Peacekeeping is helpful in resolving civil wars, but there is little chance of peacekeeping operations or other international peace-building interventions for many conflicts. How do internal wars stabilize in the absence of meaningful international involvement? Two key factors, the government's political space for bargaining and the relative power of armed groups, help to explain when it is possible to reach either stable cooperation between states and armed groups or negotiated settlements. We analyze three conflict trajectories—“long-term limited cooperation” arrangements, state incorporation or disarmament, and ongoing conflict—to show that the paths to stabilization are often ethically fraught and empirically complicated but exist even when international involvement is off the table. We use quantitative and qualitative data to study the relationships between armed groups and governments in much of post-colonial South Asia, including during periods of little or no violence. Understanding these trajectories provides policymakers, analysts, and scholars with useful tools for identifying policy options and political trade-offs as they seek to reduce the human costs of war.