In the late 1980s/early 1990s the concept of leadership was introduced in the study of international regimes to describe the role negotiating parties some-times would take on to craft agreement. The concept seemed to grasp an essential feature of multilateral cooperative efforts: that parties can be differentiated by the extent to which they are capable of, and willing to, take on a particular responsibility of guiding other parties in directions that could lead to joint solutions. The concept of leadership has only to a small extent been subjected to critical analytical and conceptual discussion. In this article we revisit the concept by asking: What are the characteristic features of leadership in international negotiations? Our analysis shows that current conceptualizations of leadership are associated with significant ambiguities that make it hard to distinguish leadership behavior from other types of bargaining behavior and that these problems are reproduced in empirical identifications of this mode of bargaining behavior.

The United States, the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases, is not going to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in the foreseeable future. Yet, a number of countries have decided to stay on the Kyoto track. Four main explanations for this apparent puzzle are considered. The first is that remaining Annex I countries still expect the Kyoto Protocol to reduce global warming sufficiently to outweigh the economic costs of implementation. The second is that the parties, by implementing the treaty, hope to induce non-parties to follow suit at some later stage. A third hypothesis is that EU climate institutions have generated a momentum that has made a change of course difficult. Finally, Kyoto's persistence may be linked to the European Union's desire to stand forth as an international leader in the field of climate politics. We conclude that the first two explanations have little explanatory power, but find the latter two more promising.

The role of nonstate actors in international environmental politics has been given increased scholarly attention during the last decade. While most analyses are focused on direct nonstate influence at the international level, one main objective of this article is to develop a multi-level approach that allows analysis of nonstate influence channeled via the domestic decision making level. The point of departure for the analysis is the International Whaling Commission (IWC) during the period from 1970 to 1990, with a particular focus on the competition for influence characterizing the relationship between the scientific community and the environmental and animal rights movement. The analysis shows that domestic channels of influence may be equally, or even more important than channels of influence linked to the international decision making level. In the case of the IWC, for instance, the environmental and animal rights movement succeeded in mobilizing domestic public support, particularly in the United States, and had a key ally in the US government, Congress and Administration. The domestic role of this nonstate actor was of key importance to its success in influencing the development of the international whaling regime. The analysis shows, therefore, that examining the role of the domestic channel is integral to understanding nonstate influence on international policy-making, and particularly how some nonstate actors acquire influence at the expense of others.

The primary focus of most academic climate policy studies has been the robustness of climate science and the development of international negotiations and institutions, in which states, and sometimes societies, have been pinpointed as the key players. Systematic comparative studies of multinational and even global non-governmental actors have been in short supply. This research lacuna is particularly glaring since the position of a major non-state actor—the oil industry—may be crucial to the viability of the climate regime. This analysis shows that there are striking differences in the ways European-based and US-based oil companies have responded to the climate issue—here represented by the Royal Dutch/Shell Group and Exxon Mobil—and that one major source of explanation for this difference is found in the national political contexts of the companies' home-base countries. The importance of political context implies that the conditions for changing oil companies' climate strategies are likely to be located in the political context rather than in the companies themselves.