In “To Arm or to Ally?” Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper present an elegant and powerful theory that explains conditions under which a great power (in their case, the United States) offers a client state arms, an alliance commitment, or both.1 Their article does not give due attention, however, to what motivates a patron to provide security assistance to clients in the first place—especially its desire to influence its clients to obtain concessions in military, political, economic, and other policies.2 Below I explain how Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper's conceptualization of key variables inadvertently plays down the role of influence-seeking in U.S. policy.
First, Yarhi-Milo, Lanoszka, and Cooper's conceptualization of arms transfers does not reflect the wide range of ways in which a patron can support a client and the significant differences among the types of arms transfers with regard to buying influence. Their conceptualization of arms...