highly controversial, because they commit the member states to imposing trade restrictions on listed species. We examine whether—and how—CITES' impressive institutional apparatus deprives the member states of their bargaining power and empowers actors who can make reasoned arguments on the merits of a listing decision. For this purpose, we demonstrate theoretically that appropriately designed decision-making procedures can diminish stake-holders' opportunities for exploiting their bargaining power and provide room for reason-based deliberation. Subsequently, we explore member states' and other stakeholders' incentives, created by the CITES listing procedure, for refraining from bargaining and accepting scientifically sound decisions. Finally, we examine three recent controversial listing decisions as examples of the actual operation of the listing procedure.
Journal Articles
Publisher: Journals Gateway
Global Environmental Politics (2006) 6 (2): 1–31.
Published: 01 May 2006
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The competitive quest of the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO for authority to regulate international trade in genetically modified organisms (GMOs) exemplifies a typical interaction between international institutions with diverging objectives. This article first develops a conceptual framework for the analysis of institutional interaction that emphasizes disaggregation of complex interaction situations into separate cases of clearly directed inter-institutional influence. These cases can follow different causal mechanisms. Second, applying this framework to the interaction between the Cartagena Protocol and the WTO reveals that existing commitments have driven parties toward a step-wise delimitation of the institutions' jurisdictions. Although the WTO acquired a firstmover advantage by structuring the regulatory field, the Cartagena Protocol showed surprising strength in exploiting the remaining room for maneuver. The structure of international governance thus steers institutions with differing objectives toward a jurisdictional balance that, while reflecting existing power relations, limits the potential for conflict and frames available policy choices.