Summaries Free

9–50

Do Autocrats Need a Foreign Enemy? Evidence from Fortress Russia

Henry E. Hale, George Washington University, and Adam C. Lenton, Wake Forest University

Conventional thinking suggests that autocrats need enemies and thus have incentives to create them. Russia's Vladimir Putin is often thought to reap domestic legitimacy from belligerence. We examine multiple public opinion datasets collected in Russia that span Putin's presidency to confirm that he gains popularity from a sense of Western threat. But findings indicate that until 2021, these gains came primarily from a carefully cultivated domestic reputation for responding to threats with moderation instead of bellicosity. Our survey experiment further suggests that Putin wins as much support when he is prudent and cooperative as when he is hostile and aggressive. These findings add to evidence that Russia's full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine was not a war of domestic political necessity. They also help explain why Putin felt that he had to promote the invasion at home as a careful, limited, defensive act rather than something glorious for which the Russian population should fully mobilize. Even the most aggressive autocrats may still cater to public preferences for moderate foreign policy.

51–90

The Iron Dice: Fatalism and War

Dominic Tierney, Swarthmore College

Leaders in international relations often exhibit fatalism, or the belief that events are guided by forces beyond their control. In some cases, fatalism may reflect reality, or be rhetoric to boost support. But there is also an important psychological explanation: fatalism can help leaders avoid responsibility for costly outcomes and protect their self-image. Fatalism is more likely: (1) in regard to bad outcomes versus good outcomes; (2) when war is seen as imminent versus far-off; and (3) in nondemocratic regimes versus democratic regimes. The concept of fatalism is central to philosophy, religion, medicine, sociology, and psychology, but has been neglected by scholars in international relations. Fatalism may be an important cause of war, especially when combined with a perceived window of opportunity. This research contributes to democratic peace theory by helping explain the lack of war between representative regimes. If elected leaders are less prone to extreme fatalism about war, democracies may have more room to maneuver in a crisis. I use case studies of the origins of World War I and World War II to probe the argument.

91–132

Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don’t: The Assurance Dilemma in International Coercion

Reid B. C. Pauly, Brown University

Why do some coercive demands succeed but others fail? A dominant paradigm explains coercive outcomes by pointing to the credibility and severity of threats. The concept of coercive assurance is an understudied type of commitment problem in the coercion literature. It suggests that a coercer must assure its target that its threats are conditional on the target's behavior. Many scholars overlook coercive assurance, in part because they assume it is automatic. But assurance is a crucial component of any coercive process. Even highly credible and severe threats can fail when the coercer's assurance is not credible. A novel theory, the assurance dilemma, helps to answer the following questions: Why do targets of coercion fear unconditional pain? Why do coercers punish after receiving compliance? What is the relationship between threats and assurances in coercion? The actions that a coercer can take to bolster the credibility of a threat undermine the credibility of its assurance that it will not punish the target. Targets fear that punishment may be unavoidable and thus look for assuring signals before ceding to the coercer's demands. The case of coercive bargaining over the Iranian nuclear program demonstrates the logic and effectiveness of the use of assurance.

133–170

Stabilizing Civil Wars without Peacekeeping: Evidence from South Asia

Basil Bastaki, Yale University, Paul Staniland, University of Chicago, and Bryan Popoola

Peacekeeping is helpful in resolving civil wars, but there is little chance of peacekeeping operations or other international peace-building interventions for many conflicts. How do internal wars stabilize in the absence of meaningful international involvement? Two key factors, the government's political space for bargaining and the relative power of armed groups, help to explain when it is possible to reach either stable cooperation between states and armed groups or negotiated settlements. We analyze three conflict trajectories—“long-term limited cooperation” arrangements, state incorporation or disarmament, and ongoing conflict—to show that the paths to stabilization are often ethically fraught and empirically complicated but exist even when international involvement is off the table. We use quantitative and qualitative data to study the relationships between armed groups and governments in much of post-colonial South Asia, including during periods of little or no violence. Understanding these trajectories provides policymakers, analysts, and scholars with useful tools for identifying policy options and political trade-offs as they seek to reduce the human costs of war.